Archive for Bobby Abreu

Statistical anomalies in baseball are fun to monitor. I stumbled across one this morning while checking to see how Bobby Abreu had fared this season. In 120 plate appearances, Abreu is slashing .271/.417/.375. The season is still young, but out-OBPing a slugging percentage after 80-100 PAs is strange to the eye. Unorthodox slash lines like Abreu’s stick out for their rarity and invite the questions of why and often they occur.

By analyzing the three rates in the “slash” fashion, fans and analysts have come to expect each successive rate to exceed its predecessor. Outlying that norm is difficult given the inputs fueling the rates. Even Willie Bloomquist can luck himself into an extra-base hit.

It’s extremely rare to post a batting average higher than an OBP, as it would entail never walking or getting hit by a pitch, but recording a few sacrifice flies. And players infrequently post OBPs in excess of their SLG while simultaneously having a decent season. More commonly, these players would fail to record many, or any, extra base hits. It makes more sense to see Reid Brignac’s .212/.257/.212 than Abreu’s line.

But Abreu’s wOBA is currently .365, meaning he is having a solid season at the plate in spite of his slash line cosmetics. There are currently six qualifying players with a wOBA of .325 or higher who boast unorthodox slash lines.

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On account of the Angels and Yankees don’t begin their ALCS match-up for like another 20 days, I was going to wait a bit on this. But seeing as Dave Cameron has already submitted his preview, and seeing how Dave is the boss of me, I guess it makes sense to drop this record.

Rather than look at the match-ups per se, I thought it might be interesting to look at a player who’s played for both teams: Bobby Abreu.

In particular, I’d like to try and answer a question that has been bothering me a little since these playoffs began.

The question: Is Bobby Abreu fast?

The answer: It’s hard to tell.

At first glance, you might say, no. Bobby Abreu doesn’t look fast. Or, at least he doesn’t fit our image of a speed merchant. He’s got a thick trunk, thick legs, and — not that it’s entirely relevant — a little bit of a pudgy face. Who among the games bona fide base stealers has Bobby Abreu’s body? Matt Kemp is bigger (6-foot-3, 226) and he stole 34 bases this year, but he’s also Abreu’s junior by 10 years. Hanley Ramirez? David Wright? Brandon Phillips? Mark Reynolds? They’re all near the same size, but all are at least five years younger and all stole fewer bases at lower success rates.

Abreu’s basic counting stats are those of a legitimate stolen base threat. Abreu stole 30 bases this year and has averaged 28.4 SB since 1998, when he became a full-timer with the Phillies. Over the same span, he’s averaged only 9.1 CS, good for a 75.8% success rate — above any break-even point you’d care to use.

Like Linear Weights? Using Tom Tango’s Custom Linear Weights matrix and supposing a league average run environment for every player (not ideal, but much easier for me), Abreu comes away with 1.96 SB Runs, good for 18th among 154 qualified batters. His SB Runs per attempt comes out to 0.052, good for 30th among the 80 qualified batters with at least 10 attempts. In other words, not elite, but still above average.

What’s another way we might evaluate speed? How about defensive range? Well, this is where it gets ugly for Abreu, who this year posted a -5.2 UZR/150. Not terrible, right? Sure, but that’s only because Abreu’s arm was worth 6.9 runs. His Range Runs above Average (RngR) was -13.8, PLACING HIM BEHIND BEHIND BRAD HAWPE… IN FEWER GAMES. Last year, it was worse: -29.0 RngR. Nor was his arm able to help so much, thus giving him a season-ending -25.3 UZR/150. Ick. That’s disgusting.

Finally, Speed Score might be another way to evaluate Abreu, but I’ll admit, I’m a little suspicious. Consider some of these Spd numbers:

Player		Spd
R. Ibanez	4.8
R. Howard	4.8
F. Gutierrez	4.8
H. Pence	4.5
M. Cameron	4.3

Any measure of speed that ranks Raul Ibanez and Ryan Howard either equal to, or above, Franklin Gutierrez, Hunter Pence, and Mike Cameron ought to be approached carefully. For what it’s worth, Abreu finished with a 5.6 Spd, above the league average of 5.0.

