Archive for dayton moore

Karl Marx famously opens his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by writing that “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” While the attribution to Hegel is somewhat dubious, the application to yesterday’s events is all too applicable.

Late yesterday afternoon, when the Kansas City Royals were rumored to have agreed to a one-year, $2 million deal with Zombie Edgar Renteria, the reaction was mixed with approval, disapproval, and shrugs. But, as Buddy Bell once said, things can always get worse: it turned out the Renteria report was false, and the Royals had given a $2 million deal for 2012 (with incentives; no word on whether it includes the traditional Royals mutual option) to the man they had paid $2 million not to play for them in 2011: Yuniesky Betancourt. The Twitter reaction among Royals fans was swift and changing — from fury to laughter to, in some cases, apology. In the space of minutes things indeed moved from tragedy to farce (I heard somewhere that inserting historical references into posts gets you great gigs down the road). But if the facts surrounding the case of the Betancourt Farce are fairly plain for all to see, their “meaning” for the future of the the Dayton Moore-led Kansas Royals is not so clear.

Read the rest of this entry »

Let’s see: former Atlanta prospect from the early 2000s, terrible plate discipline, was last decent more than three seasons ago, strong arm, questionable range, reportedly a “good clubhouse guy” despite whining about losing playing time while playing horribly, a right-handed PowerBat (TM) without much power, platoon issues… That’s right, Jeff Francoeur has finally joined Dayton Moore’s Kansas City Royals. Like there was ever any doubt.

Read the rest of this entry »

In a move that will shake up the NL West, nay, the entire National League as we know it, the Kansas City Royals have reportedly traded outfielder Scott Podsednik to the Los Angeles Dodgers for minor leaguers Lucas May and Elisaul Pimentel. The Dodgers will reportedly pick up the $650,000 dollars still owed to Podsednik, whose initial signing by the Royals during the off-season inspired some jackass on the internet to hypothesize a ‘Contest‘ between Dayton Moore and Omar Minaya to match foolish move for foolish move.

It must be admitted that Podsednik has played better than expected, accumulating 1.2 WAR in 94 games for the Royals, although the playing time (replacement) element is inflated due to the Royals hitting Podsednik first for most of the season (14.3 replacement runs versus 11.3 total runs above replacement means he was still a below-average player). Sure, his defense in left field was average at best according to UZR (-1.5), DRS (-12!), and to anyone who watched his …circuitous… routes (one of the most frustrating parts of Rick Ankiel being out for so long only to have Pods get traded right as Ankiel returned was that we missed the inevitable collision). Over the rest of the season, playing full-time, one would expect Podsednik to be worth roughly a half-win above replacement level, although how much playing time he gets will be contingent on when Manny Ramirez and Reed Johnson return from their respective injuries. Assuming full-time play, a half win is probably worth about $2 million dollars. Minus the $650,000 owed to Podsednik, the surplus is roughly the market value of a C prospect.

I’ll defer to others regarding the prospects that the Dodgers are sending to Kansas City. I’ve read both May and Pimental described as “fringe,” although John Sickels called May (a catcher with a decent bat but defensive issues) a “C” prospect during the past off-season, which would make this potentially a minor win for the Royals, although given the Dodgers’ situation (a contender with injuries to multiple outfielders) either way it seems to be a fair trade for both sides.

While Podsednik has played better than should have been expected for the Royals and thus justified his low cost in a vacuum, it was still not a smart signing for the Royals, given that even with Podsednik’s not-horrible play he’s still a below-average outfielder in his mid-thirties who wouldn’t exactly have taken the Royals to a new level. Moreover, one also has to take into account the opportunity cost the Royals gave up “showcasing” Podsednik while Mitch Maier sat on the bench and newly-minted outfielder Alex Gordon rotted in AAA. But that’s all water under the bridge. Although it is unlikely that Mays or Pimental will amount to much, it is still a decent return to get due to a fortuitous confluence of a (typical) BABIP-fueled July by Podsednik and the Dodgers’ outfield problems (Juan Pierre apparently isn’t available, no doubt much to Ned Colletti’s chagrin). It doesn’t make up for, well, you know… but it would be churlish to deny that this was nice work by Dayton Moore.

