JAWS and the 2019 Hall of Fame Ballot: Omar Vizquel

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2019 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2018 election at SI.com, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

In the eyes of many, Omar Vizquel was the successor to Ozzie Smith when it came to dazzling defense. Thanks to the increased prevalence of highlight footage on the internet and cable shows such as ESPN’s SportsCenter and Baseball Tonight, the diminutive Venezuelan shortstop’s barehanded grabs, diving stops, and daily acrobatics were seen by far more viewers than Smith’s ever were. Vizquel made up for having a less-than-prototypically-strong arm with incredibly soft hands and a knack for advantageous positioning. Such was the perception of his prowess at the position that he took home 11 Gold Gloves, more than any shortstop this side of Smith, who won 13.

Vizquel’s offense was at least superficially akin to Smith’s: he was a singles-slapping switch-hitter in lineups full of bigger bats, and at his best, a capable table-setter who got on base often enough to score 80, 90, or even 100 runs in some seasons. His ability to move the runner over with a sacrifice bunt or a productive out delighted purists, and he could steal a base, too. While he lacked power, he dealt in volume, piling up more hits (2,877) than all but four shortstops, each in the Hall of Fame or heading there: Derek Jeter (3,465), Honus Wagner (3,420), Cal Ripken (3,184), and Robin Yount (3,142). During his 11-year run in Cleveland (1994-2004), he helped the Indians to six playoff appearances and two pennants.

To some, that makes Vizquel an easy call for the Hall of Fame. In his ballot debut last year, he received 37.0% of the vote, a level of support that doesn’t indicate a fast track to Cooperstown but more often than not suggests eventual enshrinement. These eyes aren’t so sure it’s merited. By WAR and JAWS, Vizquel’s case isn’t nearly as strong as it is on the traditional merits. His candidacy has already become a point of friction between old-school and new-school thinkers, and only promises to be more of the same, not unlike that of Jack Morris.

2019 BBWAA Candidate: Omar Vizquel
Player Career WAR Peak WAR JAWS
Omar Vizquel 45.6 26.8 36.2
Avg. HOF SS 67.0 42.9 55.0
2,877 80 .272/.336/.352 82
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference

Born to an electrical company technician and a kindergarten teacher in Caracas, Venezuela on April 24, 1967, Vizquel grew up in the poor neighborhood of Santa Eduvigis, where baseball was a constant. As a youngster, he honed his quick reflexes and extraordinary hands by carrying around a rubber ball or tennis ball, which he would constantly bounce off of nearby objects and snare barehanded. Those skills were put to great use as he played on the rocky sandlots of his hometown, where preventing ground balls from hitting him in the face was a necessary survival tactic.

When Vizquel cut his teeth on those sandlots, the presence of his countrymen in the major leagues had begun to ramp up significantly. The first Venezuela-born major leaguer was pitcher Alex Carrasquel, who spent 1939-1945 with the Senators, with a brief cameo with the White Sox in 1949. The third was his nephew, Chico Carrasquel, who spent 1950-1959 in the majors, including six years with the White Sox alongside Nellie Fox as one the era’s great double play combos. The younger Carrasquel became the first Venezuela-born All-Star in 1951, and made three more Summer Classic squads before being traded to the Indians for Larry Doby in October 1955. The White Sox replaced him with another Venezuelan, Luis Aparicio, who immediately validated the deal by winning AL Rookie of the Year and leading the league in stolen bases for the first of nine straight years. He won nine Gold Gloves, and was eventually elected to the Hall of Fame. Through 1966, nine Venezuela-born players had reached the majors, but in 1967 alone, the year of Vizquel’s birth, five more did, the start of a steady stream that continues to this day.

