Archive for Kansas City Royals

[Author’s added note, May 14, ~10:20 A.M. EST: You really should check out Posnanski’s post that really lays out Hillman’s clubhouse issues that I hinted at below. Do so if for no other reason that to find out that by the end of his first season, “the players were rather openly comparing Trey Hillman to Michael from “The Office.” Hmm… I wonder where they got that idea?]

The first manager of the 2010 season has been “let go”: Thursday afternoon, immediately after Zack Greinke’s first super-duper meaningful pitcher win of the season, the Kansas City Royals announced the firing of manager Trey Hillman. I’m not an “insider,” so I won’t get into analyzing the specific politics of the organization. That sort of stuff will hopefully come from the almost-always outstanding work of Joe Posnanski, Rany Jazayerli, Sam Mellinger, and others.

It is tempting to run through a sampling of Hillman’s “greatest hits.” (Who can forget Kyle Farnsworth pitching to Jim Thome on Opening Day 2009?) We’ll always remember Hillman’s response to the person who asked why left-handed reliever Ron Mahay wasn’t brought in to face Thome : “Mahay isn’t a lefty specialist.” Hillman handled the bullpen poorly, made bizarre playing time decisions, had an amazingly poor grasp of the platoon, and allegedly lost the clubhouse in his very first Spring Training with the club. I personally soured on Hillman fairly quickly. I didn’t appreciate the condescending tone Hillman tended to take when he felt cornered, and it was clear that part of the problem was his personality and attitude (he didn’t have time to “educate” us).

Nevertheless, even when someone has lost their job deservedly, it is difficult to take much joy in it. Hillman clearly loves the sport, and went to great lengths to be “in baseball” any way he could — working his way through the Yankees’ minor league system as as manager, leading the Nippon Ham Fighters to Pacific League championships in 2006 and 2007, and finally getting a shot at the American major leagues with the Royals in 2008. This is what happens to managers who preside over terrible teams. I would be shocked if Trey Hillman ever managed in the American major leagues again, and while that’s an accurate reflection of his abilities, it is sad to see that part of his dream end. Like just about every defeated political candidate I’ve ever heard, he never sounded better than during his ‘concession speech.’ All the best to Trey Hillman in his future endeavors. I’m just glad he got to stay long enough to see Jason Kendall’s emotional 250th hit-by-pitch.

The least surprising post-firing announcement is that Hillman’s replacement, at least on an interim basis, is former Brewers skipper Ned Yost. You aren’t going to believe this, but Yost was a coach for the Atlanta Braves at the same time Dayton Moore was working there. Some blame Yost for the Brewers’ pennant race problems during the last part of his Milwaukee tenure, but it is safe to say Yost probably won’t have to deal with that situation anytime soon with Kansas City. The truth is that it just doesn’t matter all that much, from a pure baseball perspective. You’ve read the sabermetric “managers don’t matter all that much” thing before: yes, managers often make bad strategic decisions, and sometimes they blow up in their faces, as in the Farnsworth/Thome example above. But over time… sometimes you pinch-run Tony Pena, Jr. for your designated hitter Billy Butler in a close game, Pena gets stranded, then, in extra innings, one of the worst hitters in the history of the major leagues, playing DH, gets the game-winning hit. Within a few games, random variation limits the amount of damage (or good) a manager can do. Yes, Hillman played Jose Guillen too much, but he’s not the person who gave an obviously declining outfielder in his early thirties a guaranteed $36 million dollar contract, either.

Back to the matter at hand. If you’re reading this, you probably know how this usually plays out. A new GM (Dayton Moore) comes in, quickly gets rid of the current manager (Cf. Buddy Bell) and brings in “his guy” (Trey Hillman). If after two or three seasons, if the team is still losing, the manager gets canned, and the GM’s leash gets shorter. Dayton Moore was quite emotional during Thursday’s presser, but it would be cynical to suggest that it was for any reason other than his personal relationship with Trey Hillman. Still, this is a clear sign (especially if one thinks the order to make a change came from ownership) that patience with the Royals’ lack of progress at the major league level is running thin. Pre-Moore acquisition Alex Gordon has been successfully neutered, but the most valuable on the team are still pre-Moore draftees Zack Greinke and Billy Butler. Hillman was Moore’s last line of defense. Some may say that Moore needs time to “see the end of what he started” in the minor leagues. Did anyone say that Allard Baird should be allowed to see what became of Greinke, Butler, and Gordon?

