One More Look at Baseball’s Spending Landscape
Here’s the thing: You might well be sick of this. Actually, no, here’s the thing: Even if you are sick of this, which you might be, baseball writers are in the writing business, and when baseball things happen, baseball writers write about them. When baseball things *don’t* happen, baseball writers still need to write, because that’s the job. So you’ve been seeing a lot about the slow pace of free agency, and you’ve been thinking more than you’d like to about trends in team payrolls. Throw this onto the pile. I’ve got even more analysis.
As Craig Edwards wrote a few days ago, league-wide spending could go down in 2018, compared to 2017. That’s not something that frequently happens. Within that post, Craig inserted a plot, showing how all 30 teams have moved. Here, I’d like to add some further context, courtesy of Cot’s Contracts. I’m going to look at every team, going back to the year 2000.
There was a Jerry Dipoto quote recently that generated a lot of attention. Dipoto said to gathered media that there might be more competition for the No. 1 pick than there will be for the World Series. I’m not familiar with Dipoto’s thinking on the subject, so I don’t know how much analysis actually went into that statement, but it hit on what’s been a recurring theme. In the words of players and player representatives, there aren’t enough teams right now trying to be good. There might, in fact, be too many teams trying to be bad.
The way I see it, very few teams are trying to be bad. The Marlins are obviously tanking. Beyond them — well, there are teams that have recently started to tank or rebuild, but there’s not much else that’s new. I guess the Tigers are either tanking or rebuilding, depending on your definitions. The White Sox started rebuilding some time ago. So did the Phillies, and the Braves, and the Padres, and so on. This is information you probably know.
Back to the matter of spending. I decided to set an arbitrary cutoff. I’ve got opening-day payroll information for every team going back to 2000. My cutoffs: 20%. In this plot, the number of teams, each year, that increased payroll by at least 20%.
These are substantial boosts. There’s no real difference between a 19% boost and a 20% boost, but I had to draw the line somewhere. The peak: Between 2000 and 2001, 13 teams increased opening-day spending by at least 20%. Through last offseason, the average was about seven teams. At present, we’re looking at three teams that meet the criteria. Those teams are the Brewers, Diamondbacks, and Astros.
Now for the opposite. In this plot, the number of teams, each year, that decreased payroll by at least 20%.
Right. So, before, the peak was seven teams, between 2003 and 2004. Through last offseason, the average was about three teams. Right now, we’ve got nine teams that fit. Those teams: the Rangers, Royals, Dodgers, Marlins, Orioles, A’s, White Sox, Phillies, and Tigers.
It probably seems even more meaningful in combined table form. So, here that is.
| Years | Up 20% or more | Down 20% or more | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 – 01 | 13 | 2 | 11 |
| 2001 – 02 | 7 | 3 | 4 |
| 2002 – 03 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| 2003 – 04 | 6 | 7 | -1 |
| 2004 – 05 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| 2005 – 06 | 10 | 1 | 9 |
| 2006 – 07 | 7 | 2 | 5 |
| 2007 – 08 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| 2008 – 09 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| 2009 – 10 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| 2010 – 11 | 6 | 5 | 1 |
| 2011 – 12 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| 2012 – 13 | 9 | 2 | 7 |
| 2013 – 14 | 7 | 1 | 6 |
| 2014 – 15 | 9 | 1 | 8 |
| 2015 – 16 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| 2016 – 17 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| 2017 – 18 | 3 | 9 | -6 |
We’re looking at six more big drops than big hikes. Only once before in the window were there more big decreases than increases, and that was by a total of one team. Now, granted, you probably could’ve predicted this, just from knowing that league-wide spending is currently down — that drop has to show up somewhere. But this is precisely what’s been making so many people so upset. League revenues are at an all-time high. Why should so many more teams be cutting costs? Where’s the sense in paring down, when not enough teams are trying to improve right away?
And yet. And yet, the obvious follow-up is: These numbers don’t matter yet. They don’t matter yet, because those projected 2018 opening-day payrolls aren’t set in stone. Dozens upon dozens of big-league players are still free agents, available on the market, and many of them are going to sign contracts. Many of those are going to be lucrative. There’s been something of a crucial misunderstanding. Not that everyone’s fallen victim, but anyway — the market isn’t slow because of a lack of offers. Not in many cases. It’s slow because offers haven’t been agreed to. It’s not like teams have just been sitting the whole market out.
Yu Darvish has at least one huge offer on the table. He might just be holding out to re-sign with the Dodgers. The Dodgers, in turn, have been trying to shed money to stay under the competitive-balance tax, which is a legitimate factor here, but the stumbling block there would be organizational resistance to packaging a quality prospect with whatever money is going off the books. Anyway, if Darvish is holding out, that affects Jake Arrieta. It also especially affects guys like Alex Cobb and Lance Lynn. Elsewhere, it’s been widely reported that Eric Hosmer has two huge offers on the table, from his two serious suitors. Scott Boras reportedly wants an eighth year. I’m not going to re-litigate the case of Eric Hosmer, but then he’s holding up Logan Morrison, and potentially Mike Moustakas, among others. And there’s the staring contest between the Red Sox and J.D. Martinez. Martinez has a huge offer on the table. Boras is holding out for more. Outside of Boston, the market at such a price doesn’t seem to exist. Boras hasn’t been able to drum up his usual intrigue.
Every case is complicated, and every case involves more details than are publicly known. It’s undeniable that the Yankees and Dodgers have both had some kind of effect on the market in particular, because of their desire to stay under $197 million. It would be fair to argue whether staying under the tax is actually as important to them as they’ve let on. But this isn’t just about the Yankees and the Dodgers, and this isn’t just about teams in the process of rebuilding. Teams have always tried to rebuild from time to time, and rebuilding teams don’t set the free-agent market. Contending teams set the free-agent market, and there are contending teams trying to sign free agents. There are even non-competitive teams in the mix, like the Padres and the Royals! But my sense is that teams definitely evaluate players more similarly than they ever have, and as a consequence of that, they’re less willing to budge — more willing to set red lines, walk-away points. They’d be less susceptible to player-agent persuasion. Agents have jobs to do, but a part of the job is keeping clients realistically informed about the state of the market. Teams are just ahead of where agents are right now, which is part of the reason behind this waiting game. Rob Manfred issued a statement today, and of course Manfred is a biased source, but he’s correct in noting that agents haven’t necessarily kept up with the market. They can’t force money to materialize, if teams are unwilling to exceed certain price points.
