Archive for war

Reviewing the Preseason Standings Projections

The FanGraphs staff made its obligatory preseason picks before the season (naturally), and I think it’s safe to say that none of us have psychic powers. My picks of the Angels and Blue Jays to win their divisions — they’re not looking so hot right now. In my defense, I was just blindly going along with what our preseason WAR estimates told me. OK, not the greatest defense, but I figured Steamer + ZiPS + FG-created depth charts could produce better guesses than I could on my own. Especially with the roster changes that have happened lately, I thought it would be a good time to revisit our projections. The Angels came up the series victors against the Blue Jays in their recent four-game Battle of the Disappointments, but both teams are still far below the expectations put on them.  However, let’s examine: could they actually be good teams who have just been unlucky?

Most teams have played somewhere around 110 games this season. That leaves plenty of room for unpredictability. If you flipped a coin 110 times, you’d expect to get about 55 heads, right? Well, the binomial distribution says there’s only about a 49.5% chance of the heads total being within even three of that (somewhere between 52 and 58 times). MLB teams are pretty different from coins — they’re a lot more expensive — but I think you can apply the same principle to them. The above calculation for the coin assumes the “true” rate of heads is 50%. What would we see if we were to presume our projections’ estimated preseason win totals are actually representative of the “true” win rates for each team? The following table will show you: Read the rest of this entry »


Miguel Cabrera’s Trade Value

Miguel Cabrera getting a first place MVP vote is pretty silly. That said, as a player, dude is awesome. He’s not Keith Hernandez with the glove or Willie Wilson on the basepaths, but in case you haven’t noticed, he’s pretty good at the whole “hitting” thing. From 2007 to 2009, Caberara generated 110.5 batting runs above average. During that period, he’s accumulated more Wins Above Replacement than fellow first basemen Lance Berkman, Adrian Gonzalez, Carlos Pena, and Ryan Howard. Cabrera will only be 27 next season. Rumor has it that he may be available in trade with the Tigers trying to clear salary. If so, what is his value?

To reiterate: Cabrera is an excellent (and still young) player. However, as fans, we’ve lately become more aware that a player’s value includes not only his (total) baseball skill, but, as Dave pointed out earlier in a different context, the player’s contract. Think about it this way: if someone gives you a house worth two million dollars, then you’ve gained two million dollars in assets. However, if someone “gives” you the same house conditional on you paying off the same two million dollars, you haven’t really added an asset, have you?

The valuation of baseball players is similar. Without getting into methods for calculating dollars per marginal win (see Colin Wyers’ excellent series at THT), this is perhaps the most important function of WAR. Teams spend money to add wins. WAR tells you how many wins a player adds above “freely available” talent. On its own, WAR tells us how much a player helps his team even if he’s below average. When WAR is connected with relative dollar value of marginal wins, we get a sense of how much a player exceeded or fell short of the value of his salary. Let’s apply this to Cabrera.

CHONE projects Cabrera as 37 runs above average per 150 games a hitter next season. Jeff Zimmerman projects him as a -1 defender at 1B. Looking at Cabrera’s baserunning numbers from the last few seasons, let’s call him -2. Prorated for 150 games, that’s: +37 hitting, -1 fielding, -11.5 position, -2 baserunning, +23 AL replacement level = about a 4.5 WAR player in 2010.

Following Tango, I’ll assume the current market value of a marginal win is $4.4 million. Again following Tango’s generic model, assume post-peak players decline by half-a-win per year. We need to build in annual salary inflation, (which I’ve set at 7%). With those assumptions in place, over the next six seasons (2010-2015) we’d expect a 4.5 WAR player like Cabrera to be worth about $102 million. Cabrera’s only 27, so the decline curve may be a bit harsh. If we add on a half-win a season to the original calculation, his estimated value from 2010 to 2015 is $118 million.

From 2010 to 2015 (six seasons), Cabrera is guaranteed $126 million. Think back to the house example — no matter how nice the house is, if you have to pay full price (or more) for it, you aren’t adding an asset. Cabrera is an excellent player, but he’s going to be being paid as much (or more) than he’s (likely) going to be worth.

Of course, the Tigers could pick up a chunk of Cabrera’s future salary and/or throw in cheap talent to add value from their side. However, straight up, given his estimated talent and large contract, Miguel Cabrera’s intrinsic trade value appears to be… nothing?

This is a bit of an extreme conclusion. Cabrera’s trade value is not “nothing.” He is one of the best hitters in the league and is young enough that he will probably remain so for at least the next few years. Having an efficient payroll is just a means to winning, not an end in itself, and players like Cabrera are rare indeed. Still, since Cabrera is being paid (at least) his likely market value over the life of the contract, he would only really help teams that can afford to pay market value on a regular basis — the Yankees, and perhaps the Red Sox (though probably not the Dodgers at the moment given their ownership situation). And the Yankees already have an expensive first baseman signed long-term in Mark Teixeira. Cabrera isn’t worth “nothing,” but his contract gives the Tigers much less leverage than one would expect given his age and skill.


Billy Butler’s 2009 vs. Alex Gordon’s 2008

Other than Zack Greinke’s historic season, the 2009 Royals had little go right. Billy Butler was one non-Greinke bright spot. After a disappointing 2008, Butler raked in 2009, hitting .301/.362/.492 (.369 wOBA). He even became the everyday first baseman despite questions about his defense, beating out celebrated glove-man Mike Jacobs.

