Revisiting the Angels Hypothetical
It was a little over three years ago that I first took a look at this question. The article was a hit!
Now I think it’s time to run the numbers again. People change. Situations change. Statistical projections change. Mike Trout is fantastically good. He is probably the best player in baseball, and he’s under contract with the Angels for another three seasons. Albert Pujols used to be fantastically good. He’s not so much anymore. He was just one of the worst players in baseball, and he’s under contract with the Angels for another four seasons. You know where this is going. You’ve probably wondered about this before, even though the hypothetical is stupid and unrealistic.
Trout isn’t going to get traded. Aside from everything else, he has no-trade protection. Pujols isn’t going to get traded. Aside from everything else, he also has no-trade protection. But let’s say the Angels wanted to make a trade. Let’s say they wanted to package the two players together. Does Pujols’ negative value outweigh Trout’s positive value? Would the Angels trade these players, combined, for nothing? Again, this is stupid. Let’s dive in.
Over the past three years, Trout has been worth 25 WAR. He projects at 8.7, according to Steamer, and he is 26 years old. As for Pujols — over the past three years, he has been worth 0.6 WAR. He projects at -0.1, according to Steamer, and he’ll shortly turn 38 years old.
Trout is under contract through 2020. In each season, he’s due $33.25 million. Pujols is under contract through 2021. His salary next season is $27 million, and it goes up a million each year. These contracts are complicated, especially in Pujols’ case, but for simplicity here, we’ll just focus on the regular salaries and ignore everything else. Mostly, it comes down to those terms.
There’s no scientifically rigorous means of addressing the question. We have to make a bunch of assumptions if we want to get anywhere close, so that’s what I’ll do, just like how I did it before. The goal here is combining Trout and Pujols and searching for any potential surplus value — that is, value above the guaranteed salaries. Where there’s a bunch of surplus value, there’s a bunch of trade value. Where surplus value doesn’t exist, neither does a great chance of a trade. I want to make this as simple as I can, so, I’ve run simple calculations. The results are in the following table, which is based on the Steamer projections, and on a starting point of $9 million per WAR, which is what Dave recommended when I asked him. That reflects the approximate market rate for available wins, and there’s a built-in 5% increase year over year. You see salaries and estimated values, in millions.
| Year | Trout ($sal) | Pujols ($sal) | Trout ($val) | Pujols ($val) | Surplus ($val) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 33.3 | 27.0 | 78.3 | 0.0 | 18.1 |
| 2019 | 33.3 | 28.0 | 82.2 | 0.0 | 21.0 |
| 2020 | 33.3 | 29.0 | 86.3 | 0.0 | 24.1 |
| 2021 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -30.0 |
| Total | 99.8 | 114.0 | 246.8 | 0.0 | 33.1 |
Trout is due just shy of $100 million, yet he’s projected to be worth a little shy of $250 million. Pujols is due $114 million, yet he’s projected to be worth nothing at all. Maybe you could argue he’s projected to be worth the league minimum or something, but that’s effectively negligible. Putting it all together, the most important number is in the bottom right. There’s a surplus-value estimate of roughly $33 million. In net present value, it’s about $34 million. That’s a fairly large and positive number, all things considered.
So it’s settled, then: Trout + Pujols = value. Even now that Trout is particularly expensive, and nearing the end of his deal, this is still a positive package. Working further in the trade’s favor is that Trout would bring compensation upon leaving in free agency. Or, you could say there’s value in being able to negotiate an extension. Working against the trade is that having Pujols is complicated; he’s not good anymore, but he’s still Albert Pujols, and last year he drove in 101 runs. No one wants to be the executive who outright cuts Pujols loose. At the same time, it would be troubling to play him too much. The Pujols situation is best from a distance, and no one would want to inherit it.
Maybe that would all balance out. Maybe it’s all still a net positive for the trade. Yet there’s one more, major complicating factor. Next year, combined, Trout and Pujols are due $60.25 million. Then it goes up to $61.25 million, and then it goes up to $62.25 million. Pujols is due $30 million in 2021. The competitive-balance-tax threshold will rise from $197 million this coming year to $210 million. Any team that goes over the threshold would have to pay some kind of tax.
The situation for every team is different, but when you’re paying a tax, it eats away at the estimated surplus value. Suddenly Trout and Pujols would effectively cost more than their salaries. In the worst-case scenario, where a team is already at the threshold and has been there for a few years, there would be a tax of 50% on the dollar. Which would raise the cost here by more than $30 million in each of the next three years. Such a team wouldn’t want to make this trade. It would no longer be worthwhile, at least absent a bunch of other cost-cutting moves. The competitive-balance tax isn’t an actual salary cap, but it sort of functions that way. Teams are strongly incentivized to drop below, and adding Trout and Pujols wouldn’t help that one bit.