The situation is about to change. With spring training around the corner, remaining free agents might feel an urgency to find a new home. But injuries would also open new opportunities, and some teams might just get sick of leaving so many wins out there for the taking. There’s going to be leverage on both sides, and quality players will come to agreements. This just isn’t a story about teams not spending. It’s a story about teams trying to spend responsibly, and it’s a story about unemployed players on baseball’s least efficient market. Once just a handful of dominoes fall, then we should be able to better evaluate where the league has gotten to. For now, stubbornness is king.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.


I’m dying for there to be something else to write about.
I have some ideas.
Mike Trout
Adrian Beltre
Babe Ruth
Mlb translators
Ichiro
Some clips of Barry Bonds home runs
Statcast data based off of old video
One thing I would find fascinating is if someone at Fangraphs did a series of articles where they played fantasy GM for each team out there, setting out an off season plan for the team. What is your direction for the team (rebuild, tank, add, hold, chips in, etc) and how would you get there? FA, trade, promotion, etc. Some teams will be more interesting than others of course, and maybe you only do contenders, but I’d love an article like this on Cleveland.
What do they do at 3B? Ramirez? Yandy and shift Ramirez to 2B? Then what to do with Kipnis?
Do they add and “go for it” because you feel like their window is closing because of the ascendancy of the Astros and Yankees? Or do you decide winning a weak division and rolling the dice in the post season is enough?
Grass growing
Underwear-folding techniques
Lint collection
Or if Nathaniel/Travis/Craig refuse to write about anything else, they can simply redo their poor work.
Nathaniel’s “38% player split’ figure (which this whole absurd series is based on) is dubious- his only source is a now defunct website BizofBaseball. So here’s an article idea- Tony Clark says the split is roughly 50-50%, let’s have a serious empiricist try to estimate whether that is correct- without using a defunct website or poor methodology.
Craig’s “payroll might dip” article should be sent back with a “try again” mark. Instead of making a comparison between 2017 opening day spend and February 2 2018 spend, assuming not another cent is spent, why not use serious empiricism to estimate the 2018 opening day spend- don’t forget, teams can spend in ways other than FA (i.e. contract extensions).
Travis can redo his unbelievably bad JD Martinez projection- if you are going to make a sample size of less than 30, don’t throw out catchers just so that the aging projection for Martinez is better. Better yet, don’t use over-fit comparison criteria to create a sample of 10 players, use a sample over 30.
These are all basics- it’s not that the topic is bad, misleading or boring, the writing and intellectual process is.
If you don’t care for the content, don’t read it. I can understand being bored by the subject matter–we would all rather talk baseball, but what’s the point of the invective?
Hoping to give constructive feedback to encourage better writing.
Regardless of the validity of your feedback, coming off so unnecessarily aggressive makes it hard to take it as constructive.
Hard to imagine that you don’t have an agenda of some sort.
One of these posts per OP is justifiable, if annoying. But you don’t seem to have another theme tune in your pocket, do you?
Wasn’t BizofBaseball Maury Brown’s site? That’s a legit source.
fwiw, I got a % of revenue split in the low 40s using some very rough back of the envelope math.
Hear hear. There is nothing left to cover on this story. I mean, nothing. Let’s just wait until we have some more news that actually breaks before tackling it again.
Personally, I want to hear more about:
Steven Souza
Yolmer Sanchez
Michael Wacha
Alex Claudio
Clete Boyer (I will read anything about Clete Boyer)
Winter Leagues
Pitches with lots of movement (this could be a series…fastballs with most movement, changeups with most movement, etc)
I feel like the loss of Eno means we won’t get the sweet sweet “check out this dude’s weird grip” pieces we all know and love so much.
Instead we need analysis of the best screwballs and eephus pitches of all times.
Lots of disjointed pieces on the same topic lately.
It’s almost like the site needs a Managing Editor.
I applied – I haven’t heard back. Can you put in a good word for me?
Generating article ideas is fun. This is more of a bigger project: which current (and past) GMs have assembled the most WAR/year and WAR/$? Who are the best/worst traders, and who gets the best/worst FA deals? Who’s traded away the most home-grown talent? (Ok, we know the answer to that one already). Who inherited the best team? Who made the biggest turnaround in a 3 or 5 year period, and vice versa? Some way to quantify and visualize GM performance from multiple angles seems like it’d be fun to digest.
Regarding the current topic of spending, the one thing I would like to see once everyone is signed is how do these deals compare to the crowd and DC estimates? As Travis noted in his Jan 3rd piece: “Max Rieper of Royals Review found that, from 2013 to -17, free agents who signed before Jan. 1 received guaranteed dollars 4.0% above FanGraphs’ crowdsourced estimates. Free agents who signed after Jan. 1, meanwhile, received 25.3% less than FanGraphs’ estimates.”
It seems like a big issue is that the good teams are so much better than everyone else and the middle of the pack teams know Yu Darvish doesn’t push them over the hump so it’s not worth spending on him. This means there are less suitors than normal. In the past there may have been 8-10 teams in each league that felt like they could compete for a WS title. This year their are only 4-5 teams in each league that seem within reach of a WS (i.e. within a few wins of the Astros or Dodgers) and could benefit from a big signing. All of those teams have been linked to the biggest names which makes sense and no one else is bothering because they’d rather give their farms another year and save the money for future FA classes.
Agreed in a sense- LAD, Chi, and Hou have a front office/resources combination that is hard to beat.
But the projected standings are roughly normal.
https://www.fangraphs.com/depthcharts.aspx?position=Standings
12 teams are projected within 81 wins. Only one team projected above 94 wins, only one team projected below 68 wins.
There are 10 playoff spots- the clubs projected 8th, 9th & 10th at the moment project to win 88, 87, & 85 games- hardly uncatchable. Two teams are right outside projected at 83 wins. Four additional teams project at 81 or 80 wins, then 5 more between 77 and 79.
The tanking & superteam narrative is largely made up as far as WAR distribution throughout the league today- except that the top 3 franchises are run so well that everyone knows that the top few clubs will be in a great spot to add what is needed during the season.
I don’t buy that any team runs a nearly mistake-free operation. If they did, things would get pretty boring at sites like this.
The Cubs signed a left-handed corner outfielder to a huge contract largely for his defense, which is a pretty terrible idea. The Yankees and Red Sox have some seriously bloated deals. The Astros picked Mark Appel. The Dodgers gave Brett Anderson a qualifying offer. More recently, every team let Verlander through waivers, which is nothing short of awful.
Baseball is hard, it has not been “solved”, and we should all be thankful since this keeps it interesting.
There’s a lot of luck involved. Appell would have been a cub had Theo and friends lost a few more games (in a season they were trying to lose). That would have made the cubs title run more difficult, and you’d have more folks claiming that the Astros brass are geniuses.
The Astros tried to lose for 6 straight seasons, Cubs 5.