Can we conclude anything? Hard to say. The naked eye and some of the numbers suggest a player with average speed at best. The stolen base numbers suggests a talented base stealer. Maybe the reality is that Abreu relies more on guile than pure speed to steal his bases and that, for some reason, said guile doesn’t translate to the field. That’s a strange conclusion, I think, but the most reasonable one considering.

Though it may feel ages away, Spring Training is fast approaching, and for the first time in 11 seasons, Bobby Abreu has no idea where he will be playing. Abreu’s case has been documented numerous times here: his defense is poor and his bat, though still solid, is in decline mode. Add in that he turns 35 in March and Abreu just does not seem as attractive of an asset as he once did.

Factoring in the current scope of the economy it is not terribly surprising that his asking price was scoffed at, but the issue now deals with the depths to which his asking price will sink. On top of the factors mentioned above, something else is apparently contributing to his dearth of suitors and potential landing spots: teams are getting smarter.

As Dave discussed earlier, Peter Gammons wrote that teams are learning to value defense much moreso than before, leading them to worry about the potential number of runs guys like Abreu, Adam Dunn, and Manny Ramirez give back with the glove. I don’t think each and every team has suddenly hopped on the defensive bandwagon but rather that they recognize $16 mil/yr for three seasons is excessive for a 35-yr old with a declining bat and poor glove in the current market.

Had we just listed the attributes as opposed to the attached name, eliminating all aspects of reputation, the proposed deal would, without a doubt, seem ludicrous. With Abreu gradually decreasing his expectations, the last piece of news on the matter pegged him at 1-yr/$8 mil. At such a little commitment and a drastically lower salary, one could easily reason that a wide array of suitors would line up. This is yet to be the case. Abreu has been linked to the Braves, Mariners, Dodgers, White Sox and Mets, but a Mets official apparently reported that the deal would need to be for a maximum of 1-yr/$4 mil for the Mets to pull the trigger.

I cannot speak for the validity of that statement or how the remaining interested parties value Bobby’s skills, but 1 yr/$4 mil would be the same value, with one less year, that Jeremy Affeldt received from the Giants. The deal would be half of Pat Burrell’s average annual value, which itself was largely depressed. The deal would be $250K less than Brandon Lyon received from the Tigers and equal to the amount Abreu’s former employer, the Yankees, will give to Damaso Marte. I ultimately expect Abreu to sign for a bit more than $4 mil but it has been nothing less than fascinating to watch his asking price potentially end up at 1/4 of its original total.

Our thoughts here on Bobby Abreu are not exactly news. At this stage in his career, Abreu is a solid hitter on the decline who plays poor defense at a corner outfield position. There are several players who fit this description still available on the market, which supply and demand in economic theory suggests will drive down their price. Add onto that how teams are seemingly becoming more fiscally responsible this winter and it comes as no surprise that Abreu’s desired 4-yr/$60 mil or whatever deal is terribly unrealistic.

Jerry Crasnick reported yesterday that Abreu would “be willing to settle” for deals similar to Raul Ibanez and Milton Bradley. The latter two signed deals hovering around 3-yr/$30 mil. Ibanez, though perhaps lesser of a hitter, is a solid comp for Abreu, as both are getting up there in age, losing offensive value, and watching their defensive values drop from bad to awful.

When Adam Dunn, six years younger and more productive offensively, is struggling to land a multi-year deal, the likelihood of Abreu signing an Ibanez/Bradley deal again is very unrealistic. Then, today, reports surfaced that Abreu would be willing to accept a 1-yr deal. I’m not sure how this qualifies as a conscious decision from Abreu. He has to accept a 1-yr deal if he wants to play baseball in the major leagues this season. Nobody is going to sign him to a multi-year deal in this climate.

