FanGraphs Baseball

In a pair of recent posts at this site, Matthew Kory has examined — first before the Royals’ great success and then also after it — has examined what sort of effect the World Series champions might have on the roster-construction philosphies of baseball’s other 29 teams. Both pieces are founded on a reasonable assumption — namely, that it’s common for franchises to imitate the process utilized by the league’s great victor, with a view to also imitating the product. The Copycat Effect, is how one might characterize this. Why felines specifically have been singled out for their mimetic inclinations, I can’t say. That the phenomenon exists seems like a reasonable possibility.

The current post resembles Kory’s own efforts in that the objective is to isolate and explore the most pronounced traits of baseball’s championship club — those traits which, were an organization tempted to emulate the champion, they would themselves identify as most important. Where it differs from Kory’s work, however, is that the intent here is to look towards the future. Instead of examing which current major-league players or teams most embody the Royals’ strengths, what I’d like to ask is which prospects do that. In other words, I’d like to ask this: which rookie-eligible players would a general manager, attempting to best imitate the Royals, set about acquiring (or keeping, as the case may be)?

That’s the guiding inquiry of the current post. How to answer it, though?

First, this way: by identifying those traits endemic to the Royals. Again, Kory’s work is helpful here. In the latter of his two posts, he identifies the traits which most distinguished Kansas City from the rest of the league: a low strikeout rate among the club’s hitters, strong baserunning, elite defensive ability, and a talented bullpen. For the purposes of this post, I’ll be ignoring pitchers. I’ll do it for a number of reasons, but largely because betting on even the near-term success of relievers is a fool’s errand. So the focus will be on hitters.

That’s the first step towards answering the question. The second: to utilize the recently published Steamer 600 projections for 2016. Here’s how I began: for all 4043 players for whom a forecast has been produced, I calculated the z-scores in each of three categories: strikeout rate (where lower is better), baserunning runs relative to average, and defensive runs (which accounts both for fielding runs and positional adjustment). I then averaged together the z-scores for each of those three categories. Reason dictates that the resulting figure should represent to what degree the relevant player might offer the skills possessed by Royals players.

Below are the top-10 rookie-eligible players by that methodology. Note that Age represents 2016 baseball age and all heading titles preceded by -z- represent z-scores.

Royals Prospects Who Aren’t Royals: Attempt No. 1

Name	Team	Pos	Age	PA	K%	BsR	Def	zK%	zBsR	zDef	Total
Willians Astudillo	PHI	C/1B	24	450	7.1%	0.1	7.5	3.1	0.2	1.2	1.5
Jose Peraza	LAN	2B	22	600	11.2%	0.9	1.9	2.3	1.5	0.3	1.4
Rossmel Perez	BAL	C	26	450	10.0%	0.1	7.5	2.5	0.2	1.2	1.3
Tomas Telis	MIA	C	25	450	12.2%	0.2	8.2	2.1	0.4	1.3	1.3
Hanser Alberto	TEX	2B	23	600	11.7%	0.4	4.7	2.2	0.7	0.8	1.2
Tyler Heineman	HOU	C	25	450	12.2%	0.1	7.5	2.1	0.2	1.2	1.2
Raywilly Gomez	LAA	C	26	450	13.3%	0.2	7.5	1.9	0.4	1.2	1.2
Benjamin Turner	SFN	C/1B	26	450	13.3%	0.2	7.5	1.9	0.4	1.2	1.2
Ramon Cabrera	CIN	C	26	450	14.2%	0.0	10.2	1.8	0.1	1.7	1.2
Alex Swim	MIN	C/OF	25	450	12.9%	0.1	7.5	2.0	0.2	1.2	1.2

So, an immediate observation: this is a list full of catchers plus also Jose Peraza and Hanser Alberto. Because catchers receive such a large positional adjustment (+7.5 runs per every 450 plate appearances), they’re inclined to gravitate towards the top of lists like this. Where projections are concerned, positional adjustments aren’t subject to regression and translation like other metrics. Strikeout rate, baserunning, fielding runs: where only minor-league data is available, Steamer is conservative — particularly so regarding the latter two variables. As such, the large catcher’s positional adjustment unduly rewards catchers. Catchers are important, but merely presenting a list of doesn’t seem entirely in keeping with our objective here. We’ll have to refine our methodology.

