2015 Positional Ball-in-Play Retrospective – LF

As the calendar mercifully flips to March, it won’t be long until meaningful major league baseball games will be played in a ballpark near you. Meanwhile, let’s continue our series of position-by-position looks at the ball-in-play (BIP) profiles of 2015 regulars and semi-regulars. We’ve already looked at all the various infield positions, so today we’ll begin our outfield review in left field.

First, let’s review some ground rules. To come up with an overall player population roughly equal to one player per team per position, the minimum number of batted balls with Statcast readings was set at 164. Players were listed at the position at which they played the most games. There is more than one player per team at some positions and less at others, like catcher and DH. Players are listed in descending OPS+ order. Let’s begin with the AL left fielders.

BIP Overview – AL LF
Name Avg MPH FB/LD MPH GB MPH POP% FLY% LD% GB% CON K% BB% OPS+ Pull% Cent% Opp%
Cespedes 93.18 96.53 89.46 3.4% 34.5% 20.4% 41.7% 156 20.9% 4.9% 137 43.7% 34.8% 21.5%
Brantley 89.11 91.93 87.35 1.7% 30.0% 22.5% 45.8% 107 8.6% 10.1% 130 42.7% 32.7% 24.6%
Gordon 89.00 91.50 86.61 3.0% 34.6% 24.8% 37.6% 123 21.8% 11.6% 120 45.7% 36.3% 18.0%
S.Smith 89.41 91.86 88.29 0.7% 37.3% 19.7% 42.3% 112 21.9% 10.4% 117 38.7% 34.8% 26.5%
Guyer 86.72 90.73 84.81 6.0% 28.6% 21.2% 44.2% 95 15.8% 6.5% 115 44.7% 32.7% 22.6%
Rasmus 90.24 93.42 84.02 5.1% 46.5% 20.0% 28.4% 159 31.8% 9.7% 113 52.8% 27.0% 20.2%
Gardner 88.22 91.69 86.48 2.1% 31.8% 20.8% 45.3% 101 20.6% 10.4% 105 34.9% 34.5% 30.7%
De Aza 86.63 89.12 83.31 0.9% 36.8% 23.4% 39.0% 118 23.0% 8.5% 104 37.1% 39.2% 23.7%
Dv.Murphy 88.79 90.24 87.98 4.1% 28.4% 16.7% 50.8% 92 12.5% 5.1% 101 38.7% 39.6% 21.7%
E.Rosario 87.90 91.11 83.52 4.8% 35.8% 20.3% 39.1% 129 24.9% 3.2% 99 39.0% 35.8% 25.2%
Tucker 90.55 91.38 90.90 4.8% 31.0% 17.7% 46.6% 106 21.1% 6.2% 99 43.1% 33.6% 23.3%
Me.Cabrera 90.19 91.11 91.38 2.7% 27.2% 23.9% 46.3% 84 12.9% 5.9% 97 36.9% 35.4% 27.7%
H.Ramirez 91.16 95.39 89.24 3.6% 26.0% 20.4% 50.0% 91 16.5% 4.9% 90 37.1% 39.5% 23.4%
DeJesus 87.87 91.16 85.21 3.0% 29.8% 23.5% 43.7% 68 16.4% 6.6% 76 42.0% 33.2% 24.8%
Aviles 87.10 88.20 87.75 4.3% 30.2% 16.3% 49.2% 56 12.0% 6.3% 61 38.0% 36.8% 25.2%
AVERAGE 89.07 91.69 87.09 3.3% 32.6% 20.8% 43.3% 106 18.7% 7.4% 104 41.0% 35.1% 23.9%

Most of the column headers are self explanatory, including average BIP speed (overall and by BIP type), BIP type frequency, K and BB rates, and BIP by field sector (pull, central, opposite). Each player’s OPS and Unadjusted Contact Score (CON) is also listed. For those of you who have not read my articles on the topic, Contact Score is derived by removing Ks and BBs from hitters’ batting lines, assigning run values to all other events, and comparing them to a league average of 100.