Perhaps he and his agent can feel better about themselves since taking the initiative makes it appear as if they have arrived at this conclusion, but they were forced to accept a 1-yr deal. As a rightfielder, Abreu projects to around +1.45 wins. As a DH, closer to +1.9 wins. The positional adjustment for DH is stiffer than it is for corner outfielders, but Abreu’s terrible defense added onto the adjustment comes out worse than the DH adjustment.

As a corner outfielder, his fair market value for a 1-yr deal is $6.5 mil. At DH, $8.6 mil. I can see him signing a 1-yr/$10 mil contract, but things could easily go the other way based on what happens with Dunn, Manny Ramirez, Garrett Anderson, and Ken Griffey, Jr. No matter how one chooses to dissect Abreu’s eventual signing, if he signs for anything more than $6.5 mil as a corner outfielder, he better exceed his projection for the sake of the team. The best bet for any interested parties is to put him at the DH spot where his lack of defensive ability can be hidden.

This offseason has been particularly interesting, as seven, count them, seven, corner outfielders with similar skillsets hit the open market. Bobby Abreu, Garrett Anderson, Pat Burrell, Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey, Raul Ibanez and Manny Ramirez all became free agents, all looking to hit a big payday. To date, only Ibanez has signed, and that deal has been largely lampooned.

With a surplus at the position, the market price has seemingly been driven down. After all, why pay an exorbitant fee for Burrell if Abreu could be had for slightly less? Or, replace either of those two names with any of the aforementioned others and the rhetorical question still works. Anderson is a better fielder than hitter, but the remaining players can all be classified as good-hitting, bad-fielding players.

If we want to include Anderson in the mix, this classification can be adjusted to show that these seven players are all one-dimensional.

Going along with the idea of positional adjustments that Dave has written so much about this week, I thought it would be interesting to show the production levels and dollar valuations for everyone sans-Ibanez at both the corner outfield position and designated hitter spot.

Before examining the results, let it be known that the positional adjustments are -7.5 runs per 162 games for LF, and -17.5 runs per 162 games for DH. Short of 162 games, these are prorated. The value above replacement is +20 runs per 600 PA, prorated below that number. Here are the results if they signed on as a leftfielder:

Name        PA/GP    wRAA   UZR    Pos.   Adj.  WAR
Abreu      600/159   16.0  -14.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.46
Anderson   540/140   -6.0    5.0   18.0  -6.5   +1.05
Burrell    600/157   19.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.97
Dunn       600/159   23.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +2.36
Griffey    550/130    2.0  -13.0   18.0  -6.0   +0.10
Ramirez    580/150   35.0  -12.0   19.0  -6.9   +3.51

As a corner outfielder, Ramirez is still the cream of the crop, with Dunn coming in over one win less valuable. Griffey is essentially the definition of a replacement player, and the rest project as below average players. In Burrell’s case, he projects as an average player next year, but at his age, a sharper decline isn’t out of the question. How about if they were to serve as designated hitters instead of outfielders?

To convert to designated hitters, we prorate the -17.5 positional adjustment per 162 games and get rid of the UZR projections. This bumps up the value of Burrell, Abreu, Dunn, Manny, and Griffey. Anderson, who projects to be below average offensively, loses value.

Burrell shifts from +1.97 to +2.20. Abreu from +1.46 to +1.88. Dunn from +2.36 to +2.58. Manny from +3.51 to +3.70. And Griffey from +0.10 to +0.60. Anderson digresses from +1.05 to -0.30, becoming a below replacement level player if he signs as a designated hitter. Translated to dollars, here are the discrepancies between being a LF and DH:

Name       LF WAR   LF FMV    DH WAR    DH FMV
Abreu      +1.46    $7.30     +1.88     $9.40
Anderson   +1.05    $5.20     -0.30     $0.40
Burrell    +1.97    $9.85     +2.20    $11.00
Dunn       +2.36   $11.80     +2.58    $12.90
Griffey    +0.10    $0.50     +0.60     $3.00
Ramirez    +3.51   $17.55     +3.70    $18.50

These results suggest that everyone but Anderson would better serve their team as a designated hitter than leftfielder. For teams, perhaps the most financially interesting dilemma is how much to offer these players given how many of them are on the market. If teams can sign these players for their leftfield fair market value and play them at DH, they will get a steal of sorts. But, if the Ibanez signing is a sign of things to come, teams still do not understand the value of defense.