Trey Hillman (about whom Moore once said had a chance to be “one of the best baseball men of his generation”) needed to go, if for no other reason than showing that there is some level of “accountability” within the organization. The signals indicate that ownership isn’t going to wait around indefinitely on Dayton Moore, either. Again, we’ve seen this movie: new general manager comes in, honeymoon period (he isn’t the old guy!), seems to have a plan (I bet no one has ever thought of building a “farm system” before!), hires new manager (new ideas from Japan!), spends lots of money of free agents… then, when/if things go south, one of the last lines of defense is that the GM’s managerial hire gets fired. The typical next step isn’t to fire the new manager: after the first hire-and-fire, it’s usually the GM’s turn.

Now that is a process worth trusting.

Episode Twenty-Seven
In which the panel records a meltdown.

Headlines
Starlin Castro in the Chicago Sky
Demoted: Alex Gordon
N’doy: The Tampa Bay Rays Are Good
Speaking of Meltdowns
… and other populist declarations!

Featuring
Dave Cameron, Full-Time Employee
Matt Klaassen, Study Carrel-er
Bryan Smith, Resident Prospect Maven

Finally, you can subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or other feeder things.

Audio on the flip-flop.

Read the rest of this entry »

Considering only current ability to win rather than value relative to salary, if one looks at the Royals’ roster long enough, focusing in the decent rotation, the closer, and a couple of young (-ish) position players with upside, one might convince oneself that this is a decently talented team. One would be wrong. The Royals currently have one of the worst major league rosters in the American League (thank you, Blue Jays rebuild!).

The starting rotation is actually pretty good. After the monstrous Zack Greinke, there is a sizable drop-off, but not to the depths. Gil Meche isn’t as good he was a couple of seasons ago, but he’s likely better than 2009, and may still be a decent #2 starter. Injuries are a serious concern for Meche, however. Injuries also loom over sabermetric darling Brian Bannister, who might be a marginal #3 starter. Luke Hochevar is unlikely to live up to the expectations generated by being the #1 overall pick in 2006, but he has a non-trivial chance of being above-average. The #5 spot is a question mark, but that is the case for many teams.

The two losers of the epic Kyle Farnsworth–Kyle Davies–Robinson Tejeda battle royale for the #5 spot will end up in the bullpen. While each might be worth (another) try in the rotation, Davies and Tejeda profile better as relievers, and Farnsworth profiles better as an object lesson in what kind of player not to sign to a multi-year deal. Joakim Soria’s value, like that of most closers, is quite exaggerated, but he is one of the best relievers in the game, and keeps this group from being dreadful. For the ‘pen in front of Soria, the Royals have to hope some combination of Davies, Tejeda, and Carlos Rosa combined with the sunk costs of Kyle Farnsworth and Juan Cruz turns into something useful in middle relief.

If the rotation looks like it could be above average (provided good health), and the bullpen looks mediocre-but-passable (mostly due to Soria), the position players look absolutely dreadful. Billy Butler, Alex Gordon, and David DeJesus are the only players projected to be above average, and while Butler can’t defend or run, Gordon isn’t the next George Brett, and DeJesus bothers people who think that defense in the corner outfield spots doesn’t matter, they are good players that could help most teams. It would be unfair to blame the Royals’ failures on Butler and Gordon not becoming superduperstars. I’ve run the numbers – if Butler and Gordon turned into Mark Teixeira and Alex Rodriguez, the 2010 Royals still wouldn’t project as a .500 team. The Royals have other useful pieces such as Alberto Callaspo, Chris Getz, and perhaps Rick Ankiel. However, far too much playing time and/or roster space is slated for players who are nearly worthless (Scott Podsednik and Jason Kendall), completely worthless (Yuniesky Betancourt and Willie Bloomquist) and worse than worthless (Jose Guillen). Yes, the Royals could (and should) better utilize stopgap role-players like Josh Fields, Kila Ka’aihue, Mike Aviles, Mitch Maier, and Brayan Pena, but a couple more wins would only make them less bad.

This might be understandable if the Royals were committed to a thorough rebuild, but current management has never seemed to grasp that notion, and the signing of thirty-something mediocrities (Ankiel) and scrubs (Podsednik, Kendall) doesn’t signal a change. Moreover, while Butler is still young, Greinke, Hochevar, and Gordon are all already in their mid-twenties, and Meche and DeJesus are all in their thirties (Bannister is 29), so the aging curve doesn’t offer much hope for 2010 or 2011. Significant help won’t be arriving from the minors anytime soon.

