FanGraphs Baseball

Jeff Sullivan FanGraphs Chat — 10/29/13

9:04
Jeff Sullivan: Hey all. Late today because whatever

9:04
Jeff Sullivan: It was a late night and I don’t have enough respect for you to show up four minutes ago

9:04
Comment From Justin
Hey, it’s 12:04, time for the Sullivan chat!

9:05
Jeff Sullivan: It matters!

9:05
Comment From Bret
Farrell or Matheny – who would you rather manage your team?

9:05
Jeff Sullivan: Farrell, because I’d be in the AL and there would be fewer opportunities for managerial mistakes

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More Fun with Markov: Custom Run Expectancies

Before the season, I put up a three-part series (1, 2, and 3) that explained how linearly-weighted stats like wOBA, while useful for comparing players to each other, don’t necessarily reflect each player’s true contribution to their team’s run scoring.  You see, the weights used to calculate wOBA are based on league averages.  So, for a team with league average breakdowns in walk rate, singles rate, home run rate, etc., wOBA (and its offspring, wRC+) ought to work very well in figuring out how valuable a player is (or would be) to an offense.  However, when it comes to particularly bad or good offenses, or to those with unusual breakdowns, wOBA will lose some of its efficacy.

Why?  There are synergistic effects in offenses to consider.  First of all, if a team gets on base a lot, there will be more team plate appearances to go around, which of course gives its batters more chances to contribute.  Second of all, if the team gets on base a lot, a batter’s hits are generally worth more, because they’ll tend to drive in more runs.  And, of course, once the batter gets on base in such a team, it will be likelier that there will be a hit (or series of hits) to drive him in.  The reverse of all three points is true in a team that rarely gets on base.

But it goes even beyond that.  Let’s say Team A gets on base 40% of the time, and Team B gets on only 20%, but their balances of the ways they get on base are equal (e.g. each hits 7x as many singles as they do HRs) .  A home run is going to be worth something like 14% more to Team A, due to more runners being on base.  However, to Team B, a home run is worth over ten times as much as a walk, whereas to Team A, it’s worth only about 5 times as much.  That’s because Team A has a much better chance of sustaining a rally that will eventually drive in that walked batter.  Team B will be much more reliant on home runs for scoring runs.

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Effectively Wild Episode 317: How World Series Game Five Was Won (and Lost)

Ben and Sam discuss David Ortiz, Jon Lester and Adam Wainwright, and the latest questionable moves by Mike Matheny and John Farrell.


Jon Lester on the Edge Puts Red Sox on the Edge

Without doubt, the worst question asked of Mike Matheny in his postgame press conference Monday night was whether or not he thought David Ortiz deserved the World Series MVP award. That question, presumably, came from a trained and experienced professional journalist, and Matheny responded about exactly as you’d think he would. If it used to be true that there are no stupid questions, then I think we can agree it’s true no longer. Humanity has broken new ground. But with all that said, you figure Ortiz does have the inside track at this point. In this paragraph we’re going to pretend to care about the World Series MVP award. Ortiz presently doesn’t have much in the way of competition, but perhaps some consideration could be given to Koji Uehara, and of course plenty of consideration would deserve to go to Jon Lester. For it’s Lester who has now bested Adam Wainwright twice, including once Monday in St. Louis.

In retrospect, Lester didn’t need to be as good in Game 1 as he was. He did need to be as good as he was in Game 5, and thankfully because he was so good, we don’t need to sit here talking about whether he should’ve batted in the top of the seventh. (No.) We can just focus on Lester’s performance on the mound, and he finished with a run and seven strikeouts over nearly eight innings. Ask the Cardinals and they’ll tell you Lester on Monday was the same as he was before. A few have gone on record saying as much, and twice now the Cardinals haven’t had an answer. But I think it should be pointed out things weren’t completely alike. There were plenty of similarities between Game 1 Lester and Game 5 Lester — Lester himself was genetically identical — but Game 5 Lester featured a couple twists.

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Lester Bests the Cardinals, and the Twitterverse, in Game Five

The story of Game Five was Jon Lester. The Red Sox lefthander matched Cardinals ace Adam Wainwright pitch for pitch in what turned out to be yet another nail-biter in a white-knuckle World Series. When it was over, the Red Sox had a 3-1 win and a three-games-to-two lead heading back to Fenway Park.

The deciding runs came in the seventh inning, as did the night’s most-interesting Twitter debate. The game was tied, runners were on first and second, and there was one out. David Ross was at the plate. Lester was on deck.

A number of people — some within the media — began Tweeting that the Red Sox should pinch-hit for Lester when his spot came up. After Ross doubled to make the score 2-1, and put runners on second and third, the Tweets increased. “You can’t let Lester bat and give up an out here” was the common refrain. Read the rest of this entry »


Lester, Wainwright, and World Series Repeat Starters

One of the points we’ve been hammering home really all postseason long is that starting pitchers tend to perform worse and worse as a game goes on. It’s far from a dramatic effect — a pitcher the third time around shouldn’t be expected to get completely and utterly bombed — but an effect is there, as pitchers make subsequent trips through the order. Starters become less effective, and so it becomes more and more important to put your trust in a fresh bullpen. It stands to reason part of the effect is pitchers getting a little fatigued. It stands to reason another part of the effect is hitters getting multiple looks at a guy. Hitters communicating with one another about what they’ve seen from a guy. The second and third time, the average hitter might be more prepared to punish the guy on the mound.