The Mariners signed Vizquel in 1984, just short of his 17th birthday, for a mere $2,000 bonus and brought him to the US, where he lived with three other young Venezuelans. His parents had forced him to take a three-month crash course in English to prepare for his career, which began in Butte, Montana, with Seattle’s Pioneer League affiliate. He climbed the organizational ladder methodically: Low-A Bellingham in 1985, A-Level Wausau in 1986 (the year he began switch-hitting), A-Level Salinas in 1987, Double-A Vermont and Triple-A Calgary in 1988, and finally the Mariners on Opening Day 1989, filling in for incumbent Rey Quinones, who had sprained his ankle in spring training.

The 22-year-old Vizquel wasn’t an overnight success. He made a throwing error in his first game, added another error in his third, and was sent back to Calgary after going just 3-for-24. Quinones returned from the disabled list and reclaimed his job, but was traded to the Pirates on April 21. Vizquel returned for the rest of the season, and while he was above-average defensively (+6 runs via Total Zone), he hit just .220/.273/.261 in 431 plate appearances for an anemic 50 OPS+, the majors’ worst mark for any hitter with at least 400 PA that year.

After Vizqel sprained the medial collateral ligament of his left knee the following spring, the team left him at Calgary through his rehab and into early July. He went 2-for-3 with a homer in his July 5 return, and while he still hit just .247/.295/.298 (67 OPS+) in 285 PA, he was 13 runs above average afield en route to 1.5 WAR. His bat remained similarly sluggish in 1991, but in a lineup where Ken Griffey Jr., Edgar Martinez, and Jay Buhner were developing into forces to be reckoned with, the Mariners could afford to carry Vizquel. His defense (+14 runs) played a part in helping Seattle to its first above-.500 season at 83-79.

The team regressed to 64-98 the following year, even as Vizquel hit a relatively robust .294/.340/.352 en route to a 95 OPS+ and 3.5 WAR, but he couldn’t maintain that gain, backsliding to .255/.319/.298 (67 OPS+) in 1993. He did claim his first Gold Glove with defense that was 16 runs above average — a mark that would stand as his career best — no doubt bolstered by the notoriety he gained for sealing Chris Bosio’s April 22 no-hitter against the Red Sox when he barehanded a chopper behind the mound, on the second-base side, and beat batter Earnest Riles by two steps at first base.

In 1993, the Mariners drafted Alex Rodriguez with the number one overall pick. Though they weren’t teammates yet, the contrast between the light-hitting 5’9″ Vizquel and the powerful 6’3″ Rodriguez couldn’t have been more striking. Big men had played shortstop before, but not until 6’4″ Cal Ripken came along in the early 1980s had one flourished as a two-way threat. With Rodriguez waiting in the wings, the Mariners traded Vizquel to the Indians for stopgap shortstop Felix Fermin and DH Reggie Jefferson in December 1993.

It was an astute move by Cleveland general manager John Hart. The Indians had cracked .500 just once in the previous 12 seasons, but Hart was assembling a powerhouse lineup featuring youngsters Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, and Carlos Baerga, as well as prime Albert Belle and Kenny Lofton. Though he missed seven weeks early in the season due to a right knee sprain, Vizquel solidified the defense, and the lineup could more than support his limp bat. The team went 64-47 during the strike-shortened season, and the following year went an MLB-best 100-44 en route to their first pennant since 1954. Vizquel hit just .266/.333/.351 (71 OPS+), and snagged his third Gold Glove, though for what it’s worth, Total Zone valued his defense that year at just one run above average, part of a four-year stretch (1994-98) in which he was barely in the black. Still, he gained no small amount of attention for his fieldwork in the postseason, with Sports Illustrated’s Tim Kurkjian calling him “the Indians’ most fascinating player to watch” in a feature the following spring.

The Indians lost the 1995 World Series to the Braves, but Hart’s foresight in signing Ramirez, Thome, Baerga, Lofton, Charles Nagy, and Sandy Alomar Jr. to long-term extensions — many of which bought out players’ arbitration years — enabled the small-market team to afford its top players, creating a core that would win six division titles and two pennants from 1995-2001. That included Vizquel, who was heading into his age-29 season; Hart signed him to a five-year, $15.35 million extension that December.

