Archive for Manny Ramirez

The 2011 Rays opened the season with their designated hitter position filled by a Hall of Very Good platoon: Johnny Damon and Manny Ramirez. I don’t need to remind you how many people around here and elsewhere thought the combined pickup was a great idea, and one reason that they came to the Rays so cheap — just $7.25 million combined, just $2 million of which went to Manny — was that their mutual agent Scott Boras negotiated a package deal. Once Manny retired, Johnny Damon picked up nearly all of the slack, winding up with 150 games played — his 16th straight season with at least 140 games played.

But after hearing that the Rays weren’t bringing him back, Damon is right where Manny is: at the back of the breadline. Manny is currently unemployed because he has announced his desire to unretire, as Matt Klaassen wrote Monday. One reason Manny says for his desire to return is that, as he told ESPN, he wants to be a role model:

I want to show people that Manny can change, that he can do the right thing.

Manny will still have to serve a 50-game suspension, and his one-for-17 performance in 2011 won’t inspire much confidence either, so he may have a difficult time convincing another team to take a chance on him. (Much like Barry Bonds in 2008.)
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We’re going to take the time machine all the way back to July of 2008, assessing some of the deals made around the trade deadline.

Dodgers receive: LF Manny Ramirez
Red Sox receive: LF Jason Bay
Pirates receive: RHP Bryan Morris, 2B/3B Andy LaRoche, OF Brandon Moss, RHP Craig Hansen
Winner: Red Sox, Dodgers

It was time for Manny to leave Beantown, and although the deadline seemed to have passed, these three teams were able to work a deal that would shake the baseball world. Jason Bay found the postseason in Boston and had a huge 2009, putting up 5.0 WAR. Manny said hello to L.A.-L.A. land and was unstrasburgly for the Dodgers, hitting .396/.489/.743 for the boys in blue in 2008. The Pirates, well, they decided to go with quantity over quality, and it bit them. After a nice year from LaRoche in 2009 (2.6 WAR), he’s been awful this season (-0.6 WAR), and doesn’t project to be the line drive hitter he once was. Craig Hansen has had health issues and Brandon Moss was below average, but Bryan Morris does seem to be a promising prospect. Still, Pittsburgh could have done better for Bay.
– – –

Angels receive: 1B Mark Teixeira
Braves receive: 1B Casey Kotchman, RHP Stephen Marek
Winner: Angels

The Braves thought they had found Teixeira’s semi-replacement in Kotchman, but instead they got someone who’d hit .267/.346/.378 at first base, never giving Atlanta anything of much substance. Stephen Marek is 26 years old and floundering in Triple-A. Teixeira? He hit .358/.448/.632 for the Angels and helped get them to the playoffs in 2008. They also used his compensation draft pick to take OF Mike Trout, one of the brightest young outfield prospects in the minors today.
– – –

Dodgers receive: 3B Casey Blake
Indians receive: RHP Jon Meloan, C Carlos Santana
Winner: Indians

Poor Paul DePodesta is an Assistant GM while Colletti gets to make moves like this. While Casey Blake has certainly been valuable for the Dodgers, this one has to hurt LA in the long run. Blake racked up 4.6 WAR last year, but his defense has dropped and his offense is stagnant. He’s on the downside of his career. Santana, meanwhile, is a switch-hitting catcher with a stance just like Victor Martinez and serious power. Blake has been a nice player for LA, but Santana looks to out-WAR him over the next few years, and then some.
– – –

Phillies receive: RHP Joe Blanton
Athletics receive: 2B Adrian Cardenas, LHP Josh Outman, OF Matthew Spencer
Winner: Push

For now, the Phillies generally win because flags fly forever. This one is likely to change in the next few years, but the guarantee isn’t enough there that I’ll give it to Oakland quite yet. Outman has produced a 4.09 FIP and 1.6 WAR for the A’s in 2008-09 (he’s been hurt this year). Cardenas is a slick middle infielder who may be a star one day, but until then is no sure thing. At 22, he’s crushed Double-A pitching, but has stagnated in Triple-A, hitting .242/.305/.337 there in 82 games, and just .228/.285/.281 this year. However, he has time to adjust, and once he does he can be dangerous.
– – –

