Marcus Semien, the Quietest Star

Marcus Semien is up to his usual tricks. He’s eighth among all position players in WAR, comfortably the best on a first-place Rangers squad. For the third straight year and the fourth out of five, he’s on track to rack up four-plus WAR as one of the two best players on his team. For someone who didn’t post an above-average batting line until his seventh major league season, it’s an impressive accomplishment.
Perhaps more impressive to me: he’s doing it right under our noses, and no one seems to notice. Semien is good at everything but not in a way that adds up to a tremendous offensive line. His best skill might be durability. He’s clearly a very good player, but his particular set of skills are highlighted by the framework we grade him under. I’m interested in Semien as a player, and I’m also interested in why he’s the poster boy for both what WAR gets right and where it has limits.
Let’s start with how Semien does it. It’s fairly straightforward: he’s above average at every phase of the game. It begins with his plate discipline. To put it simply, he doesn’t make bad decisions about when to swing. In each of the past five years, he’s accomplished an impressive double: chasing fewer pitches than league average and simultaneously swinging at more in-zone pitches than league average. To state the obvious, that’s a great way to both rack up a pile of walks and avoid strikeouts.
If you zoom in on Semien’s decisions, they get even better. He doesn’t have massive raw power; he’s roughly average when it comes to any measure of top exit velocity you care to pick. He delivers extra base hits most frequently when he swings at something over the heart of the plate, more so than whichever slugger you care to compare him to. Guess what? He’s one of the best in the business at doing just that. When pitchers throw him something over the heart of the plate, he swings a whopping 85% of the time. That’s the sixth-best rate in baseball this year, up there with aggressive hitters like Corey Seager and Freddie Freeman.
That might not sound impressive on its own. After all, a few weak hitters dot the top of this list, too. Ezequiel Tovar is third, and he’s far too aggressive for his own good. Joey Gallo and Christian Bethancourt feature prominently at the top of the table. Merely swinging at a lot of pitches down the middle doesn’t mean you have it figured out. But Semien has the other side of the equation under control, too. When pitchers throw him something in the chase zone (not right on the fringes of the zone, but not an automatic take either), he doesn’t swing. Of the 297 hitters who have seen at least 100 chase pitches this year, 243 of them have swung more frequently than Semien. He’s an outlier in both directions.
He needs to be, because as we’ve already covered, his raw power is pedestrian. With middle-of-the-pack exit velocity, you might expect middle-of-the-pack power production. You’d be wrong, because Semien squeezes every last drop out of his contact quality. His park-adjusted isolated power is 16% higher than MLB average so far this year. It was 21% higher than average last year, 61% above average in 2021. By swinging at good pitches, getting the ball in the air, and generally maxing out his batted ball opportunities, he puts up solidly above-average hitting numbers with great regularity.
“Solidly above average” does a good job of describing Semien’s other contributions as well. He’s a plus baserunner — not one of the best in the league but inarguably above average. He’s a solid defender at an up-the-middle position. He’s a scratch defender at shortstop, which makes him a plus defender at second base. No matter the phase of the game, Semien is better than most major leaguers at it.
Exactly how valuable is that skillset? That’s a question sabermetricians still wrestle with. By wins above replacement, Semien has been the tenth-best position player in baseball from 2019 to now. But that statement lacks context. WAR lacks context by its very nature. It’s an attempt to boil down all of baseball into a single number, a goal that inherently removes nuance. Take a look at those aforementioned top ten players, with a few statistics appended:
| Player | WAR | wRC+ | PA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aaron Judge | 25.1 | 170 | 2103 |
| Mookie Betts | 22.8 | 139 | 2454 |
| Freddie Freeman | 22.7 | 150 | 2685 |
| José Ramírez | 21.7 | 133 | 2412 |
| Juan Soto | 21.3 | 153 | 2478 |
| Mike Trout | 21.2 | 167 | 1790 |
| Trea Turner | 21.2 | 127 | 2498 |
| Francisco Lindor | 20.4 | 113 | 2449 |
| Paul Goldschmidt | 20.3 | 143 | 2553 |
| Marcus Semien | 20.0 | 122 | 2760 |
Semien’s standout skill jumps out: he just plays more than the rest of these guys. His offensive production is above average but not otherworldly. He’s not one of the best shortstop defenders of our generation like Lindor. But he’s out there every single day; he has a whopping 1,000 more plate appearances than Trout, for example. In fact, Semien leads the majors in plate appearances over that span. Freeman is the only other player within 100, and José Abreu is the only other player within even 200.
