Let Me Upgrade You: Small Improvements With Big Playoff Implications

Last week, Dan Szymborski looked at how much a team’s fortunes can change in the first month of the season. That old truism – you can’t win the World Series in April, but you can lose it – turns out to, in fact, be true. Dan’s research found that even teams we think are good – those projected to win 90 or more games – had meaningfully worse results after a bad April, even if their actual talent remained the same.
In other words, those early losses really do count. But I like to look at things from a glass-half-full perspective, so my takeaway was that there’s still plenty of time to fix a bad start, because it’s still early in the season. But how to fix it? That’s a trickier question. Luckily, “that’s a tricky question” is just FanGraphs for “that’s a fun thing to write an article about,” so I’ve got answers for you.
I came up with a method that let me look at all 30 teams at once. First, I took our playoff odds, with current standings, for every team in baseball. Then, I went through and found each team’s weakest position. I did this separately for pitchers and hitters. How’d I do it? I sure hope you’re in the mood for some methodological exposition, but if not, you can probably skip the next three paragraphs and get right to the good stuff.
For each batting position on each team, I summed the projected WAR from our Depth Charts. I used these to create league-wide averages for each position, important considering the average shortstop projection, for example, is much better than the average first base projection. Then I compared each position for each team to the league average and noted the one that fell furthest short. To improve that position, I created a synthetic league-average player and assigned that player either the most plate appearances that any player on that team was projected for at that position, or 600 plate appearances, whichever was higher. I then rebuilt the depth chart behind our synthetic player by sliding down whoever was left and noted the difference in WAR between the new depth chart and the old one. I divided that change in WAR by the number of games remaining in the season to turn it into a change in winning percentage, bumped that team’s true talent winning percentage by that amount, and then re-ran our playoff odds 20,000 times with its new, improved squad, keeping the talent level of all other teams constant, to calculate what its odds would look like post-trade.
For starting pitchers, I constructed a league-average pitcher by averaging the top seven options on each team’s depth chart to create one global league-average WAR per inning pitched. For upgrades, I went down each rotation in order until I found a player with a lower projected WAR per inning pitched than that league average. I replaced that pitcher with the league-average option, then used a waterfall method. The displaced pitcher took the spot of the first pitcher below him on the depth chart who projected to be worse than him on a per-inning basis. Then that displaced pitcher followed the same procedure, over and over until I rebuilt the entire depth chart. In this way, injured but talented players didn’t get bumped down the playing time ladder undeservedly. I then took the difference between how much WAR the pre- and post-upgrade rotations projected for, turned that into increased winning percentage, and re-ran the playoff odds.
I didn’t subtract any players from any teams when I re-ran the odds. I also didn’t re-run platoons or account for risk of injury. These odds are intended as a quick check of how much teams might improve by patching their weakest holes, not as a complete functioning model of the major leagues. I think their estimates are reasonable. I wouldn’t defend any of them as being perfect, but I do think that this method does an excellent job of identifying low-hanging fruit.
Sorry, did your eyes glaze over there? That was a lot of methodology in a few dense paragraphs. But whether you felt like following along or not, the upshot is that I came up with a list of how much each team in baseball could improve by replacing its weakest position with a league-average player, and how much that would change its playoff odds. For example, the AL East could use some shortstops, but not every team could use them equally:
| Team | Upgrade Position | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yankees | SS | 0.8 | 3.1% |
| Blue Jays | SS | 0.3 | 1.8% |
| Red Sox | SS | 1.0 | 5.7% |
| Orioles | CF | n/a | n/a |
| Rays | SS | 1.7 | 10.0% |
The Blue Jays and Orioles have well-rounded squads, which explains why the WAR upgrade from shoring up their weakest spot is minimal. In fact, all of Baltimore’s non-pitcher positions are projected to be above average, so we can’t upgrade its roster with a league-average player, even in center field, the team’s weakest spot. That’s why you see “n/a” in the table above. The Yankees project to receive nearly as large of a WAR upgrade as the Red Sox from this exercise, but since they’re already quite likely to make the playoffs, their playoff odds change by less. And the Rays have the largest potential gain in the majors. They’re right on the fringe of the playoff race, and yet they have the worst projected shortstop depth chart in the majors.