More generally, it’s important for every team to be efficient. The market might pay $9 million per win in free agency, but you can’t pay $9 million per win for a whole roster. That would make a 40-WAR ballclub cost $360 million. If you take a team with a payroll of $180 million, then, in order to get to 40 WAR, it would need to average $4.5 million per win. There’s nothing that helps efficiency more than productive young players close to the minimum, but Trout and Pujols would eat up about a third of the money. Add them to this hypothetical team for 2018 and it would need to find about 31 WAR with about $120 million. Now you’re looking at $3.9 million per win for the remainder. It gets to be challenging as flexibility is limited.
Mike Trout and Albert Pujols have value, combined, in isolation. Or, if you prefer, in theory. In practice, the competitive-balance tax would take a lot of teams out of the running. The overage would chip away at that theoretical value, in some cases erasing it entirely. So Trout and Pujols would have the most value to a low-cost team that nevertheless has a lot of money to spend. A team with all sorts of financial flexibility. I don’t think there’s a better candidate out there than the Phillies, who could absorb the cost without hurting in any meaningful way. The Phillies have cut costs as they’ve rebuilt, and now they’re looking to start ramping up. They could afford Trout and Pujols, and the package would even be worth something to them. Even despite how awkward it would be to have Pujols on the roster in the first place.
I didn’t mean to take us to the Phillies, but, here we are. The original point was just to run some math. That math was run earlier, and Trout and Pujols do still have a certain amount of surplus value. In reality, the teams that could afford to take them both on are few and far between, but candidates do exist. And this is something that’s never going to happen. So concludes the latest edition of stupidly examining an Angels hypothetical.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.


How is the net present value higher than the total surplus value? Shouldn’t the total surplus be discounted?
The biggest amount is negative $30mm in 2021. Since it’s the furthest year from now, it gets discounted the most.
If you have all positive cash flows, the NPV will be lower. But when you have negative cash flows (or surplus values), it can go either way.
I think it’s because the Year 4 surplus value is actually negative $30MM. That’s atypical.
The only way this happens is if the Angels want to do a salary dump. The only place that would love #5 is St. Louis. Cards should suggest it. Give them Pham and forget about Stanton (or maybe not and build us the Super Team of 2018-2020).
He is probably the best player in baseball.
Probably? Blasphemy!
Oh god, five more months of Trout hypotheticals in Philadelphia.
This should be a weekly series.
Actually, I think the ideal team for this stupid hypothetical (I mean that in the best way possible, FWIW) would be the Astros. They play in a large market that should be able to support a team at the luxury tax mark, the the ~60M that this would add would bring them right to that mark (assuming they likely then give away someone like Gattis or Gurriel). They don’t have a lot of future commitments, either.
Of course, when you look at it this way, the obvious team that most would be able to afford the combo would be… the Angels. Here you have a team on the brink of a playoff spot, with very few contract commitments save those two, and who play in one of the largest markets in the country.
Can the Angels bolster their farm system by trading with themselves?
I’m sure that if they throw all their prospects into that trade, then each of those prospects will increase in value a lot – merely for being part of the Trout/Pujols trade. And unlike other teams, the Angels can throw all of their prospects into that trade and watch them come out all shiny afterward.
Nobody mention this idea to Jerry Dipoto, because he will try.
I’m a firm believer in the trade-everyone theory. Pay Trout’s entire contract, trade him, and take a team’s entire farm system in return. Then sign Harper and do the same thing. Over and over again. 10 years from now the Angels will have the greatest team in the history of baseball. What could possibly go wrong?
Scott Boras likes this plan a lot more than Arte Moreno.
The Rule 5 Draft could go wrong.
There’s a few minutes I won’t get back…
Is Pujols’s value really zero? There seems to be a strong argument that he has a negative value going forward. I understand it’s not so simple as saying he was worth -1.7 WAR last year so he added $15 million to his salary cost, but there’s also the cost of the essentially wasted roster spot to consider.
An article about how to figure the actual “value” of players with negative WAR would be quite interesting, I think.
This. There is a very real chance that Pujols is never really healthy again, but healthy enough that his salary and fame put him in the lineup every night. There he combines groundouts with double plays and the occasional BOOM to produce negative WAR in each year remaining on his deal. It only takes about -3.5 from him to completely offset the surplus value in Trout’s deal.