I’m intrigued, Dayton. For your next tricks, I suggest a) convincing another team that Rick Ankiel is worth something (even if only taking on his salary); and b) resisting going after the Big Prize.

As has been written before, Royals outfielder David DeJesus is the sort of player who tends to fly under the radar because he does no one thing exceptionally well, but he does a number of things at an average or above-average level. He’s been about a 3 WAR player most of his career, and has accumulated almost that much value already in 2010. DeJesus probably isn’t an average center fielder any more, but runs saved in left or right field count, too. Despite having only average-ish power and being a terrible basestealer, DeJesus has a .344 career wOBA (.290/.361/.429). At 30, DeJesus is having a career year in 2010 offensively, with a .379 wOBA (.329/.397/.466). That probably is not his true talent level, but ZiPS’ rest-of-season projection is bullish nonetheless: .299/.369/.444 (.358 wOBA). One good test to see if a sports journalist has a clue is whether he or she says “David DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” By my calculations, those people think that a fourth outfielder is someone whose true talent level over a full season is (conservatively, based on current projections) about 3 WAR. Draw your own conclusions.

Given DeJesus’ subtle combination of skills, it is ironic that the poorly-constructed-but-“official” Elias Rankings might somehow catch on to his value. According to the latest “reverse engineered” Elias Rankings at MLB Trade Rumors, if free agency started today, DeJesus would be Type A, meaning that if the Royals were to offer him arbitration and he turned it down then signed with another team, the Royals would get the signing team’s first round pick in the 2011 draft as well as supplemental pick.

This is particularly interesting because DeJesus is one of the Royals’ best trading chips due both to his value on the field and his team-friendly contract: $4.6 million for all of 2010 with a $6 milllion club option for 2011 (with a $500,000 buyout). Assuming DeJesus is only owed about two million dollars over the rest of the season and (using the conservative 3 WAR full season estimate) is projected to be worth about 1.5 wins at four million dollars per win, that’s four million dollars of surplus value this season. Assuming the team is smart and picks up the option, a half-win decline to 2.5 WAR for 2011 and inflation to about $4.5 million per win, that’s another five million dollars of surplus. Nine million dollars surplus could fetch something like good (if non-elite) prospect and perhaps some filler, and again, that’s based on a conservative estimate of DeJesus’ value.

But if DeJesus ends up a Type A free agent, that potentially adds an interesting wrinkle. In a Kansas City Star article from last month discussing DeJesus, several possible courses of action are mentioned, including trading DeJesus, picking up the 2011 option and keeping him, picking up the 2011 option and trading him in the offseason, and declining the option and then offering him arbitration in hopes he would turn it down and sign with another team, thus netting the Royals draft compensation. This last possibility is what interests me here.

It is an intriging suggestion, but ultimately, it is something the Royals should not do for two reasons. First of all, Victor Wang’s research on Type A compensation (summarized here) values average Type A compensation at about six million dollars. Assuming the Royals could make a fair trade (there is little point in analyzing possible screw-jobs) now at the conservatively-projected above surplus of nine million, the draft pick compensation wouldn’t hold up. Indeed, it is not clear that the draft pick compensation would even be more valuable than picking up DeJesus’ option and trading him in the offseason.

The second reason the arbitration-offer route is a bad idea is that DeJesus would be very likely to accept it. DeJesus is a good player that could help a lot of teams, but he isn’t a top-level talent like Matt Holliday was or Carl Crawford will be. He’s more like Orlando Hudson — a good player, but not good enough that teams are willing to overlook the draft pick they would have to give up to sign him. In each of the last two offseasons, Hudson ended up signing deals below his market value because teams were conscious of giving up the draft pick. DeJesus and his agent have no doubt noticed this, and realize they are likely to get a larger award in arbitration than free agency. If the Royals offer arbitration and DeJesus accepts, they not only don’t get the draft picks, but they would end up paying more in the arbitration award than they would have if they had picked up the option. Moreover, this would further reduce the surplus value (and thus potential return) DeJesus would have on the 2011 trade market.

DeJesus’ Type A status may bring send images of draft picks floating through the heads of Royals fans and officials. But given the likely outcome of that decision combined with the team’s current state, Kansas City should be looking to trade DeJesus now, as his value will never be higher.