Six teams could boost their playoff odds by more than five percentage points by upgrading their weakest position to league average:
| Team | Upgrade Position | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rays | SS | 1.7 | 10.0% |
| Diamondbacks | 1B | 1.4 | 7.6% |
| Braves | SS | 1.3 | 7.1% |
| Guardians | SS | 1.5 | 6.9% |
| Red Sox | SS | 1.0 | 5.7% |
| Padres | 1B | 1.4 | 5.5% |
I did the same thing for starting pitchers, and this time we’ll flip leagues and coasts and use the NL West as an example:
| Team | Rotation Spot Upgraded | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dodgers | SP6 | 0.3 | 0.2% |
| Diamondbacks | SP1 | 0.7 | 4.0% |
| Padres | SP4 | 1.1 | 4.4% |
| Giants | SP2 | 1.0 | 4.0% |
| Rockies | SP1 | 1.2 | 0.1% |
First, yes, technically a league-average starting pitcher would project for infinitesimally more WAR than Zac Gallen, but the real gain comes from pushing some of the less-capable arms at the back of the rotation into spot duty. But I think this division demonstrates the utility of this method very well. The Dodgers don’t really need an average starting pitcher; he’d only be their sixth-best option. Thus, they’d get only a very small WAR upgrade – and also a very small playoff odds increase, since they’re already basically a lock for October.
The Diamondbacks get the most bang for their buck because they’re in the cuspiest position. Entering Monday, we gave them a 30% chance of making the playoffs, as opposed to around 20% for the Padres and Giants. And the poor Rockies badly need an upgrade – but even an upgraded Rockies squad basically never makes the playoffs anyway.
Let’s look at the teams who could use an extra arm most:
| Team | Rotation Spot Upgraded | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phillies | SP5 | 1.0 | 5.4% |
| Astros | SP2 | 0.9 | 5.3% |
| Cubs | SP2 | 0.9 | 5.1% |
| Padres | SP4 | 1.1 | 4.4% |
| Royals | SP3 | 0.7 | 4.1% |
Those are good insights (and you can see the entire list here), but I wanted to ask one more question. There’s no reason that I have to limit my model to upgrading to an average player. I told the model that we could instead add a good starter, a player who projects for one WAR more than league average at his position. Now we’re really cooking with gas. Ten teams could add double-digit percentage points to their playoff odds by grabbing one of those guys today:
| Team | Upgrade Position | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rays | SS | 2.9 | 16.8% |
| Diamondbacks | 1B | 2.6 | 13.8% |
| Braves | SS | 2.5 | 13.2% |
| Red Sox | SS | 2.2 | 12.3% |
| Guardians | SS | 2.7 | 12.2% |
| Royals | 2B | 2.1 | 11.5% |
| Brewers | 1B | 2.1 | 10.8% |
| Pirates | C | 1.9 | 10.5% |
| Rangers | 2B | 1.7 | 10.2% |
| Padres | 1B | 2.6 | 10.2% |
And at the risk of just showing you too many charts, adding a good starter helps a lot of teams quite a bit:
| Team | Rotation Spot Upgraded | WAR From Upgrade | Playoff% Increase From Upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Astros | SP2 | 1.8 | 10.7% |
| Cubs | SP1 | 1.9 | 10.7% |
| Diamondbacks | SP1 | 1.8 | 9.9% |
| Royals | SP2 | 1.7 | 9.8% |
| Phillies | SP3 | 1.8 | 9.6% |
| Orioles | SP1 | 1.8 | 9.2% |
| Blue Jays | SP2 | 1.5 | 8.6% |
| Guardians | SP1 | 1.9 | 8.6% |
| Mariners | SP3 | 1.7 | 8.4% |
| Giants | SP2 | 2.1 | 8.4% |
| Padres | SP1 | 2.1 | 8.3% |
The point of this exercise? Honestly, mostly I just wanted to make the tool I used to get these insights. It seems like a fun one for trade analysis. But I also think this serves as a reminder of how much season there is in front of us. Adding an average regular would have a huge impact on a great number of playoff contenders. Adding an above-average regular could change the playoff picture substantially. It’s so early in the year that a small change in team quality can still have a large impact on playoff outcomes. So you can get sad about a slow start if you’d like. But I’d prefer to dream about how to turn things around. It’s April. Anything can happen. Dream big – or at least, dream of your team snagging a decent starting pitcher and a capable shortstop.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Beyonce Clemens is best Clemens
As I’m sure we all know, Braves have that SS upgrade on the way already. Plus, Kim is more of a 3 WAR (season long) player than a 2.
