Kyle Schwarber Is the Newest National
In 2020, the Nationals had an outfield problem. You might not have noticed it, because of human cheat code Juan Soto, but think of it this way: Soto accounted for 2.4 WAR. The outfield as a whole, Soto included, managed 2.0 WAR. The other six players accounted for a whopping negative 0.4 WAR, and you don’t need a fancy analyst to tell you that’s bad.
On Saturday, the team made a step toward remedying that weakness for 2021. They signed Kyle Schwarber to a one-year deal worth $10 million, immediately upgrading their second corner outfield spot from Andrew Stevenson (projected near replacement level in 2021) to Schwarber’s league-average stylings. Jesse Dougherty first reported the deal.
What you think of Schwarber depends on when you picture him. If your mental image was formed in 2015, he’s an up-and-coming slugger with defensive issues. If it was formed in 2016, he’s a World Series hero. If it’s been formed since then, he’s an inconsistent but exciting hitter with a problem on defense, a cypher who might have his best days ahead of him but who might also never re-scale the heights of his 2015 debut.
When Schwarber is at his best, he embodies baseball’s move toward whiffs, walks, and home runs. In fact, that’s true even at his worst: in each of his seasons, he’s had a higher walk rate, strikeout rate, and isolated power than average. Whether each of those seasons turned out well or poorly depends on the balance between those three factors.
In 2020, nothing worked quite right. His strikeout rate, a gruesome 29.5%, might sound like a problem, and it’s certainly not great! It was also only 1.5 percentage points higher than his career average, and it wasn’t the worst single-season mark of his career. His 13.4% walk rate wasn’t the culprit, either: that mark is almost exactly the same as his career rate. No, the problem was in the power.
How do you think of power? Home runs are one obvious metric, and Schwarber set new lows in that category in 2020, though only marginally. He cranked 11 homers in 224 plate appearances, a 4.9% home run rate. That’s the worst mark of his career, but it’s only narrowly behind the 5.1% rate he posted in a disappointing 2017. In fact, if you care instead about home runs per fly ball, Schwarber’s 25.6% mark was instead his best.
Doubles are another important component of power. Schwarber managed only six in 2020, the second-worst rate of doubles per plate appearance of his career. In all, he produced extra base hits in 7.6% of his plate appearances, the worst rate of his career, and nowhere near his nearly 10% rate entering 2020.
Another way to measure power is to ignore the outcomes completely and focus on process. Schwarber’s barrel rate dipped from 13.8% (career before 2020) to 11.2%, and his groundball rate spiked above 50%. More grounders and fewer smashed balls in the air go hand in hand, and they conspired to limit the number of chances Schwarber had to get the extra bases he thrives on.
If you’d prefer to separate barrels into two categories, as Alex Chamberlain outlined here, something interesting emerges. Chamberlain created a new subdivision of barrels that he calls “blasts.” Essentially, they’re the hardest-hit half of the population of barrels, the most valuable half of the most valuable subset of batted balls. In this category, Schwarber’s 2020 looks different (my numbers differ slightly from Chamberlain’s because I removed untracked balls from the denominator):
| Year | Blast Rate | Barrel Rate |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 7.9% | 12.2% |
| 2017 | 9.0% | 15.1% |
| 2018 | 7.7% | 12.7% |
| 2019 | 10.2% | 14.5% |
| 2020 | 9.0% | 11.2% |
In fact, that’s a more honest way of describing his most recent campaign. The balls he hit hardest, the ones that carry the most predictive power from year to year, looked basically like every other Schwarber season. An 11.2% barrel rate is solid — it places Schwarber in the top 25% of the league in terms of power on contact. He fares better in terms of blasts, where he’s in the 92nd percentile. In other words, Schwarber is still a premium power hitter, even if his doubles and homers wouldn’t tell you that in 2020.
Should we worry about the walks and strikeouts? Maybe a little bit, at least if Schwarber repeats his 2020 walk and strikeout rates. Expressed as one number, he would need to be 4% above average when he puts the ball in play to end up average overall. That’s not a problem — again, he’s a great hitter when he makes contact — but it helps set a rough idea for what Schwarber will be. His plate discipline will hurt him slightly, his power will make up for it, and it will probably work out to an above average but not standout offensive line.
