POLL: What Kind of Team Do You Want to Root For?
I noticed an underlying theme in both pieces I’ve written since coming back, along with many others written this offseason at FanGraphs. If you are a fan of a small- or medium-market team that will never spend to the luxury-tax line and thus always be at a disadvantage, do you want your team to try to always be .500 or better, or do you want them push all the chips in the middle for a smaller competitive window? In my stats vs. scouting article I referenced a progressive vs. traditional divide, which was broadly defined by design, but there are often noticeable differences in team-building strategies from the two overarching philosophies, which I will again illustrate broadly to show the two contrasting viewpoints.
The traditional clubs tend favor prospects with pedigree (bonus or draft position, mostly), with big tools/upside and the process of team-building is often to not push the chips into the middle (spending in free agency, trading prospects) until the core talents (best prospects and young MLB assets) have arrived in the big leagues and have established themselves. When that window opens, you do whatever you can afford to do within reason to make those 3-5 years the best you can and, in practice, it’s usually 2-3 years of a peak, often followed directly by a tear-down rebuild. The Royals appear to have just passed the peak stage of this plan, the Braves hope their core is established in 2019 and the Padres may be just behind the Braves (you could also argue the old-school Marlins have done this multiple times and are about to try again now).
On the progressive side, you have a more conservative, corporate approach where the club’s goal is to almost always have a 78-92 win team entering Spring Training, with a chance to make the playoffs every year, never with a bottom-ten ranked farm system, so they are flexible and can go where the breaks lead them. The valuation techniques emphasize the analytic more often, which can sometimes seem superior and sometimes seem foolish, depending on the execution. When a rare group of talent and a potential World Series contender emerges, the progressive team will push some chips in depending on how big the payroll is. The Rays have a bottom-five payroll and can only cash in some chips without mortgaging multiple future years, whereas the Indians and Astros are higher up the food chain and can do a little more when the time comes, and have done just that.
What we just saw in Pittsburgh (and may see soon in Tampa Bay) is what happens when a very low-payroll team sees a dip coming (controllable talent becoming uncontrolled soon) and doesn’t think there’s a World Series contender core, so they slide down toward the bottom end of that win range so that in a couple years they can have a sustainable core with a chance to slide near the top of it, rather than just tread water. Ideally, you can slash payroll in the down years, then reinvest it in the competing years (the Rays has done this in the past) to match the competitive cycle and not waste free-agent money on veterans in years when they are less needed. You could argue many teams are in this bucket, with varying payroll/margin for error: the D’Backs, Brewers, Phillies, A’s and Twins, along with the aforementioned Rays, Pirates, Indians and Astros.
Eleven clubs were over $175 million in payroll for the 2017 season (Dodgers, Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Tigers, Giants, Nationals, Rangers, Orioles, Cubs, Angels), so let’s toss those teams out and ask fans of the other 19 clubs: if forced to pick one or the other, which of these overarching philosophies would you prefer to root for?
Kiley McDaniel has worked as an executive and scout, most recently for the Atlanta Braves, also for the New York Yankees, Baltimore Orioles and Pittsburgh Pirates. He's written for ESPN, Fox Sports and Baseball Prospectus. Follow him on twitter.
I know the Orioles were tossed out from the poll, but as someone who grew up during the Baltimorean dark ages of the 2000s (the Orioles first winning season of my lifetime came when I was 15 years old, for perspective), I personally will always choose the team that’s in contention every year, even if it means not going all-in. As a fan, it is absolutely demoralizing watching a team with no shot at the playoffs lose day in and day out. While obviously the ultimate prize is a championship, I absolutely love the thrill of a pennant race down the stretch of the regular season also, and going through long stretches with no chance at that just makes rooting for that team not fun.
This might not be the same method I would choose as a GM, but as a fan, I want some semblance of hope every spring and hopefully summer and fall.
I don’t remember which year it was, I think 1999 or 2000, the Orioles had the highest payroll in baseball, before being overtaken by the spending Yankees, who of course then paced the league for well over a decade.
I completely understand what you are saying (and agree), but that was much more about terrible decision making than a cyclical process. You can probably argue the team was trying to pursue the ‘always competitive’ strategy and a long walk in the wilderness was what they got instead.
