Archive for the contest

Jason Bay, Platoon Outfielder?

Remember back in the 2009-2010 off-season, when some people weren’t sure who was better between big-time free agent outfielders Jason Bay and Matt Holliday? That was awesome. The Bay contract may not have been the nail in the coffin of Omar Minaya’s tenure as general manager of the Mets, but it was pretty close.

It is unlikely that even the biggest critics of the Bay contract at the time (and I was not a fan) thought things would get this bad this quickly. Bay was paid to be a star, but he has not even been an average player in either of his seasons so far with the Mets. Perhaps he was about average overall when he played in 2010, but he missed more than a third of the 2010 season. In 2011 he played more, but went from overpaid average player to just a bad player. He has looked so poor in spring training that there is talk (understandably dismissed by the Mets) that Bay could be platooned if he starts slow this year. The talk may be baseless, but that it is even out there is a bad sign for the Mets given that Bay still has two years and $35 million guaranteed (including the $3 million buyout on the 2014 club option) on his contract, which also includes a full no-trade clause.

But for the sake of speculation, if the Mets did decide to platoon Bay, would it really accomplish anything?

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Francoeur Is Destiny, or Contest Over

Let’s see: former Atlanta prospect from the early 2000s, terrible plate discipline, was last decent more than three seasons ago, strong arm, questionable range, reportedly a “good clubhouse guy” despite whining about losing playing time while playing horribly, a right-handed PowerBat (TM) without much power, platoon issues… That’s right, Jeff Francoeur has finally joined Dayton Moore’s Kansas City Royals. Like there was ever any doubt.

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The Scott Podsednik Trade: Kansas City’s Perspective

In a move that will shake up the NL West, nay, the entire National League as we know it, the Kansas City Royals have reportedly traded outfielder Scott Podsednik to the Los Angeles Dodgers for minor leaguers Lucas May and Elisaul Pimentel. The Dodgers will reportedly pick up the $650,000 dollars still owed to Podsednik, whose initial signing by the Royals during the off-season inspired some jackass on the internet to hypothesize a ‘Contest‘ between Dayton Moore and Omar Minaya to match foolish move for foolish move.

It must be admitted that Podsednik has played better than expected, accumulating 1.2 WAR in 94 games for the Royals, although the playing time (replacement) element is inflated due to the Royals hitting Podsednik first for most of the season (14.3 replacement runs versus 11.3 total runs above replacement means he was still a below-average player). Sure, his defense in left field was average at best according to UZR (-1.5), DRS (-12!), and to anyone who watched his …circuitous… routes (one of the most frustrating parts of Rick Ankiel being out for so long only to have Pods get traded right as Ankiel returned was that we missed the inevitable collision). Over the rest of the season, playing full-time, one would expect Podsednik to be worth roughly a half-win above replacement level, although how much playing time he gets will be contingent on when Manny Ramirez and Reed Johnson return from their respective injuries. Assuming full-time play, a half win is probably worth about $2 million dollars. Minus the $650,000 owed to Podsednik, the surplus is roughly the market value of a C prospect.

I’ll defer to others regarding the prospects that the Dodgers are sending to Kansas City. I’ve read both May and Pimental described as “fringe,” although John Sickels called May (a catcher with a decent bat but defensive issues) a “C” prospect during the past off-season, which would make this potentially a minor win for the Royals, although given the Dodgers’ situation (a contender with injuries to multiple outfielders) either way it seems to be a fair trade for both sides.

While Podsednik has played better than should have been expected for the Royals and thus justified his low cost in a vacuum, it was still not a smart signing for the Royals, given that even with Podsednik’s not-horrible play he’s still a below-average outfielder in his mid-thirties who wouldn’t exactly have taken the Royals to a new level. Moreover, one also has to take into account the opportunity cost the Royals gave up “showcasing” Podsednik while Mitch Maier sat on the bench and newly-minted outfielder Alex Gordon rotted in AAA. But that’s all water under the bridge. Although it is unlikely that Mays or Pimental will amount to much, it is still a decent return to get due to a fortuitous confluence of a (typical) BABIP-fueled July by Podsednik and the Dodgers’ outfield problems (Juan Pierre apparently isn’t available, no doubt much to Ned Colletti’s chagrin). It doesn’t make up for, well, you know… but it would be churlish to deny that this was nice work by Dayton Moore.