Why does that matter? Because WAR is a counting statistic, which means that players above replacement level rack up value every time they play (on average). An average player is worth just under two wins over 600 plate appearances — around 1.85 to be more precise. Give that player an extra 130 plate appearances (Semien has averaged 732 in the last three non-COVID seasons), and they’d be worth more like 2.3 wins above replacement.
If you’re a little bit better than average, those extra plate appearances add even more juice. Consider a player who produces 4 WAR per 600 plate appearances. That’s a fringe All Star, more or less — Matt Chapman or Eugenio Suárez in 2022. Turn that up to 730 plate appearances, and that’d be more like a 5 WAR performance. Likewise, Semien finished last year with 4.2 WAR, right in line with Chapman and Suárez. If he’d only been able to play for 600 plate appearances worth of time, though, he’d have finished the year with 3.5 WAR, comfortably behind them.
Should we be giving Semien credit for that extra playing time? It depends on how you view the concept of replacement level. The central concept of replacement level is undeniably clever: If you’re batting for your team, someone else can’t be batting, naturally enough. Value depends on the difference between what you did and what someone else would have done in your place. That concept gets extended to fielding, baserunning, and everything else on a baseball diamond. It’s an elegant way of assigning value, and the general concept of value relative to replacement is pervasive not just in sports but also in pretty much every analytical field you can imagine today. But as Bill James often points out, the real sticking point is in that definition of replacement level.
WAR handles this question more or less by fiat. Or, well, fiat isn’t quite right. In 2013, FanGraphs and Baseball Reference agreed to use the same replacement level value in their calculations of WAR. That value works out to 1,000 wins above replacement per year, split across the entire major leagues. That’s based on a variety of studies that estimate production by freely available players, but it’s just that: an estimate.
For the most part, WAR being slightly off just isn’t that big of a deal for single-season purposes. If you calculate replacement level wrong, so what? Most full-time starters get 600–650 plate appearances a year, so the players we’re comparing when we look at WAR leaderboards are putting up their statistics over similar workloads. One player is usually way out in front, anyway; Semien could have batted 1,500 times last year without putting up as much value as Aaron Judge.
Semien is right on the borderline of making me reconsider the argument, though. He plays so much that the playing time differences really do matter. He’s worse on a per-plate-appearance basis than everyone in his general vicinity on the WAR leaderboards. It’s absolutely true that the best way to calculate value is relative to what you’d be getting from a replacement. The definition of replacement merely matters more for Semien.
Consider this: if we look at wins above average instead of above replacement, Semien drops to 15th instead of 10th. Notably, he’s behind Fernando Tatis Jr. despite having batted more than 1,000 times more often over that window. Instead of being a rounding error behind Trout, he’s 5.5 wins behind. Change the baseline, and value changes right alongside it.
Which baseline is correct is a trickier question, and in my opinion, value is ultimately heavily dependent on team context. Good teams have better replacements than bad teams in general. Last year, for example, the Dodgers had to dip into their replacements when they faced a wave of injuries. Their replacements were great, though, producing 2.5 WAR in 528 plate appearances because Trayce Thompson, who they acquired for nothing in the middle of the year, put up 2.8 WAR. The Astros, on the other hand, got 0.3 WAR out of replacement level players over 708 plate appearances.
Who your direct replacement is matters a lot, in other words. The problem with calculating that for Semien is that he mostly hasn’t had a replacement. He played in 161 games last year. The year before that, he played in all 162. He played in all 162 in 2019 as well. My best guess is that Josh H. Smith would get extra reps if Semien played less, but it’s really just a guess.
Smith looks like a roughly average player to me. Our projections think he’ll be worth 0.6 WAR in 175 plate appearances the rest of the way this year, which works out to around 2 WAR per 600 plate appearances. But if it’s not Smith as a replacement, it might be Travis Jankowski (via some infield/outfield switches), and we think he’s much closer to replacement level. In other words, the context of replacement level isn’t even clear when we pick a specific team and a specific year.