Overview

This post could easily be three words long, but I assume that the premise of the “What the X Should Do” series is to assume the place of the front office, so… I know it’s hard to believe, but the Royals are out of 2010 contention this season. They need to look to the future, but it is difficult to figure out when that “future” might actually begin, and thus what current players might and might not be part of it.

Buy or Sell

Clearly, the Royals should sell, but whom? The Royals aren’t young: the only player under 26 among the regulars and starting pitchers is Billy Butler. As will be discussed below, there’s no significant help coming from the farm system (other than from players who should already be up like Alex Gordon and Kila Ka’aihue — both 26) this season or next. The most optimistic possibility for significant help from the minors is 2012, and while that seems unrealistic to me, it at least gives us a place to start: the Royals should be looking to get value for any player on their roster that is not likely to have value for them in 2012.

The Royals have plenty of players that will not be helpful in 2012 or after, but a sizable chunk of them are useless (or close to it) now. Scott Podsednik is Juan Pierre without the glove. Jose Guillen has hit decently this season, but once you narrow his options to AL teams (he can only DH, despite recent appearances in RF), then narrow that to contenders… and after that, well, there’s still his massive salary (prorated portion of $12 million dollars remaining this season). Both were hot to start the season, and if they can’t get a C- prospect for either of them with the Royals picking up their entire salaries now, they never will. Both are currently sucking up playing time better given to others, and should simply be released. Well, if Podsednik can’t be traded he might be useful off the bench “just in case” fellow ill-fated outfield acquisition Rick Ankiel doesn’t return to full health soon. The Royals might as well keep Ankiel around to up his numbers a bit in case of a waiver trade (he has no value at the moment), although he should not be allowed to block Alex Gordon or even Mitch Maier. Gil Meche is a slightly different case, and is on the DL at the moment, but even if he wasn’t, his 2009 and 2010 performance, as well as his contract, gives him little or no value on the market without the Royals picking up a significant portion of his salary. Some other Royals might have a bit of value, but not enough to be helpful to the Royals other than as a salary dump: Kyle Farnsworth, Willie Bloomquist, and Captain 92%.

The Royals do have some players that they should move in expectation of getting something helpful back. Brian Bannister is 29, his recent performances don’t inspire confidence, and by the time 2012 comes around he won’t be worth his likely arbitration award, but he’s still under team control, and might be a useful #4 starter somewhere else. David DeJesus, one of the more underrated players in baseball, has significantly more value. He plays good defense on the outfield corners, can probably still play passably in center, and is having the best offensive season of his career. He has a very club-friendly contract ($4.7 million in 2010, with a $6 million club option for 2011, a bargain for a 3-win player). While he can help a team now, and the Royals don’t need to be (re-)signing any 30+ players for their next contender. He won’t bring back a future star, but he could bring back another (young and cost-controlled) David DeJesus-type: an above-average regular. The longer they wait, the less they will get back.

One intriguing piece is closer Joakim Soria, who has a club-friendly contract through 2011 with club options for 2012-2014. It is a good deal for the team, but relievers are rarely worth more than two wins a season, and the Royals should be at least check if they can get more value for him on the market for the 2012-and-after seasons.

There is something special on the roster. As I wrote above, the “2012” scenario is exceedingly optimistic, but it remains in the minds of many fans because it is the last season of Zack Greinke’s current contract. Greinke has been up and down this season, but his 5-win 2008 and 9-win 2009 are still relevant. Unless the Royals can realistically contend in 2012, the club needs to be open to trading Greinke. They have time to be picky (and don’t have to trade him this season), but the sooner they move him, the more they can get for him. Even if one thinks he is “only” a five-win pitcher, he’s being paid like a sub-3 win pitcher for the remainder of his contract, and that value could bring back an impressive haul.

Now, if even 2013 seems unrealistic for contention, then all bets are off. If that is the case, the Royals don’t have to trade the following players, but the team should be open to seeing what value they can bring back: Alberto Callaspo (for sure), Chris Iannet– I mean Alex Gordon (still potentially good, despite the organization’s efforts to scapegoat, bury, and devalue him), and Billy Butler (unless they can extend him to an Adam Lind-type contract).