Of course, baseball is more than just offense. Schwarber has to play the field — at least unless and until the NL switches to a DH for 2021 — and the picture there is decidedly less rosy than it is at the plate. Schwarber is a large gentleman — he’s listed at 6-foot and 235 pounds — and saying that he’s been bad on defense in his time in the majors undersells things. Schwarber is bad on defense in the way that Cleveland likes saving a little money or AJ Preller enjoys the occasional trade.
Per Statcast, Schwarber has been 29 runs below average as an outfielder in his career. That’s the fifth-worst mark in the majors over that period, ahead of only noted butchers Nick Castellanos, Matt Kemp, Melky Cabrera, and Shin-Soo Choo. He put together one solid defensive season, in 2018, and that season shows the best case scenario for Schwarber: he tallied a whopping 11 outfield assists that year, only one off the league lead, which was worth between 7 and 8 runs per both UZR and DRS.
Schwarber’s arm is no joke. When he first reached the majors, the Cubs still considered him a part-time catcher in large part because of that cannon arm. If the Nationals can somehow entice runners to take off against Schwarber, they might be able to wrangle another positive defensive season out of him despite his lack of range.
More realistically, Washington is hoping for a DH slot where they can hide Schwarber. With Howie Kendrick’s retirement, the Nationals don’t have an obvious candidate to fill that role, which means they can slide Schwarber there without losing anything on offense. That would leave them with Stevenson and Soto flanking defensive standout Victor Robles, which sounds to me like a solid defensive outfield. With Schwarber’s offensive value firmly in the green, that sounds like the best possible case here.
How does this deal work out poorly for Washington? The worst-case scenario is this: the NL plays 2021 without a DH, Schwarber’s plate discipline takes a step back, and he ends up as an average bat with painful outfield defense, more of the replacement level soup that they ran out around Soto in 2020. Even that, though, is hardly a disaster: at only one year, there’s no chance of this deal sticking around to haunt them.
For Schwarber, this contract fits his needs as well as can be expected. First, there’s the money: Schwarber will earn more on this deal than he projected to earn in arbitration with the Cubs. That’s a clear upside. Second, he’s still eligible for free agency after 2021 — his contract has a mutual option for 2022, but that’s merely a fancy way of telling a player you like them; the player can, after all, always decline his end of the deal.
More importantly, Schwarber will get everyday playing time in Washington. After the first five years of his career, I’m not sure that any team is clamoring to give Schwarber a long-term deal. That remains the brass ring for players: after six seasons at collectively-bargained low wages, free agency theoretically unleashes the forces of capitalism in their favor. For Schwarber, however, those forces aren’t yet guaranteed to work; bat-first corner types have found soft markets as teams realize they can replace those players with pre-arbitration talent without losing much on-field production.
For Schwarber to strike it rich, he needs to rise above the fray of slightly-above-average bats to become a premium one. For teams to believe that, he needs to do so in as big of a sample as possible. In that sense, the best thing Schwarber could do for himself is find somewhere with thin outfield and DH depth, and Washington fits the bill exactly. As a bonus, they’ll be playoff contenders, which is always a plus.
After their disappointing 2020, the Nationals could use some offensive help. After his arrested development, Schwarber could use some exposure. With this deal, both sides are getting what they want, at a rate that should make everyone happy. That’s a solid outcome for everyone — other than the rest of the NL East, perhaps.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
I think they’re hoping for a DH spot so they can hide Bell and hopefully convert Schwarber into a full-time first baseman. Schwarber’s defense wasn’t always this bad, but the last couple years it has been; I think he’d be a better fit at first and he very likely will not be worse than Josh Bell there.
I think the power will play in almost any park, so I like this deal overall for the Nationals. If there is a DH then Schwarber can move to first and they can see how real Stevenson is, and if not they get a lefty thumper with sub-par defense.
No disrespect, but Schwarber’s only defensive asset is his arm, and while Josh Bell is awful at first base, there is no reason to suspect that Schwarber would be better, more to think he would be as bad or worse. The hope is that Kevin Long can work some kind of magic and some magnitude of offensive surge by Schwarber will compensate for his play in the field as long as Washington has to endure it. More concerning is that this signing signals the Nationals are unlikely to trade for Suarez of the Reds, who at least has a decent glove.
Sure, he could be worse. He could also be better. If I were a Nationals fan I would hope he gets lots of reps in training camp if the DH is imminent.
I agree 100%.