Where does that leave me in thinking about Semien’s value? I’m inclined to side with our calculation of WAR rather than trying to recalculate some higher replacement level, even after presenting the argument against it here. The truth is that durability is valuable. Semien’s extra playing time lets the team give other players rest and use situationally useful guys when they’re at their best rather than overexposing them. His durability is truly impressive, too, which makes me more inclined to give him credit for it. Excluding 2023, he has eight pieces of black ink on his Baseball Reference page — games in 2019, plate appearances in 2019, games in 2021, plate appearances in 2021, games in 2022, plate appearances in 2022, at-bats in 2022, and sacrifice flies in 2022. In other words, he’s the very best in the league at being out there every day, and providing an above-average rate while doing so.
Could you argue that WAR slightly overstates Semien’s value? Sure. But I bet you his teammates would tell you otherwise, and I bet you teams would as well. The plate appearances we don’t see from his replacement might be impossibly tricky to value, but that doesn’t mean they’re worthless. It just means our tools aren’t perfect, and while I think we’re pretty good at valuing production these days, I don’t think we’ll ever get all the way to perfection.
Statistics in this article are current through games of Saturday, June 17.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
I’m Glad Ben Got To Write This Marcus Semien Tribute Instead Of Something About Rob Manfred Today.
I guess I can see the issue of why a team might see all those PAs as adding extra value to a player and be worried; if he finally does miss some time, it cuts into that value more. Semien in particular is nearly 33. Not really the time of your career you stay a paragon of health/don’t get more days off added in. But who knows, maybe he’ll defy those odds and keep being pretty good at everything for 700 at bats a year. The Rangers sure paid him like that’s the plan.
If you’ve ever been a business owner or in management then you know how valuable dependable people are that show up and do the job every day. And, you also know how disruptive it is to have someone that you can’t count on to show up when they’re supposed to and misses too much time.
I’d rather have 9 players that are a little less talented but play every game than stars that are on and off the IL.
What this article gets at (and the discussion of the concept of WAR in general) is basically how much “less talented” would be an acceptable tradeoff? It’s the Barry Larkin/Larry Walker argument.
Looks more like the Rangers paid Semien very similar to how the Jays paid George Springer. The Rangers also paid him $25m a year for 7 years because he’s a remarkably good player, one of the most valuable in the game—which turns out to be one of the results of being ‘pretty (very) good at everything.’
me too
I land in the same place as Ben; I don’t think changing the baseline matters quite so much for Semien. There’s real value in having a person who plays everyday. Freddie Freeman and Semien, and to a lesser extent Trea Turner, Francisco Lindor, Paul Goldschmidt, and Xander Bogaerts are super valuable because you don’t ever have to worry about their availability.
That said, there is a real question whether replacement level is set to the right place, especially for pitchers. Watching Oakland’s pitching, Kansas City’s outfielders, and Nick Maton (who is sort of in his own category) play regularly makes me wonder if it isn’t so easy to find replacement-level players after all. And if that’s the case, maybe the concept of replacement needs to be tweaked.
There are three key components of WAR that still need to be refined and studied more deeply:
First, the definition of “replacement level” – as you noted – still doesn’t feel right.
Second, the defensive component of WAR still seems to produce strange results sometimes, or results that vary for a single player from year to year in a way that feels strange and inconsistent. Also, we’ve seen three different defensive eras in the last decade – pre-shift, shift, and “new rules” – and I’m not sure the defensive component of WAR fully contemplates true defensive value.
In addition, defensive outliers still feel to me to have geometric additional value rather than linear additional value.
Third, the 1B penalty in WAR remains too steep and other positional adjustments retain an appearance of inflation (and, again, those positional adjustments didn’t change from pre-shift to shift to new rules eras, which just doesn’t make logical sense). Pete Alonso is top-5 in baseball in wRC+ since 2019 and has made himself into a top-5 defensive 1B in baseball. I can’t believe that Francisco Lindor is more valuable than Pete Alonso. I can’t believe that Marcus Semien is more valuable than Pete Alonso. And I know the answer to that is that any old ballplayer can play first base… but they don’t. If that were the case, teams would have changed strategy by now. The fact that teams haven’t materially changed strategy with how they staff the position tells me that the on-field evidence doesn’t back up the current positional adjustment.