Brewers receive: SP CC Sabathia
Indians receive: OF Matt LaPorta, LHP Zach Jackson, RHP Rob Bryson, OF Michael Brantley
Winner: Brewers

As well as Mark Shapiro made out in the Blake deal he underperformed in the Sabathia trade. CC helped bring Milwaukee to the playoffs via the Wild Card by throwing seven complete games in seventeen starts with a 1.65 ERA. He was simply outstanding. LaPorta, meanwhile, has struggled in adjusting to the big leagues. In 87 combined games in the majors during his age 24-25 seasons, LaPorta has hit just .240/.301/.377. An OPS of .678 just will not get it done for a guy who was touted for his massive power, especially when he’s a DH trying to play a mediocre outfield and first base.
– – –

Yankees receive: OF Xavier Nady, LHP Damaso Marte
Pirates receive: OF Jose Tabata, RHP Ross Ohlendorf, RHP Jeff Karstens, RHP Daniel McCutchen
Winner: Pirates

While Nady hit pretty well with the Yankees (.270/.319/.469), Marte’s inability to stay healthy and his mediocre pitching gives this to Pittsburgh. The Pirates decided to go with both quality and quantity here, getting a bunch of players who will help them in the long run, highlighted by Jose Tabata. At worst, Pittsburgh can always put Ohlendorf, who majored in Operations Research and Financial Engineering at Princeton, in the front office.

These Dodgers just cannot be stopped.

With the game tied 2-2 in the 6th inning, Bronson Arroyo found himself in a jam with the bases loaded and only one out. Chad Billingsley was due up and was pitching well, having fanned 7 batters and allowed just 2 ER on 93 pitches, but manager Joe Torre opted to go all in and let Manny Ramirez pinch hit. Ramirez was not in the lineup because of a bruised left hand suffered the previous night.

Dusty Baker then countered with his sinker-balling reliever Nick Masset in hopes of inducing a double play. Instead, Manny hit a laser beam into the left field stands, also fittingly known as the “Mannywood section”. Dodger Stadium erupted into a total frenzy. Ramirez ended up taking two curtain calls. It also just so happened to be Manny Ramirez bobble-head night.

Some fans and members of the media are already calling this as one of the greatest moments in Dodger history, going so far to compare this moment to Kirk Gibson’s triumphant limp around the bases of Game 1 of the ’88 World Series. Yeah, I don’t think so, but there is a definite lesson here.

Sorry, self-righteous sports writers. Next time you feel like writing some high-horsed column about how steroids are the epitome of evil in baseball, go back and watch the Manny Granny and watch the fans go completely bananas. It is hard proof that the majority of fans really don’t give a rip about PEDs.

Quantifying the contributions of a manager is a very difficult task in the world of baseball evaluations. Regardless, even those who feel that managers do very little can agree that one responsibility involves accurately filling out the lineup card prior to a game. Rays manager Joe Maddon seemingly could not handle this responsibility yesterday, leading to a ruling that places Sunday’s Rays-Indians game atop all others this week.

Though Clayton Kershaw and his seven no-hit innings certainly made a solid argument and the three consecutive walk-off wins for the Yankees stated an impressive case, Maddon’s blunder and the results surpassed all others.

For those who have not yet heard, Maddon penciled in both Evan Longoria and Ben Zobrist at third base. The ‘5’ on the lineup card next to Longoria’s name was circled, suggesting he would actually be the designated hitter. After Zobrist played the field in the top of the first, Indians skipper Eric Wedge pointed out the flaw. Thirteen grueling minutes later, the umpires stripped the Rays of their right to use a designated hitter, meaning that Andy Sonnanstine would be their third hitter.

B.J. Upton led off with a walk and promptly stole second base. Carl Crawford then singled him in, bringing Sonnanstine to the plate. Sonny tried to sacrifice Crawford along but ended up reaching first on a fielder’s choice force out.