It may be just pure preference, but I think that even highly-touted prospects have greater error-bars than does adding ML-talent to your playoff chances during your window of contention. It certainly hurts if those prospects you traded become great on another team, but I like the rebuild process of collecting new prospects and seeing those play even if your team is out of contention for 3-5 years.
Can I suggest something else? It’s probably more “traditional” but it doesn’t quite fit what is suggested here. This might not work as well anymore with agents steering players away from signing long-term extensions…it would cost a lot more than it did then.
John Hart, when he was with Cleveland, put together a blueprint that involved signing your core position players to long-term extensions very, very early. You play out with those guys, and that forms your core. You don’t get the cheap pre-arb years but when you hit on a guy they’re yours for along time. This smooths out the inevitable ups and downs when you sell your pitching and other players, which you should do aggressively.
To be fair, the Pirates also signed guys to long-term extensions except they never really pushed their chips to the center or sold their pitching (or other position players) as aggressively as they should have when it looked like the window was over.
So I guess that means I’m a traditionalist when it comes to pitching and a new-age team when it comes to position players?
What you’ve described would probably be agreed on as the perfect situation by everyone. But most teams aren’t lucky enough to continually have young, core players that they can long-term sign on the cheap. It sounds like you prefer having the pros of both the conservative and aggressive philosophies without having any of the cons.
I don’t really think that’s true at all. It would flatten out your 2-3 “contention windows” and the 2-3 year “rebuilding windows”. That’s not the pros of both without the cons of either, just a middle ground that would still have peaks and valleys of the traditionalist approach but not as extreme.
I also think that it is totally okay to give out bigger early extensions if players aren’t biting on them anymore. That will constrain your spending in FA but that’s okay.
The bigger point is that you should avoid strip-mining the entire team every time you miss a contention window, and the ones to keep are position players you can lock up to longer term contracts. Keep a few guys (they don’t even have to be the best guys!) and sell the rest, and be especially aggressive about selling pitchers.
So, if I were the Rays, I would have likely already traded Colome and Archer. But I would have kept the position players I could sign to a long-term deal (Corey Dickerson, for example), even if it wasn’t at the super-steep discount we’re used to. If I were the Pirates, I would have sold on Gerrit Cole much earlier, but not Starling Marte (although the PED suspension kind of screws things up).
My concern is less with having stars during the lean years, and more with having some guys already in place when my guys come up from the minors. And also, to have some guys the 10-year olds in the stands can get attached to.
Regarding the Pirates, I’m not sure that’s grounded in reality. When would you have traded Cole? After 2015 when he was a top 5 pitcher in the league on a 98 win team? You’d have riots in the streets and then you’re stripping a very good team at that stage. Not only that, but who would have paid for him at that stage? A pitcher cheap as hell with four years of control coming off a 5 win season. Or after 2016 when he had 3 trips to the disabled list? How valuable is he then? I think they got a poor return for Cole because of what they targeted, but I don’t see how trading him after 15 or 16 is realistic at all.
I don’t see how one can argue against the stripping or tanking strategy when it clearly worked so well for the last two WS winners who are positioned very well for the future too. The Pirates bought into their myth that they could have an “endless window” of contention by signing young position players to below market value. But they fell behind very quickly in the power revolution (power hitting and pitching) and their 5-6 year fallow period in LA from refusal to spend money caught up with them. Given the landscape in their division (Cubs and Cards in contention, Brewers on the rise) I think they’re better served razing it, rather then playing this lukewarm they’re content with. To me, the middle road ain’t an option.
The economics and decision making efficiencies have changed the game’s competitive environment so much since the 1990s. Some of those deals are over 20 years old; no moneyball, little data analysis, different labor relationship, players union had a backbone, etc.
I can appreciate that’s what you prefer because it was a formative experience, but I don’t think a return to those days is possible.
I don’t know that it is that far gone. The Pirates signed a whole bunch of their position players to longer-term contracts in the last half-dozen years. The Cardinals have done it with a bunch of players lately too.
Yes, top players are less willing to compromise and take the bird in hand, but I still think it is possible at has at least as much to do with teams wanting squeeze pre-arb years cheaply.
I think the point is, I don’t like it when teams completely strip-mine the major league club and look like they’re angling for draft position. It’s absolutely no fun. So keep some of the fun with some longer-term pieces, and sell any asset that you can’t keep around long term.