I’m intrigued, Dayton. For your next tricks, I suggest a) convincing another team that Rick Ankiel is worth something (even if only taking on his salary); and b) resisting going after the Big Prize.


What the Kansas City Royals Should Do

Overview

This post could easily be three words long, but I assume that the premise of the “What the X Should Do” series is to assume the place of the front office, so… I know it’s hard to believe, but the Royals are out of 2010 contention this season. They need to look to the future, but it is difficult to figure out when that “future” might actually begin, and thus what current players might and might not be part of it.

Buy or Sell

Clearly, the Royals should sell, but whom? The Royals aren’t young: the only player under 26 among the regulars and starting pitchers is Billy Butler. As will be discussed below, there’s no significant help coming from the farm system (other than from players who should already be up like Alex Gordon and Kila Ka’aihue — both 26) this season or next. The most optimistic possibility for significant help from the minors is 2012, and while that seems unrealistic to me, it at least gives us a place to start: the Royals should be looking to get value for any player on their roster that is not likely to have value for them in 2012.

The Royals have plenty of players that will not be helpful in 2012 or after, but a sizable chunk of them are useless (or close to it) now. Scott Podsednik is Juan Pierre without the glove. Jose Guillen has hit decently this season, but once you narrow his options to AL teams (he can only DH, despite recent appearances in RF), then narrow that to contenders… and after that, well, there’s still his massive salary (prorated portion of $12 million dollars remaining this season). Both were hot to start the season, and if they can’t get a C- prospect for either of them with the Royals picking up their entire salaries now, they never will. Both are currently sucking up playing time better given to others, and should simply be released. Well, if Podsednik can’t be traded he might be useful off the bench “just in case” fellow ill-fated outfield acquisition Rick Ankiel doesn’t return to full health soon. The Royals might as well keep Ankiel around to up his numbers a bit in case of a waiver trade (he has no value at the moment), although he should not be allowed to block Alex Gordon or even Mitch Maier. Gil Meche is a slightly different case, and is on the DL at the moment, but even if he wasn’t, his 2009 and 2010 performance, as well as his contract, gives him little or no value on the market without the Royals picking up a significant portion of his salary. Some other Royals might have a bit of value, but not enough to be helpful to the Royals other than as a salary dump: Kyle Farnsworth, Willie Bloomquist, and Captain 92%.

The Royals do have some players that they should move in expectation of getting something helpful back. Brian Bannister is 29, his recent performances don’t inspire confidence, and by the time 2012 comes around he won’t be worth his likely arbitration award, but he’s still under team control, and might be a useful #4 starter somewhere else. David DeJesus, one of the more underrated players in baseball, has significantly more value. He plays good defense on the outfield corners, can probably still play passably in center, and is having the best offensive season of his career. He has a very club-friendly contract ($4.7 million in 2010, with a $6 million club option for 2011, a bargain for a 3-win player). While he can help a team now, and the Royals don’t need to be (re-)signing any 30+ players for their next contender. He won’t bring back a future star, but he could bring back another (young and cost-controlled) David DeJesus-type: an above-average regular. The longer they wait, the less they will get back.

One intriguing piece is closer Joakim Soria, who has a club-friendly contract through 2011 with club options for 2012-2014. It is a good deal for the team, but relievers are rarely worth more than two wins a season, and the Royals should be at least check if they can get more value for him on the market for the 2012-and-after seasons.

There is something special on the roster. As I wrote above, the “2012” scenario is exceedingly optimistic, but it remains in the minds of many fans because it is the last season of Zack Greinke’s current contract. Greinke has been up and down this season, but his 5-win 2008 and 9-win 2009 are still relevant. Unless the Royals can realistically contend in 2012, the club needs to be open to trading Greinke. They have time to be picky (and don’t have to trade him this season), but the sooner they move him, the more they can get for him. Even if one thinks he is “only” a five-win pitcher, he’s being paid like a sub-3 win pitcher for the remainder of his contract, and that value could bring back an impressive haul.