Working with hitting coach Charlie Manuel (who would take over from Mike Hargrove as manager in 2000), Vizquel matured considerably as a hitter. From his debut through 1995, he batted .256/.315/.314 for a 72 OPS+ and a combined -106 batting runs (the offensive component of WAR). From 1996-2004, he hit a composite .286/.356/.385 for a 93 OPS+ and was just 29 runs below average at the plate, with four seasons either at zero or in the black. In 1999, he set across-the-board career bests with a .333/.397/.436 line, a 111 OPS+, 42 steals and 6.0 WAR.

Vizquel collected Gold Gloves annually from 1996-2001 — the last three while paired with Roberto Alomar for one of the most visually arresting double play combos in recent memory — though the advanced metrics suggest his defense wasn’t so exceptional. Here it’s worth yet another reminder that single-season defensive data captures a fair bit of noise along with the signal, and it’s better to consider in the context of multiple seasons. By Total Zone, Vizquel’s defensive value ranged from +14 to -8 runs relative to average in this six-year span. His 16 runs above average for the period ranked just 15th in the majors, far behind Rey Sanchez (+89) and Rey Ordonez (+62), the top two at the position.

Despite repeatedly winning their division, the Indians couldn’t nab that elusive championship. They came agonizingly close in 1997, despite just an 86-75 record. After defeating the defending champion Yankees in the Division Series and the Orioles in the ALCS, they took a 2-1 lead into the ninth inning of Game 7 of the World Series against the Marlins. Alas, closer Jose Mesa surrendered the tying run in the bottom of the ninth on two singles and a sacrifice fly, and an error by second baseman Tony Fernandez on Craig Counsell’s grounder in the 11th inning led to the series-winning run.

The sting of that loss lingered, and became part of the biggest controversy of Vizquel’s career. Though he had been close friends with Mesa to that point, Vizquel’s subsequent actions towards his teammate were anything but friendly. First he irritated Mesa by cartwheeling across home plate after homering off him during an intrasquad game in 1998. In exchange, after the pitcher was traded to the Giants in midseason and signed with the Mariners the following winter, he brushed his old pal back during a 1999 encounter. Things came to a head when, on the opening page of his 2002 autobiography, Omar! My Life On and Off the Field, Vizquel wrote of Game 7:

“The eyes of the world were focused on every move we made. Unfortunately, Jose’s own eyes were vacant. Completely empty. Nobody home. You could almost see right through him. Not long after I looked into his vacant eyes, he blew the save and the Marlins tied the game.”

Understandably livid, Mesa, by that point a member of the Phillies, plunked Vizquel during a 2002 interleague game and was fined $500. In the spring of 2003, he told reporter Randy Miller, “I will not forgive him. Even my little boy (Jose Jr.) told me to get him. If I face him 10 more times, I’ll hit him 10 times. I want to kill him.”

Mesa hit Vizquel in their next encounter in 2006 and was suspended for four games, after which they squared off three more times without incident. They never did mend fences, and the shortstop somehow remained puzzled even while saying in 2014, “It was kind of sad that I never got to tell him that I didn’t really mean anything bad about what I said in the book.”

While Vizquel generally got high marks for his comportment throughout his career, his ongoing feud with Mesa was a low point. Game Sevens are inevitably filled with heroes and goats, but it takes some chutzpah to humiliate a teammate — and a close friend — on the opening page of a memoir. Yeesh.

In February 2001, Vizquel signed a two-year, $15 million extension with the Indians, one that also raised his salary for that season from $3 million to $4.5 million, and included a $5 million mutual option for 2005. His streak of Gold Gloves ended in 2002, but he set a career high with 14 homers and earned All-Star honors for the third time; the first two had been in 1998 and 1999, no small achievement with Rodriguez, Jeter, and Nomar Garciaparra in their collective heyday as “the trinity.” A pair of surgeries to repair the meniscus of his right knee — he tore it again while rehabbing — limited Vizquel to 64 games in 2003, and, after he failed a physical, prevented a trade of the 36-year-old shortstop back to the Mariners that winter.