Flags fly forever. Go all-in when you’ve got your chance. Way more prospects end up being Brandon Wood than Mike Trout anyways.
I don’t understand what you’re saying. Both models can work, and have recently worked.
Most prospects are neither Brandon Wood nor Mike Trout because most prospects are not top-top projected-future-stars. Accumulating prospects is less about putting all your hope in a generational talent and more about diffusing risk over multiple, valuable prospects, which both contributes depth* to the major league team and also provides the team with tradeable assets that you can cash in when the timing is right**.
*And of course, besides depth, you also can usually get a few true stars out of it. The most valuable thing in the game is a young, cost-controlled, superstar, and the only way to get one of those is development (you develop your own or you develop the talent to trade fro one.)
**Prospects are more liquid than money in baseball, since the ways you can spend money are limited, but you can acquire literally any player in the game at almost any time in exchange for other players. At the July 31 deadline, that is virtually the only way you can acquire anything.
Yet, when you reach the playoffs more than just two or three years at a time during your peak all-in years, then you’ve got a much better chance at winning a World Series or two. The MLB playoffs are often little more than a crapshoot, after all.
“when you’ve got your chance”
from what I’ve noticed that approach requires some years of a conservative build to the roster. As the pieces come together(say, the Indians of the last 5 yrs) you add some key elements (Miller, Encarnacion) in hope of getting over the top. Their success was developing over time and is sustainable.
Funny, I expected this to be 50-50 based on years of debate online and lo and behold it is here too. There is just no way to reconcile those who enjoy being decent every year with those who want that ring above all.
Well, for one thing, the people “who enjoy being decent every year” likely also want a ring above all, they just happen to think a strategy where the team is more consistently “decent” is as or more likely to get a ring.
Yeah, but it is distinct from the all in for sure. In that case the reasoning is to take maximum advantage of being good. There has been plenty of commentary in the last week about how the Bucs didnt maximize their window. I for one had no issue with them playing it tight with future assets, but I’m in that stay good longer camp.
My conundrum with this question is that I prefer a team that is always trying, but yet I know this strategy doesn’t really work, and you still end up with bad years. Therefore I selected the choice for tanking for a few years
It’s interesting you don’t include the Orioles in this; the media is already telling fans the club ‘can’t afford’ Manny Machado, which I think is ridiculous with a payroll of that size.
To be fair, no team can “afford” a 400m dollar contract even if it is market value. It’s just not efficient roster construction.
This poll seems like it’s heavily pre-loaded by the conclusion-drawing adjectives you’re using to describe the two approaches — on one side “all-in,” “big tools,” “upside,” and on the other “conservative,” “decent” — but I’m not at all convinced there’s an empirical reason for this difference in characterization. Do the “all-in” teams actually demonstrably do better during their “all-in” windows of contention than the “conservative” teams do? I see no reason to conclude this is true prima facie.
I don’t think Kiley is bias-ing the question, though FanGraphs seems to be really motivated to get this year’s class of FA’s signed or else declare “collusion.” There’s an equal of amount of doubt that “prospect hoarder”-teams do much better than “boom-bust”-types over the long-run. Eg, the Pirates’ problem is that their core ML-players and their vaunted prospects (Meadows, Glasnow, Bell, Newman, etc.) both declined simultaneously. That’s not to say it’s clear that prospect-hoarding was the wrong decision for the Pirates, just that there’s uncertainty in both options, so the decision boils down to each specific team’s context. (I think the Braves-Marlins choice that Joser offers below is a false one. Both are dream outcomes and I’d say 10 consecutive years of playoffs for a mid-market team like the Braves is impossible in today’s game. Could any team afford Maddux, Glavine, Smoltz, Chipper, Andruw, Javy, etc simultaneously today?)
My point is that there aren’t actually two clear strategic options for every team to pursue where one has higher variance but also predictably higher upside. Characterizing the two choices that way stacks the deck in favor of an approach that, it’s at least arguable, actually just concedes and pre-tanks some seasons without necessarily even improving the odds of others (all that much, or at all). Of course I don’t object to presenting this as an idealized choice — what do you want your team to TRY to do? — just for fun or whatever, but that doesn’t necessarily correspond in any way to what the true outcomes are. And yes, cards on the table, I strongly suspect that the “all-in” model just predictably leads to worse results overall.
What kind of 5-year-old child do you want to teach science?