Stupid patch of ice.
So for the record, we have Kim down as a 2.5 WAR player if he got 100% of the Braves’ PA’s at shortstop for the rest of the year. But the average team has a shortstop WAR projection of 3.3, so they’d still be somewhat below average, though by about 0.3 WAR less. The point is, this method accounts for injured guys, so long as they’re projected to come back and play this year – we have Kim down for 394 PA out of Atlanta’s 657.
Now, how do you feel about those projections? That’s up to you. Personally, I think they’re a little light defensively. But that’s how I got to the answer I did from our depth charts.
I think the projections are clearly flawed for an obvious reason: Kim was terrible for most of last year and that weighs heavily.
His defense and SLG projections most of all. Which is also for a straightforward reason – recovering from a shoulder injury. (His throws from SS were ~5 MPH slower).
I don’t make a habit of going against projections but this one is a slam dunk.
The problem with the kinds of injuries Kim has suffered is that they’re much more difficult to heal from, and even once he’s all the way back in game shape he’ll never be quite the same. He’s also 30, and his skillset is that of a glove first middle infielder with some speed on the bases. He’s not an automatic out per se, but his game has always been elite defense coupled with a major league average bat. Once the defense slips, and it will, he’s going to have a much more difficult time cracking 3 WAR per year going forward.
Everything you say here is baked into the projections. Surely he will heal *somewhat* if not all the way. He will likely regain some of that lost 5 MPH, perhaps all of it.
That recovery is not baked into the projections, which even Ben agrees is at least a little light re: defense. He said 2.5+ WAR, I said 3. That’s a small difference.
The defense will slip surely, but why would we project it to happen this season?
Never count on a hitter bring productive coming back from s wrist injury.
This is interesting and I’d probably agree but I’m not sure what it has to do with Kim. He’s hurt basically every part of his body over the past several years, but not his wrist.
And this is why shortstops and starting pitchers make the big money.
The problem with this model is that in-season acquisition like this is often a closed system. If a team were to say, trade for Nolan Schanuel to fix a 1B problem, that’s also going to affect the Angels’ team quality (and by extension, their opponent’s winning percentages). Many teams have division opponents they still have 13 games against. Since we’re a dozen or so games in, that’s high single digits percentage of the season. That can definitely swing wild card races, in particular.
The playoff odds are an estimate with pretty large bars to begin with, I’m not entirely convinced that this method adds much.
Since trading for any decent player in April is challenging, I view this more as an early referendum of which teams may have sold their rosters short over the offseason. Regardless of strategy and unforeseen injuries, ideally a front office’s approach to building a contender would hold water for more than 1 week. I’d like to see these scenarios re-analyzed in July.
I considered this and decided it didn’t matter. My reasoning:
Two wins per 162 games is .012 if you turn that into winning percentage. So if the Angels get 2 WAR worse without Schanuel, let’s say that lowers their true talent winning percentage by .012, from call it .450 to .438. Let’s say that you are a .550 team who plays 13 games against the Angels. Log5 tells you that out of 13 games, you’d expect a .550 team to win 7.79 against a .450 team. Out of 13 games, you’d expect a .550 team to win 7.94 against a .438 team. Basically, it just doesn’t matter that much. I thought about the extreme difficulty of adding these fraction-of-a-win adjustments and decided that it just wasn’t going to add anything.
Carson Williams has a better shot at league average than Taylor Walls.
Mostly because we know Taylor Walls has virtually zero shot of being league average.
Williams looks awful. He looks like he has a 20 grade hit tool instead of 30 or 35. He’s graded as a future 70 defender and he’s -3 FRV already. The only reason why he is more likely than Walls is because theoretically he’s got a chance to turn things around. But his inability to make contact got completely exposed in AAA last year, and the fact that he’s not at least scratch at shortstop is super worrying.
I think he’d probably get more attention for these issues except that Roki Sasaki, Dylan Crews, and Kristian Campbell are higher profile than he is.
Basically yes, but if the Rays really need a league average SS to be competitive, they should give Williams a real shot. Maybe in June or something if he does well in AAA. They don’t have other options really if everyone needs a SS. Julio Lugo is no longer with us. RIP.