At 37, Vizquel enjoyed a strong rebound with the Indians (.291/.353/.388, 99 OPS+) en route to 4.0 WAR, the second-highest total of his career. While the Indians declined their end of the mutual option, Vizquel parlayed that performance into a three-year, $12.25 million deal with the Giants. He won Gold Gloves in the first two of those years, albeit with Defensive Runs Saved totals of just +1 and +7, and WAR totals of 1.5 and 2.9. His bat fell off the table in 2007, his age-40 season (.246/.305/.316, 61 OPS+), and despite a career high +16 DRS, his total value was just 0.7 WAR.

While the Giants re-signed Vizquel, his performance slipped even further in 2008. That year began with a seven-week stint on the DL for surgery to repair the meniscus in his left knee, as well as a bone bruise, and finished with career worsts in OPS+ (45 OPS+) and WAR (-0.5). One highlight: on May 25, 2008, he surpassed Aparicio for the most games played at shortstop with 2,584.

Graduating into a utility role that included ample time at second and third as well as short, Vizquel spent four more years in the majors with the Rangers (2009), White Sox (2010-2011, while wearing Aparicio’s number 11, un-retired with his blessing) and Blue Jays (2012), the last of those coming at age 45. He hit a combined .262/.312/.320 for a 70 OPS+ in 931 PA in those four years, and only in 2010 did he play regularly. In June 2012, he announced that he would retire at season’s end, and on October 4 in Toronto, with former teammate Baerga and fellow Venezuelans Aparicio and Andres Gallaraga on hand, he threw out the ceremonial first pitch and collected a single in the final at-bat of his 24-year career.

Vizquel’s longevity, which allowed him to play a record 2,709 games at shortstop, collect 2,877 hits (fifth at the position) and win 11 Gold Gloves (more than all but Smith), is perhaps the best point in his favor when it comes to the Hall of Fame. But beyond those standings, his resumé is a mixture of good news/bad news. Vizquel helped his teams reach the playoffs six times and the World Series twice, though he was less productive at the plate there (.250/.327/.316 in 264 PA) than in the regular season. Thanks in large part to the presence of the shortstop trinity, he made just three All-Star teams, a comparatively low total for a modern Hall of Famer, and the entirety of his MVP consideration consisted of a 16th-place finish in 1999. Still, his Hall of Fame Monitor score of 120, while not indicating a slam dunk, is on the side of “more likely than not.”

Then there’s the defense. Vizquel’s flair afield produced countless highlight loops that received considerable attention thanks to the Internet and cable TV, not to mention the routine exposure he got in the expanded postseason format from 1995 through 2001. Observers such as Kurkjian weren’t shy about letting the superlatives flow, and Vizquel was a fan favorite, albeit not enough of one to be voted to start a single All-Star Game. Having written more than once on the pros and cons of his case, I can attest that his defenders will come out of the woodwork to drop a good word on his behalf (along with a few unprintable ones on mine).

Baseball-Reference credits Vizquel as being 129 runs above average for his career defensively, via a combination of Total Zone (+80 runs through 2002) and Defensive Runs Saved (+49 from 2003-12). Ultimate Zone Rating credits him as 47 runs above average as well for the latter period. The combined total doesn’t blow the doors off the shrine, ranking 18th all-time among shortstops, better than 12 of the 20 Hall of Famers at the position.

Should it be better? Advanced fielding statistics aren’t easy to penetrate, but feel around the margins of the basic stats and you can see why the metrics don’t put Vizquel on the same level as Smith. Vizquel holds the edge in fielding percentage, .985 to .978, but both were 12 points higher than their respective leagues’ shortstops during the course of their careers. From there, the comparison becomes more lopsided in the Wizard’s favor.