AGGRESSIVE: A child who goes all-in with ambitious, high-upside projects like building a nuclear reactor in the backyard, but half the time doesn’t get enough sleep at night in pursuit of that goal and then spends the next day throwing tantrums
CONSERVATIVE: A child who does a lot of smaller experiments like growing plants from seed or making an electrical circuit that lights a bulb, and usually has a reasonable chance of going to sleep around bedtime
I agree. Even with the conservative approach, there are still several peaks and valleys.
Take the Cardinals for example, a clear conservative team who have arguably done it better than any other team in the 21st Century. Yet, they too have relative peaks (like their 2006 and 2011 Championships and their 100+ win juggernauts in 2004, 2005, and 2015) and valleys (like their two most recent seasons, as well as 2007 when they actually finished below .500). They’re just generally not as sharp as with the tanking and all-in approach.
I agree with the notion that the Cardinals have done well with sustained success but had peaks and valleys.
I’d argue, though, that the 2006 World Series winning team was in fact a relative valley when it came to overall team quality (and that was reflected in winning only 83 regular season games) that happened to hit a hot streak in the playoffs. That goes back to the point of why a lot of people prefer to have a team that at least has a shot at the playoffs as often as possible.
I feel like just baseball, the conservative approach has to be better. For basketball or something, I would definitely just want to maximize my chances of achieving a super-team.
However, that may be changing now. With the highest-payroll teams like the Dodgers, Yankees, and Cubs also at the forefront of progressive management, you wonder if we’re entering a phase where in order to compete with them, you have to build a team that good. The Astros and Indians probably don’t have the payroll to sustain their current success, but today, it’s hard to imagine a team other than [Cubs, Dodgers, Yankees, Astros, Indians] winning it all. Given a 50/50 bet between them and [the rest] I think I would take them. I don’t think that is typical. If I’m right, that means that the Astros and Indians were better off building super teams even if it leads to a hard rebuild at some point.
The Astros play in one of the biggest media markets in the country, and just won the World Series last year with what looks to be a contender for years to come. Why do we assume they can’t end up right around the tax threshold? It’s not like we’re generally seeing teams spend $600 million on payroll, it seems like it’s doing it’s job.
The Astros’ payroll for 2018 is $132mm, the Cubs are $142mm.
It would be interesting to compare team payroll distributions, normalized for total league spend, over time.
I don’t know where you’re finding $142 million for the Cubs’ 2018 payroll. Cot’s has the 25-man cash Opening Day payroll for 2018 at $160 million and the estimated luxury tax payroll at $164 million. Both figures would be down from 2017, and it’s probable that the Cubs’ 2018 payroll will move up with at least one more FA signing of a starting pitcher.
I’ve said this frequently: I’d much rather have the decade the Braves had from 1995 to 2005 than the decade the Marlins had, even though the Marlins have two World Series titles from that span vs the Braves’ one. The Marlins didn’t sniff the postseason any of the years except for those two, whereas the Braves went to the postseason every year and usually advanced at least one round. The Braves were a well-built team that ran into some bad luck (and some good Yankees teams); the Marlins were a frequently-bad revolving door team with some kind of drunk leprechaun lightning striking twice.
More generally I’d much rather cheer for a smart, well-constructed team with a conveyor of talent from the minors that just happens to come up a game short in the postseason crapshoot than a built-for-one-season pile of hired guns teetering on the brink of tear-it-all-down even if they do a deal with devil and win it all.
While I don’t disagree per se, I think this is a bit of a missed analogy. The Braves were probably better than the Marlins ever were, and for way longer of course. That is like answering Kiley’s question with “I’d rather have both.” He’s asking about process, not outcome. I think we all recognize that the Braves should have won way more world series than the Marlins, so the question is more like this: would you rather have the Braves’ peak, or the Braves’ longevity?
Something like 50% of the comments in this thread so far are not even remotely answering the strategy/process question that it seems like was meant, and instead are talking purely or almost purely about outcomes — so I think it’s probably fair to conclude the article could’ve been clearer about this.
Assuming the goal is to win the World Series (which, from a fan perspective might not be the goal)…
If you believe the playoffs are a crapshoot that anyone can win, then your primary goal should be centered around the binary of making vs not making the playoffs for as many years as possible. Wins that get you over the playoff line have elevated value.
