MLB Hitters Are Getting Off the Ground
Last week, Travis Sawchik wrote an outstanding article titled “Can More MLB Hitters Get Off the Ground?” The article went in depth about the optimal swing plane, and about the resistance it can face within the game when a player’s thinking about trying to hit the ball in the air. Players have been instructed for decades to swing down on the ball in an attempt to generate backspin. Recent breakouts like Josh Donaldson and Justin Turner, however, can vouch for simply letting it fly. They’ve found their success from always swinging up.
For the most part, right now, the conversation is built upon anecdotes. There have been players who have changed their swings, but we haven’t seen anything reflected in the overall league numbers. Last year, the average ground-ball rate was 45%. Five years ago, the average ground-ball rate was 45%. That number seldom budges, and it does in part speak to baseball’s consistency. We aren’t seeing a reflection of a whole bunch of guys suddenly adopting uppercuts.
But then, it all depends on how you dig. It turns out there is something. A sign, if a small one, that we’ve entered a period of transition.
There’s no perfect way to research which players are or aren’t changing their approaches. In theory, more players should be changing, to try to drive the ball in the air. We did, for what it’s worth, just observe a home-run spike, so that’s of note. Power numbers just took off, but that could have more to do with the baseball. So why don’t we settle for something simple, and look at ground-ball rates? Although we have data going back to 2002, I’ll go back to only 2009, when it seems like the system became less subjective. The details are important, but I’ll try to hurry up and get to the results.
Here’s what I did: I looked at all the players who batted at least 250 times in consecutive seasons. Then I counted up the number of players who saw their ground-ball rates drop by at least five percentage points. Very easy! It’s far from perfect. For example, this misses Donaldson, since he made his changes before he had enough big-league experience. And this misses, say, A.J. Pollock, who has definitely made changes, but while still hitting grounders. This is only a simple and imperfect glance, but the most recent number caught my eye.
Between the last two years, there were 53 qualifying hitters. The previous high in the admittedly short window was 37, and the six-year average was 30. This picks up a hitter like Rougned Odor, who made hitting for power the focal point of his game. This picks up Leonys Martin and Daniel Murphy. Christian Yelich and Jose Altuve. Not everyone necessarily wound up doing this on purpose — sometimes numbers just bounce around for no reason — but it’s at least interesting to see a recent surge. It fits in with what *should* be taking place.
While the above was happening, there were 33 hitters who saw their ground-ball rates increase by at least five percentage points. The previous six-year average was 41. So, last year, there were 20 more ground-ball decreasers than ground-ball increasers. The average before was 11 in the other direction. That’s another reflection of a swing in approach. The numbers, again, are going to fluctuate just naturally, but last year there was more of a fly-ball lean, and that should catch your attention.
All it is, for now, is a single data point. It might not capture a developing trend, and that’s something we’ll just have to look for further down the road. It’s just another detail to add as we think about the present and the future of hitting in the major leagues. It definitely seems like there’s a difference between the average big-league swing and what the average big-league swing ought to be. It’s a multi-billion-dollar industry, with players who are highly incentivized to be the best versions of themselves, and they’re going to get to thinking. Especially if they feel like they’ve underachieved. There are enough other success stories to look at, and with more data than ever floating around, players are increasingly open-minded. And so are the people superior to them.
When it comes to examining the greater baseball landscape, the biggest changes have to occur below the majors. Players have to be taught how to hit the ball hard in Little League, in high school, in college. There’s still a lot of lousy instruction out there, or at least stubborn instruction, and that’s nothing you can tackle overnight. Coaches tend to be set in their ways, and we’re not heading into a regular season where every single player takes a swing like Ryan Schimpf. It’s going to be a very gradual process.
But this is one way in which big-leaguers are role models. You can see how Josh Donaldson found success. You can see how Justin Turner and A.J. Pollock and J.D. Martinez found success. Though it’s true their old approaches got them all to the majors in the first place, they only became stars when they made the same general change to trying to hit the ball hard in the air. You’ve read so many of the individual anecdotes. On some level you’ve probably sensed that there was a trend. There does appear to be something of a present-day shift, as hitters fight back against the information advantage so many pitchers have been provided. Pitchers these days know what their pitches do, and they know where all the hitters struggle. So more hitters appear to be preparing themselves to hit the crap out of every mistake.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.

I got my balls off the ground last year. And that’s how I made history.
