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Teams are constantly trying to sign young players to contract extensions, buying out both the remainder of the player’s cost-controlled seasons and then years of free agency after that. Doing so provides great benefits to the team, chiefly by allowing them to avoid the expenses of the free-agent market.

Not every player is offered or signs that type of extension, however. Some players choose to avoid extensions altogether, hoping for the big free-agent payoff as soon as possible. Other players might develop later and miss the window for an extension. Still others might lack the requisite talent to attract a deal. In every case, the player in question moves on, and that’s the end of it.

There’s a final scenario, however — one in which the club and player both possess an interest in reaching an extension but, for whatever reason, are unable to agree on the terms until the player’s final season of team control. In this case, a team isn’t buying out team-control years, only free-agent ones. And that changes the calculus a little bit. Because, while it’s possible the team might be receiving something of a discount from free agency, the odds of these deals working out for the team are not great.

Contracts for pending free agents (how I’ll refer to these players in their last year of team control) aren’t common. Players who’ve reached the brink of free agency have a major incentive to play out the year and see what the market provides. Having been unable to reach a deal for years, the odds that a player and his club will have a change of heart are low. This is particularly true for players who have never signed a contract extension and are heading into their sixth (or, because of service-time manipulation, seventh) year in the majors, and are now faced with their first chance at free agency.

Despite their rarity, there are a few examples of these contracts for pending free agents every season. Last year, for example, Rick Porcello signed a five-year deal with the Red Sox, while Clayton Kershaw and Brett Gardner have also signed similar contracts in the past couple years.

Looking at contracts from late-2007 through 2013, we can see how those deals have worked out for the teams that have signed them. Using MLB Trade Rumors’ extension tracker I looked for players with between five and six years of service time who were pending free agents and then signed contracts buying out at least two years of free agency. Those deals needed to be at least half-completed by this season to provide a decent idea on the deal’s outcome. In all, I found 26 such contracts. To determine value, I used $8 million per win for this season, and to approximate past and future years, adjusted by $250,000 per season. For contracts still active in 2016, I used the FanGraphs Depth Charts projection for the player, and if there were any years after 2016, I decreased the 2016 projection by half a win per year.

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Yesterday, I ran a post about the teams that we’ve run posts about. Turns out we haven’t written very much about the Twins over the years. We all kind of already knew that. People commented and here is one of them:

Twins fan here. The Twins bring some of it on themselves. For the umpteenth year in a row, they finished dead last in strikeout %. I suppose that in itself is worth thinking about. But now that I actually think about it, who isn’t getting his due? Trevor May? Who, Twins fans, should fangraphs be writing about that they’re not writing about?

I didn’t actually intend for things to work out this way, but let’s talk about the Twins pitchers and strikeouts.

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Mickey Jannis wasn’t allowed to throw a knuckleball when he was in the Rays system. That was in 2010 and 2011, his first two seasons of professional baseball. He’s a Met now, and the butterfly is out of his back pocket.

The bridge between Tampa Bay and New York was unaffiliated. Jannis pitched in the independent Frontier and Atlantic leagues from 2012 to 2014. Non-baseball options were available — the 28-year-old righty has a degree in business administration from Cal State Bakersfield — but he wasn’t ready to give up his dream. Not when he had a secret weapon to employ.

Flummoxing hitters with his floater, Jannis put up a 1.18 ERA for the Long Island Ducks early last summer. Subsequently inked to a contract by the Mets in July, he proceeded to hold his own in 11 appearances between high-A St. Lucie and Double-A Binghamton.

Jannis discussed his atypical journey, and the evolution of his equally atypical go-to pitch, at the tail end of the Arizona Fall League season.

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Jannis on knuckleball commitment: “I mentioned it to (the Rays) toward the end of my second season, when I was with Hudson Valley, but I wasn’t able to throw it in a game. My manager, Jared Sandberg, was kind of all for it. He was, ‘Yeah man, that’s good enough to throw,’ but it just didn’t work out to where I could. I only threw it on the side. Read the rest of this entry »

Ben and Sam preview the Athletics’ season with SB Nation’s Claire McNear, and George talks to San Francisco Chronicle A’s beat writer Susan Slusser (at 21:09).