On the Farm

Prior to the season, Beyond the Box Score’s aggregate farm system rankings had the Royals at #6, and since then Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer have actually started to live up to their draft status, and the pitching continues to impress. That being said, it must be kept in mind that other than raking 26-year-old “prospects” Alex Gordon and (maybe) Kila Ka’aihue in AAA (being blocked by all that super talent on the big club), none of the impact prospects are above AA, which is why the 2012 scenario is so unlikely.

Budget

Say what you want about Dayton Moore (and I have), but along with putting together a good farm system, he has also done well in convincing ownership to increase the budget significantly (which is the main reason the farm system has improved). The Royals’ major league payroll is currently around $75 million dollars and probably won’t go much higher in the near future. While Guillen, Ankiel, Willie Bloomquist, and Kyle Farnsworth will be coming off the books after the season, the Royals have a number of players due for arbitration raises such as Gordon, Butler, Callaspo, Bannister, as well as contractual raises for players like Greinke and Soria, so there won’t be much money as one might think for Dayton Moore to make his typically shrewd free agent signings.*

* Props to Dan Szymborski.

[Author’s added note, May 14, ~10:20 A.M. EST: You really should check out Posnanski’s post that really lays out Hillman’s clubhouse issues that I hinted at below. Do so if for no other reason that to find out that by the end of his first season, “the players were rather openly comparing Trey Hillman to Michael from “The Office.” Hmm… I wonder where they got that idea?]

The first manager of the 2010 season has been “let go”: Thursday afternoon, immediately after Zack Greinke’s first super-duper meaningful pitcher win of the season, the Kansas City Royals announced the firing of manager Trey Hillman. I’m not an “insider,” so I won’t get into analyzing the specific politics of the organization. That sort of stuff will hopefully come from the almost-always outstanding work of Joe Posnanski, Rany Jazayerli, Sam Mellinger, and others.

It is tempting to run through a sampling of Hillman’s “greatest hits.” (Who can forget Kyle Farnsworth pitching to Jim Thome on Opening Day 2009?) We’ll always remember Hillman’s response to the person who asked why left-handed reliever Ron Mahay wasn’t brought in to face Thome : “Mahay isn’t a lefty specialist.” Hillman handled the bullpen poorly, made bizarre playing time decisions, had an amazingly poor grasp of the platoon, and allegedly lost the clubhouse in his very first Spring Training with the club. I personally soured on Hillman fairly quickly. I didn’t appreciate the condescending tone Hillman tended to take when he felt cornered, and it was clear that part of the problem was his personality and attitude (he didn’t have time to “educate” us).

Nevertheless, even when someone has lost their job deservedly, it is difficult to take much joy in it. Hillman clearly loves the sport, and went to great lengths to be “in baseball” any way he could — working his way through the Yankees’ minor league system as as manager, leading the Nippon Ham Fighters to Pacific League championships in 2006 and 2007, and finally getting a shot at the American major leagues with the Royals in 2008. This is what happens to managers who preside over terrible teams. I would be shocked if Trey Hillman ever managed in the American major leagues again, and while that’s an accurate reflection of his abilities, it is sad to see that part of his dream end. Like just about every defeated political candidate I’ve ever heard, he never sounded better than during his ‘concession speech.’ All the best to Trey Hillman in his future endeavors. I’m just glad he got to stay long enough to see Jason Kendall’s emotional 250th hit-by-pitch.

The least surprising post-firing announcement is that Hillman’s replacement, at least on an interim basis, is former Brewers skipper Ned Yost. You aren’t going to believe this, but Yost was a coach for the Atlanta Braves at the same time Dayton Moore was working there. Some blame Yost for the Brewers’ pennant race problems during the last part of his Milwaukee tenure, but it is safe to say Yost probably won’t have to deal with that situation anytime soon with Kansas City. The truth is that it just doesn’t matter all that much, from a pure baseball perspective. You’ve read the sabermetric “managers don’t matter all that much” thing before: yes, managers often make bad strategic decisions, and sometimes they blow up in their faces, as in the Farnsworth/Thome example above. But over time… sometimes you pinch-run Tony Pena, Jr. for your designated hitter Billy Butler in a close game, Pena gets stranded, then, in extra innings, one of the worst hitters in the history of the major leagues, playing DH, gets the game-winning hit. Within a few games, random variation limits the amount of damage (or good) a manager can do. Yes, Hillman played Jose Guillen too much, but he’s not the person who gave an obviously declining outfielder in his early thirties a guaranteed $36 million dollar contract, either.