Still, the calendar year is almost over and these six players are yet to find new homes. A couple may get the paydays initially sought, but others may have to substantially lower their requests to garner a full year’s worth of playing time.

Bobby Abreu has had an incredibly consistent career, at least from an offensive standpoint. From 1998-2007, his OBP never fell below the .393 mark. He has knocked in 98 or more runners each year since 1999. In that same span he has never recorded less than 35 doubles, a walk rate below 14.5%, or a BABIP lower than .327. Additionally, in the ten seasons from 1999-2008, Abreu has hit the 20 HR-20 SB mark eight times, even reaching the 30-30 mark on two of those occasions. For his career, he is right around a .300/.400/.500 slash line, with 241 home runs, 318 stolen bases, and a WPA/LI of 37.03. When he decides to retire, he will be remembered as a great offensive player, one who never truly became the superstar many felt he could become, but who still put together quite the impressive resume.

Some of these numbers have taken a turn for the worse over the last two seasons, however. His OBP fell to .369 in 2007 and .371 in 2008. His ISO has dropped from .242 in 2004 to .176 right now, which is higher than the .162 posted the year prior. Primarily known for having a great eye at the plate, Abreu’s ability to lay off of pitches out of the zone has diminished as well, as his O-Swing% has risen from 10% in 2005 to 16% over the past two seasons. Almost a direct result, the walk rate, never before lower than 14.5%, was 12.2% in 2007, and just 10.7% in 2008. Essentially, this is a case of an aging player losing the skills that make him effective.

Abreu is now a 34-yr old free agent, who will turn 35 during Spring Training of 2009. According to recent reports, he is seeking a deal worth 45 million dollars spread over three seasons. The Yankees and Mets are both seemingly shying away from his asking price, which brings forth the idea that he just is not worth the investment. If so, what exactly is he worth?

From 2006-08, his WPA/LI is an aggregate 5.73. Using some weighting, I am quite comfortable deeming him as a true talent 1.8 win above average player. Defensively, however, is another story. Via the + – system, Bobby has either been the worst, or among the worst, rightfielders in baseball over the past three seasons, posting a -14, -14, and -24. We’ll call him a true talent -17 fielder, which amounts to about 1.5 wins. Before any adjustments are even made, we are now looking at a player worth about 0.3 wins above average. As a corner outfielder, though, -0.5 wins must be docked via a positional adjustment, and +2.0 wins must be added to give us a total above a replacement player. 1.8 + 2.0 – 0.5 – 1.5 = 1.8.

With this in mind, Bobby Abreu is worth about 1.8 wins above a replacement player. Multiply that total by the 5.5 million dollar per win free agency rate, and the grand total is 9.9 million, which will be rounded up to 10 million. Essentially, based on his true talent level right now, if Abreu were to sign a one year deal, a fee of ten million dollars would be appropriate. Since he is seeking a three-year deal, a 10% discount rate comes into play, deeming an appropriate contract worth 27 million dollars over three seasons. Abreu is currently seeking about 18 million dollars more than he is worth. If some team can convince him to serve as a DH, then his asking price may not be in the realm of the absurd, but 15 million dollars per year for a very bad defensive corner outfielder currently losing the offensive skills that allow him to stay in the lineup should not be very realistic.

Abreu was my favorite Phillies player growing up, and my second favorite player to Greg Maddux, but at this stage in the game, he just isn’t worth what he is asking.