If you believe that only the very best N teams have a shot at winning the World Series, then your goal should be to get into the top N, even if for a short period of time. Wins that get you into the top N have elevated value.
I am really interested to see how Jeff Bridich operates in Colorado. Both of these approaches make sense and would be possible here.
The trouble with going all-in before a reset is that mismanaging that reset leaves you out of contention for many years. Badly run teams get better very slowly, so the all-in approach seems to carry way too much risk.
The recipe for rebuilds/resets is fairly standard: you trade your veterans with surplus value for prospects and the prices (surplus value of prospects) are listed. Doesn’t seem more likely to mismanage than hoarding your own prospects and hoping they meet expectations such as KATOH.
Braves will never win a playoff series anyway, so I’d just like to see them play meaningful baseball in the regular season most of the time.
2017 payroll is not a good indicator of which teams are small market and which teams are big market. Part of the “go all-in for 2-3 years” includes spending over budget for a few years if you think the window is open. Make no mistake, many of the teams listed as “big market teams” are not your perennial payroll powerhouses (Orioles, Tigers, Nationals, Rangers) and will slash payrolls once they are no longer in contention as the Orioles and Tigers already have, and many of the other 19 will gladly take their place when their window comes as high-payroll teams (Phillies in particular come to mind).
As a Reds fan, it has been my experience that the conservative approach only produces those 80 win teams when it is backed by significant resources. Take the conservative approach on a below average budget and you build 74 win lost decade teams that only sniff playoff competition when absolutely everything breaks right.
Experientially, the difference between 64 wins and 74 wins isn’t all that great. So give me a few years of known losing and low expectations with the hope of building a genuine window of competitiveness.
Is this not a bit of a false choice? Surely, you’d want a conservative approach that gives you upside, and when that upside seems to be realized, you push all-in.
Even when you approach your upside, you still have to make the choice whether to push all-in or not. I realize they are excluded from this calculation, but using the Dodgers as an example, they have been criticized a lot by the local media for not going “all-in” the past few years, even though they had a great look in the playoffs. People still talk about them not signing Scherzer or Greinke, and not trading for Cole Hamels. Doing any one of those things would have improved their odds in the short term, but they decided to take the more conservative approach. Like I say above, I think this may work better for them, since their payroll gives them such a high baseline, while a lower-budget team might want to lean towards cashing in their opportunities.
I’d rather win a championship every 10 years and be non-competitive in 8 of those 10 years, than be .500 for 10 years. It’s all about championships and the playoffs. If you’ve forgotten that feeling, go back and watch some tape so the nostalgia returns.
Hovering around .500 is just the baseline for the conservative approach. Many of those teams are going to be much better than .500 and make the playoffs and maybe even win the World Series.
For me, I went with the aggressive strategy. As a fan I would hate to see my team be like the 2015 Pirates where they had room to improve, but did not and suffered for it. Or a team like the Mariners, who are annually considered a decent team but never really get over the hump. Also, in the “reset” years, unlike other major American sports, baseball gives you an excuse to pay extra attention to and learn about the teams’ farm system, keeping you both engaged and hopeful (somewhat) for the coming years.
My father and I have very little in common, besides baseball. I have been very grateful that the Rays have been contenders for a decade. I would rather play competitive baseball in September every year, and win nothing, than sell at the deadline 4 out of 5 years, and win the series in the 5th. I like being able to call Dad and ask him to go to a game in September.
There are so many ways to be “aggressive” or “conservative.” Which are the Nationals?
Trading pieces for short-term gain is clearly aggressive; Gleyber Torres+ for a couple months of Aroldis Chapman, for example.
But signing Scherzer to a 7 year, $210M contract is also aggressive. Extending Strasburg for a 7yr/$175M deal is aggressive. Trading top prospects for five affordable years of control of Adam Eaton is aggressive. But those are all moves that set the Nationals up to at least be decent, with some kind of playoff shot, every single season for years.
Joined up just so that I could respond to this. I think an opportunity was missed here: it would be very interesting to run this poll and also ask what team a responder generally rooted for, if any. I am almost certain there would be some correlations. A few would be clear — how could a Cardinals fan NOT take the conservative approach and how could a Pirates fan not take the aggressive one? — but for most teams, even the rich ones, there might be some unexpected insights into specific fan bases, at least to the extent that FG readers reflect them.
For what kind of team do I want to root