Also can we have a word about the supposed free-agent armageddon that was supposedly happening? Schwarber just got a $2M raise over what I think was his most optimistic arb projection. Morton got a deal comparable to the one that got turned down. There’s a decent chance Hand gets a 2-year deal at a slightly lower rate than his team option.
I think it is possible that some teams like the Rays and Cubs and Clevelands thought there was more of a consensus about not spending money than there really was, or that they knew they might be making a bad dollar decision but felt they couldn’t afford to wait and find out. I think that there is a real split between the teams that want to cut costs and those that want to stay where they are approximately and while some of the teams in each bucket are the ones we expect, some are not.
It’s mid January.
How many guys have signed?
How many have gotten raises?
How many have taken cuts?
How many are waiting?
How many team are idling with simiar holes?
And how does it compare to the recent, prepandemic past?
As the OP pointed out, Washington had a problem and they focused on one guy they think can solve it. They might be right, they might not. But the guy they picked up was non-tendered and got a one year deal at a decent enough but hardly eye-popping rate.
I’m not sure a couple guys make for a trend.
Let’s see how February plays out. Or March.
Yep.
Last year 19 free agents got contracts of $20 million plus. Seventeen of those had signed by today’s date.
So far this year only two free agents have signed contracts in excess of $20 – McCann ( who got a lot more than was expected) and Kim (who got a lot less than was expected).
Still a lot of top free agents out there and it’s entirely possible that several of them turn into Kimbrel, Keuchel or Moustakas type situtations.
I do wonder how the almost inevitable delay is playing into the negotiations.
At this point it would be weird if it weren’t at least in part due to the negotiations. In addition to the uncertanties over the season there is the question of whether the players might strike or be locked out or what terms they might settle on.
I suppose but last year’s free agent crop was also just a whole lot better, too. It does seem like there aren’t any teams out there that are so intent on improving, like the Reds and White Sox last year, that they’re being super-aggressive. The Mets are the closest to that. But it’s also confounded by the fact that…these guys aren’t as good. I think there’s a decent chance that these guys wind up with those deals at the end of the day anyway.
Just taking a quick look at Fangraphs top 50 free agents:
Two years ago, 27 free agents were predicted by both Fangraphs and the fans to get contracts about $20 million. And another 5 were predicted by either Fangraphs or the fans to get contracts above that value.
This year, those numbers are 16 and 8.
So there is some evidence that this year’s FA crop isn’t quite as good as last year’s. Though there are a couple of caveats that go with that. Firstly, the person making the predictions for Fangraphs changed from Kiley to Craig, Secondly, and most importantly, we don’t know to what extent predictions were lowered by the expected FA apocalypse.
Either way, there are plenty of free agents who are expected to get contracts above $20 million. But so far, unlike last year, teams aren’t signing them.
See I think Craig is much more generous with his contracts that Kiley was. Craig is still kind of in the dollar per WAR mode and Kiley was kind of in front office mode.
Still, I think the larger point is that there isn’t an obvious baseline to compare it to. I think it is probably worse than last offseason but we don’t have any strong evidence to show that yet…the baseline we have with the options and nontenders is not showing what we thought it would.
So I do agree to this to an extent, but I also think it’s worth reflecting on the guys who I (and everyone else, really) said “this is the canary in the coal mine.” Two of them have now signed for comparable money, one a little bit more. I think it’s worth thinking about them, since the other free agents don’t have that obvious “baseline” to compare it to.
What it says is that the Nationals have $10M but the Cubs don’t have $8M. That’s it. The number of suitors Schwarber had indicates the number of teams that think he’s worth a contract. It’s all about cold hard cash. And I know someone is going to respond to this with a statement about how much the Cubs franchise is worth. Value and cash are two very different things. The Cubs have a lot of value. The team doesn’t have cash.
I think this is another way of saying that the individual teams’ financial situations, and how they interpret those financial situations, is varying quite a lot across teams. This is always true but I don’t think that these sensational option declines and non-tenders are saying a lot about baseball as a whole. It says a lot about how the teams are perceiving themselves. I said a lot of stuff about how this or that was a canary in the coal mine for the whole free agent market and I’m starting to think I was wrong.
I think that canary is just singing a different song.