The Royals’ other “Savior,” Alex Gordon, has not quite (ahem) lived up to expectations. Hailed as “the next George Brett” upon being drafted in 2005, Gordon started at the hot corner on Opening Day 2007 and received a standing ovation. Things went downhill from there, as Gordon ended 2007 with a .317 wOBA. In 2008, he posted a merely decent .344 wOBA. Gordon got seriously injured to start 2009 , struggled upon returning, got demoted, and finally limped to a .321 wOBA (although 189 PA tells us next to nothing). The current attitude of many is understandable: Butler is The Man, and Gordon is a question mark at best.

Butler is clearly superior to Gordon as a hitter, and his minor league performances always indicated a higher offensive upside. But it is curious that so many smart people following the Royals have so readily hailed Butler’s 2009 as an awesome breakthrough while saying “meh” to Gordon’s decent 2008. Why is this curious? Because despite the glaring offensive disparity, we live in the Age of WAR. Let’s compare each player’s best season so far: Butler’s 2009 vs. Gordon’s 2008.

Butler’s 2009 value was excellent offensively at 21 runs above average. It was less impressive defensively. Despite looking better than expected, Butler posted a -6.7 UZR at first base (with a -12.6 overall positional adjustment). Butler’s overall WAR for 2009: an above-average 2.4.

Gordon’s 2008 value was more evenly distributed. +7.7 runs hitting, but only -3.0 UZR. However, the latter was accumulated while playing the much-more-valuable 3B. Altogether Gordon had a 2.6 WAR in 2008. It is obvious why many were down on Gordon’s 2008 relative to the Butler’s awesome 2009. Wait, what? Gordon was actually slightly more valuable in 2008 than Butler was in 2009?

Not really. After all, FanGraph WAR doesn’t currently include baserunning (other than SB/CS, which are included in wOBA/wRAA). Looking at the non-SB elements of baserunning using Baseball Prospectus’s EqBRR, as Erik did, we find that Butler was one of the worst baserunners in baseball in 2009 at about five runs below average, putting his WAR at about 1.9. In 2008, Gordon was about +3, which puts his WAR at about 2.9. So Gordon’s 2008 wasn’t “slightly” more valuable than Butler’s 2009, it was significantly more valuable. In fact, once baserunning is fully taken into account, Butler’s 1.9 WAR 2009 isn’t even quite as good as Gordon’s 2.1 WAR from his “disastrous” 2007.

My point is not about the relative value of Butler and Gordon going forward. Batting generally improves the most in the early 20s (whereas fielding and baserunning are relatively static), and Butler is two years younger than Gordon. There are legitimate questions about Gordon’s future given his performance and health. My intent is neither to run down Butler nor celebrate Gordon. One might respond that “Gordon’s value was primarily due to defense, position and baserunning!” But that is exactly the point — those things matter. Despite living in the Age of WAR, informed observers sometimes still focus on only one aspect of a player’s performance. And that can lead to a gap between a perception of one value disparity and the reality of the opposite.


The 5 (or so) Average-est Position Players of 2009

This June I posted a ranking of the “average-est” positional players in baseball (according to current WAR). R.J. liked it so much that he “borrowed” the idea for a post later in the summer. It’s just a toy stat, but a fun one. Simply subtract the “replacement” runs from a players contribution, and the absolute value of the remaining runs is the amount a position player is away from league average. (It’s not as straightforward with pitching.) Part of the fun is seeing the different ways one can get to be league average in relation to hitting, fielding, and positional value. So now that the season is over, who were the average-est position players of 2009?

The number after the player’s name is the players “absolute” difference from average according to stats here at FanGraphs (remember the usual qualifications and take this with grain of salt). Unlike earlier in the season, there are fewer players at the extremes of hitting and fielding value.

5) Clint Barmes (1.3). Maybe I just don’t follow the NL West closely enough, but am I the only one who gets this guy mixed up with Garrett Atkins? I shouldn’t, because despite being about as bad at the plate as Atkins this season, he’s a far better defender. I was surprised to see that Barmes has logged more career innings at SS than 2B, and has performed well there (+6.2 career UZR/150).

4) Magglio Ordonez (0.8). This is a shock, given just how public Ordonez’ struggles with the bat this season were. Well, at least the Tigers avoided triggering that massive vesting option for 2010. Oh, wait.

[Bengie Molina (0.7). It’s the Giants’ awesome cleanup hitter! Better than some might think… doesn’t take much for a catcher. However, I decided he shouldn’t count since FanGraphs WAR doesn’t currently incorporate catcher defense. If you do include one of the available measures for 2009 catcher defense, Molina’s clearly below average. Don’t worry Giants fans, your boys aren’t totally out of it…]

3) Aaron Rowand (0.7). I don’t think this is what the Giants were looking for when they signed him. Not horrible or great in any one area — slightly below average as a hitter, slightly above average as a defensive center fielder.

2) Jimmy Rollins (0.3). So close! Rollins had a dreadful year with the bat (although he rebounded in the second half), and a down year in the field (for him) according to UZR, but for a shortstop, that’s good enough to be a league-average player. I’ll be posting more on him in a few days.

1) Ryan Ludwick (0.0). At 18.1 RAR and with 18.1 replacement runs, Ludwick was a perfectly average positional player of 2009. While he was slightly above average as a hitter (5.3) and fielder (1.3), he played a less demanding corner outfield position for -6.4. It’s a far cry from 2008’s 5.6 WAR, and a lesson in regression to the mean, but he was still a bargain at $3.7M. Congratulations on your perfect adequacy, Mr. Ludwick! No wonder you made that cameo on Shaq Vs.

For Average-ness rankings of all qualified 2009 position players, click here.