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It’s no secret that, over the last several years, we’ve been seeing more and more high velocity in the major leagues. The league-average fastball keeps getting hotter, thanks to different training techniques, and thanks to different young-player development, and thanks to God knows how many other things. It’s not that everyone now can throw 95; it’s that the guys who can throw 95 are no longer thought of as freaks. Every team has at least a few of them stashed away.

The velocity trend has lifted many boats. As you can imagine, with league-wide velocity increasing, the same has been apparent on the team level. The Pirates, just as one example, have pretty clearly targeted hard throwers, and that’s just a part of their complicated plan. Not every team has participated, however. The Angels haven’t featured too many hard throwers, as Jered Weaver has taken it upon himself to counter Garrett Richards. The Diamondbacks were more finesse-y for a stretch, before picking it up last season. And the Giants have been another exception. Probably the greatest exception — no team has averaged a slower fastball over the last four years. Presumably related to that, the Giants have also thrown the lowest rate of fastballs.

Yet now they’re a team in transition. I’m not saying this is intentional, but looking ahead, the Giants are lined up to be a harder-throwing baseball team. After years of sagging velocity, the 2016 Giants could be almost league average.

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As we count down the days until spring-training games begin, let’s continue to take a position-by-position look back at the ball-in-play (BIP) profiles of 2015 semi-regulars and regulars to see if we can find any clues as to their projected performance moving forward. We’ve already looked at first and second baseman; today, let’s go all the way to the “good” end of the defensive spectrum and examine the shortstops.

First, some ground rules. To come up with an overall player population roughly equal to one player per team per position, the minimum number of batted balls with Statcast readings was set at 164. Players were listed at the position at which they played the most games. There is more than one player per team at some positions and less at others, like catcher and DH. Players are listed in descending OPS+ order. Without further ado, let’s kick it off with AL shortstops.

BIP Overview – AL Shortstops

Name	Avg MPH	FB/LD MPH	GB MPH	POP%	FLY%	LD%	GB%	CON	K%	BB%	OPS+	Pull%	Cent%	Opp%
Correa	90.58	94.66	87.39	2.6%	26.5%	22.4%	48.6%	130	18.1%	9.3%	132	35.5%	34.2%	30.4%
Lindor	89.08	92.05	88.13	3.1%	25.6%	20.6%	50.8%	118	15.8%	6.2%	122	34.6%	36.1%	29.3%
Bogaerts	88.13	90.84	87.53	2.7%	23.1%	21.5%	52.7%	114	15.4%	4.9%	108	33.8%	34.2%	32.1%
Miller	90.71	94.00	89.64	2.6%	28.8%	20.2%	48.4%	99	20.3%	9.5%	106	32.9%	35.5%	31.7%
Cabrera	87.76	91.61	85.25	5.3%	38.3%	20.7%	35.8%	106	19.4%	6.5%	105	47.9%	27.7%	24.4%
E.Escobar	86.06	89.55	82.32	3.1%	35.6%	19.3%	42.0%	107	19.3%	6.3%	102	41.5%	34.2%	24.2%
Iglesias	83.33	87.17	82.95	3.5%	19.7%	21.0%	55.9%	82	9.7%	5.5%	100	34.6%	36.4%	29.0%
Semien	87.56	91.54	82.12	3.3%	35.5%	23.1%	38.1%	106	22.0%	7.0%	95	42.0%	33.3%	24.7%
Gregorius	86.05	88.67	84.75	3.2%	30.9%	21.2%	44.7%	81	14.7%	5.7%	90	38.5%	35.0%	26.5%
Reyes	85.06	85.92	85.83	7.7%	28.2%	20.0%	44.1%	80	11.9%	5.0%	84	42.5%	35.7%	21.8%
Aybar	85.25	87.87	84.72	1.4%	25.0%	21.0%	52.6%	69	11.4%	3.9%	81	40.1%	37.5%	22.4%
Andrus	87.28	89.71	87.36	3.1%	28.7%	21.1%	47.1%	69	11.8%	7.0%	80	43.7%	31.0%	25.2%
A.Ramirez	84.66	87.57	83.34	3.3%	25.8%	21.4%	49.5%	66	10.9%	5.0%	79	38.1%	42.3%	19.5%
J.Ramirez	86.15	87.73	86.63	4.8%	31.4%	16.2%	47.6%	55	11.0%	9.0%	70	44.2%	30.4%	25.4%
A.Escobar	84.11	86.51	83.31	3.0%	26.9%	22.3%	47.8%	61	11.3%	3.9%	68	31.5%	38.3%	30.2%
Hardy	87.94	90.69	86.51	3.4%	29.7%	17.5%	49.4%	64	20.1%	4.6%	53	40.1%	40.4%	19.5%
AVERAGE	86.86	89.76	85.49	3.5%	28.7%	20.6%	47.2%	88	15.2%	6.2%	92	38.8%	35.1%	26.0%