In the top of the second, Ben Francisco hit a three-run homer to put the Tribe ahead, 3-1. A half-inning later, Jason Bartlett tripled and crossed home plate courtesy of a Gabe Kapler groundout. The game remained 3-2 in favor of the Indians until the bottom of the fourth inning, when the Rays erupted for five runs. Prior to that inning, Sonnanstine had batted again and struck out.

The five-run rally kicked off when Ben Zobrist started the frame with a triple. Bartlett then singled him home to knot the game at three runs apiece. Kapler walked and Akinori Iwamura singled to load the bases with nary an out. Michel Hernandez then delivered a bases clearing double to put the Rays ahead, 6-3. After Upton and Crawford were both retired, Sonnanstine launched a double over the head of the quite shallow Ryan Garko, scoring Hernandez.

Sonnanstine lasted until the sixth inning and left with a 7-5 lead. Though he got the win, he did not necessarily pitch that well. Maybe he took his poor at bats back to the mound with him. The last time this odd ruling came into play was on July 23, 1999, when Mike Hargrove messed up the fielding positions of Manny Ramirez and Alex Ramirez, meaning Charles Nagy had to bat. It isn’t uncommon to see a pitcher record a win while going 1-3 with an RBI at the dish… but it is very odd to see this occur in a league specifically designed to avoid pitchers hitting.

Things are finally beginning to shape out. After Raul Ibanez signed a somewhat ludicrous contract well before the glut of corner outfielders felt the constraints of the current economy, first hand, some of these cards have been drawn. Bobby Abreu signed for 1-yr/$5 mil with the Angels. Adam Dunn signed for 2-yr/$20 mil with the Nationals. Compared to the 3-yr/$31.5 mil contract handed to Ibanez, and, in a vacuum, the former two signings are relative steals.

As Dave pointed out yesterday, however, both create issues for their respective teams and lineups. One aspect of their signings not yet touched on is what it means for the remaining corner outfielders on the market, primarily Manny Ramirez. Manny has already turned down deals worth 2-yr/$45 mil and 1-yr/$25 mil, both offered from the Dodgers, who seem to be his only suitor.

The Giants reportedly had interest in the services of ManRam, but their 4-yr/$100 mil rumored deal proved fictitious or exaggerated at best. And the Giants may spend a good portion of what they have left on Joe Crede. The Mets are out. The Angels, another potential suitor, filled a void that probably didn’t exist by signing Abreu. The Nats, who had plenty to spend, inked Dunn. Realistically, Manny has one team really interested in what he brings to the table, a team that has to date offered him two contracts defying what we have generally seen in the market, in Manny’s favor.

For a while, plenty of analysts suggested that Manny would dictate what happened to Dunn, Abreu, Griffey and Garret. Realistically, the deals inked by both Abreu and Dunn not only lower the bar even further for Griffey and Garret, but hurt Manny’s leverage. With potentially interested teams filling needs elsewhere, Ramirez will have to sign with the Dodgers if he wants to play baseball next year, unless some other team swoops in out of nowhere and snatches him up.

Either way, this has certainly been the craziest free agent market I can remember in my years of baseball fandom. We have a player seeking an extremely lucrative deal in a depressed market from a team that has no competition for his services. Then again, Scott Boras, the best agent of all time, represents Manny, so don’t be surprised if he actually does coax the Dodgers for a surplus of funds.

Following the 2007 season, the Los Angeles Dodgers seemingly had their outfield in order. Juan Pierre had signed a 5-yr/$55 mil deal prior to the season and was not about to sit on the bench. Flanking him would be prospects Matt Kemp and Andre Ethier. Ned Colletti then proceeded to sign Andruw Jones to a 2-yr/$36.2 mil contract, creating a logjam in the outfield and relegating someone to the bench in the process. With all of the money invested in Jones and Pierre, the odd man out had to come from Ethier and Kemp.

Jones produced a .234 wOBA and, despite a +3.7 UZR rating in centerfield, proving his worth to be -0.4 wins. He missed most of the season, opening up a spot for all three of Pierre, Ethier, and Kemp.