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Given the assorted other advances in the game, it’s a little weird we’re still talking about divisions. Divisions have been there all along, so it’s not like they’re some unusual concept, but a perfectly balanced version of baseball doesn’t have them. It’s because of the divisional structure that we had the Cubs and the Pirates forced into a wild-card showdown despite finishing second and third in the National League standings. There’s a good argument to be made that divisions should be completely abolished.

But, you know, that’s not on the horizon. Divisions are presumably here for a while. There are practical considerations that get in the way of idealized baseball. Our reality is one with divisions, and with unbalanced schedules. Sometimes that helps a team, and sometimes that hurts a team. The hope is that in the long run it all evens out.

As long as there are divisions, the makeup of the divisions is going to matter. And as long as there are divisions, they’ll be easy enough to analyze. For example, what follows is a plot of 2015 divisional strength. I thought about doing this in a more advanced way, by, say, folding in WAR or something, but I settled on comfortable simplicity. There are six divisions, yes? In the plot, each division’s overall winning percentage, and also each division’s winning percentage in games against opponents from outside the division. Within, the teams always go .500, by necessity, so that reduces the spread.

Read the rest on Just A Bit Outside.

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The American League edition of this post ran yesterday, and can be found right here.

There’s no sense in bogging the top of this down with words, really. My comments on the history of the Gold Glove, its improvements, and defensive metrics can be read in yesterday’s post. For those interested, I will re-publish the qualification rules and selection process before we begin:

Regarding eligibility, I used the same qualification rules used by Rawlings for the official award. If you’d like, you can find those here. Once having my player pool, I pulled three advanced defensive metrics for consideration: Defensive Runs Saved, calculated by Baseball Info Solutions, Ultimate Zone Rating, calculated by Mitchel Lichtman and used as the in-house FanGraphs metric, and Fielding Runs Above Average, calculated by BaseballProspectus and used as their in-house defensive metric. I summed the three, then averaged them together to figure a “total” defensive runs saved number.

For catchers, things are a bit trickier, so instead I’ve just broken it down to the three major components of catching: controlling the run game (rSB, from FanGraphs), framing (from BaseballProspectus) and blocking (also from BP). These numbers are all represented in run values above or below average, and summed to give us a total defensive runs saved figure for catchers. UZR doesn’t exist for pitchers, so only DRS and FRAA are used.

To the awards!
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The season is over. The games have been played, the asses have been crowned. That’s the end. All done.

Except of course, no, not at all. Baseball season is like outer space, or an order of breadsticks at WTF Thursday’s Neighborhoodish Restaurant. It never ends. But before we move on to the business of baseball’s business, our topic for the next [checks watch] five months, let’s look back just a tad. You’ll recall, in a bit of foreshadowing, that I graded the Royals’ division-winning celebration in September. It has been suggested by some that, now that Kansas City are champions, I should grade their World Series-winning celebration, and see how it stacks up. See if they’ve learned anything over the last month. So, rather than think too hard about a different, more original topic idea, I thought, “Yeah. Sure.” So here we are! Exciting!

We’ll start where we started last time: the beginning. Which is really the end. It’s here:

With two strikes, Wade Davis threw a fastball inside that may or may not have caught the corner. Didn’t matter. The game was already over. Wilmer Flores, already focused on his off season of deep disappointment akin to learning that WTF Thursday’s Neighborhoodish Restaurant closes at 9pm — meaning endless breadsticks are a myth — took the pitch. I’ve watched the play over and over and despite solid video evidence to the contrary I’m not convinced Flores didn’t wander back to the dugout three pitches earlier.

In any case, let’s get to the grading. You may (not) recall that the Royals’ division-winning celebration garnered 58 out of 70 possible points, or 83%. Not bad. But let’s see if the Royals can improve on that effort, or if I even remember what the categories are.

*****

Appropriate Excitement Level

Heh. Remembered that one.

Look, I really want to talk about the appropriate excitement level. I mean, heck, it’s the heading and everything. And sure, fine, the Royals were super excited. Ten points out of 10, boys. Well done. But the thing I keep noticing after Davis’ strikeout of Flores is Flores. Just watch this.

Davis throws the game’s final pitch.

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Four days. It took MLB all of four days to bring us the first transaction of the off-season, as the Mariners and Rays got together on a six player trade that ships some interesting players in both directions. The full trade, as announced on Thursday evening.