True, if some franchises tried losing that badly for that long they’d likely be playing in a World Series – in Montreal.
I am unimpressed by teams building through half a decade of deliberate awful. Not that these teams didn’t do other things well, but it is a very selfish strategy that violates important norms that teams are expected to follow for MLB to function well. [Insert any applicable political analogy here.]
I highly doubt that the Cubs would have taken Appel first overall. The current Cubs’ front office operated with a draft strategy of using their high first round picks on position players, with the logic that such players have a higher success rate than pitchers picked in similar spots. At the time, I’m pretty sure that the consensus view was that Jon Gray as well as Appel would be drafted higher than Bryant.
The real luck for the Cubs was that the Astros didn’t decide to draft Bryant ahead of them.
Define “spending responsibly”
You can say teams spending $9M/Win (they’re not) is responsible. But when revenues are up, a win should cost more. That’s the players argument.
The players’ argument seems to be that a steady 5%+ CAGR in salaries over time is not enough, it needs to be up every single year without a blip. It’s lunacy.
And this “tanking” narrative seems totally overblown to me. Resources are finite and teams SHOULD be allocating them to highest and best use. Both across the roster and across periods of time.
And if MLB owners are trying to lose en masse, thus far they are doing a terrible job. Here is the list of all the teams Steamer projects to win fewer than 70 games: the Royals, the Marlins, the White Sox. That’s the whole list. One team that’s coming off a great 5 year stretch, one that is in rebuild mode, and one that is the Marlins.
11 out of 32 NFL teams didn’t win 40% of their games. (That’s about a 65-win season). A third of the teams! Where’s the hysteria? In the NBA, it’s about 9 of 30. Again, call it 30% of the league on a 65-win or less pace.
Is NBAGraphs.com writing about this every day, 4 times a day?
Enough already. Please. I am starting to feel like FG is working for Scott Boras.
Let’s get back to matters of import. Like what Matt Albers is going to have for breakfast tomorrow. (My guess: a lot).
You cite players’ salary increases without noting the sport’s (owners’) revenue increases. Depending on who you ask, expenditures on players as a percentage of revenue remained pretty constant for a decade until this offseason. Suddenly everyone’s counting pennies? As he says, nothing to prove it, not even any strong evidence, but I’m always skeptical of coincidences. I’m old enough to have lived through all the collusion findings, and the front offices always look innocent until suddenly they don’t.
I remain unconvinced that there has definitively been some step-function change in team spending.
Santana, Cain, Bruce, a slew of RPs that I can neither remember nor differentiate – they all signed for about where one might have guessed. The Yankees effectively signed” Stanton to an enormous deal (with a player opt out).
I’d give this 14 months before I get too worked about it. (And remember, this is the deal the players asked for).
I also remember 1987 and IF Hosmer is sitting on something like $140/7 – and betting he can do better – I’d argue that’s materially different than Andre Dawson mailing out a blank check.
It’s also worth considering here that there’s an asymmetry of utility, and what might be best for each player as an individual might not be optimal for the group.
IE, if Todd Frazier would rather stay local than make more money, so be it. WAR is pretty fungible to a team; practical realities might not be to a player.
Otani very explicitly chose to leave upwards of $100M on the table because it was more important to him to get to the Show immediately than delay his gratification 24 months. That is NOT economically optimal. And it happens not to be the decision I would have made. But it’s not collusion.
I think we know far too little to say it is or is not anything. I agree that there’s nothing concrete out in public. It’s more a sense I’ve gotten from some of the dismissive comments people like Buck Showalter have made about what’s on the market vs. what’s on the roster. Sorry, haven’t been keeping notes so I can’t provide citations, but he’s not the only one I’ve read. I’m just sensing a “who needs them?” attitude from a lot of front office people in the quotes they’re giving the media about this.
I say this as someone who’s glad owners are no longer bidding against themselves and overpaying a few stars while starving the minor leaguers who keep the game going. The longer it goes before the dominoes start to fall, the worse it looks for the game, and I’d argue the worse it is for the game, at least its labor relations.
Good post DBA455.
I would note that, ironically, Ohtani is probably the player (and int’l FA) who could raise a collusion argument- and to a lesser extent minor leaguers and major league minimum guys could as well.
Just not free agents- not with top of the market FAs refusing to sign offers that pay them more than market rate. There’s nothing wrong with players and agents holding out of course- they should get what they can- but their holding out does not support a case for collusion.
“expenditures on players as a percentage of revenue remained pretty constant for a decade until this offseason”
You are not working with the facts, but taking a Boras talking point at face value.
Expenditure on players has been around 50% since 2003. There is no serious evidence to the contrary. This is not set to change this year- FA spend will likely be $1.4b+ this year, roughly in line with recent years, and average MLB payroll is likely to top out at a new all time high by opening day.
There are only two sources suggesting otherwise:
(1) Scott Boras- quoted in almost every Travis article lately; and
(2) the defunct website BizofBaseball
+ maybe CAA
Neither of these sources are verifiable. Further, Boras himself admits that he is including the MLBAM sales revenue- which is not annual revenue nor is it baseball-related revenue under CBA definitions.
Even so, the Travis/Craig/Nathaniel dream team keep writings these tone-deaf recycled anti-fact articles that no one is asking for.
No, actually, I’m saying the same thing you are, I think — expenditures remained constant, though 50% is the MLB figure. I’ve also seen 43%, but whatever, no matter whose figures you use, that’s not in question. I don’t accept Boras’ figure. But until some big names sign this offseason, this offseason represents a big drop-off, doesn’t it?
Do you have a link for your salary projection?
Truth be told I”m not offended by the articles, and hey, I’m paying for them.
Ah sorry, you are right I misread you.
The winning % analysis doesn’t make sense… these are very different industries competing at very different paces.
Teams are spending $9m/projected WAR. The only two counterexamples (which exist every year) are Cozart and Frazier – due to a temporarily flooded 3B market.
MLB is very likely to set record-high payrolls this season, around $138m per club by opening day.
What are the other examples? A couple of QO players (aka the elite players, including one who took a shorter than typical contract) and mostly elite relievers who earn more $/WAR than other players and are increasingly valuable to top teams.
The “glut at third base” includes players who also play second base, left field and shortstop. It is hardly an anomaly restricted to third base.
Most free agent players appear set to end up on the Frazier pay scale than the Cain pay scale. We can wait for what seems inevitable to happen before writing about it, or we can write about it as it evolves before there are spring training developments and signings to cover.
Since we are indulging in the latter, I and perhaps others will be prepared to issue a public apology for our collective “blasphemy” against the “immutable” linear relationship between projected WAR and free agent salaries if our “wild speculations” based on supply & demand prove false.