If the Cubs can’t afford Yu Darvish and Kyle Schwarber in terms of current cash, then there’s a problem. This will impact the free agent market both in terms of supply (Schwarber being available to sign and Darvish available in trade likely takes away two other FA signings, because those guys “shouldn’t” have been available) and in terms of demand (there are simply less teams looking to spend money).
The real signal, to me, is what’s happening in the AL and NL Central as compared to the “coastal” divisions, both east and west, of both leagues. Right now, many interesting cash management decisions (cutting payroll) are being made by teams in the Central Divisions. Less so on the coasts, except for teams whose normal MO is, has been, and likely will be super efficient payroll management (i.e., Rays). Credit to Jayson Stark for writing about this and trying to draw attention to it.
Again, I’m not expecting anyone to cry for the ownership of any baseball team. But look at what’s happening in Chicago (NL), Cinci, Cleveland, etc. Baseball is a regional game. The middle of the country is feeling the economic impact of the pandemic far worse than the coasts are. And I don’t think a lot of people on the coasts understand what’s happening in the middle of the country because it gets discounted as a political statement rather than an economic reality. Central division owners seem to be very concerned with what their in-game revenues will be even when fans are allowed to return, because their local economies are getting hit far harder than the coasts.
Liquidity is not a function of company value.
The easiest example is Amazon which is valued over a trillion along with Microsoft and Apple but where Apple has a hundred billion cash stash and MS $50B plus (depending on any companies they’re buying) Amazon has a whole lot less accumulated cash because they spend it as fast as they earn it.
In baseball terms, a team like SF that owns their stadium is worth a ton on paper but they also carried (carry?) a load of debt from building the stadium. Which was fine when the stadium was bring in hundreds of millions in attendance to make the payments. Less so when it doesn’t.
Each team has its own internal structure with debt load, free cash flow, and valuation, all of which depend on the various revenue streams. And unlike the Illitch days in Detroit, most teams aren’t run as billionaire’s vanity projects but as for-profit or at least self-funding businesses.
Now they lost a year of attendance.
The owners of the Nationals are among the richest in MLB and they tend to heavily backload their biggest contracts so they had no problem coming up with $10M. But it remains to be seen how much more they spend after this.
Liquidity is not a function of company value.
Yes, agreed. That’s why, as unpopular as it is to do so, I keep banging the drum about the difference between cash flow and “franchise value” as estimated by Forbes or any other site. Just because the teams are worth a lot on paper if the owner sells doesn’t mean any particular team owner has a lot of liquidity to inject into the franchise right now to increase or even maintain payroll.
What it really says is that the Cubs misjudged the market.
Because if the Cubs somehow knew that the Nationals would be willing to pay $10M for Schwarber, then they could have easily kept Schwarber who would have gotten $8M and then traded him to the Nationals for some lottery prospect who has non-zero surplus value.
It’s simpler than that. The investments of the Ricketts family are hemmoraging cash. No one should or will feel sorry for them. Their franchise is worth a lot of money. But in terms of cash flow, when your business operations are baseball and real estate that largely depends on foot traffic from baseball, you’re in some real trouble right now. The investments you made that you thought would be great synergies for your baseball team are highly correlated to the economic effect of the downturn.
This is not a request for pity for the Ricketts. Rather, this is a statement of reality. They’re not going to sell the team, so they will be cutting costs to preserve *cash* until things turn around. And it sucks because the Chicago Cubs should have a highly competitive team and a top-10 payroll. But it isn’t going to happen in 2021.
Exactly.
It’s the same situation in Cleveland: Dolan isn’t going to sell but he does have to retire Sherman’s escrowed shares. So the budge gets slashed.
Nationals might move Turner to center and let Kieboom try SS if he improves, but I doubt they want to take away chances from defensive expert Victor Robles, especially since his power looks like it’s starting to develop
Displacing your two best position players at premium positions where they are passable (or in WAS’s case, excel) is probably unwise under any circumstances (the Dodgers aren’t even trying to push Seager off SS yet, and he’s no Turner there), but to do it to give reps to Carter Kieboom at SS doesn’t make sense. What’s the motivation there?
Exactly, hence the “I doubt they want to”
I doubt I want to read more of your thoughts on this.
So, who plays OF in Cleveland this year? Meg? Dan? Cave Dameron?
One of the two SS from the Mets. I read that at least.
Kamikaze Tanaka in LF, Willie Mays Hayes in CF, and Pedro Cerrano in RF
Put me in coach.