Most of the column headers are self explanatory, including average BIP speed (overall and by BIP type), BIP type frequency, K and BB rates, and BIP by field sector (pull, central, opposite). Each player’s OPS and Unadjusted Contact Score (CON) is also listed. For those of you who have not read my articles on the topic, Contact Score is derived by removing Ks and BBs from hitters’ batting lines, assigning run values to all other events, and comparing them to a league average of 100.

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Let’s be honest. I’ll start. I’m not a very good baseball player. I used to be much better than I am now, but even back when I was better, I was not good. I fit in with my high school competition and, later, adult league, but in the grander scheme I was, sadly, not good. You are also probably bad at baseball. I know because you are reading this and not playing baseball. That’s okay. It’s what joins us together, you and me.

But what if you had to play? What if you were sitting in the bleachers at Camden Yards and all the Orioles came down with 168-hour food poisoning. What if the team bus blew out a tire between the airport and the ballpark and there were no other buses available because the Pope was in town for a week and he loves buses. So, you need to play!

The team needs you, but it also knows you are terrible. You have to play, but you have to play as little as possible while playing. Where could you play with out hurting the team? Well, nowhere. You’re going to hurt the team. Badly. You’re going to really hurt the team because you are awful. Terrible. The worst. You’re just barely better than me, although that’s like saying rotten food is better than poo. It is, but it’s also what Olympic announcers refer to as a “low bar.”

The worst part is that you have to play for a week’s worth of games. And you’re starting. All six games (there’s an off-day but it’s in Baltimore [sad face emoticon]). That’s one long monster truck rally! You have to hit and play the field. No DH for you. Maybe you’re stuck playing for the Red Sox and David Ortiz is like, “No way, bro. Get out there.” Maybe the other people who are forced into duty are older, fatter, and worse than you. Maybe I have to play DH!

So. Now we have to figure out where to put you. First things first: let’s figure out the batting order. Course, it’s actually not hard to figure out the batting order. You’re batting last. The less you bat the better. Because you’re horrible. Sorry to dwell on the fact; I just don’t want you to forget. It’s sort of the point of this article. But it’s probably for the best, batting ninth. I mean, really, do you want to stand in against 95 mph heat? I sure as hell don’t. I don’t want to tell you what I’d do in my pants in that situation, pun sadly intended. I’d bat 10th if I could. I imagine, whether you admit it or not, you would too. But you can’t. You’re hitting ninth. Congratulations. Hope you can foul one off, maybe. Also try not to mess your pants too noticeably.

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On Tuesday, our friends over at NEIFI published a piece about one of the more interesting parts of MLB’s international spending market, building off reports that 16-year-old Lazaro Armenteros — Lazarito, as he is commonly referred to — is looking for a signing bonus in the range of $15-$20 million.

As mentioned, he’s expected to get a bonus in the $15-20 million range. Jim Bowden claims it could reach $25-30m. He’s 16 years old, has no performance record whatsoever. For all practical purposes, he’s in the same boat as any other international free agent his age. The record for largest signing bonus for an international free agent of this age is Nomar Mazara’s $4.95 million.

Sure, perhaps there’s inflation to consider. But are we really supposed to believe that Lazarito’s expected talent is roughly triple, or perhaps as much as six times higher, than the expected value of any other 16-year-old international player? Any 16-year-old international player ever?

That would be really hard to buy under any circumstances. But perhaps especially because no one even actually seems to be making that claim about Lazarito’s talent. People are certainly glowing about Lazarito, saying he has exceptional tools and blue-chip potential. Similar things were said about Miguel Sano, Wily Mo Pena, Michael Ynoa, and others. Similar things are said about one or two amateur free agents each season, or at least every couple of seasons. And yet no player in that age bracket has ever signed for more than $5m.

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