Nearly all 70 free agents who’ve signed so far have signed for market value.
http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/free-agents/
Sports Illustrated report that Frazier “made it clear that he wanted to stay in NY” and took “a hometown discount.”
There are already 70 signed free agents- none but Cozart and Frazier project for $10m+ surplus. Dyson looks to be the only FA likely to join the surplus value group. We can already be sure that this FA offseason is not providing surplus value moreso than normal- especially because we know what offers the few remaining above average players are sitting on.
Also, I am not seeing a glut of average free agents at 2B or LF Just Walker at 2B I believe (maybe Nunez?), and who in LF? None project for 2 WAR that I can see. Many modern players can switch back and forth from 3B/LF/2B, but that’s more true for younger players than aging FAs.
This is a great reference link. Reminds me of all the FAs I had forgotten about, and is illustrative of the recency bias at work here. You’d think it was 2 years ago that Tyler Chatwood got 25-30% MORE than Cameron was anticipating. Not 2 months.
(I’d point to CC as a guy who also signed a little light, but that also seemed to be by choice/for personal reasons. The Granderson deal continues to surprise me a bit though, his poor Dodger run notwithstanding.)
Teams are not spending $9 million/projected WAR. It’s more like $7 million (run the numbers on Cain, Santana, etc), but even if it was $9 million that doesn’t really prove or disprove your point since we don’t have the numbers from prior years (only what was actually put up, which doesn’t help us figure out what the expected utility was then).
Part of the reason this discussion is so maddening is because there is just no clear data that show everything is hunky-dory for the players, nor any that show that the sky is falling. People just take the numbers and spin a story that matches what they think anyways.
And that doesn’t even take into account that offseason spending isn’t even close to over yet!
We do have data, just not many contracts except for relievers. We will have better data when more contracts are signed, but the absence of contracts is also data, though it is a noisy signal compared to signed contracts.
We also have a good idea of the available player pool and of team rosters and needs, which is the most important data for estimating free agent contracts for specific players.
So yes, we can assess the offseason better in April, but there is enough evidence today to discuss a case against the null hypothesis of sameness.
> There’s no real difference between a 19% boost and a 20% boost, but I had to draw the line somewhere.
If you guys have someone who uses R on the team, this would be a good place to use geom_joy (or any other way to make a joy plot). There are good ways to show distribution changes, and this is an ideal spot for one.
Or you could add the data to this post and someone in the comments could do it. It’s pretty simple.
“They cant force money to materialize, ..if teams are unwilling to exceed certain price points.”
If all teams have the same price points that leads one to collusion. 30 separate teams each with differing levels in their ability to spend, different needs and differing expectations for success cant possibly all have the same price points
As for forcing money to materialize the league has never been as cash rich as it is now with record revenue growth in 2017 and teams prepared to enjoy a 50 million capital gains infusion at much lower taxes from the BamTek sale
Frankly, one wonders as well if lower taxes is a reason teams seem more interested in higher profits than winning. This does not refute collusion but simply reinforces it as it enables teams to be more readily accepting of the risk of doing so yet again. The rewards are simplybgreater now.
“If all teams have the same price points that leads one to collusion.”
No, it doesn’t. Collusion is active, intentional, conspiring. There are plenty of non-collusive industries where firms independently come to very similar conclusions about the value of a given skillset.
No one is arguing that SD and KC, for example, have made the same exact offers to Hosmer. In fact, it’s been reported that the offers are not the same. The only thing that is happening is that Boras isn’t accepting the current highest offer (hoping the other team will bid more), but the other team isn’t budging.
This isn’t “collusion,” or anything even approaching the definition of it.
Jeff, the Travis/Craig/Nathaniel series is just awful, a really bad turn for fangraphs.
It is so repetitive and anti-factual. Nearly every fangraphs reader, of course, supports the players & staff over ownership. Nearly every reader supports reduced cost control, minimum wage for minor leaguers, limits on ownership take, higher major league minimum, and just about every other truly progressive change to MLB CBA.
What I’m sick of is these disingenuous articles that peddle Boras/CAA talking points and a refusal to have a serious discussion.
The data that Nathaniel cited for his “38% player revenue share” figure comes from a defunct website Bizofbaseball. That’s just lazy and poor writing- to continue to spread this figure as fact is far short of fangraphs’ typical quality.
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-mlbpa-has-a-problem/
Travis’ article ‘JD Martinez is Worth the price’ is some of the worst sports empiricism I’ve ever seen. He ignored both defense and baserunning, set arbitrary filters to find a handful of similar batters, excluded catchers from the sample so that the average hitting statistics would improve (even though the catchers otherwise qualified), and then projected a “WAR” based only on a 10-person sample size which was carried by two caught PED users (Giambi and Ortiz). This convoluted method projected Martinez 1.0 WAR higher than Steamer or Depth Charts. It’s fine to have varying projections, but it’s just poor writing to bend over backwards with needlessly poor empiricism to give a bias projection to suit a boring agenda. There is 0% chance that Travis is going to use such shoddy methodology to give a Boras client a worse projection than Steamer- as that would undermine Travis’ nonstop headline, ‘Boras/CAA client ______ is worth it, teams should spend big in FA, it’s the new market inefficiency.”
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/j-d-martinez-is-worth-the-price/
Craig’s articles are similarly agenda driven. When he’s not regurgitating Travis and Nathaniel article-types, he’s using poor empiricism to push the same talking points. His recent ‘MLB Payroll Might Decline’ article is a good example. Serious empiricism would use a model to project the free agent signings and contract extentions that will be given out over the next few months, and then make a comparison between ‘expected 2018 opening day payroll’ and 2017 opening day payroll. But Craig doesn’t do that- infact, there is very little evidence of empirical competence from this new wave of fangraphs talking-points merchants. Absurdly, the data in his article compares ‘February 2nd 2018 spend data’ to 2017 opening day data. The article fails to estimate how much more money will be spent this offseason, so it fails to make a relevant comparison.
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-payroll-might-decrease-for-first-time-in-long-time/
The uniformity of the bias, talking points, and shoddy methods in these articles reek of planning and coordination. It’s clear that the authors are invested in these talking points- Nathaniel probably professionally so. This isn’t objective sports journalism. These articles are no better than Buster Olney’s recent article bashing Tony Clark while taking CAA/Boras quotes at face value. This is not clever commentary or information-rich insight, it’s boring and poor quality, ESPN style agenda campaigning.