Now, if even 2013 seems unrealistic for contention, then all bets are off. If that is the case, the Royals don’t have to trade the following players, but the team should be open to seeing what value they can bring back: Alberto Callaspo (for sure), Chris Iannet– I mean Alex Gordon (still potentially good, despite the organization’s efforts to scapegoat, bury, and devalue him), and Billy Butler (unless they can extend him to an Adam Lind-type contract).

On the Farm

Prior to the season, Beyond the Box Score’s aggregate farm system rankings had the Royals at #6, and since then Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer have actually started to live up to their draft status, and the pitching continues to impress. That being said, it must be kept in mind that other than raking 26-year-old “prospects” Alex Gordon and (maybe) Kila Ka’aihue in AAA (being blocked by all that super talent on the big club), none of the impact prospects are above AA, which is why the 2012 scenario is so unlikely.

Budget

Say what you want about Dayton Moore (and I have), but along with putting together a good farm system, he has also done well in convincing ownership to increase the budget significantly (which is the main reason the farm system has improved). The Royals’ major league payroll is currently around $75 million dollars and probably won’t go much higher in the near future. While Guillen, Ankiel, Willie Bloomquist, and Kyle Farnsworth will be coming off the books after the season, the Royals have a number of players due for arbitration raises such as Gordon, Butler, Callaspo, Bannister, as well as contractual raises for players like Greinke and Soria, so there won’t be much money as one might think for Dayton Moore to make his typically shrewd free agent signings.*

* Props to Dan Szymborski.


Trey Hillman: 2010’s First Sacrificial Lamb

[Author’s added note, May 14, ~10:20 A.M. EST: You really should check out Posnanski’s post that really lays out Hillman’s clubhouse issues that I hinted at below. Do so if for no other reason that to find out that by the end of his first season, “the players were rather openly comparing Trey Hillman to Michael from “The Office.” Hmm… I wonder where they got that idea?]

The first manager of the 2010 season has been “let go”: Thursday afternoon, immediately after Zack Greinke’s first super-duper meaningful pitcher win of the season, the Kansas City Royals announced the firing of manager Trey Hillman. I’m not an “insider,” so I won’t get into analyzing the specific politics of the organization. That sort of stuff will hopefully come from the almost-always outstanding work of Joe Posnanski, Rany Jazayerli, Sam Mellinger, and others.

It is tempting to run through a sampling of Hillman’s “greatest hits.” (Who can forget Kyle Farnsworth pitching to Jim Thome on Opening Day 2009?) We’ll always remember Hillman’s response to the person who asked why left-handed reliever Ron Mahay wasn’t brought in to face Thome : “Mahay isn’t a lefty specialist.” Hillman handled the bullpen poorly, made bizarre playing time decisions, had an amazingly poor grasp of the platoon, and allegedly lost the clubhouse in his very first Spring Training with the club. I personally soured on Hillman fairly quickly. I didn’t appreciate the condescending tone Hillman tended to take when he felt cornered, and it was clear that part of the problem was his personality and attitude (he didn’t have time to “educate” us).

Nevertheless, even when someone has lost their job deservedly, it is difficult to take much joy in it. Hillman clearly loves the sport, and went to great lengths to be “in baseball” any way he could — working his way through the Yankees’ minor league system as as manager, leading the Nippon Ham Fighters to Pacific League championships in 2006 and 2007, and finally getting a shot at the American major leagues with the Royals in 2008. This is what happens to managers who preside over terrible teams. I would be shocked if Trey Hillman ever managed in the American major leagues again, and while that’s an accurate reflection of his abilities, it is sad to see that part of his dream end. Like just about every defeated political candidate I’ve ever heard, he never sounded better than during his ‘concession speech.’ All the best to Trey Hillman in his future endeavors. I’m just glad he got to stay long enough to see Jason Kendall’s emotional 250th hit-by-pitch.