Today I learned Julio Lugo is dead!
I just went to his Wikipedia page and learned that he was arrested for kidnapping a couple at gunpoint. “The charges were later dismissed.” I don’t know how the justice system works in the DR but it seems like a weird thing to get arrested for *and then* get dismissed.
I do think that if I was a Padres fan I would be a little annoyed that the team decided to run with Walker Buehler and German Marquez in their rotation and a Sheets / France platoon at first base.
But they’re selling the team and they did run out of money a couple of years ago, so it’s not that surprising that they’re trying to limit costs.
I’m also looking at their AAA roster and it looks like it is almost totally out of real prospects. It looks like it’s almost entirely Quad-A and org guys.
if I were a Padres fan I would hate AJ Preller. He could be the best talent acquisition guy in the league, but he pisses so much of it away. And makes highly questionable FA signings. Questionable in that they are good players, but he pays way too much for them. Let’s not forget the completely failed go for it move when he was newer, trading a ton of talent away and playing all sorts of dudes out of position… Out of the race by June. He’s a terrible fit for the top spot in an org and has been for a long time.
as they said on the Sopranos “some guys are better as #2’s”
My general overview of the Preller era is that when he’s selling he gets good value, and when he’s buying he gives up too much.
But it’s a little more complicated than that because starting from the moment when Seidler took over as control person through 2024 he did pretty well.
These are the different phases of the Preller era:
2014-2015 as Buyer: Trading away Trea Turner, Yasmani Grandal, Zach Eflin, and Max Fried to get Wil Myers, Matt Kemp, and Justin Upton is bad. Real bad.
2015-2016 as Seller: Very good. Tatis Jr deal was here, as was deal that brought them Josh Naylor. Got more from trading Kimbrel than he gave up.
2017-2019: Things got quiet here.
2019-2020 Offseason: Absolutely crushed it by getting Trent Grisham and Jake Cronenworth.
2020 In-Season: Bad. Josh Naylor turned out to be really good. They traded Andres Munoz and Ty France for Austin Nola.
2020-2021: This is when Seidler took over. The Snell, Musgrove, and Darvish trades were huge wins–the main problem was the Darvish extension. The Hader trade worked out okay for them.
2022: The Soto trade looks bad now, but at the time the team was really deep in win-now mode. I have a hard time faulting him for this one.
2023: Peter Seidler dies.
2024: Dylan Cease trade was an enormous win. The Jason Adam trade was also a pretty big win. This is largely the end of the
2025: Oh boy, this was bad. Luis Arraez was fine, but Jakob Marsee will probably be pretty good. Leo De Vries already looks like he could supplant Jake Cronenworth, and Mason Miller is a huge luxury for an already elite bullpen. They traded six prospects for O’Hearn and Laureano, and the chances that one of them breaks out is pretty good.
My take: Ideally what they would do is keep Preller until it’s time to sell, have him trade everyone, and then fire him and beg James Click to come take over.
I feel bad for Preller, he had a mandate to bring a championship to San Diego in Peter Seidler’s lifetime, so I can excuse away alot of those overpays in FA and trades.
Now that Seidler is gone he was left with a terrible farm system that couldn’t possibly add enough value to offset all the declining play from guys locked into long term deals, so I can see a reasonable argument that the best strategy is to just be hyper aggressive trying to win before half the payroll is tied up in replacement level or worse 35+ year olds.
To be fair, most AAA teams are just the place where journeymen and higher end org depth plays. Most organizations don’t let their actual top prospects hang there for very long if at all.
Padres are just in a super weird spot as an organization. Farm system very depleted and payroll is probably maxed out. A ton of 30+ veterans on the team, some who are still pretty good players but have a lot of money left to be paid into their 30s. The rest of the veterans are guys barely hanging in the league on short-term deals, and Freddy Fermin.
This is a team with truly next to no more levers to pull in terms of trades or callups, best they probably do is waiver wire pickups. The Padres win with this group or they don’t win. And I have a feeling that this group may be in the dangerous spot of old, expensive, and just not quite good enough.
Even if they fall behind the pack before the trade deadline, there is not much that makes sense to sell to get any value to try to reload for the next 1-2 years. Maybe Michael King or Morejon? But these guys are pure rentals.