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Spotted: Nearly Real Baseball on Almost Television

Arencibia

While much of what appears on the author’s desktop is both detestable and also capable of being detested, that’s less the case with the image above, itself recently captured and and edited and uploaded by that same author by means of his personal computer.

Depicted in that image are Toronto right-hander Drew Hutchison and Philadelphia batter J.P. Arencibia, the latter of whom one finds in the process of recording what the Phillies broadcast team has referred to optimistically as Arencibia’s “first spring-training home run.”

While such a course of events typically wouldn’t merit attention, it’s notable today on account of how the image has been made by possible by the first telecast available this spring by way of MLB.TV. Later today, it would appear, curious fans also have the opportunity to observe Cleveland and Cincinnati face off roughly 2000 miles away from the dirty, dirty shores of the Cuyahoga River. For the moment, however, Maikel Franco is batting for Philly and in the midst of a 1-1 count.


If Josh Collmenter pitches a good game in a blowout, did it really happen?

Collmenter came in relief in 32 games. Among the 210 relievers with at least 30 innings, he had the 6th lowest Leverage Index at a tiny 0.39. He also had the 23rd best performance as measured by change in Run Expectancy.

Only 4 of those 32 games did he enter the game when it really mattered. There was another 3 when it sort of mattered. The other 25 games were a smattering of complete blowouts to mostly didn’t matter.

When we’re handing out wins, especially in games that he had virtually no hand in participating because of the timing in which he came into the game, should Collmenter be like a tree in the forest with no one around?

Or do we give him credit for his performance even though it had no impact when it did happen?


Parity Is the Reward for Having Incentives to Lose

To be honest, I didn’t want to write about the “tanking” story anymore. After Buster Olney and Jayson Stark both wrote extensively about the issue in December and January, I published something of a rebuttal, and since then, follow-up discussions haven’t proven particularly useful, as both sides seem pretty entrenched in their interpretations. Olney and Stark are firmly in the camp that this is a huge systematic problem for Major League Baseball, and others — such as Joel Sherman — have also published pieces suggesting that MLB needs to intervene, so this issue isn’t going away.

Yesterday, Stark wrote another piece on the issue, soliciting comments from Tony Clark on whether the MLBPA is going to make this an issue in the CBA. Clark was diplomatic, keeping his options open, but didn’t really say anything particularly newsworthy. But there was an interesting comment in Stark’s column, from Stark himself, that I think is worth discussing.

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The Atlanta Braves and the Importance of the Local Market

Determining profits and losses for baseball franchises is a speculative task. When teams say they’re losing money, we can take them at their word or ignore them. They don’t open their books, so how much money teams make or lose is subject to factors outside of publicly available knowledge — and, therefore, equally subject to a lot of potential “massaging” on the part of the teams themselves.

That state of affairs might change slightly in the near future, however. Liberty Media, owners of the Atlanta Braves — as well as a majority stake in Sirius XM and a substantial stake in Live Nation Entertainment — are planning to offer stock in their separate divisions. As a result, they’ll have to provide more information to the public on the Braves’ operations. The Braves are claiming losses over the past few years, although in a cash sense, those losses are a bit deceiving, and the team is set to make money this season after slashing payroll.

There was a time, not all that long ago, that almost all Atlanta Braves games were broadcast nationally on TBS. The cable network, owned ostensibly by the same person who owned the Braves, Ted Turner, used the Braves to get publicity for his cable network, and the Braves were able to reach a broader base of fans. In the middle of the Braves’ great run of success, Time Warner bought Turner’s broadcasting company and the Braves, and the new owners continued to put Braves games on TBS. Changes to this once symbiotic partnership, however, brought an end to TBS’s almost daily Braves telecasts and saw the team enter one of the worst television contracts of the last few decades.