Further, the same material is just recycled and recycled. Nathaniel Grow’s last article on the Curt Flood Act is just his recycled Uni paper from a decade ago.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1373063
Recycled talking points passed off as articles are simply boring and poor quality. The self referential nature of the Craig/Travis/Nathaniel articles makes it worse- why don’t the authors be honest and cite the defunct ‘Bizofbaseball.com’ website when arguing that the players’ share has decreased, instead of misleading citations to Nathaniel’s article- as if Nathaniel’s article proved anything?
This style of referencing fangraphs articles that are poorly done creates a circular reference of nonsense- Sadtrombone and others have pointed out how work on the supposed ‘January discount’ is being misread by Travis. William has pointed out Nathaniel’s mistakes, I have pointed out Craig’s mistakes.
This article’s first line is the closet any author has gotten to engaging with the criticism. No one I’ve read is sick of the topic- but rather sick of the bias, sick of the lazy writing, sick of the anti-factual talking points, the bad/zero math, the tone deaf anti-progressive suggestions (fire Clark, increase FA spend, calling Boras FAs the ‘middle class,’ disband the union).
Surely fangraphs readers would give huge support to a slightly different agent- one that focuses on reducing cost control, increases the major league minimum, helps minor leaguers achieve fair work conditions, ends discrimination against foreigners, and otherwise promotes the interests of lower earners.
But that is not at all what we are getting- we are getting recycled ESPN style talking points.
Now compare these endless Travis/Craig/Nathaniel ‘spend FA money!!’ articles to your recent ‘Ripe to buy a prospect’ article- they are night and day. The T/C/N series is just Buster Olney fluff plus some laughably poor math and a refusal to seriously discuss the points- readers can get that anywhere. Your article- about a clever, modern NBA-style trade to get an under-the-radar possible-stud SP- had nothing in common with ESPN style hit pieces on Tony Clark. If we want to read cheerleading for every name FA, we have Jim Bowden.
I cannot wait for Travis, Craig and Nathaniel to start writing articles with serious empirical approaches that assess player performance in a manner that isn’t agenda driven- instead of ‘well, I made a sample of late starters who hit almost exact the same as JD Martinez, threw out the ones who aged the worst, and ignored defense and baserunning- to come up with a 10 man sample from the steroid era to project Martinez’s performance.’ That poor quality methodology is so stupid it insults the readers.
I hear there’s a community blog section. You’re welcome to write there.
As in, many enjoy these articles. Regardless of your view on these articles, your points are factually wrong.
Regardless of your view on his comments, at least he made an argument. If you’re gonna call something “factually wrong,” back it up.
A number of poster have complained about the poor writing and misleading use of data in this Craig/Travis/Nathaniel series- which is partly why Jeff’s first line of this article acknowledges that readers are sick of the agenda-push.
This is the first time that I can recall that fangraphs has had a coordinated, message-focused, PR campaign about something unrelated to performance (even HOF is related to performance), and it’s all built on Nathaniel’s faulty “38%” figure and other poor math (i.e. Travis’s Martinez project ignoring fielding and running, or Craig’s ‘assume not another cent is spent from February to April’ comparison of off season spending).
It’s a change in style, methodology and integrity that is drawing a fair share of complaints- apologies if mine is overly wordy (my post above certainly is, redundant plus typos) but it is an honest opinion and I’ve provided specific points and citations.
And you have been posting the same response to all of these articles; same wording, same complaints, same attacks, same points. Not that I disagree with you necessarily, but if you’re calling FanGraphs repetitive on this topic, consider yourself as well.
Also, have you clarified your allegiances by the way? You’ve accused three different FanGraphs writers of being in the shady employ of agents and MLBPA. By that same logic, can’t they accuse you of being Rob Manfred’s confidant/stooge?
Certainly my objection to this misleading series is repetitive- but the same recycled articles every day will generally draw similar comments.
There are a few others posting ‘sick of this topic,’ ‘overdone,’ ‘Boras talking points’ etc.
And no one is accusing Nathaniel/Travis/Craig of working for Boras- just for doing poor lazy work that devalues the site. Peddling talking points is easy and this coordinated series reeks of selling a lazy and agenda-driven meme from their content partner ESPN.
“You’ve accused three different FanGraphs writers of being in the shady employ of agents and MLBPA.”
No, he didn’t.
You keep saying “defunct website” as if it discredits the work. Its proprietor now writes for Forbes, IIRC. A web site closing because it can’t monetize its product is unrelated to the reliability of its data or analysis.
Citing a defunct website as your only source weakens an argument, especially when there is evidence to the contrary.
MLB/AP sources, as reported by the Globe and Mail, report that:
“Financial data released by Major League Baseball to The Associated Press showed the big leaguers’ share of net revenue was between 48.5 per cent and 51.7 per cent each year since 2006.”
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/baseball/players-share-of-revenue-steady-but-cuban-prospects-getting-big-deals/article29321879/
Tony Clark Head of the MLBAP says that “despite what you may have read or heard at any given time, the quote-unquote ‘player share’ is as close to 50-50 as it has been in a long time.”
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-baseball-players-owners-tony-clark-scott-boras-20151203-story.html
Maury Brown of BizofBaseball, formerly Hardball Times and now Forbes, is not under scrutiny here- and that’s the point- we can’t scrutinize his work because it’s not available. It’s the Nathaniel/Travis/Craig contributions which are being scrutinized because they treat this information as fact without seriously acknowledging contrary evidence. Part of this is disingenuous- as Nathaniel knows that Bizofbaseball is speaking about gross revenue, when the actual CBA deals with net revenue in large part because of debt-servicing that comes out of gross revenue. It’s the application of this unverifiable information that is dubious and misleading, with a particularly disingenuous refusal to deal with conflicting evidence that doesn’t serve the talking points.
“monetize its product” sounds like no one was buying what they were selling. And that does not breed confidence in the product.
I don’t like this series either, and have also noted a lot of pretty serious errors of interpretation, mostly about how (fortunately only some) writers/commenters misuse Matt Swartz’s work on $/win.
But
(a) this is not a conspiracy, it’s trying to get page clicks and links help with that;
(b) the empiricism is questionable largely because they’re trying to generate lots of content, because of page clicks;
(c) I don’t pay any money for this, although I should, and am grateful someone is willing to make me think even though they are often wrong;
(d) the commenters at Fangraphs are a really challenging bunch…in this one, someone suggests a joy plot. In another one, someone suggested principal components analysis. This is a pretty serious group. We are gonna rip everything apart.
(e) did I mention this is not a conspiracy?
I think we’ve covered all the angles on this story anyway. I’m with carter up top, I want to talk/read about Ichiro instead.
#bringbackenosandcameron
I fear my “what is Matt Albers going to eat tomorrow?” idea is getting lost in the clutter here.
Anyway, I’m off to find out how I can make $187/hr working from home.