On the other hand…their farm reloads really damn fast, because Preller’s a good GM.
It’s the dichotomy – he’s not quite Dombo, *but*…
I think this is right. The team is up for sale or will be soon, so the budget they have is what they are spending currently.
Their number 1 prospect is a guy who has been consistently injured and hasn’t hit since he was in A ball…in 2023.
Their top prospect is a guy who has pitched 3 innings in A-ball.
Their number 3 prospect doesn’t have any glaring red flags but he’s 21 years old in high A so he is a long way away. Their #4 is in AA at least.
In general help is a long way off. If they had kept De Vries he would be up next year for sure and maybe even this year but they traded him. They don’t really have the trade chips to get a solution without increasing salary.
This is probably the last stand. The team is only getting older from here.
I know baseball is the least of the problems with the situation, but this article really hammers how just how much Wander Franco being a terrible human screwed over the Rays’ plans.
This feels like it would be super fun to play around with if it were an FG labs tool, but reading that methodology makes me feel like it’s probably too tough to build that. Fun analysis regardless
What happened to the average leverage index for every game being displayed when clicking on the box score? It disappeared. Please assist.
Interesting. The Reds are 6-3 yet with their two best SP on the DL yet no mention of the Reds here. The three teams the Reds have played are all on here yet no mention of the Reds. The Reds record when the starting pitcher is not one of the three best SP in baseball is 6-1. Yet no mention of the Reds. The Reds defense has yet to make an error this year and they have scored several of there runs, leading to a couple of wins because of their intelligence on the basepaths. Yet no mention of the Reds. Only three teams currently have a better record than the Reds. Yet no mention of the Reds. The Reds have a strong bullpen and starting pitching depth. Yet no mention of the Reds.
I know it is early. But the Reds made the playoffs last year and has a better team than last year. You mention 20 teams on here. Are there 10 teams in the NL better than the Reds? I doubt it.
I am going to go out on a limb and say that Chase Burns is their best pitcher now. Hunter Greene is awesome but I think Burns might be better.
Between him, Misiorowski, Eury Perez, Schlittler, and McLean we are going to be spoiled for guys with crazy stuff for a while. These are the guys who are the heir to the current crop of aces like Skubal, Crochet, and Cristopher Sanchez (and Skenes but he will be here for a while).
I can’t disagree with you sadtrombone. Burns, Greene and Lodolo make a very good top three come September if healthy. Add to that Lowder’s first 8 starts as a ML pitcher and I think they are playoff bound. But still not good enough to make this post.
This post is mostly about potential playoff teams’ glaring weaknesses. Not being included on that list means the Reds don’t have any notable ones!
If only…
More than that. The post is about a statistic Ben calculated about how much a team’s playoff chances would improve if [etc. etc., as explained in the article]. Ben discussed those state for two sample divisions, neither of which was the NL Central. Then he discussed the teams who would gain the most, none of which were the Reds.
There is a link to the values for every team if you are dying for Reds content. Sorting by the four stats, the Reds rank 15th, 17th, 16th, and 17th out of the 30 teams. They are pretty much objectively the least interesting team to talk about here.
(OK, maybe tied with Miami.)
The Nats need a bullpen upgrade badly. We are second in runs scored and last in rubs given up. but it’s the bullpen that has been awful. if we had a real closer we would have likely won 2 of our losses. Maybe more. if the scoring holds up, and it seems like it should to some degree, it is a missed opportunity on the pitching.
The principal reason that SS is the position most mentioned is that there are so many good shortstops, so the league average guy is very, very good. Top prospects like Carson Williams and Marcelo Mayer, even if they blossom into everything projected of them, likely aren’t league average or above in a world of Witt, Henderson, Lindor, Perdomo, etc, etc. Sure, adding a league average SS would help a lot of teams, since the league average SS is likely a guy who is slighted by not making the All-Star team, but where (or at what price) are you going to find him?
Agreed. Characterizing upgrading your shortstop to league average as a “patch” seems off. This only matters if you’re actually translating this analysis into real-world application. If most of these teams want to improve, shortstop is unlikely to be a feasible place to do it.
Who could the Brewers get that is 2.1 WAR better than Andrew Vaughn at 1B?
Great work Ben – Cool approach – Thank You