The 2010 Royals will probably win 70+ games in 2010, and some will hail this as improvement. Don’t be fooled, it is less “improvement” than positive regression. “Even” 74 wins is never a sign of a good team, particularly in the weak AL Central. The very fact that 74 wins appears to be improvement says as much about the current state of the team than any number of player analyses.

Gods of Baseball, why must you test me so?

Earlier tonight, before my wife and I went out for supper, I read reports that the Royals had signed Jason Kendall for four million dollars over two years. I shuddered and began thinking about how to explain this silliness to even the most obstinate Dayton Moore-defender. Halfway through the meal I made the foolish (in more ways than one) mistake of looking at my BlackBerry. Kendall had, in fact, signed with the Royals for two years and six million dollars, a contract that, like Ivan Rodriguez’s deal with the Nationals, is appropriate for about a 1 WAR player. I then realized that anyone would understand why this contract is ridiculous.

Let’s get the basics out of the way: The Royals aren’t going to be getting any “interest” from Kendall’s excellent 1999-2004, or decent 2005-2006. They’re getting the 2010/11 model. CHONE projects Kendall to hit a .247/.317/.315 in Kansas City, or 25 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is roughly the same: .240/.313/.316; -26/150.

The Royals aren’t just paying for Kendall’s “bat,” but for his allegedly tremendous defense. CHONE’s TotalZone system apparently didn’t get the memo, projecting Kendall at -2/150. Other sources are the the same ballpark: I had Kendall at -4.5 runs in 2009. Translating the 2009 Fans’ Scouting Report to runs, I got about -3.

Even with the positional adjustment for catchers, Kendall projects as a 0.5 WAR player per 150 games, and few catchers play 150 games. The Royals managed to acquire a guy who is barely better than a AAA journeyman, will be 36 in 2010, will likely be replacement level or below in 2011 if he isn’t already, and are paying him six million dollars over two years. This would be a bad contract no matter what the team’s situation.

For the Royals, it’s even worse. For one thing, the Royals are at the opposite end of the “value of a marginal win spectrum” from, say, the Rays. If Dayton Moore and Jack Zduriencik switched places today, the Royals probably wouldn’t be ready to contend until at least 2012. Why blow money on a rich man’s replacement player now?

Moreover, the Royals have better internal options. Yes, Kendall will achieve what few could in making Royals fans miss the magic of Miguel Olivo’s strike-zone judgment and pitch-blocking skills. He’s gone, but there’s also a personal (and admittedly irrational) favorite of mine: the soon-to-be-non-tendered John Buck, who (aside from many fans never forgiving him for being part of the Carlos Beltran “haul”) has defensive problems of his own. Since Dayton Moore came to town, he has played Michael Scott to Buck’s Toby Flenderson. While it wouldn’t be worth it for the Royals to pay Buck’s likely arbitration award, as Rany Jazayerli suggests, they at least could have seen if they could non-tender Buck then re-sign him for less than Kendall, as Buck looks to be a 1-1.5 WAR player according to CHONE (if teams are smart, he will get a fair bit of attention once he’s non-tendered).

Buck is likely a dead issue at this point, but the Royals also have Brayan Pena, who was acquired off waivers in 2008 in one of Dayton Moore’s smarter moves (insert joke here). CHONE projects his bat at league average and his glove at -5 — a 2.7 WAR catcher. That is probably optimistic; but if Pena is a -5 hitter and a -10 defender, that’s still about a 1.5 WAR player — much better than Kendall. Even if Pena is a -10 hitter and -15 defender… you guessed it, that’s about the same as Jason Kendall projects for 2010, minus about $2.5 million in salary. Maybe the Royals will “get smart” and sit Kendall for Pena, but a rebuilding team that puts itself into the situation of paying a backup catcher three million dollars a year doesn’t bring the word “smart” to mind.

Buck and Pena aren’t the primary issue here. They are examples that emphasize both the overpayment and pointlessness of the Kendall acquisition, particularly on a team that will be lucky to win 75 games in 2010. It is tempting to turn this into a rant about Dayton Moore, but frankly, this probably won’t be my last chance to do so this off-season. Instead, let’s have some words from the man of the hour himself, Jason Kendall:

“There were other offers,” [Kendall] said, “but one thing about Dayton and the Royals is, they called me the first day I became a free agent. That’s something that kind of speaks for itself.”