The least surprising post-firing announcement is that Hillman’s replacement, at least on an interim basis, is former Brewers skipper Ned Yost. You aren’t going to believe this, but Yost was a coach for the Atlanta Braves at the same time Dayton Moore was working there. Some blame Yost for the Brewers’ pennant race problems during the last part of his Milwaukee tenure, but it is safe to say Yost probably won’t have to deal with that situation anytime soon with Kansas City. The truth is that it just doesn’t matter all that much, from a pure baseball perspective. You’ve read the sabermetric “managers don’t matter all that much” thing before: yes, managers often make bad strategic decisions, and sometimes they blow up in their faces, as in the Farnsworth/Thome example above. But over time… sometimes you pinch-run Tony Pena, Jr. for your designated hitter Billy Butler in a close game, Pena gets stranded, then, in extra innings, one of the worst hitters in the history of the major leagues, playing DH, gets the game-winning hit. Within a few games, random variation limits the amount of damage (or good) a manager can do. Yes, Hillman played Jose Guillen too much, but he’s not the person who gave an obviously declining outfielder in his early thirties a guaranteed $36 million dollar contract, either.

Back to the matter at hand. If you’re reading this, you probably know how this usually plays out. A new GM (Dayton Moore) comes in, quickly gets rid of the current manager (Cf. Buddy Bell) and brings in “his guy” (Trey Hillman). If after two or three seasons, if the team is still losing, the manager gets canned, and the GM’s leash gets shorter. Dayton Moore was quite emotional during Thursday’s presser, but it would be cynical to suggest that it was for any reason other than his personal relationship with Trey Hillman. Still, this is a clear sign (especially if one thinks the order to make a change came from ownership) that patience with the Royals’ lack of progress at the major league level is running thin. Pre-Moore acquisition Alex Gordon has been successfully neutered, but the most valuable on the team are still pre-Moore draftees Zack Greinke and Billy Butler. Hillman was Moore’s last line of defense. Some may say that Moore needs time to “see the end of what he started” in the minor leagues. Did anyone say that Allard Baird should be allowed to see what became of Greinke, Butler, and Gordon?

Trey Hillman (about whom Moore once said had a chance to be “one of the best baseball men of his generation”) needed to go, if for no other reason than showing that there is some level of “accountability” within the organization. The signals indicate that ownership isn’t going to wait around indefinitely on Dayton Moore, either. Again, we’ve seen this movie: new general manager comes in, honeymoon period (he isn’t the old guy!), seems to have a plan (I bet no one has ever thought of building a “farm system” before!), hires new manager (new ideas from Japan!), spends lots of money of free agents… then, when/if things go south, one of the last lines of defense is that the GM’s managerial hire gets fired. The typical next step isn’t to fire the new manager: after the first hire-and-fire, it’s usually the GM’s turn.

Now that is a process worth trusting.


Fun with Low Reliability Scores

It’s been a crazy day. I’m busy working, writing various things. Then, because I’m a real genius when it comes to hitting “reply all,” I realized that I didn’t let people know I wanted to post, and what I wanted to write on got (rightly) taken. To top it off, there’s big happenings afoot in Rumorland that may dramatically affect the outcome of The Contest, but I don’t want to jinx it (whatever “jinxing it” would involve).

So today, I want to do something different and look at some “low reliability” offensive projections for 2010. From time to time, I reference “my” projections for a particular player. Believe me, I’m no statistical or programming guru. I simply started with Colin Wyers’ MySQL script for a Marcel-type offensive projections, then added in some tweaks for different aging curves and amounts of regression for different components. Like Marcel, it doesn’t adjust for parks or leagues or include minor-league data. Marcel isn’t intended to compete with the “big boys” (e.g., CHONE, ZiPS, PECOTA), but rather to be a baseline against which they are judged — in fact, Marcel does pretty well. I just hope I’m not doing something worse. In any case, it’s just a toy for my personal enjoyment at this point; it would take a fair bit more tweaking before I published the projections as a whole or even gave the “system” a name (although I admit having some ideas for the latter).