Manny Ramirez soon joined the team, once again creating a surplus of outfielders. Fans screamed for Pierre to sit on the bench and Ethier to receive plenty of playing time. Though Joe Torre did not immediately react to these please, he soon found it too difficult of a task to keep Ethier out of the lineup. Pierre became disgruntled, but Kemp and Ethier needed to play every day, and you do not acquire Manny Ramirez to sit on the bench.

Jones may have missed a good portion of the 2008 season, but he is still technically under contract. Pierre also has three more years remaining. Kemp and Ethier are pretty much guaranteed starting jobs next season, but who takes over the remaining outfield spot?

Manny Ramirez does not appear to be heading for as big a payday as he expected, meaning the initial 2-yr/$45 mil offer that the Dodgers withdrew may make the most sense. Should he re-sign with the Dodgers, Colletti will have the outfield that helped propel the team into the playoffs returning n tact. He will also have around $30 mil in outfielders sitting on the bench/not living up to their paycheck.

The most recent reports have Jones heading to the Mets. Unless the Dodgers are willing to take on a bad contract like the one belonging to Luis Castillo (of whom they have no interest), Colletti will have to pay the large majority of Jones’ salary. If Ramirez rejoins the team and Jones is dealt, then Juan Pierre may not be happy, but you could do much worse in the fourth outfielder department. The big issue there is that he will earn plenty of money to make contributions that do not necessarily merit that fee.

An even newer report has Adam Dunn talking to the Dodgers. I cannot imagine Colletti would sign both Dunn and Ramirez, meaning he will go for either one or the other. Both are all-hit/no-field corner outfielders. Their 2009 projections call for +3.5 wins for Manny and around +2.8 wins for Dunn. Dunn is several years younger than Ramirez and will cost less, as well. From an owner’s perspective, however, ManRam puts butts in the seats, and Dunn does not.

Regardless, Pierre could be very useful as a pinch-runner who stays in the game as a defensive replacement, occasionally garnering starts. For most Dodgers fans, it seems the ideal solution is to cut ties with both Pierre and Jones while bringing back Ramirez to play left-field. The Jones part of that solution may come to fruition very soon, but I would fully expect to see Pierre in Dodger-blue as a fourth outfielder come Spring Training 2009. Either way, Colletti definitely loves him some outfielders, as four are currently under contract already and two more have been heavily rumored to be signed.

For the last month or so, we have primarily been focusing on dollar valuations and factors outside of offense that need to be added into any type of evaluation. This has enabled us to determine the fair market values for several players as well as figure the fee certain teams are paying for each added win. One player left out of such posts is Manny Ramirez. Per reader request, we will figure out exactly what Manny’s fair market value is, taking into account his offense, defense, and baserunning.

Offense
One of the best hitters of all time, Manny is still one of the best hitters today, even at 36 years old. In 2008, he hit .332/.430/.601, good for a .432 wOBA and +56 runs above average, his best offensive season since 2002. In fact, via WPA/LI, 2008 was the best offensive season of Manny’s entire career! Moving forward, Marcel projects Manny to produce a .389 wOBA in 2009, which would translate to +30 runs above average. Not as potent as last year by any stretch, but still more effective offensively than the likes of Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell, Bobby Abreu, and the recently-signed Raul Ibanez.

Defense
Defensive excellence and Manny Ramirez, quite simply, do not belong in the same sentence. Unless, of course, the sentence is sarcastic and designed to point out how much of a liability he can be with the glove. UZR has him all over the place since 2002, ranging from +4 runs back then to -23 runs in 2005. From 2005-2008, his UZR numbers are -23, -20, -18, -5. His defense looked substantially better in 2008, but that does not make him solid in the field. A convervative UZR projection would peg Manny as a -10 runs fielder in 2009.

Baserunning/Adjustments
Via BP’s equivalent baserunning runs, Manny was worth +0.25 runs on the bases last year, and -2.05 runs the year before. Then, for whatever reason, the data does not seem to be there. Let’s call him -1 run on the bases, not terrible, not impressive.