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Stop Throwing This Pitch to Nolan Arenado

Pitchers know hitters. They’ve got to. Sure, for the most part, pitchers want to trust their stuff and hit their spots and any deviation too far from one’s comfort zone is a concession to the hitter, but pitchers have got to know hitters, lest they be made to look silly. Example: pitcher faces high-ball hitter, throws high ball, gives up dinger. Well, duh. We told you he was a high-ball hitter, dumb-dumb. Why’d you put it there?

This is why pitchers read scouting reports, and watch videos, and look at heatmaps, and converse with their peers, and use their human brain to rethink past matchups against whichever opponent looms next on the docket. So they don’t look like a dumb-dumb. That’s all anyone’s trying to do, really. Competitive edge, work ethic, drive, determination — those are all just codewords for “Please don’t let my peers judge me.”

That’s why Mike Trout stopped getting the low fastball last year. It wasn’t for baseball reasons. It was so that anytime a nearby group of people shared a laugh over This Week’s Meme, the group’s laughter would no longer be misconstrued by the dumb-dumb pitcher who threw Mike Trout a low fastball as a public and personal lampooning.

But it turns out nobody is perfect, and that’s why we’re all insecure. Mistakes are made, constantly, by every kind of person at every kind of job. Making mistakes is one of the things humans are best at. All we can do is try to be better at learning from mistakes than we are at making them, and oftentimes it feels like an uphill climb.

Say, speaking of which, plenty of pitchers made mistakes to Nolan Arenado last year. Did you know he hit 42 homers? Don’t believe me? Look, here they are!

Screen Shot 2016-03-01 at 9.26.47 AM

Now we have something different to talk about. Now we have something different we have to talk about. You’ll notice I’ve drawn a red line that splits the field in two, and you’ll notice that 40 of the black dots representing home runs are to the left of that dividing red line. You could say Nolan Arenado has a type.

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August Fagerstrom FanGraphs Chat — 3/1/16

11:43
august fagerstrom: return of the Tuesday chat!

11:43
august fagerstrom: baseball on the TV!

11:43
august fagerstrom: good day

11:44
august fagerstrom: Listen to some Grinderman

11:44
august fagerstrom: we’ll start up ’round noonish

12:02
august fagerstrom: alrighty!

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Build a Better WAR Metric: Timing Buckets

On September 1, 2015, the Nationals and Cardinals played a game where the Nationals took a big lead, only to give most of it back almost immediately. The Nationals kept trying to hold on, until the end, when the Cardinals won the game on a 3-run HR.


Source: FanGraphs

Let’s look at that ninth inning. First up was Jason Heyward. He grounded out. That context-neutral run value of making an out is -0.25 runs (or -.027 wins). Making an out to start the inning with the bases empty is only worth -0.225 runs (or -.024 wins). Therefore, the base-out timing value of the out is +.025 runs (or +.003 wins). It looks like this:

-.027 wins: Heyward’s out
+.003 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty

But we know more information. It was a 5-5 game to start the bottom of the 9th. This is a higher leverage situation than random. Heyward’s out actually reduced the chance of winning by .050 wins, not .024 wins. That is, the impact is felt twice as much as a random leadoff situation. So, there’s yet another .026 wins to account for. This is what it looks like:

-.027 wins: Heyward’s out
+.003 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty
-.026 wins: high impact timing of out in 9th inning of tied game

The question to ask yourself (not to me, but to yourself), is how much do you want to credit Heyward for making an out in this situation: do you want to just credit him with a random out, because he was just plucked into this situation, or do you want to credit him with making an out as the leverage was lower impact (bases empty) or even high impact (9th inning of a tied game)? Is an out an out, or does the out depend on the situation?

Let’s continue. Yadier Molina also got an out. Going through the above machinations gives us this:

-.027 wins: Molina’s out
+.010 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty
-.019 wins: high impact timing of out in 9th inning of tied game

Now the fun begins. Cody Stanley doubled.