Indeed.

Other than Zack Greinke’s historic season, the 2009 Royals had little go right. Billy Butler was one non-Greinke bright spot. After a disappointing 2008, Butler raked in 2009, hitting .301/.362/.492 (.369 wOBA). He even became the everyday first baseman despite questions about his defense, beating out celebrated glove-man Mike Jacobs.

The Royals’ other “Savior,” Alex Gordon, has not quite (ahem) lived up to expectations. Hailed as “the next George Brett” upon being drafted in 2005, Gordon started at the hot corner on Opening Day 2007 and received a standing ovation. Things went downhill from there, as Gordon ended 2007 with a .317 wOBA. In 2008, he posted a merely decent .344 wOBA. Gordon got seriously injured to start 2009 , struggled upon returning, got demoted, and finally limped to a .321 wOBA (although 189 PA tells us next to nothing). The current attitude of many is understandable: Butler is The Man, and Gordon is a question mark at best.

Butler is clearly superior to Gordon as a hitter, and his minor league performances always indicated a higher offensive upside. But it is curious that so many smart people following the Royals have so readily hailed Butler’s 2009 as an awesome breakthrough while saying “meh” to Gordon’s decent 2008. Why is this curious? Because despite the glaring offensive disparity, we live in the Age of WAR. Let’s compare each player’s best season so far: Butler’s 2009 vs. Gordon’s 2008.

Butler’s 2009 value was excellent offensively at 21 runs above average. It was less impressive defensively. Despite looking better than expected, Butler posted a -6.7 UZR at first base (with a -12.6 overall positional adjustment). Butler’s overall WAR for 2009: an above-average 2.4.

Gordon’s 2008 value was more evenly distributed. +7.7 runs hitting, but only -3.0 UZR. However, the latter was accumulated while playing the much-more-valuable 3B. Altogether Gordon had a 2.6 WAR in 2008. It is obvious why many were down on Gordon’s 2008 relative to the Butler’s awesome 2009. Wait, what? Gordon was actually slightly more valuable in 2008 than Butler was in 2009?

Not really. After all, FanGraph WAR doesn’t currently include baserunning (other than SB/CS, which are included in wOBA/wRAA). Looking at the non-SB elements of baserunning using Baseball Prospectus’s EqBRR, as Erik did, we find that Butler was one of the worst baserunners in baseball in 2009 at about five runs below average, putting his WAR at about 1.9. In 2008, Gordon was about +3, which puts his WAR at about 2.9. So Gordon’s 2008 wasn’t “slightly” more valuable than Butler’s 2009, it was significantly more valuable. In fact, once baserunning is fully taken into account, Butler’s 1.9 WAR 2009 isn’t even quite as good as Gordon’s 2.1 WAR from his “disastrous” 2007.

My point is not about the relative value of Butler and Gordon going forward. Batting generally improves the most in the early 20s (whereas fielding and baserunning are relatively static), and Butler is two years younger than Gordon. There are legitimate questions about Gordon’s future given his performance and health. My intent is neither to run down Butler nor celebrate Gordon. One might respond that “Gordon’s value was primarily due to defense, position and baserunning!” But that is exactly the point — those things matter. Despite living in the Age of WAR, informed observers sometimes still focus on only one aspect of a player’s performance. And that can lead to a gap between a perception of one value disparity and the reality of the opposite.

It’s safe to say that things have not gone quite like the Kansas City Royals management thought it would in 2009. The club started off pretty well but faded quickly in the standings and the Major League club is now in fourth place in the American League Central division, 11.5 games out of first place.

While the big-league club is floundering, there is some good news on the farm – especially down in low-A ball with the Burlington Bees. In recent years, the Royals organization has been stung by its inability to develop its own starting pitchers. Young stud Zack Greinke has begun to shift that trend and more reinforcements are on the way (albeit it slowly).

The Royals organization drafted two 6’5” prep pitchers in the 2008 draft: Michael Montgomery (supplemental first round) and Tim Melville (fourth round). Melville was a first-round talent who fell due to signability concerns, but the Royals did what any good organization (desperately in need of minor league talent/depth) should do: It ponied up the cash for a deserving talent, giving the organization two outstanding pitching talents from the 2008 draft.