I’ve decided clicking on that recurring spam link is going to be less painful than another “is tanking ruining baseball?! We’ll be back after the traffic and weather to tell you!!” local-news style hype piece.
Someone come get me when pitchers and catchers report.
Oh, and PS, I am betting pancakes and sausages.
‘…stubbormess is king.”
yes MESS.
we have one person driving this bus and he wears the crown you imply. Boras is holding his clients hostage at the cost of possible injury and/or lost employment.
The owners may be in collusion here as far as coming to realize together that investing in FA’s is less cost effective than grooming your own (how did the Astros build their WS team?) for trade or rostering. I have no beef with their stand.
Why did you use today’s data? February 7th isn’t particularly relevant, opening day is.
It’s so easy to simply build an estimator for ‘2018 now-to-opening-day spend’ and make a serious comparison.
I’ve done it myself, and I estimate another $320 AAV in added payroll via free agency plus another $60m AAV in added payroll from contract extensions. Or put another way, another $600m in FA total spend, plus another $350 in total contract extension spend. Reasonable minds can differ on whether Arrieta will get $18m or $22m per year, but certainly not 0.
Similarly- why suggest that maybe more teams are tanking without using any WAR projections?
From what I can tell, current team WAR projections are as normal as ever- no dramatic fallout whatsoever regarding 2nd and 3rd tier contenders. The bulk of the good will that fangraphs has painstakingly created is from using data insights to dispel nonsense. Dipoto is talking nonsense, just regurgitating a popular meme to an audience- why use his throw away comment as sort of evidence instead of using projections to assess which teams are competing?
1) using opening day for comparison while today is more than a month before then would be beyond idiotic, especially given the state of this free agent market and the activity that should occur between now and opening day.
2) if it’s so easy, can you do it? I suggest putting it on GitHub (do you even know what that is?) or some repo, so others could use it.
3) changes in payroll directly indicate ownership plans, while WAR doesn’t always – some teams have internal measures of player value that go beyond WAR. Public analysis using War would miss that and be misguided. Though WAR should probabaly be included with payroll for a more complete analysis.
using a projection so as to compare ‘projected 2018 opening day payroll’ with 2017 payroll is not beyond idiotic.
Yes I know what github is.
‘Tanking’ is not about spending, infact it often includes absorbing bad contracts. It’s about not competing- thus Boras’ offensive and over-the-top comment about ‘anti competitive cancer.’ A team with a projected 77 wins isn’t “tanking” just because they don’t spend. 20 teams are currently projected as many or more wins than the Brewers- which of those 21 total teams are tanking? Only 3 clubs project for less than 70 wins- and one of them has a $140m offer on the table, as does the 4th worst projected club in the land (SD).
Is Cinci dumping its talent? The Phillies aren’t tanking, neither are the Braves- hardly a race towards the bottom in the NL save for the Marlins. Which other NL team is talking? The Pirates are projected for 78 wins.
And the AL only has 4 teams projected below 77 wins- ChiSox, KC, Detroit and Baltimore. KC has made a big offer, Chicago is getting involved in big FA bids, while really only Detroit is scaling back and trading assets. Baltimore is only willing to trade Machado if he won’t resign- no intentional race to the bottom there.
Spending reflects team intent a bit- it also reflects what is available on the market. MLB teams are projected to have the highest ever payroll this opening day- albeit a moderate 1-3% increase in line but not leading the recent 5-ish% growth.
“It’s so easy to simply build an estimator for ‘2018 now-to-opening-day spend’ and make a serious comparison.”
And yet so hard to demonstrate that it works. Why don’t we just wait to see how many of the currently unemployed go without any guaranteed-money offers before we start declaring what is and isn’t happening. You seem very certain of a level of spending on remaining bodies that I don’t see coming to fruition. I don’t think the front offices are bluffing. I think a lot of guys are going to go without jobs.
Players are currently sitting on offers that make the estimates easier.
Darvish, Martinez & Hosmer are all sitting on offers of $20m AAV. Those 3 deals (60m) will close 20% of the current gap ($300m) from current 2018 payrolls to 2017. Another 30 or so notable ‘top 50’ FAs are likely to sign for an average around $7m AAV (210m). Spring contract extensions have averaged ~$50m added AAV in recent years. Additionally, ~20 small signings outside of top-50 type FAs will sign for ~$1.5 each, adding another $30m. To sum, 60+210+50+30=350, which is greater than the 300m current gap despite low-end estimates.
A comparison based on ‘if clubs dont’ spend anymore’ doesn’t lead to insight. If authors projected different figures- that’s reasonable, but arguing on the basis of 0 further spending is poor.
70 free agents have signed for money so far providing a sample.
http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/free-agents/
Generally, the current market matches up with last years’ other than timing- i.e. around record breaking market values. Next year’s market will obviously smash the records, so typical market growth is pretty apparent.
So far the offseason signings feature ~70 players, over 3 months, for an average of $5m AAV each, totaling $350m AAV added. Roughly, 50% of the top 50 are unsigned; more than 50% of the top 10 are still unsigned; 35% (~7 weeks) of the off season is left; and roughly 90 FAs are left. Not all will be signed (I’ve projected only ~50 of the remaining ~90 to sign), but each month sees about 23 players sign and about $115m AAV added to payrolls. So 2 more months at this pace adds around 46 signings and $230 added AAV.
This pace-based estimate ($230 more in FA) roughly squares with the player-based projection ($300 more in FA) I suggested above. Since the biggest offers made this offseason (i.e. Darvish, etc) are still unsigned,I think the player based projection offers more insight. The average of the two projections is that $275m AAV will be added in FA before opening day. Adding also the contract extension money ($50m+), it’s very likely 2018 opening day payroll will exceed 2017 by roughly 1-2m.
Using total spend from February, and assuming no further spend, fails to flesh out the issue.
Zach Duke and Yovani Gallardo are getting $2m AAV deals, David Freese suffered not in vain.
Analytically inclined front offices or not, but at least some of the bigger franchises are surely waiting for the next year’s free agent class.
One can hope of buying a championship or two by signing one or more of the following: Harper, Machado, Kersh, Donaldson, Blackmon, not to mention, there’ll be an assortment of wily veterans available too.
Too bad for current crop of free agents that they aren’t that good and market incentives go against them.
Let’s change a subject.
maybe… just maybe; if history did not tell us that many FA signings over the years have failed to bring winning baseball to town, then the FA’s of today would not be out in the cold. Factor in the crop to be up for FA in 2019 and it does not look pretty.
When the Yankees/BoSox/Dodgers come to realize that FA signings don’t translate to winning teams then you know a major shift has happened. It’s not all about staying below the luxury tax, though that is good economics.