For each player projected, my system, like Marcel, generates a “reliability score,” which, in Tango’s words,

shows how much of the forecast is based on his performance, and how much was regression towards the mean…. [for example] Bobby Abreu shows a .87. That means that I regressed towards the mean 13%. Using that, it should be easy enough to figure out a confidence interval for each of the stats. If I show a reliability of .00, this means that it is an absolute pure guess on my part.

Generally, you want to look elsewhere than Marcel’s or my system when the reliability score is under .72 or so.

But that’s where today’s “fun “starts, because the way the projection system is set up with the Baseball Databank, if a player (pitchers are excluded) even has 1 plate appearance in last three years, it generates a projection for him. So let’s take a look at four goodies my mystery projection system has in store for in 2010. I’ll give the “three slash,” then runs created above average per 150 games, and then the reliability score for each player and some commentary. At the very least, this might provide a weird corollary to Dave Cameron’s point about regression “fixing” problems.

Morgan Ensberg, .250/.332/.408, -2/150, .505 r. I just read that he retired last spring due to lack of interest from major league teams. It’s not surprising, I guess, but I have to say that it seems like just yet yesterday he was a decent-fielding, three true outcomes machine for Houston. Then, after 2006… nothing. But my system says he’s not a bad bat if he can field decently.

Neifi Perez, .251/.315/.402, -8/150 .141 r. Perez was the return for one of the worst trades in recent history, but at least the team that got him never repeated that sort of mistake again. That’s not a bad line for a shortstop. Indeed, Neifi’s due for a career year at the plate (regression!). I mean, you wouldn’t hit him first or anything.

With the signings of Vladimir Guerrero and Jack Cust this weekend, here are two DH candidates.

Jay Gibbons, .254/.305/.403 -12/150, .412 r. Last seen playing for the Newark Bears, Gibbons, like Ensberg, retired in 2009 after being unable to find a job for a major-league team. I used to regularly take a certain well-known fantasy guru’s advice and put Gibbons on my roto team. It never worked, not even once. I was never really not sure what the guru or the Orioles saw in him. I guess he put up a decent season in 2005, and even played the outfield pretty well. But he never really seemed to have the patience or contact skills to back up his lack of defense.

Barry Bonds, .261/.410/.478, +16/150, .536 r. You had to know it was coming, right? Not bad for a man who hasn’t played the past two seasons. Perhaps you’d expect better linear weights for a guy with a .410 OBP, but keep in mind that the lwts don’t include intentional walks, which Bonds had a lot of (like Marcel, my system current projects iBBs). Still, there are plenty of teams that could use a +16 hitter at DH. I wonder how permanent that retirement is?

Until the next installment!


Scott Podsednik, Dayton Moore, and The Contest

One might be tempted to see the Royals’ signing of outfielder Scott Podsednik as a move to steal the headlines in the wake of cross-state rival St. Louis’ big Matt Holliday contract earlier this week. Or maybe they just wanted to sneak in the bad news on Friday. Close observers, however, know better. This is all part of The Contest.

I’m not exactly sure what the goal of The Contest is: to put together a team that might contend in 2005, get fired, or to shatter the blogosphere’s Universal Snark-O-Meter in one fell blow, but it’s been apparent for some time now that Royals General Manager Dayton Moore and his Mets counterpart Omar Minaya have been involved in some sort of bizarre rivalry for at least the last year. It’s been a real back-and-forth (forgive the shaky chronology):

* Dayton acquires Mike Jacobs, Kyle Farnsworth, Horacio Ramirez, and Willie Bloomquist as part of a misguided attempt to contend.

* Omar responds by giving Oliver Perez three years and $36 million (aka, “The Jose Guillen Special”).

* The same week that the Royals trade prospects for Yuniesky Betancourt, the Mets trade Ryan Church for Jeff Francoeur (the latter must really have burned Dayton up inside).