Back to the matter at hand. If you’re reading this, you probably know how this usually plays out. A new GM (Dayton Moore) comes in, quickly gets rid of the current manager (Cf. Buddy Bell) and brings in “his guy” (Trey Hillman). If after two or three seasons, if the team is still losing, the manager gets canned, and the GM’s leash gets shorter. Dayton Moore was quite emotional during Thursday’s presser, but it would be cynical to suggest that it was for any reason other than his personal relationship with Trey Hillman. Still, this is a clear sign (especially if one thinks the order to make a change came from ownership) that patience with the Royals’ lack of progress at the major league level is running thin. Pre-Moore acquisition Alex Gordon has been successfully neutered, but the most valuable on the team are still pre-Moore draftees Zack Greinke and Billy Butler. Hillman was Moore’s last line of defense. Some may say that Moore needs time to “see the end of what he started” in the minor leagues. Did anyone say that Allard Baird should be allowed to see what became of Greinke, Butler, and Gordon?

Trey Hillman (about whom Moore once said had a chance to be “one of the best baseball men of his generation”) needed to go, if for no other reason than showing that there is some level of “accountability” within the organization. The signals indicate that ownership isn’t going to wait around indefinitely on Dayton Moore, either. Again, we’ve seen this movie: new general manager comes in, honeymoon period (he isn’t the old guy!), seems to have a plan (I bet no one has ever thought of building a “farm system” before!), hires new manager (new ideas from Japan!), spends lots of money of free agents… then, when/if things go south, one of the last lines of defense is that the GM’s managerial hire gets fired. The typical next step isn’t to fire the new manager: after the first hire-and-fire, it’s usually the GM’s turn.

Now that is a process worth trusting.

One might be tempted to see the Royals’ signing of outfielder Scott Podsednik as a move to steal the headlines in the wake of cross-state rival St. Louis’ big Matt Holliday contract earlier this week. Or maybe they just wanted to sneak in the bad news on Friday. Close observers, however, know better. This is all part of The Contest.

I’m not exactly sure what the goal of The Contest is: to put together a team that might contend in 2005, get fired, or to shatter the blogosphere’s Universal Snark-O-Meter in one fell blow, but it’s been apparent for some time now that Royals General Manager Dayton Moore and his Mets counterpart Omar Minaya have been involved in some sort of bizarre rivalry for at least the last year. It’s been a real back-and-forth (forgive the shaky chronology):

* Dayton acquires Mike Jacobs, Kyle Farnsworth, Horacio Ramirez, and Willie Bloomquist as part of a misguided attempt to contend.

* Omar responds by giving Oliver Perez three years and $36 million (aka, “The Jose Guillen Special”).

* The same week that the Royals trade prospects for Yuniesky Betancourt, the Mets trade Ryan Church for Jeff Francoeur (the latter must really have burned Dayton up inside).

* Omar accuses a reporter critical of a fired Mets official of gunning for a job with the Mets.

* In the midst of a near 100-loss season, Dayton lectures Royals fans on their lust for instant gratification and admonishes them to “trust the process.”

* Dayton understandably allows two below-average catchers to walk (Miguel Olivo and John Buck), but then signs Zombie Jason Kendall for more than either Olivo or Buck get on the open market.

* Omar, bidding against himself, manages to overpay Jason Bay by at least $15-$20 million.

It was obviously Dayton’s time to shine. And shine he did.

The terms of the deal haven’t been made public yet (to my knowledge). But what kind of player is the 34-year-old Podsednik at this point?

CHONE has Podsednik projected for a context-neutral .271/.333/.367, 9 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is .269/.324/.384, -8/150. Defensively, CHONE’s TotalZone projection is +4 in left field (Podsednik’s primary position the last few seasons) per 150 games. Jeff Zimmerman has him at -2. My projection includes basestealing (in short: he steals a lot, but gets caught too much to be worth it), but as far as his baserunning goes otherwise, he’s average at best at this point.

Per 150 games (which Podsednik hasn’t played since 2004): let’s call it +1 defense, -7 prorated positional adjustment for left field, -9 offense + 20 replacement level = 0.5 WAR player. Fans have so far projected Podsednik at 0.2 WAR for 2010.