While Vizquel is third all-time in assists for a shortstop (7,676), it’s largely a product of his longevity. He never led his league in the category, and while he ranked in the top five eight times, six of those were fourth or fifth. Smith, the all-time leader among shortstops with 8,375 assists — in 1,175 fewer innings, roughly 130 games — led his league eight times, and was second in four others. The story is similar concerning double plays: Vizquel, the all-time leader at 1,734, led his league once and was third three times; Smith, second all-time with 1,590 double plays, led his league five times and was second six times.

True, Smith played in an era with more balls in play and fewer strikeouts. According to B-Ref, during his time in the field, 83% of his pitching staff’s plate appearances ended with a ball in play; for Vizquel’s teams, the rate was 77%. So there would have been fewer chances for him to make a play. Likewise, his staffs faced a smaller proportion of right-handed batters, those whose natural pull tendency would be to the left side of the infield: 58%, in line with the league average, where Smith’s teams faced 61% righties, two points above average.

Calculations such as those go into the Total Zone defensive metrics, and while it’s an oversimplification to say that the difference between Smith and Vizquel can be boiled down to range factor (putouts plus assists per nine innings) relative to their league averages, such a comparison gets the point across. The Wizard averaged 5.22 plays per nine, while the league’s shortstops averaged 4.78, a difference of 0.44 per nine. Vizquel averaged 4.62 per nine for his time at shortstop, while the league averaged 4.61 — a difference of just 0.01. Aparicio and Rabbit Maranville, both enshrined for the perception that their glove work offset similarly light sticks, have larger gaps as well; the former was 0.16 above his leagues, the latter 0.28 above.

By the advanced stats, Smith has an edge of 111 runs over Vizquel on the defensive side, and that’s before considering offense. Vizquel’s .272/.336/.352 slash line closely resembles Smith’s .262/.337/.328, but Omar played in a much higher-scoring era than Ozzie, so his OPS+ is just 82 compared to Smith’s 87. Over the course of his 12,013 plate appearances, Vizquel was 244 runs below average with the bat, the 13th-lowest total among players who spent the majority of their careers at shortstop. That’s 16 runs worse than Maranville, the worst among current Hall of Fame shortstops, and 127 runs worse than Smith. What’s more, where Smith made up 79 runs on the bases (steals as well as advancement on hits and outs) and 23 more on avoiding double plays, Vizquel — who stole 404 bases, albeit with just a 70.8% success rate — was one run below average in the former and nine above in the latter. His net offense was -236 runs to Smith’s -15. In other words, despite their similar slash lines, the gap between the two players on the offensive side was twice as large as on the defensive side.

For all of his Gold Gloves and perceived defensive value, Vizquel’s offense was so deficient that he ranked in the top 10 in his league in WAR just once, with a career-high 6.0 in 1999. Smith made his leagues’ top 10 six times, Maranville five times, and Aparicio twice. Vizquel’s career total of 45.3 WAR ranks 28th among shortstops, but is higher than just four of those enshrined, namely the the BBWAA-elected Maranville, the Veterans Committee-elected Travis Jackson (who ranked in the top 10 six times), and Phil Rizzuto (who ranked in the top 10 three times), and the Old Timers Committee-elected Hughie Jennings (who led the NL in WAR four times). Vizquel’s total is a hefty 21.4 WAR below the standard at the position. Within 2.0 WAR on either side are Miguel Tejada, Art Fletcher, Jimmy Rollins, Vern Stephens, Tony Fernandez, Roger Peckinpaugh, Garciaparra, and Jackson, the only Hall of Famer of the bunch, largely thanks to some Veterans Committee cronyism.

The news is even harsher when it comes to Vizquel’s peak score of 26.6, which ranks 61st of the 16 players within two wins on either side. (Notables include Cecil Travis, Marty Marion, and Edgar Renteria, none Hall of Famers.) Thus Vizquel’s 36.2 JAWS ranks 42nd, just ahead of popular Era Committee candidates such as Davey Concepcion and Maury Wills but lower than all of the enshrined shortstops, with Maranville (42.8/30.4/36.6) bringing up the rear. Reigning glove whiz Andrelton Simmons, who just turned 29 and has six full seasons plus a 49-game rookie campaign under his belt, has a 34.9/34.9/34.9 career/peak/JAWS and will pass Vizquel in 2019.