I believe the assumption is that if he is such a consistent drain, the team would be rational and cut him before he can accrue meaningful negative cost. Jeff touches briefly on the “he’s albert pujols so an outright cut would be hard” as having an additional drag on the value (although realistically if a GM actually pulled this off I don’t think anyone would complain about cutting pujols)
While you make a good point there, there’s also a chance he has a bounceback at some point that brings him to positive value territory
Plus if he becomes truly awful you can always release him.
“Again, this is stupid. Let’s dive in.” This could be in many Jeff Sullivan articles.
If I am a billionaire with nothing left to buy except a championship, this is what I do. And then I turn around and sign Trout to a sweet contract extension with the money I save from Pujols’ contract coming off the books. And then I roll around in my pile of money like scrooge mcduck.
> So it’s settled, then: Trout + Pujols = value.
Tell that to the very mediocre Angels.
Future hypothetical suggestion. How much money, if any, is a player leaving on the table by taking the security of a multi year deal versus betting on themselves on consecutive 1 year deals. Hypothetically: Bryce Harper, 1 ten-year contract versus 10 one-year contracts.
Great question here. Let’s use Pujols as the hypothetical.
He became arb eligible in 2004 just as he signed a huge 7-year, $100 million deal.
For the sake of ease and because I’m too lazy to go back and estimate arbitration, let’s start with his first potential free agent year, 2007.
So instead of being in the fourth year of a big extension and due $15 million, let’s pretend he was a free agent. He just came off a phenomenal 8.1 WAR season in 2006 in which he hit .331/.431/.671. He was just about to turn 27 and there was no reason to expect regression yet. After averaging more than 8 wins over the previous 4 seasons, even a conservative 7-win projection seems reasonable.
That would mean he could probably have signed a $30 million 1-year deal for 2007, based on the Dollars estimates for 2006 on his page (he was worth $38.9 million with 8.1 WAR, according to FanGraphs estimates, which helps us to figure in free agent dollar inflation). Using the same estimates up through his age 30 season, I’m estimating about $30 million for the 2007 season, $35m for 2008, $40m for 2009, and $40m for 2010.
Since he was now 30 and had declined some in 2010, I would estimate $40m for 2011, $35m for 2012, $25m for 2013, $20m for 2014, $18m for 2015, $12m for 2016, and $4m for 2017, with probably no more significant offers going forward (barring some miraculous turnaround).
That means he would have made a total of $329 million dollars AFTER becoming a free agent before the start of the 2007 season.
Over that time period and through 2021 he will have ACTUALLY been paid $319 million (not counting any of the incentives, the deferred money, the personal service relationship, etc.).
There are a ton of assumptions built into this really rough estimate, including whether he might have performed differently (better or worse) knowing he was constantly playing for the next contract. It also assumes that teams mostly didn’t think he was 3-4 years older than his listed age and are relying at least mainly on previous year’s performance and not solely or mostly on his age at the time. It also doesn’t take into account if teams might be willing to pay less knowing that you only have him for one year with no chance for an extension before he becomes a free agent again.
But if this is even within an order of magnitude of being correct, it means that he did pretty well getting fair value from his contracts vs. doing a 1-year deal every year.
Anytime someone starts off an article telling me how stupid it was last time it was written, it makes me want to read it even more. Thanks!
But how would a team made up of only Trouts and Pujolses fare against, say, a team made of only Bartolo Colons or Dee Gordons?
I enjoyed this version!
But man, a little hand injury can changed minds. Trout had his best offensive output, also keeping his steals going. This, while screwing his hand up stealing second while he was on an offensive tear.
He still kept up with, and surpassed some season long total projections while showing the best k-bb ratio in his career. And surely beat his slash line projections.
Its like we see a guy in New York hit a bunch of homeruns, while whiffing through a large part of the season and we’ve already forgotten. Trout is the leagues best player, no maybes or “one of the best”.
Hes clear ahead of everyone, or am I the only one that was more impressed with his 2017 than any other year (save his rookie 2012)?
Booooo!!!!!!! Just throwing some shade so I can get quoted in the next one.
The actual not-hypothetical takeaway here is that paying Mike Trout what he’s worth in FA would be a fools’ errand, and non-angels fans should perhaps be grateful that he took arte’s money instead of hitting free agency this year and crippling a team’s finances even if he lives up to that value.
Related: this could have been the offseason of both Otani and Trout. Probably best for all of our blood pressure that he took the deal.