+.081 wins: Stanley’s double
-.056 wins: low impact timing of double with two outs
+.043 wins: high impact timing of double in 9th inning of tied game

So, in a random situation, a double with two outs is not that valuable. It’s less valuable than a random walk. That’s why we have a huge -.056 win value to account for its low impact. But at the same time, this puts the winning run on base in the bottom of the 9th. This is enormously high impact. How you approach valuation will decide how you want to credit Stanley and his double.

Tommy Pham walked with first base open and winning runner already on base.

+.032 wins: Pham’s walk
-.020 wins: low impact timing of walk with 1st base open
-.009 wins: low impact timing of walk (run is useless)

Let’s pause here. The double put the winning run on base, and left 1B open. The walk is in fact practically useless. The win value changed by +.003 wins, which is pretty close to zero. The batter and pitcher know this, which is why we see a NEGATIVE impact of the walk in the 9th inning of a tied game, even though we are in a high leverage situation. This is unlike the double which had a huge POSITIVE impact. The entire sequencing of the situation matters. Given that the batter and pitcher are aware of the situations as they develop, the entire timing values noted above make perfect sense.

Finally, the HR by Brandon Moss.

+.150 wins: Moss’s HR
+.137 wins: high impact timing of HR with 2 runners on
+.114 wins: high impact timing of HR to win the game

In the end, the Cardinals went from a 61.4% chance of winning to 100%, adding +0.386 wins. Adding up the above, and we get:

+.209 wins: all the events in a random situation
+.074 wins: high/low impact timing for base-out situations
+.103 wins: high impact timing of inning/score (except walk)

So, how do you, the reader, want to evaluate each of these plays? How much do you want to assign to the batter (and pitcher) and how much do you just want to have some general “timing” buckets, not linked to any particular player?


Free Dilson Herrera

A cornucopia of promising young hitters lost their rookie eligibility over the course of the 2015 season. Carlos Correa, Kris Bryant, Francisco Lindor and Kyle Schwarber are just a few of the most notable names. Each of them were consensus top prospects, and each looks primed to have an excellent big league career.

However, there was another youngster who eschewed his rookie eligibility with much less fanfare, yet whose future may be nearly as bright — at least according to the stats. As you probably deduced from the title of this piece, that player is Mets second baseman Dilson Herrera. Herrera’s minor league performance yields a KATOH forecast of 10.1 WAR over the next six years. Were he still prospect eligible, he would have landed 12th on KATOH’s top 100.

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Your Stance On the Team Projections (National League)

And we’re back for the second half of this polling project. If you missed the first half, which was dedicated to the American League, here you go. The idea, in short, is just to gauge community opinion of the team projections, which as of Monday are now updated to include ZiPS, instead of just being based on Steamer like before. What we all see now should be awful close to what we see on the eve of opening day, and so, with that in mind, here’s the projected National League:

NL Projected Records
Team W L
Cubs 97 65
Dodgers 94 68
Mets 90 72
Nationals 90 72
Giants 87 75
Cardinals 85 77
Pirates 84 78
Marlins 81 81
Diamondbacks 80 82
Padres 73 89
Rockies 72 90
Brewers 71 91
Reds 70 92
Braves 68 94
Phillies 64 98

The NL projections haven’t been as controversial as the AL projections. On the AL side, we’ve had to talk entirely too much about the Royals, and we’ve also had teams like the Red Sox go off the rails. The NL has behaved more predictably of late, but that doesn’t mean you might not still disagree with some of the projections in that table. Teams are predictable until they aren’t, and this is the whole reason behind the project. I just want to know where you think the numbers are good, and I want to know where you think the numbers are being stupid.

A request, again: when voting below, please try to consider only the information we have at this moment. You can assume that some prospects will or will not eventually show up, but don’t dock certain teams because you think they’ll subtract at the deadline, and don’t boost other teams for expected trade additions. I’m interested in what you think of the teams as we speak. Maybe you just haven’t thought that much about the expected cellar-dwellers, but don’t worry, you can’t actually get this wrong. Once more, thanks for all the help. We’ll analyze all this stuff later in the week.

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