Let’s assume that it’s true that there’s a benefit to having already seen a guy once in a game. Maybe it’s not, but that would be quite the discovery. It doesn’t take much of a leap, then, to suggest there might be a benefit to having already seen a guy start in a series. Face a pitcher in one plate appearance, and you might be more prepared in the second plate appearance. Face a pitcher in three plate appearances, and you might be more prepared in the fourth through sixth plate appearances. It sounds sensible, meaning this works as a starting point. It doesn’t yet work as a conclusion.

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World Series Game 5 Live Blog

5:00
David Temple: Hello, all. Jeff should be here shortly. Get your questions in now.

5:01
Jeff Sullivan: I’m right here guys

5:01
Jeff Sullivan: I got confused because David opened this before I did

5:01
Jeff Sullivan: WHO GAVE YOU PERMISSION TO DO THAT

5:01
David Temple: Early bird and whatnot

5:01
Jeff Sullivan: oh right I did

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Five Notable Steamer MLEs from 2013 (Batters)

In his capacity as a VIP baseball writer, the present author has access to the glorious major-league equivalent (MLE) data produced by Jared Cross’s Steamer projection system. In his capacity as a very irresponsible citizen, the present author has decided to present here five notable batter MLEs from the 2013 season, where notable appears to be defined as belonging to a player who (a) was 27 or younger in 2013, (b) received little (or nothing) in the way of major-league playing time in 2013, and also (c) received little (or nothing) in the way of exposure in 2013.

It’s for the second and third reasons there that players such as Seattle’s Nick Franklin, Minnesota’s Miguel Sano, and Houston’s George Springer — despite all having produced formidable MLE lines — are absent from the following.

Offensive and defensive value (denoted as Off and Def, respectively) are expressed relative to league average. Offensive value accounts for baserunning, in addition to batting. Defensive value accounts both for defensive runs and positional adjustment. Both metrics were recently explored by Dave Cameron in these pages.

All figures marked by an asterisk (*) denote instances in which the author has taken terrible, terrible liberties with the Steamer data. Overall baserunning value, for example, has been estimated irresponsibly using Steamer’s translated stolen-base data. Fielding and positional values, moreover, have been estimated even more irresponsibly according to positional adjustment, available defensive metrics, and scouting reports. WAR550, meanwhile, is an estimate of the player’s translated WAR over 550 plate appearances.

Name: Abraham Almonte, 24, OF (Link)
Organization: Seattle Level: Triple-A (Pacific Coast)
MLE: 396 PA, .289/.361/.429 (.329 BABIP), +11 Off*, -2 Def*, 3.4 WAR550*
Notes: Almonte might very well end up belonging to that class of outfielders who has neither the speed native to center fielders nor the power typically attendant to corner outfielders, but one who simultaneously provides value to his club, nonetheless. He controlled the plate excellently at Triple-A Tacoma, recording walk and strikeout rates there of 12.4% and 16.7%, respectively. He did that less excellently in 82 late-season plate appearances with the Mariners (7.3% BB, 25.6% K), although still managed a roughly league-average batting line over that stretch.

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Mike Matheny’s Other Decision

In the bottom of the fourth inning of Game 4, with the Cardinals up 1-0, St. Louis manager Mike Matheny faced a choice. With two outs and men on first and second, pitcher Lance Lynn stepped up. Like most pitchers, Lynn is hardly a threat with the bat; in 137 regular season plate appearances over his first three seasons, he had just seven hits, all singles. Lynn had thrown four solid innings, so Matheny let his pitcher bat. Lynn flew out to right, and the Cardinals would score just one more run.

In the top of the fifth inning of Game 4, with the Cardinals still up 1-0, Boston manager John Farrell faced a similar choice. With two outs and men on first and second, pitcher Clay Buchholz stepped up. He may or may not be able to handle the bat, but with only four career regular season plate appearances in his seven years in the bigs, there’s little reason to think he could. Buchholz had also thrown four productive innings, but Farrell instead chose not to let his pitcher bat.

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The Anatomy of David Ortiz, Human Wrecking Ball

The prevailing story from the World Series, right now, has to be the dominance and intimidation of David Ortiz. In the first four games of the series, he’s hit 16 times and made just four outs, one of which was a grand slam that Carlos Beltran pulled back. He’s hitting .727/.750/1.364 for the series, and he’s been so thoroughly dominant that, last night, Mike Matheny just gave up and intentionally walked him — even without Yadier Molina actually getting up and holding his glove out — in a situation that moved the go ahead run into scoring position. As Jeff noted this morning, that was probably not the right idea, but it came about as a result of Ortiz’s total destruction of Cardinals pitchers in this series. Ortiz, as they say, is “locked in”, and Mike Matheny had no interest in pitching to him in a critical situation.

Ortiz is, of course, a great hitter so we shouldn’t be too surprised that St. Louis is having problems getting him out. And, when we look at where St. Louis is actually pitching him, perhaps we should be even less surprised.

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