Archive for David DeJesus

A couple of years ago, Sky Andrecheck used the power of hindsight to see if an MLB team could have built a 2009 playoff contender using only players who were available on the free-agent market that previous off-season. The only caveat was that this team had to have a league-average budget. Using actual WAR and salaries, Andrecheck pieced together the perfect 25-man roster — actually 18, since he left his bullpen to fend for itself with replacement-level players — and on Aug. 24, his hypothetical team was on pace to win 96 games. And it all happened for the bargain price of $78.6 million.

While this is an interesting exercise, and one I replicated for the 2008 season, I don’t need to tell you that a pretty strong team could have been built on the backs of 2011 free-agent steals such as Bartolo Colon, Brandon McCarthy, Jhonny Peralta and Ryan Vogelsong. Instead, Mr. Dave Cameron, in his infinite generosity, has given me a budget of $80 million FanGraphs Pesos to piece together a free-agent team for next season, without the benefit of hindsight. In case you’re wondering, the ratio of FanGraphs Pesos to Schrute Bucks is 3:1.

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As has been written before, Royals outfielder David DeJesus is the sort of player who tends to fly under the radar because he does no one thing exceptionally well, but he does a number of things at an average or above-average level. He’s been about a 3 WAR player most of his career, and has accumulated almost that much value already in 2010. DeJesus probably isn’t an average center fielder any more, but runs saved in left or right field count, too. Despite having only average-ish power and being a terrible basestealer, DeJesus has a .344 career wOBA (.290/.361/.429). At 30, DeJesus is having a career year in 2010 offensively, with a .379 wOBA (.329/.397/.466). That probably is not his true talent level, but ZiPS’ rest-of-season projection is bullish nonetheless: .299/.369/.444 (.358 wOBA). One good test to see if a sports journalist has a clue is whether he or she says “David DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” By my calculations, those people think that a fourth outfielder is someone whose true talent level over a full season is (conservatively, based on current projections) about 3 WAR. Draw your own conclusions.

Given DeJesus’ subtle combination of skills, it is ironic that the poorly-constructed-but-“official” Elias Rankings might somehow catch on to his value. According to the latest “reverse engineered” Elias Rankings at MLB Trade Rumors, if free agency started today, DeJesus would be Type A, meaning that if the Royals were to offer him arbitration and he turned it down then signed with another team, the Royals would get the signing team’s first round pick in the 2011 draft as well as supplemental pick.

This is particularly interesting because DeJesus is one of the Royals’ best trading chips due both to his value on the field and his team-friendly contract: $4.6 million for all of 2010 with a $6 milllion club option for 2011 (with a $500,000 buyout). Assuming DeJesus is only owed about two million dollars over the rest of the season and (using the conservative 3 WAR full season estimate) is projected to be worth about 1.5 wins at four million dollars per win, that’s four million dollars of surplus value this season. Assuming the team is smart and picks up the option, a half-win decline to 2.5 WAR for 2011 and inflation to about $4.5 million per win, that’s another five million dollars of surplus. Nine million dollars surplus could fetch something like good (if non-elite) prospect and perhaps some filler, and again, that’s based on a conservative estimate of DeJesus’ value.

But if DeJesus ends up a Type A free agent, that potentially adds an interesting wrinkle. In a Kansas City Star article from last month discussing DeJesus, several possible courses of action are mentioned, including trading DeJesus, picking up the 2011 option and keeping him, picking up the 2011 option and trading him in the offseason, and declining the option and then offering him arbitration in hopes he would turn it down and sign with another team, thus netting the Royals draft compensation. This last possibility is what interests me here.

It is an intriging suggestion, but ultimately, it is something the Royals should not do for two reasons. First of all, Victor Wang’s research on Type A compensation (summarized here) values average Type A compensation at about six million dollars. Assuming the Royals could make a fair trade (there is little point in analyzing possible screw-jobs) now at the conservatively-projected above surplus of nine million, the draft pick compensation wouldn’t hold up. Indeed, it is not clear that the draft pick compensation would even be more valuable than picking up DeJesus’ option and trading him in the offseason.