The player whom Vizquel most closely resembles from a Hall of Fame case standpoint, Mark Belanger, is two spots ahead at 40.9/31.9/36.4. “The Blade” was utterly dreadful as a hitter (.228/.300/.280, 68 OPS+), with a net offense that was 191 runs below average, though he did have a trio of seasons with an OPS+ ranging from 95 to 100. An eight-time Gold Glove winner whose range factor exceeded the league average by 0.23 (5.16 vs. 4.93), he’s the all-time leader in fielding runs (+241, two more than Smith). Playing next to the best defensive third baseman of all time, Brooks Robinson, he started for six Orioles division winners and four pennant winners from 1969-1979 (his career spanned from 1965-1982). He received 3.7% of the vote in 1988, and hasn’t been considered since.

All of which is to say that Vizquel receiving 10 times that level of support in his ballot debut is rather surprising, as neither WAR nor JAWS can support his case. His advantage in greater exposure, particularly in an age of increased specialization, explains a lot, but it’s still maddening that a much better all-around player such as Scott Rolen (third in both Gold Gloves and fielding runs at third base, 10th in JAWS, but just 10.2% in his debut last year) is so under-supported.

Since the BBWAA returned to annual voting in 1966, 10 players — excluding those currently on the ballot — have received less than 37.0% in their ballot debuts but were eventually elected by the writers:

Hall of Famers with Least BBWAA Support in 1st Year
Player Vote % Year Elected
Rich Gossage 33.3% 2000 2008
Eddie Mathews 32.3% 1974 1978
Jim Rice 29.8% 1995 2009
Early Wynn 27.9% 1969 1972
Luis Aparicio 27.8% 1979 1984
Tim Raines 24.3% 2008 2017
Bruce Sutter 23.9% 1994 2006
Billy Williams 23.4% 1982 1987
Don Drysdale 21.0% 1975 1984
Bert Blyleven 17.5% 1998 2011
Duke Snider 17.0% 1970 1980
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference
Since 1966, including only candidates elected by BBWAA.

Meanwhile, aside from currently eligible candidates, just two players in that same span have received greater initial support and not been elected by the writers, namely Lee Smith (42.3% in 2003) and Steve Garvey (41.6% in 1993). The former, eligible on this year’s Today’s Game Era Committee panel, could be elected this weekend.

Thus, voting history suggests that it’s more likely than not Vizquel is elected eventually, regardless of whether he has the imprimatur of WAR, JAWS, and any math more complicated than his career totals. As the elections of Rice and Morris — neither of whom were anywhere close to the standards in WAR and JAWS — have shown, the conversation surrounding his candidacy between the statheads and the eye-test crowd is likely to be a shrill and polarizing one, with emotions running high. To these eyes, Vizquel was a fine ballplayer, but one whose road should stop short of Cooperstown. Those who feel similarly had best take a deep breath, however, because this could get ugly.

Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on Twitter @jay_jaffe... and BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.

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5 years ago

Advanced defensive metrics aside, Vizquel played more games at SS than anyone in history, and had the highest fielding percentage of all-time at the position. While I hate to cite fielding percentage, it’s a more objective measure than advanced metrics and probably tells you something over the course of the 23,000 innings he played at SS. Vizquel was able to handle SS for nearly his entire career and made all the plays at a better rate than anyone. I think that says a lot about his defense.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

“fielding percentage, it’s a more objective measure ”

Oh hell no. FP is entirely dependent upon the decision of the official scorer at each game. While we usually only see debates on their decisions when they make or break a no-hitter, but if you don’t think Vizquel’s rep got him a bunch of favorable scoring decisions you’re nuts. Much like we all know that the Braves’ pitchers of the 90s got some ridiculous strike zones.