9 theses
1) The two richest teams are getting under the luxury tax for the first time in a few years, explicitly so they can go over next year.
2) Given the last 3 champions, more and more teams (and fans) are looking go with the total-rebuild, accept-losing-for-a-few years approach.
3) A handful of teams currently projected to be dominant means a higher than normal number of teams concluding that either they don’t need anyone, or that they are so far behind that nobody can help.
4) Modern analytics and player valuation has led more and more teams to be skeptical of long-term deals for players with question marks.
5) The top two pitchers currently on the market are one guy who had TJ just a couple years ago and another whose peripherals have been in freefall. The top three hitters are all guys who just had the best seasons of their career. All of these players want >$100 million contracts.
That looks like a perfect storm of an offseason to me. All of them go to why this year happened, none of them suggest this is either collusion, few of them imply a long-term shift.
But add to it
6) Agents have a vested interest in denying that the market has changed and claiming collusion.
7) Teams have nothing to gain and much to lose by discussing their thinking publically.
8) Media has much more motivation (e.g. access) to stay in the good graces of players/agents than owners (especially when criticizing “owners” taken as a collective, not any one named owner).
9) Media is naturally more sympathetic with players than owners, for multiple other social/political reasons.
And you have a sports media inclined to see “collusion” and “structural problems” even when there are multiple other reasons readily at hand, including an analytic site drawing long-term conclusions based on short-term data.
Beautifully said. Concise and thoughtful.
This is one of the best pieces I’ve seen on the topic – including from people with Fangraphs bylines – so I hope it doesn’t get buried down here at the bottom of the pile.
As far as I can tell, baseball owners/management are basically behaving in a way consistent with the views endorsed on this site.
And now a couple of the authors – and a handful of commentators – are crying foul and claiming the game is some how imperiled. I just don’t get it. (And I don’t mean Jeff here; he generally does great work).
IE, one would believe that
(A) players’ output is likely to decay materially after their late 20s:
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/are-player-types-aging-differently-now/
(B) Signing 9-figure contracts is often a bad idea (for some reason i can’t quickly find the most recent Anti Trade Value list, so I’ll provide this as shorthand):
http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=1177&position=1B
(C) Roster constraints aside, player value is somewhat fungible. You don’t need “the best right-handed power hitter”, you need to prevent runs and score them. And do so with finite resources that should be allocated thoughtfully:
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/dont-trade-jackie-bradley-for-jose-abreu/
So now front offices are basically listening, and it’s being met with anguished hand-wringing?
And it’s not even a fact that teams aren’t handing out big dollar deals. It’s just that they haven’t handed out as many … yet. As has been repeated ad infinitum above, the 70 or so guys who have signed have been ~ in line with expectations. I am not convinced that the remainder – much less the class of next year – is going to take some dramatic fall just because the calendar has shifted. (And yes, I have read that Royals blog piece; I just don’t think it means what Travis thinks it means).
There’s also seeming shock at the fact that a collection of executives who run multi-billion dollar entertainment businesses are coming to broadly consistent conclusions about cost/benefit and acting rationally. What SHOULD be surprising is that for so long these valuable enterprises were literally doing things like committing to long-tailed, high-cost liabilities on the back of a napkin! And doing so over the advice of the very people they hired to make these decisions. We’re just sort of coming back to reality.
One last point: I personally dismiss out of hand the idea – which lately has been explicitly endorsed on this site – that a baseball team is somehow fundamentally different from any other entertainment business and that the owner OWES it to me to … do anything. [And yes, taxpayer subsidized stadiums are foolish, but that’s a discrete issue] To me this is just the other side of the coin of people claiming that “they’d play center field for the Yankees for free”. Each of these arguments is completely merit-less.
PS – I’d suggest that Jeff run a poll – which he has done fantastically in the past – but it’s already been done.
And it seems that, aside from Nathaniel and Travis, there’s overwhelming consensus that the slow offseason is more a function of excessive player asks/Boras (47%) than collusion/lack of an effort to win (8%).
https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2018/01/poll-whats-holding-up-the-market.html
Fangraphs seems strangely off-note here. And maybe headed in the wrong direction.
I hope the next step isn’t a series of slides telling me I “Won’t Believe This One Crazy Thing” … that Matt Albers eats for breakfast.
It’s weird. Reads this article from two(!) years ago.
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/with-chris-davis-deal-scott-boras-strikes-again/
There is nothing different about the current FA market except that, at least so far, no team’s owner has been bamboozled by Boras.
What is seemingly so ardently desired now among a selection of Fangraphs writers is for some team, any team, to grab hold of some of these FA anchors in the name “competition.” Which would of course be explicitly against the argument being made by Cameron in the article. Lol.
Other than the rest of Sports Entertainment franchises (NBA, NFL, NHL, etc.) the entertainment industry is fundamentally different.
Most notably by the practice of very public and protracted labor negotiations. Then when these players put on a uniform that identifies them with some city or region it becomes an means of representing ‘us’. To add the issue of taxpayer subsidized stadiums to the mix only strengthens the thought that ‘we’ want to be represented on the highest levels of competition… at any cost.
No where else among the variety of entertainments (music, film, stage) are any of these concerns.
Good post.
To be honest, my main disappointment is that this recent spate of articles on the CBA/FA market/slow off-season (I’m not including this one by Jeff, because it is providing facts, noting that future info will change the current facts, and leaving open its conclusions) is really at odds with what I understood (or at least hoped) Fangraphs was – an informed/empirical-based look at baseball to understand what was objectively true. Fangraphs wasn’t about just generating content based on preconceived, question-begging narratives (including actively ignoring inconsistent, probative evidence). There was a time when Dave Cameron used to make fun of Jon Heymann because that was what he did – and now, at least in this context, the Fangraphs content is indistinguishable.
Below is a link that contains a list of the highest paid players for 2018:
http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/rankings/
Run down through the list and ask yourself how many of these players you would want on your team this season, even just for one year at their 2018 salary. This is why teams are apprehensive to sign players, especially from this year’s mediocre crop of free agents
One year? There are plenty of great players on there. Do you think there’s a single contending team that wouldn’t jump at a Mike Trout contract for one year?
We have to avoid overkill in talking about this. Teams overpay players at the back end to get present production. If they have a need, for performance or even marketing reasons, and the players has other teams interested in him, they will overpay.
Of course everybody would take Mike Trout…..but how many would take Felix Hernandez, or Jordan Zimmerman, or Homer Bailey, or Albert Pujols? My point was that the average fan is likely to classify more than half of the top 40 as “too old”, “too injury prone” or “not good anymore”.
And recall that Trouts’ deal
(a) included a buyout of some arb years and
(b) was widely considered a huge bargain at the time.