Jeff, I love the way you write. But could you explain more what you think is reflected in these apparently contradictory data points — MLB GB rates holding steady, but more significant declines than increases on the individual level?
There are a lot of hitters. The number of hitters chsnging, while more than previous seasons, is still a small enough fraction that it hasn’t impacted league wide numbers significantly.
Very good job! Always look at “deltas” in existing players if you want to identify changes like this, rather than league-wide totals. The reason is that the samples of players change and if you look at league-wide numbers you never know if any changes are because of a change in the MIX of players or a change AMONG the individual players.
For example if you suspect steroid use among pitchers is causing an increase in FB speed, you look at changes in individual pitchers from year to year and NOT league-wide pitcher FB speed. If you do the latter and you see an increase, you don’t know whether that increase is caused by your hypothesis or by an influx of pitchers who throw harder (or an exodus of pitchers who throw softer).
In addition you also want to make sure you have a control group. In the above example, say you find that there is NO increase in pitcher FB speed from year 1 to year 2 in the period of time you suspect increased steroid use? Say that average speed change among pitchers is exactly 0.
That still doesn’t mean your hypothesis is incorrect! What if you include a control group from several other pairs of years where you assume no steroid use and the average difference among pitchers from year 1 to year 2 is -.2 mph? Now you DID find evidence that your hypothesis is correct!
All that being said, it would be better if Jeff included all hitters and did a “delta” weighted average. Take the change in GB% from year 1 to year 2 for all hitters who played in both years and weight that change (delta) by the lesser (or harmonic mean) of the two BIP, and get a total weighted mean. That’s a more robust and better method.
Mitchel brings up a good point about following the individual hitters. It makes me think that someone like Cameron Maybin who, through his own admission, worked with his hitting coach to adjust his mechanics halfway through 2015 and suddenly blossomed in 2016 having essentially a career year offensively.
If you look at his numbers his LD% rose significantly last year and clearly contributed to his success. Interestingly though Maybin increased his LD% while maintaining his GB%, making him a guy who appears to have converted to a line drive all fields approach preferring to utilize his speed rather than lofting the ball for power (which he does not have much of anyway).
That really wasn’t my point to be honest. Be careful about attributing a change in LD rate to anything much other than luck. That is the least “stable” (subject to the most random fluctuation) of all hitter stats.
I don’t agree. He wasn’t looking to see whether batters tended to hit fewer ground balls, or whether the league was hitting fewer ground balls, but rather whether more batters were making an intentional decision to put fewer balls on the ground. A league-wide mean across all batters does not speak to this question. The number of batters with large decreases in ground ball percentage does.
Also, I would think that in any year where you see a HR surge, you will find the same thing – that hitters, as a group, will consciously or unconsciously change their swing planes and hit more fly balls. Try this with other years where there has been a surge in HR rates. I am not sure if will show up in that year or the next year. The thing about 2015 to 2016 is that there was evidence that the HR and overall offensive surge started in the latter half of 2015 so that by the time the 2016 rolled around, hitters would have already started to change their approaches.
BTW, has anyone looked at average pitch locations from 2015 to 2016? You would expect to see a change in PITCHER approach as well in response to a surge in HR rates. I would expect to see pitch location being a bit lower in 2016 than in 2015, although a change in the strike zone can influence that as well. If the umpire K zone is slightly raised, pitchers will throw higher as well, counteracting a change in approach in response to the HR surge.
Could there be bias that ground ball increasers lose plate appearances?
If there isn’t MLB teams are doing it all wrong.
But I think there is no doubt hitters are more aware that fly balls and uppercuts are good.
A juiced ball could fuel that too because it lowers the minimum threshold for power to make fly balls pay off. When it is easier to hit fly balls out that means that fringe power guys have more incentive to hit the ball in the air.
The idea that the c-path swing is a recent idea or instructional point has to be flawed. We all know Ted Williams wrote about this 60 years ago?
High speed video footage, and the study of, showed us exactly what hitters do … rather than what they think they do. That’s important … because you can listen to what a hitter thinks they do, or what they are trying to do … and then watch what they actually do and it may be very different.
So, maybe in little league, filled with dads, kids are taught to “swing level” or “chop” or maybe even in 10U travel ball where the bases are so short that the kids can still “outrun the ball” … but at the upper levels of youth, and especially including the better players, no one is being taught swing down, or even swing level.
In looking at GB rates and why hitters hit ground balls … I would look at the proliferation of sliders and change-ups.