* Omar accuses a reporter critical of a fired Mets official of gunning for a job with the Mets.

* In the midst of a near 100-loss season, Dayton lectures Royals fans on their lust for instant gratification and admonishes them to “trust the process.”

* Dayton understandably allows two below-average catchers to walk (Miguel Olivo and John Buck), but then signs Zombie Jason Kendall for more than either Olivo or Buck get on the open market.

* Omar, bidding against himself, manages to overpay Jason Bay by at least $15-$20 million.

It was obviously Dayton’s time to shine. And shine he did.

The terms of the deal haven’t been made public yet (to my knowledge). But what kind of player is the 34-year-old Podsednik at this point?

CHONE has Podsednik projected for a context-neutral .271/.333/.367, 9 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is .269/.324/.384, -8/150. Defensively, CHONE’s TotalZone projection is +4 in left field (Podsednik’s primary position the last few seasons) per 150 games. Jeff Zimmerman has him at -2. My projection includes basestealing (in short: he steals a lot, but gets caught too much to be worth it), but as far as his baserunning goes otherwise, he’s average at best at this point.

Per 150 games (which Podsednik hasn’t played since 2004): let’s call it +1 defense, -7 prorated positional adjustment for left field, -9 offense + 20 replacement level = 0.5 WAR player. Fans have so far projected Podsednik at 0.2 WAR for 2010.

I haven’t seen the terms of the deal yet. I’ve heard rumors or one year, one million dollars, and even at $3.5 million per marginal win, at 0.5 WAR, that’s sort of reasonable… sounding.

Except that it’s still a terrible decision. Let’s put it this way: the Royals aren’t exactly at a point at which they should be spending more for a marginal win — they are one of the worst teams in the American League. It’s a slight bargain at best, and assuming (perhaps foolishly) that Moore didn’t spring for more than one year, a player with this sort of projection needs to have some upside, and Podsednik is 34 years old.

Moreover, what does this mean in relation to opportunity cost? Podsednik is 34 years old and his primary position the last few years is left field. Of course, one of the few above-average position players the Royals have is their current left fielder David DeJesus, probably a 2.5-3.0 WAR player in 2010. DeJesus is good enough defensively that he could probably be at least adequate in center (certainly better than Podsednik), but his arm (despite 2009’s impressive statistical showing in left) won’t play in right. Podsednik doesn’t have the arm for right, either… which leaves center field, something Dayton Moore has repeatedly hinted at with his talk of “speedy center fielder” (roles!) all offseason.

Leaving aside the reality that Podsednik is at best barely above average defensively in left field, thus implying a disaster in center field (where he last played full-time in 2004), the Royals already have two center fielders on the roster. One is the recently signed replacement-level Brian Anderson (Moore is apparently adding former White Sox to his palette of former Braves and Mariners). Anderson, at least, is young-ish enough to have some upside, although why Moore felt he had to give Anderson a major-league deal worth $0.7M with performance incentives is beyond me. Even worse, the Royals have Mitch Maier. Maier is nothing special — he’s probably a good fourth outfielder at best — a 1.0-1.5 WAR player. But he’s 28, at the minimum, and the Royals aren’t contending (even for .500) in 2010: this is the year to play Maier and see what he’s got and save a bit of cash. But Dayton has other ideas.

Even if Maier wasn’t around, Podsednik isn’t close to good enough to be an Iwamura-type “let’s at least have someone respectable out there” — in that case, there are still far superior players like FanGraphs-favorites Ryan Church and Gabe Gross available, and the market shows that superior players to Podsednik, such as Langerhans, are going for less than Brian Anderson money.

I could go on, but you get the picture: this deal makes no sense… unless you know about The Contest.

Your move, Omar.

[Update: As pointed out in the comments, I completely negleted to factor in Dayton’s brilliant ‘banning’ of Rany Jazayerli for criticizing the Royals’ medical staff. I apologize for the embarrassing oversight on my part. This really puts Omar behind… how many years and millions to Bengie Molina is it going to take for him to catch up?]