Tampa Bay receives:

SS Brad Miller
1B Logan Morrison
RHP Danny Farquhar

Seattle receives:

RHP Nate Karns
OF Boog Powell
LHP C.J. Riefenhauser

While this is a six player deal, for simplicity, we can mostly break this down into three one-for-ones.

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The worst called ball of the season was literally a fastball in the middle of the strike zone. That makes it genuinely the worst called ball imaginable, with the consolation being that it at least didn’t matter very much. When I’ve written these posts in the past, I’ve noted that the bad called balls look worse than the bad called strikes. There is no called-strike equivalent of a ball on a pitch down the middle. You’ll never see a called strike on a pitch at the eyes. You’ll never see a called strike on a pitch in the dirt. I think the default is to call a ball, unless the pitch does enough convincing, and there are limits to that. Still, one post has to be followed by the other. Writing about the worst called ball means I have to write about the worst called strike. That’s below, and I’m sorry it isn’t more visually hilarious, but this is still the worst of something, over seven months of baseball, and the devil is in the details. The devil loves details.

The second-worst called strike of the season? I’ve already written that up, because it was the worst called strike of the season’s first half. It was a lefty strike, thrown by Max Scherzer to Odubel Herrera to open a ballgame. The pitch measured 11 inches away from the nearest part of the strike zone.

Unsurprisingly, the worst called strike of the whole season is similar, in that it’s a lefty strike away off the plate. Over time, we’ve grown kind of used to the lefty strikes getting called, but the thing about this is lefty strikes are balls. The zone shouldn’t extend off the plate in either direction, for anyone, but it has and it does, and hitters have to live with that. The second-worst called strike was 11 inches away from the zone. The worst called strike was 12 inches away from the zone. That’s 9% worse. Pretty big gap when you’re at an extreme.

The good news is nobody cared.

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Ben and Sam talk to Kansas City Star Royals beat writer Andy McCullough about why the Royals won the World Series and what their offseason might look like.

The 2015 season will forever go down as (literally) a banner year for the New York Metropolitans. A National League championship pennant will forever fly above Citi Field, and with youthful pitching studs Jacob deGrom, Matt Harvey, Noah Syndergaard and Zack Wheeler in place for the foreseeable future, a competitive future appears assured. As someone who has spent many years in a major league front office, I can assure you, however, that the page is turned from the present to the future at record speed in the game of baseball. The Mets, and all 29 other clubs, must quickly take stock of who they are and put the wheels in motion toward the club they which to become moving forward.

There is no such thing as a perfect ball club in this day and age. The champion Royals themselves lack offensive power, and their starting rotation was far from fearsome. One can easily make the argument that the Mets owned the starting pitching advantage in each and every World Series contest. Obviously, the Royals’ superior team defense, bullpen, position player durability and ability to make contact more than offset their shortcomings.

The Mets are a very curious case. On the last day of July, they stood 30th and last in the major leagues in runs scored. It’s pretty unique to travel from that low point to playing meaningful games in November. Their other chief weakness, which just happened to be the one that reared its ugly head when the stakes were the highest, was the Mets’ subpar team defense.

While no one would have placed the Mets’ overall defensive ability on par with that of their World Series opponents, both old-fashioned and new-age metrics agree that the National League champions profiled (at worst) as an average defensive club. You want old school? The Mets ranked fifth in the NL in fielding percentage, and made the fifth-fewest errors. You want a little more new-school? They ranked second in the NL in defensive efficiency, i.e., turning batted balls into outs. So far, they look positively above average.

Let’s get a little more cutting-edge, and move on to FanGraphs’ team defense page. Here we find the Mets 17th in overall defense, 13th in UZR/150, 19th in error runs, and 10th in range runs. Now we’re talking straight up major league average.

What if we were to take a look at the issue from a somewhat different perspective, both incorporating batted ball data into the equation, and evaluating team defense from a head-to-head perspective; how did clubs perform defensively as compared to their opponents over 162 games, in the same ball parks, with the same weather conditions?

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A while back, Jeff wrote this article on an Edinson Volquez pitch to Jose Bautista in the ALDS, and a commenter left this comment:

This is a good comment. I like this comment. I decided to investigate this comment. And, as it turns out, StroShow was spot on.

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