5 years ago
Reply to  olethros

Fielding percentage = (PO + A) / (PO + A + E). Last time I checked, put outs and assists are black and while. For a guy with a .990 fielding percentage, you’re talking about 1 / 100 plays that is dependent on the official scorer. And I’d say 90% of the time, there is no argument with that decision. That leads us with 1 / 1,000 plays that is subjective.

I would argue that fielding percentage has merits in large samples. Sure you can’t make an error if you can’t get to a ball, but when Vizquel got to a ball, he made the play at a higher success rate than anyone in history. If there was ever a question of whether he could get to a ball, then why did he man short for 23,000 innings and more games than anyone in history?

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

Putouts and assists are black and white. Errors are not. How many errant throws did Vizquel make that got charge to the 1B? How many balls did he muff or miss entirely that were ruled hits?

I’m not disputing the limited usefulness of FP at all, I’m just disputing the description of it as an objective measure when it’s so plainly not.

At the end of the day, very little beyond home runs in baseball is purely objective.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

Derek Jeter was allowed to play shortstop his entire career. The idea that “he played there his whole career, so he must have been good!” is… not smart.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

Man, Fielding Percentage might be the least useful stat in all of baseball. Theoretically, it should be useful, but the home scorer bias is one of the most ridiculously out-of-whack features in our game today.

This is a case where the data is just really, really bad.

5 years ago
Reply to  olethros

It’s another KPI, not an objective measure. Vizquel made a ton of plays and fielding percentage backs up what I believe it is undisputed: he had one of the greatest hands at SS, we’ve ever seen.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

Fielding percentage doesnt tell you shit

And Jay even addresses it: vizquel is the career leader in fielding pct in part because leaguewide fielding pct has increased over time (league average ss fielding pct in vizquels era is similar to smiths league-leading pct over his own career)

Fielding percentage is a completely worthless statistic because the way scorers charge errors has changed over time

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

I suspect this:

“Vizquel played more games at SS than anyone in history, and had the highest fielding percentage of all-time at the position.”

is enough for many people, but very few fangraphs readers, and not enough of the voters to be enshrined.

It does raise several interesting discussions in my mind though, including:

– Are there legitimate alternate paths to the hall? (Accumulation, for example)
– The importance of narrative. (Jim Rice certainly benefited from this)
– The importance of doing one thing extremely well (or at least the perception of that) versus all around value

Omar is an interesting test case for several different things, and I’m pretty sure we’ll be chewing over them for the duration of his candidacy.

5 years ago

David Ortiz is likely to get in based on narrative, and Schilling will eventually also (I do think both deserve to be in anyway, but the narrative is going to make it easier for them).

5 years ago

You want an interesting test case? Andruw Jones. Better defender than Vizquel, an all-time great glove in MLB history, and he was a good hitter to boot.

It boggles my mind that Vizquel gets so much support from a vocal minority of uninformed Hall voters. No one thought they were watching a future Hall of Famer when they saw him grounding out to 2B.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

“I think that says a lot about his defense.”

Um yeah, no doubt. No one questions that he was a great fielder and if you want to come to that conclusion via traditional metrics instead of advanced one, I personally have no problem with that.

But that doesn’t address the most important question: how much value did his defense add? The traditional metrics don’t speak to value, only the advanced ones do. And the advanced ones tell us that his defense added a lot of value but not enough to make him a HOFer, once you take his mediocre offense into account.

Mean Mr. Mustard
5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

If you hate to cite fielding percentage, then don’t.

5 years ago
Reply to  DBRuns

I don’t understand all of the downvotes for DBRuns. It is just an opinion, with reasonable factual support, and not offensive. I thought FanGraphs was about considering different perspectives and not about making sure everyone sings from the same songbook.

Responding to differ about his perspective regarding FP makes sense, and is likely correct, but downvoting because of disagreement risks being as narrow in perspective as the traditional thinking that has been replaced.