Montgomery, a left-hander, made 12 appearances (nine starts) in 2008 at rookie ball. In 42.2 innings, he allowed 31 hits and posted a 1.69 ERA (3.13 FIP). So far this year, he’s also kept his ERA below 2.00 at 1.69 (2.83 FIP). He’s allowed 33 hits in 48 innings of work. The southpaw, who just turned 20 years old, has posted a walk rate of 3.94 BB/9 and a strikeout rate of 7.88 K/9. He has yet to allow a home run this season, after allowing just two in 2008.

Right-hander Melville signed too late to make his 2008 debut, so he’s a little bit behind Montgomery on the development chart. Nonetheless, he joined the left-hander in low-A ball in 2009, where he’s made 11 starts. In 50 innings, Melville has allowed 48 hits while posting rates of 3.96 BB/9 and 7.20 K/9. The 19-year-old hurler has allowed five home runs and he has a 3.78 ERA (4.34 FIP).

Despite their inexperience, both pitchers rank among the organization’s best three pitching prospects – along with high-A left-hander Danny Duffy. Montgomery features a low-90s fastball, as well as two well-developed secondary pitches: a curveball and changeup. Melville’s repertoire includes a fastball that can touch 95 mph, a good curveball and a developing changeup that needs work.

Fear not, Royals fans. Help is on the way… Unless Dayton Moore trades Montgomery and Melville for Jerry Hairston or Ramon Vazquez.

The Graduate: Mike Aviles | Born: March 1981 | Shortstop

Mike Aviles is a great story. A former NCAA Division II player of the year, he signed as a college senior for $1,000. At 5’9” he has fought his way through the minor league system and posted solid numbers. Regardless, his ascent was a slow one and lasted six seasons. At the age of 27, Aviles not only made his debut in the Majors, he showed he belonged in the league. That said, there are some areas that need work if he is going to continue to succeed, such as his walk rate (4.1%). If he is going to be a utility player, Aviles is also going to need to improve defensively at second base and third base. His play at shortstop is solid.

The Riser: Alex Caldera | Born: October 1985 | Right-Handed Pitcher

A 2007 13th round selection out of California, Alex Caldera was second in the organization in strikeouts with 120 and allowed 141 hits in 149 innings pitched. He also did an excellent job of keeping the ball in the park with just six home runs allowed (0.32 HR/9). Caldera showed excellent control of his repertoire, which includes a low-90s fastball, with a walk rate of 2.17 BB/9.

The Tumbler: Jeff Bianchi | Born: October 1986 | Shortstop

Jeff Bianchi, a former second round pick out of a Pennsylvania high school, caught people’s attentions by hitting more than .400 in his first two seasons. Unfortunately he did it in only 40 games due to injuries. The last two seasons, though, Bianchi has struggled to hit for average and he has also posted low on-base numbers: 6.4 BB% in 2007, 4.8 BB% in 2008. On the plus side, his slugging percentage rose from .315 in 2007 to .442 in 2008 and his ISO improved from .068 to .187. He may need to begin 2009 back in High-A ball. At the age of 22, he has plenty of time to find his stroke.

The ’08 Draft Pick: Tim Melville | Born: October 1989 | Right-Handed Pitcher

It’s pretty impressive that the Royals were able to nab, arguably, both the best high school hitter (Eric Hosmer) and the best high school pitcher (Tim Melville) in the 2008 draft. Even more impressive is the fact that the Royals got Melville in the fourth round because everyone else thought he was unsignable and headed to college. In the last two seasons, the Royals have done exactly what a struggle organization (with not a lot of money) needs to do – which is develop within and do not cut corners on the draft. Melville has yet to pitch in pro ball, but he features a fastball that can touch the mid-90s, a knuckle-curve with plus potential, and a developing change-up.

The ’09 Sleeper: Jose Bonilla | Born: August 1988 | Catcher

We dip down all the way to Rookie Ball for the Royals’ sleeper. Jose Bonilla received a taste of North American ball in 2007 when he appeared in three games, but he did not see regular playing time until this past season and he made the most of the opportunity. Bonilla hit .357/.405/.625 in 112 at-bats. His walk rate was low (4.3 BB%) but there aren’t many young catchers that can mix hitting for average with power (.268 ISO). He is someone to keep an eye on in 2009.

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