Outside of Arod’s first deal, how many 9-figure contracts have been big wins for the bidder? Matt Holliday’s $120/7 turned out well, and I’m certain there are more I’m forgetting.
But if someone wants to convince me that $100M+ deals have delivered break-even or better results in aggregate, I’d love to see the data.
The Dodgers’ deal with Greinke worked out well for the team. It’s a bit tougher to judge since he opted out midway through the 6 years, but he delivered surplus on that first half and would have delivered surplus over the full contract if he didn’t opt out (per his Fangraphs player page). (2018 would have been the last year of his contract, but in 5 years he’s already totaled value greater than the entire 6 years of salary of that deal.)
Scherzer’s deal still has 4 years left on it, but he’s been so good for the first 3 years of it (18 fWAR) that he doesn’t need to do that much more for it to work out well for the Nationals. Also recall that he has heavy deferrals that lower the NPV to a fair amount less than the face amount of 7/$210 million.
Lester has a chance, with 12 fWAR through the first 3 years of his 6-year deal, but his trendline is more worrisome for how it will end up looking for the team.
I certainly didn’t expect that I’d name pitchers, but those are contracts that come to mind.
“Teams overpay players at the back end to get present production.” Yes, that has been the case for many seasons but that appears to be ending. Too many Albert Pujols, Hanley Ramirez, Pablo Sandoval, Felix Hernandez, and the list goes on and on and on and……… contracts have finally brought front offices to their senses. This realization has not been accepted by Boras, CAA and the rest of the agents and they are fighting it tooth and nail.
From my perspective the Union screwed up. They paid attention to the top of the food chain and forgot about the younger player, who is bound to the team, and subject to service time manipulations as well. If the Union really wanted higher salaries, they should have fought for earlier free agency–maybe th earlier of X years of service, or age 29.
“Huge offer” should not necessarily logically equate with “fair offer.”
If JDM has a $125/5 offer, give or take, from the Red Sox, then that seems awfully “fair” to me.
IE, ~2.8 WAR in 2018 (a mix of Steamer and Zips) at $8-$9M war/per = ~$24M.
For 2018, standalone.
Look again at those aging curves and convince yourself that his rate of decline from age 31-35 is going to make paying that rate attractive for a half-decade.
And I am not ignoring the “overpay on the back end because you’re underpaying on the front end” concept. I am saying that what you are paying on the front end may have ~$0 in surplus! That’s not a good setup.
A few more thoughts, since I apparently can’t stop myself.
(A) The fact that the Red Sox seem to have an offer in that ballpark on the table argues, ipso facto, for a pretty efficient market. I don’t see a glaring need for his services anywhere else around the league. Yet, to quote another site “the very presence of a five-year offer in the currently reported range suggests that the Red Sox feel there’s some degree of competition a bit below that level ”
(B) As far as I can tell, the most likely leakers of contract offers are agents. Not teams. More likely to put a floor under an offer than a ceiling above it. So for Boras to let this information float to the press, then accuse MLB of being complicit in collusion for reading about in the paper is just abject hypocrisy.
https://www.fanragsports.com/heyman-boras-sees-too-much-of-past-in-current-state-of-mlb/
I get why Boras does it. He gets paid to be a shill.
I don’t get why FanGraphs is doing it. (In case I hadn’t mentioned that.)
This series of FA handwringing articles, if nothing else, is highlighting a flaw in the Fangraphs operating model, which seems to reiterate itself every offseason, or any time there is a slowdown in the news cycle.
There is always a common topic which every author flocks to, whether it’s juiced balls, “lift”, PEDs, collusion, etc. Everyone feels the need to chime in, and only occasionally are new ideas and fresh perspectives introduced. This is likely the result of a combination of the following:
1. Baseball does not generate enough unique topics to sustain the daily drip of blog posts, particularly during a slow offseason.
2. Lack of imagination on the part of the writers
3. A workflow that emphasizes quantity and pace of output over quality of product.
4. Good journalism is hard.
I would think that the topic du jour deserves a longer, more in-depth, cohesive investigation with the mix of quantitative analysis, locker-room access, and strictly non-baseball perspective that is the unique core competency of this site, rather than the seemingly haphazard collection of copycat articles that we have been getting.
I’m excited to see what Nathaniel/Craig/Travis do when they offer fact-driven, solid methodology, insights into performance. This current series on financials is far too labored, but they are obviously good writers.
I was glib about this above, but I’ll ask it here in sincerity (and am all ears if Jeff wants to answer): is some of this haphazardness a function of Cameron leaving?
After Nate Silver left Baseball Prospectus, the site seemed to fall into a multi-year tailspin. I would truly hate to see that happen here – and there’s no reason why it should; Jeff alone is worth the price of admission.
I am probably just over-reacting to a small sample size here and creating my own narrative. But that seems to be theme of these woe is me/slow offseason articles – so I am running with it!
Jeff, please repost all of your plots and tables in a month: I’d like to see where we end up, since, as you acknowledge, there’s lots more money that will be spent.
There is a market opportunity sitting here for a team that can afford to spend to go out and try to grab multiple free agents on the same day before anyone else knows what’s happening. if the price has not been set for pitchers because of Darvish and hitters because of Martinez, some team could go out and try to sign say Arrieta, Moustakis, LoMo, and Lynn on the same day. Sounds like a job for the Angels. At least then there’s be something new to write about.
I think that you’re overestimating just how big those discounts would be.
Maybe Moustakas has a slim enough market to take a pretty big discount, but Arrieta and Lynn look like they’ll be along the lines of 1 less guaranteed year than predicted rather than amazingly cheap. I think that the AAV to sign all four would still be ~$55 million. Give or take on each: Arrieta $20, Lynn $15, Moustakas $12, Morrison $8. And I’d predict 4 years for Arrieta, 3 for Lynn, and probably 2 each for Moustakas and Morrison.
Alllll the way down the list:
If injuries are going to be the path for this years’ FA crop to reach for Glory Days, then the situation is desperate.
I don’t remember a FanGraphs article on the subject of March/April replacements (I do remember Stephen Drew coming down from $10 million to $5 million, and even that was an obvious waste).
But, failing such an article, I think I can confidently assert that there’s going to be about 30 or 40 talented ball players out there who would be signed in a competitive environment. Even a mildly WC competitive sort of thing. You know, 500,000 more fans. Leverage on the cable TV deal.
It’s kind of funny to me that the Phillies are one of the payroll decline teams even though they’re also one of basically two teams (Brewers, Cain and Chacin) to pay aggressively for multiple free agents. They’re the only team to pay aggressively for more than 2 players (Santana, Neshek, Hunter).
That’s all.