Paul Goldschmidt may be a better example than Pete Alonso. Goldschmidt is at 56 career fWAR. Just bringing the 1B positional adjustment from -12.5 runs to -7.5 runs (which is the RF positional adjustment) boosts that career fWAR up into around 65 WAR, if I’m ballparking the math correctly. And yet the positional adjustment remains – relatively speaking – the most arbitrary component of WAR, based on data that’s 20+ years old and that was based on players changing positions etc. which isn’t a TRUE barometer of talent, especially at 1B. Many players can play 1B in a pinch. And when you see them do so, it makes it clear just how much more normalized the value of a GOOD 1B really is.
Pete Alonso’s wRC+ since 2019 works out to be 11th overall. He’s rated as average in the field for a first baseman by UZR and 83rd percentile by OAA, so he probably isn’t a top 5 fielding first baseman either. It’s tough to take the rest of your comment seriously with stuff like this in it.
Positional adjustments probably need to be re-evaluated, but first base is still going to end up as the least valuable defensive position that actually plays defense.
Tough to take the rest of my comment seriously? Wow.
He is indeed 11th overall in wRC+ since 2019. However, I suspect that the list where I saw him top-5 was set with some plate appearance minimum. Apologies that I missed that qualifier.
As far as quoting UZR and OAA… well, since part of my point is that defensive metrics remain imperfect, relying on those metrics to prove your point is a bit of a fallacy. But I will still take your comment seriously.
I agree that 1B is among the least valuable defensive positions, but to penalize is 66.66% more than RF seems excessively harsh, which was why I dialed it back to the RF adjustment in my analogy. I can argue from playing and coaching that playing an average RF is harder than playing an average 1B, but playing a great 1B is much harder than playing an average RF.
BTW, since you cited OAA, he’s 6th among MLB 1B this year, and #’s 5-8 are grouped pretty close together. Again, though, I still don’t think we’re there yet on defensive metrics.
One of the better comments I have seen here in a bit. Thanks @Tomerafan!
I think the defensive component of WAR has two interesting problems. The first is error bars/instability. It takes a long time for the state to stabilize, way longer than offense. The second is there seem to be team level effects. Some teams are probably worse than others, but some teams’ players seem weirdly low.
Let’s see if Pete Alonso gets 340/10…
Agree with your point, but not sure about the Alonso example. Statcast think his defense is quite terrible
I don’t think we’re there yet on defensive metrics overall, so I don’t put full faith in it, but I think the OAA leaderboard at 1B has him 6th in the positional ranking.
He’s been above average this year. Last year he was 16th out of 18.
This is a slightly different issue than the one I was discussing but it is probably true that the positional value is probably closer to each other now than in the past. Teams seem better at keeping guys at premium positions so it doesn’t create quite as much of a logjam, and having more DHs creates a scarcity of players who hit at an elite level. And the defensive adjustment for center field is probably too low, given that it seems to be just as hard to find a good center fielder as a shortstop.
But all of this is different than not being able to find a replacement at a more general level. I think it’s worth asking the question: If teams can find replacement-level players so easily, then why are there so many players below replacement? I get that some of it is that players have guaranteed contracts, and teams think that some players will turn around, but the Oakland Athletics have played below replacement baseball as a team up to this point. I’m not even sure how that is possible if replacement level is set at the right point. And their front office is not incompetent.
“If teams can find replacement-level players so easily, then why are there so many players below replacement….”
1.Hope (just maybe veteran X will bring back young player A in a trade, or man, Jason Heyward has such great tools…)
2.Sunk Costs (high draft picks/big contracts/Chris Davis)
3.Fan favorite/ticket sales (Miggy Cabrera)
4.Wanting to move a team to a new location (A’s)
“any old ballplayer can play first base… but they don’t. If that were the case, teams would have changed strategy by now”
I feel like this pretty well describes the Brewers’ strategy toward 1B. A lot of guys cycle through and every preseason there’s talk of a guy who’s never played there stepping in.
Agreed. Thinking about replacement level and there’s almost a “well managed replacement level” and an “oh sh**” replacement level, like truly scraping bottom of the barrel type replacement level. Very different value floors.