I haven’t seen the terms of the deal yet. I’ve heard rumors or one year, one million dollars, and even at $3.5 million per marginal win, at 0.5 WAR, that’s sort of reasonable… sounding.

Except that it’s still a terrible decision. Let’s put it this way: the Royals aren’t exactly at a point at which they should be spending more for a marginal win — they are one of the worst teams in the American League. It’s a slight bargain at best, and assuming (perhaps foolishly) that Moore didn’t spring for more than one year, a player with this sort of projection needs to have some upside, and Podsednik is 34 years old.

Moreover, what does this mean in relation to opportunity cost? Podsednik is 34 years old and his primary position the last few years is left field. Of course, one of the few above-average position players the Royals have is their current left fielder David DeJesus, probably a 2.5-3.0 WAR player in 2010. DeJesus is good enough defensively that he could probably be at least adequate in center (certainly better than Podsednik), but his arm (despite 2009’s impressive statistical showing in left) won’t play in right. Podsednik doesn’t have the arm for right, either… which leaves center field, something Dayton Moore has repeatedly hinted at with his talk of “speedy center fielder” (roles!) all offseason.

Leaving aside the reality that Podsednik is at best barely above average defensively in left field, thus implying a disaster in center field (where he last played full-time in 2004), the Royals already have two center fielders on the roster. One is the recently signed replacement-level Brian Anderson (Moore is apparently adding former White Sox to his palette of former Braves and Mariners). Anderson, at least, is young-ish enough to have some upside, although why Moore felt he had to give Anderson a major-league deal worth $0.7M with performance incentives is beyond me. Even worse, the Royals have Mitch Maier. Maier is nothing special — he’s probably a good fourth outfielder at best — a 1.0-1.5 WAR player. But he’s 28, at the minimum, and the Royals aren’t contending (even for .500) in 2010: this is the year to play Maier and see what he’s got and save a bit of cash. But Dayton has other ideas.

Even if Maier wasn’t around, Podsednik isn’t close to good enough to be an Iwamura-type “let’s at least have someone respectable out there” — in that case, there are still far superior players like FanGraphs-favorites Ryan Church and Gabe Gross available, and the market shows that superior players to Podsednik, such as Langerhans, are going for less than Brian Anderson money.

I could go on, but you get the picture: this deal makes no sense… unless you know about The Contest.

Your move, Omar.

[Update: As pointed out in the comments, I completely negleted to factor in Dayton’s brilliant ‘banning’ of Rany Jazayerli for criticizing the Royals’ medical staff. I apologize for the embarrassing oversight on my part. This really puts Omar behind… how many years and millions to Bengie Molina is it going to take for him to catch up?]

The American League’s current superiority (as a whole) to the National League is well-established. Here is one brief illustration of the gap. In short: if someone asks why you think the AL is better than the NL, ask them why they think a 90-win team is better than a 70-win team.

The more interesting issue is source of the disparity. One can imagine various explanations with different degrees of credibility: money, the DH, luck, and so on. It’s likely a combination of a number of different factors. I won’t pretend to have all the answers, but I will suggest that the relative quality of front offices (represented here by general managers) plays a major role.

Rather than going through every team, I’ll avoid the illusion of being definitive and pick whom I see as the five best and five worst current general managers. I know that every choice is debatable, but I’ll try to be relatively uncontroversial. It is also worth looking back at the “Front Office” sections of Dave Cameron’s organizational rankings from last off-season, although the judgments presented here are my own. Keep in mind that this is merely a brief reflection. These are not rankings, but merely groupings the five best and the five worst GMs in baseball.

The best: Andrew Friedman (TBA) and Theo Epstein (BOS) work in very different situations, but would be on anyone’s short list for “Best GM” given the numerous ways in which their organizations excel. Billy Beane (OAK) is still one of the top GMs in the game, despite the current rebuild. It’s easy to forget just how good the As were from 1999-2006 on a shoestring budget. It’s only been one full season and less than two off-seasons, but Jack “Jack Z.” Zduriencik (SEA) has vaulted himself into this conversation. As for a fifth member in this group… well, that’s tough. I’d like to put Brian Cashman (NYY) here, given his metamorphosis the last few years from the Yankees’ Tom Hagen into their Michael Corleone, but I’m trying to avoid too much controversy and people always get hung up on the budget. Mark Shapiro (CLE) would also be a good choice, but given Cleveland’s recently struggles, I can understand why some would object. Josh Byrnes (ARI) would be another good candidate, but if Shapiro doesn’t make it, neither should Byrnes. For #5 I’ll go with Doug Melvin (MIL), who does a good job of blending traditional and contemporary methods, but any of the other guys could make it. In no particular order: Friedman, Epstein, Beane, Zduriencik, and Melvin.