The second reason the arbitration-offer route is a bad idea is that DeJesus would be very likely to accept it. DeJesus is a good player that could help a lot of teams, but he isn’t a top-level talent like Matt Holliday was or Carl Crawford will be. He’s more like Orlando Hudson — a good player, but not good enough that teams are willing to overlook the draft pick they would have to give up to sign him. In each of the last two offseasons, Hudson ended up signing deals below his market value because teams were conscious of giving up the draft pick. DeJesus and his agent have no doubt noticed this, and realize they are likely to get a larger award in arbitration than free agency. If the Royals offer arbitration and DeJesus accepts, they not only don’t get the draft picks, but they would end up paying more in the arbitration award than they would have if they had picked up the option. Moreover, this would further reduce the surplus value (and thus potential return) DeJesus would have on the 2011 trade market.

DeJesus’ Type A status may bring send images of draft picks floating through the heads of Royals fans and officials. But given the likely outcome of that decision combined with the team’s current state, Kansas City should be looking to trade DeJesus now, as his value will never be higher.

Well, what do you know? We have finally made it to the top offensive play of this entire 2008 baseball season, and it happens to belong to a member of the Kansas City Royals. David DeJesus, to be exact. Somehow, the Washington Nationals, Baltimore Orioles, Kansas City Royals, and Seattle Mariners—four of the worst teams in baseball this past season—managed to find themselves involved in the top two offensive plays of the year. Ain’t baseball great? DeJesus’s big play, which will be prefaced and summarized below, provided a win expectancy swing of 90.36%, about one-third to one-half of a percentage point ahead of Ronnie Belliard‘s second-best play, and Pat Burrell’s third-place home run.

The game took place on July 12, in a matchup between Gil Meche and Jarrod Washburn. It also saw Horacio Ramirez, then a member of the Royals, take on his former teammates in Seattle. Would Horacio seek revenge? Oh, that’s right, he isn’t good enough to merit a storyline. Moving on. Take a look at the big spike at the end, as it is the biggest such spike this past season:

DeJesus has had an interesting career to date. His numbers in 2005, 2006, and 2008, are eerily similar, not just in raw totals but rates as well. 2007 appears to be an outlier, as his .291 BABIP was much lower than the .330+ marks he showed himself capable of in 2005, 2006, and 2008. Not many fans know about his production and potential, but he managed to put the Kansas City Royals in first place in at least one category this year: the top offensive plays.

After giving up a leadoff single to Ichiro Suzuki, Meche retired the next three hitters in the top of the first. His counterpart Washburn did not fare as well, as the Royals tacked on two quick runs on the heels of singles by Mark Grudzielanek and Alex Gordon. After one inning, the Royals led by a score of 2-0, that would last for no more than an inning. In the bottom of the second, Mark Teahen hit into a fielder’s choice, scoring Esteban German, and extending the lead to three runs.

After five innings, Meche was absolutely cruising, having walked nobody, allowed no runs to score, and given up just four hits, two of which belonged to Tug Hulett. In the sixth, however, he fell apart. Ichiro once again led off with a single, and two batters later, scored on a home run by Raul Ibanez. Jose Vidro then followed with a single. Adrian Beltre added a single of his own. With two on, and one out, Jeremy Reed hit a double, scoring both Vidro and Beltre, and giving the Mariners the 4-3 lead. The Royals’ win expectancy began the inning at 86.9%, and by the time it ended, had plummeted to 38.9%, a dropoff of 48 percentage points.

When the bottom of the seventh came to its close, their win expectancy had further been reduced to 24.9%. A 1-2-3 inning later from Horacio Ramirez, it had been nominally increased to 30%, but their offense appeared stagnant, and it was only a matter of time before the hard-throwing Brandon Morrow would enter the game. Sean Green and Arthur Rhodes kept the Royals off the scoreboards in the eighth, meaning the ninth inning would begin with the Royals having just a 16% probability of winning the game.

Horacio added another 1-2-3 inning, giving the Royals a 19.7% probability of winning as Morrow entered. John Buck struck out looking, and Ross Gload grounded out to second. Their win expectancy was now a measly 4.6%. Billy Butler then walked, to give the Royals a glimmer of hope. He was lifted in favor of speedster Joey Gathright, who would look to get himself into scoring position for a potential tie game. He didn’t even need to, as only a few pitches later, with just a 9.6% probability of winning, David DeJesus launched a two-run homer into orbit, blowing the save for Morrow, and winning the game for the Royals. His home run, worth a swing in expectancy of 90.36%, was the top offensive play of the 2008 baseball season.