Also back to semien there is inherent value in a guy who plays every freaking day. You just don’t have to burn a roster spot on a guy who can back him up. That on its own has material value that I’m not sure WAR gives credit for.
Would anyone plan that way, though? Would any team say “ok, semien’s not gonna get hurt so we don’t need to get a utility infielder?” I think anyone would plan for the possibility that he could get hurt, and anyway, his backup is probably going to be someone who backs up multiple positions. It’s not like a team would have a Marcus semien-only backup. So even if they did expect it was less likely semien gets injured, that might not effect the consideration much if his backup is also backing up, say, Corey Seager.
Correct. You still need a guy in the org who can back him up if he gets hurt. But you don’t necessarily need to burn an active MLB roster spot on him. Compared to a typical guy who sits more often. Or a guy who semi platoons or is frequently wounded.
Just looking at some rosters in the AL
Rangers have 5 IF
Mariners, Astros, Angels have 6 IF
Royals, Tigers, Twins have 7 IF
So maybe the more accurate framing is, reliable starters reduce the quantity of viable backups on the active roster! To your point they probably still have somebody who can backup multiple positions. They just need fewer of them.
Fair point, but I think the rangers have 6 right now – Lowe, Semien, Seager, Jung, Smith, Duran. Not sure if you weren’t counting Duran since he’s playing a lot of OF now, but he’s already played 2B, 3B, and SS this year (26 starts at SS).
We can look to how the Rangers construct their roster for clues. Allowed them to fully platoon at times last year in LF. Allowed them to carry 3 catchers for a time this year while Garver was DHing, but unable to play C, while working his way back from surgery.
Honestly positional adjustments except for catchers should be discarded and players judges on pure defensive abilities in two buckets, OF and IF. Of course I’m a Red Sox fan where the front office took a screw defense approach.
That just doesn’t work though, because an identically rated LF and CF are not the same value
Nor a SS and 1B, even more egregiously
I feel like if you play SS, no matter how poorly, it’s nearly impossible to have a negative WAR
There are a handful of negative WAR shortstops this year. 3 of them are qualified. I’d guess it feels that way because teams give less of a leash at short.
Not even just SS, but 2B or CF. Nick Madrigal is slashing .243/.310/.287 and is exactly replacement level.
I can’t believe you mentioned all those people while skipping over Jordan Lyles
I guess we can see why no one wanted Jurickson Profar last winter..& why is he still playing every day for Colorado?
Why does Colorado do anything that they do?
Dick Monfort’s Magic 8 Ball?
Sure you do–Lindor missed 20 games, then 35 in 2 of the last 3 full seasons. He also looks like he’s dragging, and his performance is bad enough in the context of his career that there’s no way he shouldn’t be sitting once a week at this point. Why the Mets seem bent on flogging the durability card is beyond me, but they’ve been lousy at it for at least a decade and aren’t getting any better.
Probably matters more for projecting him going forward than what he’s done, right? Do we expect him to continue to be such an outlier in terms of durability going forward now that he’s 32? I’m inclined to believe he’s probably also had a good bit of luck and the fortune of having managers who didn’t feel the need to give him scheduled rest days.
So if he were a free agent, I wouldn’t want to pay him expecting him to continue to play as much as he’s been doing. But I wouldn’t dock him anything from what he’s done, either.
I always thought of this as the Jimmy Rollins problem. Most of his best seasons by WAR were the ones where he had a ton of plate appearances. He had 7 seasons over 700 PAs (and another at 699). His MVP year he batted 778 times!
That’s the most PA by anyone in history. Rollins averaged 4.8 PA’s per game for all 162!
I think if anything we underestimate the value of durability. When looking at guys who teams “overpay” for, it seems the ability to stay on the field is more of a factor than we account for. (I used to think about this in the context of Eric Hosmer, or before that Jeff Francoeur.)
A player who doesn’t typically need a backup creates stability, a flexible bench, and fewer difficult decisions for managers and front offices.
For sure, but for that to work the player has to be worthy of playing every day, which wasn’t the case for Hosmer or Francouer
😡
Every player is durable until they aren’t
This is so good. The closing third(ish) is the best explanation of how value is context-specific that I’ve ever read.