Best GMs Tally: AL 4, NL 1

The Worst: Oh boy… This was surprisingly (and depressingly) easy. In no particular order, the Frightful Five are: Dayton Moore (KCA), Omar Minaya (NYM), Ed Wade (HOU), Ned Colletti (LAN), and Brian Sabean (SFN). Seeing those names together gives “Murderer’s Row” a new meaning. I’ll pursue the increasingly uncanny Moore/Minaya dynamic at length some other time. Suffice it to say, no one would blink an eye if tomorrow Minaya lectured Mets fans about “trusting the process” while Dayton Moore held a press conference at which he accused Joe Posnanski of gunning for a player development position with the Royals. Ed Wade’s Brandon Lyon contract aside, his organization is sort of like the Royals except older and without the glimmers of hope in the minor leagues. Some may feel it is unfair to put Colletti on this list given his team’s success, but look at the cash he has (or, more accurately, had) at his disposal relative to his divisional rivals. Then there’s Colletti’s mentor, Brian Sabean… That I’m so impressed that he’s restrained himself from resigning Bengie Molina sort of says it all.

Worst GMs Tally: AL 1, NL 4

The NL only has one of the best GMs (and again, there were other candidates in the AL that could have taken his place), and all but one of the worst. One or two changes would not alter the overall point: front office excellence seems slant heavily toward the American League, and the opposite of excellence toward the National League. Neither the selections nor the “method” employed are definitive, but I do think there is something here.

Gods of Baseball, why must you test me so?

Earlier tonight, before my wife and I went out for supper, I read reports that the Royals had signed Jason Kendall for four million dollars over two years. I shuddered and began thinking about how to explain this silliness to even the most obstinate Dayton Moore-defender. Halfway through the meal I made the foolish (in more ways than one) mistake of looking at my BlackBerry. Kendall had, in fact, signed with the Royals for two years and six million dollars, a contract that, like Ivan Rodriguez’s deal with the Nationals, is appropriate for about a 1 WAR player. I then realized that anyone would understand why this contract is ridiculous.

Let’s get the basics out of the way: The Royals aren’t going to be getting any “interest” from Kendall’s excellent 1999-2004, or decent 2005-2006. They’re getting the 2010/11 model. CHONE projects Kendall to hit a .247/.317/.315 in Kansas City, or 25 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is roughly the same: .240/.313/.316; -26/150.

The Royals aren’t just paying for Kendall’s “bat,” but for his allegedly tremendous defense. CHONE’s TotalZone system apparently didn’t get the memo, projecting Kendall at -2/150. Other sources are the the same ballpark: I had Kendall at -4.5 runs in 2009. Translating the 2009 Fans’ Scouting Report to runs, I got about -3.

Even with the positional adjustment for catchers, Kendall projects as a 0.5 WAR player per 150 games, and few catchers play 150 games. The Royals managed to acquire a guy who is barely better than a AAA journeyman, will be 36 in 2010, will likely be replacement level or below in 2011 if he isn’t already, and are paying him six million dollars over two years. This would be a bad contract no matter what the team’s situation.

For the Royals, it’s even worse. For one thing, the Royals are at the opposite end of the “value of a marginal win spectrum” from, say, the Rays. If Dayton Moore and Jack Zduriencik switched places today, the Royals probably wouldn’t be ready to contend until at least 2012. Why blow money on a rich man’s replacement player now?

Moreover, the Royals have better internal options. Yes, Kendall will achieve what few could in making Royals fans miss the magic of Miguel Olivo’s strike-zone judgment and pitch-blocking skills. He’s gone, but there’s also a personal (and admittedly irrational) favorite of mine: the soon-to-be-non-tendered John Buck, who (aside from many fans never forgiving him for being part of the Carlos Beltran “haul”) has defensive problems of his own. Since Dayton Moore came to town, he has played Michael Scott to Buck’s Toby Flenderson. While it wouldn’t be worth it for the Royals to pay Buck’s likely arbitration award, as Rany Jazayerli suggests, they at least could have seen if they could non-tender Buck then re-sign him for less than Kendall, as Buck looks to be a 1-1.5 WAR player according to CHONE (if teams are smart, he will get a fair bit of attention once he’s non-tendered).