As a corner outfielder, Manny should be docked -7.5 runs per 162 games. Projected to play 150 games next season, Manny’s prorated adjustment would be -6.9 runs. To determine value above replacement, and not average, the +20 runs per 700 PA also needs to be added. Prorating that, based on 584 projected plate appearances, adjusts this to +16.5 runs.

Overall
Adding the rounded results together: +30 + 17 – 10 – 7 – 1 = +29. Manny is a +2.9 win player in 2009. Assuming a going rate of $5 mil/win, Manny’s fair market value right now is $14.5 mil. A 3-yr deal, in a vacuum, would be worth closer to $42 mil. Suffice it to say, he is going to make much more than this. It is too difficult to quantify the merchandise and ticket sales that he will add to a team, but even with that, he does not seem to be worth the $22.5 mil/yr the Dodgers offered him earlier. Then again, accounting for the value of the actual marginal wins he is adding, he could very well be worth that fee.

Then again, perhaps the team feels that his -5 defense in 2008 is more a sign of things to come than the putrid numbers posted from 2005-07. If that is the case, then they are valuing Manny as a +34 run player, or +3.4 wins. That fair market value would be $17 mil/yr, and with the ticket sales and merchandise that would follow, it does seem more realistic that he could be worth about $22 mil/yr. For him to truly command a deal that impressive, he would have to be worth closer to four wins offensively than three, show that his defensive shortcomings are closer to a half-win docked rather than two full wins, and really keep a fanbase entertained.

Assuming -10 runs defensively, for Manny to truly command $22.5 mil/yr, he would need to be +45 runs on offense/baserunning combined. 45 runs offense + 17 over replacement – 10 defense – 7 position = +45. +45 runs = +4.5 wins. +4.5 wins * $5 mil/win = $22.5 mil.

During the latter part of this week, Dave has discussed defensive metrics and how they are, or should be, treated moreso as inferential statistics than descriptive; that the results should be treated as data points as opposed to concrete and isolated performance indicators. As odd as it sounds, defense is still undervalued today. And when I say undervalued, imagine me putting a ton of emphasis to really hammer home the point that defense just is not considered as important as offense. If I were to compare Manny Ramirez and Carl Crawford (as I will below), those who do not really consider defense to be valuable with scoff at the results.

Here are Crawford’s and Ramirez’s runs projections for 2009:

Manny Ramirez: +30 batting, -7.5 adjustment, +20 replacement, -15 defense
Carl Crawford: + 3 batting, -7.5 adjustment, +20 replacement, +10 defense

Put together, this puts Ramirez at +27.5 runs and Crawford at +25.5 runs. Converted to wins, that is a mere 2.75 to 2.55 advantage for ManRam, and that isn’t even including baserunning metrics such as BP’s equivalent baserunning runs. Now, for a second, imagine if I were to go on air at ESPN and discuss how Crawford in 2009 is almost just as valuable, all told, as Ramirez: can you imagine the type of criticism I would receive? In fact, I expect to get some here as well, even though our fanbase tends to value defense a bit more.

Even in my own head it sounds odd that Manny’s production is only two runs higher than Crawford. I hate resorting to arguments centering around how the media shapes our views of events, but this is definitely a big part of why fans focus moreso on offense, or consider offense as worth much more than defense. Only when a player is considered a defensive wiz is the run prevention with the glove deemed important, and in cases like that, people almost go too far, saying that offense doesn’t matter at all because of how solid the player’s glove looks.

Shows like SportsCenter only show the spectacular plays, and this is why our views on the defensive resumes of certain players (See: Derek Jeter) are warped. He has made some fantastic plays in his career, and we have seen them over and over again, but he is not a good fielding shortstop in any sense of the word. This doesn’t show up in the form of errors or fielding percentage, though. Even though innate flaws exist in new age defensive metrics and our perceptions of their usage, we can all agree that fielding percentage is awful. Jeter won’t make errors on certain plays, primarily because his range prevents him from making these plays.