Ben, I think you could have titled this, “Good, durable leadoff hitters are very valuable because they come up more often.” Semien plays most games, and he hits first in the batting order. That’s going to get him more plate appearances.
Marcus Semien (2019-2023)
2132 PA / 456 Games batting 1st (4.675 PA/G)
464 PA / 105 Games batting 2nd (4.419 PA/G)
169 PA / 41 Games batting 3-9 (4.122 PA/G)
2765 PA / 602 Games (4.593 PA/G)
Freddie Freeman (2019-2023)
0 PA / 0 Games batting 1st
1231 PA / 271 Games batting 2nd (4.542 PA/G)
1452 PA / 333 Games batting 3rd (4.360 PA/G)
6 PA / 4 Games batting 4-9 (1.5 PA/G)
2689 PA / 608 Games (4.423 PA/G)
In contrast, here’s another leadoff hitter:
Ronald Acuña Jr. (2019-2023)
1974 PA / 431 Games batting 1st (4.580 PA/G)
166 PA / 44 Games batting 2-9 (3.773 PA/G)
2140 PA / 475 Games (4.505 PA/G)
Being healthy is good, but combining it with batting first is great.
Aaron Judge was able to put up the silly WAR number he put up last year because of the perfect confluence of factors:
It’s hard to crack that 10 WAR line without basically being extremely good and extremely available — getting those extra PAs from hitting 1-2 is no joke over the course of a season.
Great article about a guy who has become one of my favorites!
Using replacement level as “freely available talent” makes sense. However, using Semien’s PA as a factor for this calculation feels wrong. Semien’s “extra” PA are coming from a combination of durability and batting first. If he goes on the IL and the Rangers have to use Josh H. Smith to replace him, is Smith going to bat leadoff? I doubt it. So the replacement PA should be less than what is currently being used in WAR calculations. Durability should count, but position in the batting order should not.
But that also means more PA for another more qualified hitter than Josh H. Smith.
Availability IS a skill
That’s what I keep telling my boss! I don’t do much but hot damn do I show up
One thing I think should be emphasized is Semien’s work ethic. He led the league in errors and then worked hard with Ron Washington to become a better infielder. He’s been good ever since.
couple things:
If he keeps this up for 3-4 more years, his HOF candidacy will be really interesting with the “old school” vs “new school” arguments.
Anyone that still goes on BJOL will remember that he did a study a few months back on historically “overrated” vs “underrated” players (by amount of awards, AS games, accolades, HOF, etc that players got & how it compared to their career WinShares))& he found the biggest factor was AB per year..because the guys that get 650-700 AB per year get to the round #’s..Used to be 30 HR, 100 RBI, 200 hits, etc..a lot of these players pre-dated WAR, etc, but, you can add in getting to 5 WAR in current times.
Not saying it’s perfect, but, it was interesting & applies to Semien, too..though as other’s noted playing EVERY day DOES have value in it’s own right.
Measuring above replacement assumes that replacement players are freely availabe with minimal cost to the team. The reality is a little muddier. Teams don’t have an unending supply of roster spots. If someone has a sore hip or bruise and needs to take a game or two off there isn’t going to be a roster move. Always being able to pencil a guy into lineup is valuable – but tough to calculate how much
Crazy to think how much the 2020 covid year impacted Semien’s earning power & HOF chances. 8.5 bWAR in 2019, 7.4 bWAR in 2021, sandwiched around a 0.4 bWAR output in 2020. If you drop an additional 7 bWAR in for him in 2020, his WAR7 (peak in the JAWS metric) would have been 41.1, good for 18th amongst SS all-time, or 16th vs 2Bs. This year is included, and if he finishes with another 3 bWAR, giving him 44.1 bWAR, he’s now knocking on the door! The avg 2B HOF had a 7 year peak bWAR of 44.4.
Obviously extrapolating an additional MVP-level year out of thin air for any player is wishcasting. And yet, I can’t help but feel for the guy, I would imagine coming off of 3 straight 7+ bWAR years he would’ve gotten much closer to Seager’s contract.
I think he still sneaks up on the HOF conversation due to longevity ala Adrian Beltre in like 5 years.
If he continues to stay available for 150+ games a year and justify hitting leadoff into his late 30s, I think it’s certainly possible.