Buck is likely a dead issue at this point, but the Royals also have Brayan Pena, who was acquired off waivers in 2008 in one of Dayton Moore’s smarter moves (insert joke here). CHONE projects his bat at league average and his glove at -5 — a 2.7 WAR catcher. That is probably optimistic; but if Pena is a -5 hitter and a -10 defender, that’s still about a 1.5 WAR player — much better than Kendall. Even if Pena is a -10 hitter and -15 defender… you guessed it, that’s about the same as Jason Kendall projects for 2010, minus about $2.5 million in salary. Maybe the Royals will “get smart” and sit Kendall for Pena, but a rebuilding team that puts itself into the situation of paying a backup catcher three million dollars a year doesn’t bring the word “smart” to mind.

Buck and Pena aren’t the primary issue here. They are examples that emphasize both the overpayment and pointlessness of the Kendall acquisition, particularly on a team that will be lucky to win 75 games in 2010. It is tempting to turn this into a rant about Dayton Moore, but frankly, this probably won’t be my last chance to do so this off-season. Instead, let’s have some words from the man of the hour himself, Jason Kendall:

“There were other offers,” [Kendall] said, “but one thing about Dayton and the Royals is, they called me the first day I became a free agent. That’s something that kind of speaks for itself.”

Indeed.

In the aftermath of the Teahen-for-Getz-and-Fields trade, there is a rumor that the Royals see Fields as an option in left field, and are exploring the trade market for David DeJesus. Fields’ abilities aside, they should be.

Many probably think of DeJesus as a player who is good… for the Royals. He no longer has the range to play CF well, and he doesn’t hit as one usually expects from a left fielder. Maybe that’s why so many people who should know better say things like “DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” Those people should be embarrassed.

Here are three-year WAR totals for five outfielders from 2007-2009: 9.2, 8.9, 8.7, 7.4, 6.5. Without looking, who are these players?

In order: Torii Hunter, Johnny Damon, David DeJesus, Andre Ethier, and Jason Bay.

That’s right, over the last three seasons, DeJesus has been practically equal in value to Hunter (whose overrated-ness is seriously underrated) and Damon (just plain overrated); DeJesus has been more valuable than Ethier and Jason “Do People Seriously Think I’m Anywhere Close to as Good as Matt Holliday?” Bay. All five are good, but would DeJesus ever be offered a 5/$90M deal? Would his agent ever compare him to Derek Jeter? Would anyone bother comparing DeJesus to Holliday? Would you take anyone seriously who said that “Ethier is a fourth outfielder on a good team?”

Take Bay, one of the alleged prizes of the free agent crop. I have him as about a 2.5-3 WAR player next season — decent. As for DeJesus, I have him as about a +10 fielder and a +6 hitter — so he’s also right in that 2.5-3 WAR area. Maybe Bay’s closer to 3 and DDJ’s closer to 2.5, but think about this: could you get Jason Bay for 2/$10.7M? Because that’s all DeJesus is going to cost if a team picks up his 2011 option. In other words, teams contending now in and in need of a left fielder would do well to look into DeJesus — he’s likely to be worth at least twice as what he’s paid, and he’s just about as good as the far more expensive options on the open market.

On the Royals’ end, Dayton Moore has spent the last year or two ensuring that he has to be brought up in any “worst GM” conversation. He might finally be doing what he should have done three years ago — trading older assets that are unlikely to be with the Royals (or shouldn’t be) when they have a chance at contending. Whether or not Moore knows what DeJesus and his contract are worth in the young talent the Royals should be pursuing is one (big) question; whether he is able to identify such players is another. It’s potentially a step in the right direction. If Moore can find another team willing to give up appropriate talent, this could be a good move for both teams.

Maybe then smart Royals fans would be a bit more willing to put aside their lust for instant gratification and Trust the Process™.

And maybe, just maybe, Omar Minaya might be all alone at the bottom of the pile.