Watching a game, we tend to evaluate defense solely on whether or not the play was made, not if the player had enough range to reach said ball. If Chase Utley bobbles a ball at second base, even though he showed more range to get to the ball than any other second baseman in the league, many fans would think of it as a poor play. Was it? I personally feel it would be a great sign because he was able to reach the ball, which boils down to a big point: fans are spoiled, and defense is honestly one aspect of a game where watching a game hurts our opinions and evaluations.

Shane Victorino has terrific range in centerfield, but because he scurries to a Flyball A and Carlos Beltran is able to glide to Flyball A, many people would consider Shane the better fielder. Beltran made the play look easy, and therefore it becomes expected. He is expected to make that play and those viewing the games get spoiled into considering this normal, when in fact it is insanely impressive fielding. When we see enough of something, it gradually establishes the norm in our minds, and everything is treated relative to that norm as opposed to the average for the league. This is why many fans will consider an average or slightly above average defender miraculous with the glove simply because his predecessor had awful range and displayed poor defensive abilities.

Even with all of the defensive metrics available today, this is an area that still isn’t concrete from an evaluative standpoint. This fact makes it tough to justify defensive importance when statheads like us are under intense scrutiny to mathematically and logically prove our points. I’m not sure how fans, myself included, can get past being spoiled or falling into a comfort zone with what we watch as opposed to how the average performer would perform, but until we reach that point, comparisons like Ramirez-Crawford from above will continue to look ridiculous. After all, how could Crawford’s defense and baserunning come even close to what Manny can do with the bat? Perhaps if a defensive metric comes out that leverages the importance level of the situation we could begin to show this, or one that, with very educated estimates, shows what hit would have been recorded had the ball not been fielded (as in, factoring in the run values of what would have occurred had the play not been fielded), but this is still a tough analytical facet to sell.

Defense is very important, but how important is still uncertain in the eyes of many fans, primarily because of how we value errors, and how we get spoiled watching certain players.

As well all know, yesterday was the July 31 trade deadline for Major League Baseball. Even though it was fairly quiet, a number of interesting prospects traded hands, so let’s take a look at some of them.

Gaby Hernandez, RHP
Age:22 | Level: Double-A/Triple-A
From Florida to Seattle for Arthur Rhodes

Hernandez was demoted to Double-A after posting a 7.24 ERA in 13 Triple-A starts. Only 22, the right-hander still has lots of upside and was originally drafted in the third round of the 2004 draft by the New York Mets. He was sent to Florida in the Paul LoDuca. He was sent to Florida in the Paul LoDuca trade prior to the 2007 season. Hernandez has an excellent curve ball, a low-90s fastball and a change-up. He represents a nice return for a 38-year-old LOOGY.

Andy LaRoche, 3B
Age: 24 | Level: Triple-A/Majors
Traded from Los Angeles to Pittsburgh in the three-team Manny Ramirez deal

LaRoche should finally get the opportunity to play everyday, which he deserves. He possesses the potential to hit 25-30 homers, although it remains to be seen how well he will hit for average. Pittsburgh has done a nice job of turning Jason Bay’s and Xavier Nady’s above-average seasons into quality prospects. Brother Adamand Andy will have a chance to play in the same infield.

Bryan Morris, RHP
Age: 21 | Level: A-ball
Traded from Los Angeles to Pittsburgh in the three-team Manny Ramirez deal

Morris was a first-round selection in the 2006 draft by the Dodgers but missed the 2007 season after undergoing Tommy John surgery. He has been strong this season though by allowing 73 hits and 31 walks in 81.2 innings. Morris has also struck out 72 batters and could be a nice No. 2 starter with a low-90s fastball, curve, slider and change.

Craig Hansen, RHP
Age: 24 | Level: Triple-A/Majors
Traded from Boston to Pittsburgh in the three-team Manny Ramirez deal

The former first round pick out of St. John’s University really needed out of Boston. Although he made it to the Majors shortly after being drafted, he has never been able to stick at the big league level due to below-average command and control. In 2008, he had a 5.58 ERA for Boston in 30.2 innings after allowing 29 hits and 23 walks with 25 strikeouts. Hansen has a mid-90s fastball but is still trying to improve his slider which has slipped a grade or two since college.