Turner, Soto, Bell, and Schwarber could be a fierce top of the lineup. They’ll still need a lot from Robles, Castro, and Kieboom though.
I think Kieboom will turn out average at least this year, I worry Robles is broken offensively.
Robles will still be 23 years old on opening day, it’s a little premature to write him off yet. He’ll probably bounce back. Kieboom too. You can’t count on either of them to be an impact bat, but around average isn’t unreasonable at all and if so they’ll be fine players at their positions.
Washington as a team had a wOBA of .320 v. RHP and .357 v. LHP (FG leaderboard). Righty starting pitching in particular killed them in terms of OPS per B-R. The addition of Schwarber and Bell makes them a much more balanced line up. It will help players like Gomes who historically hit LHP and may help guys like Robles and Kieboom produce a bit.
How much of the Cubs’ underperformance in 2020 is due to the lack of in-game video? Baez has made a big deal about it, but there’s no doubt that some of the Cubs – including Schwarber – were different hitters in 2020, not just “worse” performers.
In-game video isn’t coming back.
The good news is rosin (and “sticky stuff”) use is going to be policed for at least a while.
That should balance things out a bit.
I think about that a lot, but I think it’s too idiosyncratic to generalize. For every JD Martinez (whose own decline is probably intertwined with age), there’s a Corey Seager (who complained endlessly about how impossible it was to hit without video and said he’d go back as soon as it was allowed while having a career year).
If it truly was “in game video” that caused Baez all sorts of problems, couldn’t we tease it out statistically?
This signing makes alot of sense given Washington’s financial limitations and the DH uncertainty. For now they can plan to play Schwarber in LF. If they find out they get the DH, they can determine whether to spend more money on another outfielder and shift him to 1B/DH. We’ll have to see if they give him reps at 1B or not. I kind of doubt it since there is a good chance they will bring back Zimmerman. They can be patient with him since he doesn’t want to go anywhere else and lives in the DC area.
Anyone else find it strange how they still haven’t decided about the DH? It doesn’t look great how the league it basically making things up as they go
They’re holding the 15 extra DH jobs (and a slight roster increase to 26-27) hostage to the CBA negotiations. They do know what they’re doing; it’s a stare off.
Long time Schwarber stan, but I hate using OAA totals alone to judge Schwarber’s defense. Partly because it doesn’t factor his arm, and partly because it’s not position adjusted (he’s being compared to all OF, not just LF by it). But also it’s cumulative, and Schwarber has simply had more playing time than a bunch of notably worse LF on a rate basis. Check CPA instead: In 2017 he was at -5 and there were 10 OF with 25 or more attempts who were worse than him. In 2018 he was at -3 and he was ahead of 19 OF and tied with 10 others. In 2019 he was at -4 (tied with 12 others) with 22 OF worse than him. He did drop back to -5 this season (in a small sample, so using minimum 10 attempts), but there were 15 OF who were worse than him.
I’m not saying he’s great out there, and his range is limited for sure. But I think he’s gotten much much better than when he first started in 2015 and even in 2017 (when he still had a brace from his knee injury). He makes fewer ugly mistakes and plays things safe to keep the ball in front of him, but his arm is a legitimate weapon and overall I think he’s closer to an average left fielder when you include it (he’s been +3, -3, -3 in DRS each of the pat 3 years and +9.8, -0.9, -0.8 in UZR each of the last three years). Remember, the average LF is really really bad because the position tends to host a bunch of bat first players and guys without another position, but not always on a full time basis. Schwarber is far from the worst OF defender in the league (which is reflected in his UZR and DRS).
My Nats usually favor poor glovemen in free agency. Last season we sucked and the gloves were considered the number one reason. How the heck is Bell and Schwarber going to fix that! Sure they both have very good maybe great bats, but if I was Corbin or Fedde I would be complaining right about now. Always with a bad bullpen and gloves!
“Schwarber’s arm is no joke. When he first reached the majors, the Cubs still considered him a part-time catcher in large part because of that cannon arm. If the Nationals can somehow entice runners to take off against Schwarber, they might be able to wrangle another positive defensive season out of him despite his lack of range.”
Does DRAA take into consideration runners that simply don’t run out of fear of being thrown out?
I’ve always thought that Schwarber would profile best as a first baseman if not for Rizzo. I wonder if they will try it and slide Bell to DH (provided there is one).