Brandon Moss, OF
Age: 24 | Level: Triple-A/Majors
Traded from Boston to Pittsburgh in the three-team Manny Ramirez deal

Moss could get the opportunity to play everyday in Pittsburgh but he is probably a fourth outfielder long-term. The left-handed batter hit .282/.346/.528 in 163 Triple-A at-bats this season and .295/.337/.462 in 78 Major League at-bats. Moss strikes out too much and has just modest power for the corner outfield. He was originally selected in the eighth round out of high school in the 2002 draft.

When I posted my article on Kosuke Fukudome yesterday, loyal reader VegasWatch pointed out that the Cubs outfielder’s opening day home run likely contributed the bulk of his 0.52 clutch score. Therefore, after being given the label of “clutch” the net sum of all of Kosuke’s clutchiness would not add up to much.

The formula for clutch, as defined in the glossary here, is:

Clutch = WPA/pLI – WPA/LI

For further clarification, pLI refers to the average leverage index of all game events for a given player while WPA/LI refers to context neutral wins; in other words, what the player produced regardless of the situation he entered into. This formula calculates the performance level of a player in crucial situations relative to his standard production. If a player has a .330 batting average in high leverage situations but hits .330 everywhere else, he is not considered clutch. This is not to say he lacks talent, but rather he just produces at a high level in all situations and isn’t necessarily stepping his game up in crucial plate appearances.

The Kosuke example made me wonder which other players were greatly benefiting from a big play. Looking at the top eight clutch scores before the stats updated last night, I tracked the biggest individual play for each of the eight and compared the clutch score of that singular play to the net sum of their other plays. This way we can see which player’s clutch labels are truly derived from one big play as opposed to those who have been a bit more consistent in stepping up. Here are the eight, with their overall clutch score and the three required components of their biggest play – note that the pLI refers to the season average, not the game average:

Pat Burrell (1.33): 0.899 WPA, 3.56 LI, 1.09 pLI
Melvin Mora (1.30): 0.418 WPA, 5.14 LI, 1.04 pLI
Freddy Sanchez (1.27): 0.363 WPA, 4.65 LI, 1.03 pLI
Skip Schumaker (0.93): 0.287 WPA, 4.29 LI, 1.04 pLI
Jeremy Hermida (0.86): 0.294 WPA, 2.61 LI, 0.94 pLI
Bobby Abreu (0.84): 0.512 WPA, 5.44 LI, 0.92 pLI
Manny Ramirez (0.81): 0.482 WPA, 2.38 LI, 0.95 pLI
Joe Mauer (0.80): 0.364 WPA, 4.35 LI, 1.07 pLI

With these figures, here is the breakdown of the big play clutch vs. the clutch in all other plate appearances:

Pat Burrell: 0.57 big play, 0.76 other
Melvin Mora: 0.32 big play, 0.98 other
Freddy Sanchez: 0.27 big play, 1.00 other
Skip Schumaker: 0.21 big play, 0.72 other
Jeremy Hermida: 0.20 big play, 0.66 other
Bobby Abreu: 0.46 big play, 0.38 other
Manny Ramirez: 0.30 big play, 0.51 other
Joe Mauer: 0.26 big play, 0.54 other

Pat Burrell had the most clutch “big play” when he hit a walkoff two-run home run against the Giants on May 2nd. However, according to these numbers, Abreu actually benefited the most from his play; he is the only one whose big play exceeded the net sum of all other clutch plays.

On the flipside, Freddy Sanchez and Melvin Mora have been very consistent in raising their performance level in high leverage situations. When talking about a player’s clutchiness, though, it really only takes one or two big plays to cement the label. We could remove the one big play and look at all other performances but since one play can change a fan’s perception of clutchiness that just would not be fair; regardless of whether or not the clutch benefits from a huge play or a group of smaller plays added together, the bottom line is that these players have helped their team win games by stepping up in crucial situations.