The Era of Experimentation
The last thing you probably want to read right now is another summary of the slow-moving pace of free agency. And it wasn’t just that the market moved slowly — for so many players, the contracts they’ve signed have fallen well short of expectations. It’s still too soon to know whether this will be an aberration, but it does feel as if something has shifted. One explanation would be that the free-agent market, from the team perspective, worked rationally. The player perspective would be less charitable. Teams are certainly behaving as if they’re not thrilled to pay players much money as they get deeper into their 30s.
If we take it to be true that free agency is changing, well, there would be several contributors to that. And if we take it to be true that free agency is changing, that should raise the level of urgency to shift more money to players earlier in their careers. That’s the real issue for baseball to deal with. But let’s go back for a second. I want to talk about one single contributor to a depressed market. I don’t think it’s something that’s been happening intentionally, for teams to try to save money. I think the impact on the market is one arguably unfortunate side effect. This is an exciting time for baseball — the age of information. What that can mean has probably been under-discussed.
Last week, Alex Speier wrote a great article about the market in the Boston Globe. The whole thing is worth your five or ten minutes, but I want to share one excerpt, from Brian Bannister.
“What teams think they can do with players is as important as what the player has already done,” said Red Sox vice president of pitching analysis Brian Bannister. “It’s armies of very knowledgeable baseball people, analysts, and disruptive technology all combining to have a more complete approach to developing players. I think you’re seeing that around the game.”
Baseball teams have always been concerned with what a player *can* do. For a while, however, the idea of what a player can do has been informed by what a player has done. Even before projection systems, there were projection systems. If a guy has been good for a few years, he’ll probably be roughly as good again. If a guy has been volatile, you might expect him to be somewhere in the middle. The strongest predictor of the future has always been thought to be the recent past.
In general, that remains true. I imagine it will always remain true. But teams have recently been collecting information they never had. And, now — look, there have been players with potential forever. Players with obvious sky-high ceilings. Players who might be on the verge of a breakout. Teams have always worked to try to make those players better. But now, there’s data. There’s data for everything. Which means, just as we’ve gotten into the era of big data, we’ve gotten into the era of data-driven adjustments. Which teams hope will be data-driven improvements.
Every single player in baseball could be better. Every single player in baseball has tried to get better. That’s been true, more or less, from the beginning. But with Statcast having been around for a number of years, now, and with pitch-tracking having been around for even longer, there’s an increasing belief among teams that they can be smarter and more effective with this. If I could express this in the simplest possible way, more and more teams believe they can turn players into more optimized versions of themselves. They can make the changes through data, now that they’ve had time to get comfortable with it, time to more fully understand it. The players themselves are also increasingly receptive to these ideas, since it’s 2018, and the player pool is fairly young.
Yonder Alonso didn’t get a huge contract, even though he just had by far his best season. Logan Morrison got an even smaller contract, even though he also just had by far his best season. There are a number of reasons for this, but if you look at it, Alonso and Morrison benefited from hitting more balls in the air. That takes hard work, absolutely, but if those players can improve by making the changes, why couldn’t other players? Why couldn’t players already within an organization? Why invest a lot in one breakout, if you think you might be able to develop one of your own?
Hitters and teams are talking about launch angles all the time. The Rays recently implemented a drill where they put screens around the infield, to encourage hitters to aim up. That’s only one thing, though. Launch angles are one aspect of this. You’ll remember how the Pirates tried to improve the center-field defense of Andrew McCutchen by changing his pre-pitch positioning. In need of a center fielder, the Mariners this past offseason went out and got a second baseman, because they felt like the data suggested he could handle the change. Tony Cingrani looked like a different pitcher last year after being traded to the Dodgers, because they had him change how he pitches. Part of the Cubs’ recent pitch to Yu Darvish was that they had data that could help him improve. Deeper down, here’s an intriguing story about the Yankees.
Dillon Tate is working on a new pitch — that’s not the story. It’s a two-seamer — that’s not really story either. It’s how he started throwing it. Tate said the Yankees’ analytics department sized up his arm angle and spin rate and told him he’d be a “good candidate” to throw the pitch, so he’s been working on it. Interested by the chain of events, I asked Cale Coshow if the front office ever suggested a new pitcher for him. It did. When he was at Low-A Charleston, Coshow was told the organization would like to see him work on a cutter, which he’s since turned into a slider. That’s something I’d like to ask more about: the process of the front office giving pitchers new pitches and what they use to determine them.
Pitchers try to fold in new pitches all the time. We hear about it every spring training. Far less often do we hear about teams instructing pitchers to learn specific new pitches, because of their throwing motions. It’s all a part of the greater, big-picture pattern: Teams think they can make their own players better. That could be wonderful news, for their own players. It would also have a negative effect on players who are looking for work.
I imagine it wouldn’t have a negative effect on the best players out there. The stars are the stars. Darvish signed for a lot of money. Even Eric Hosmer signed for a lot of money. But you can see how this could take a bite out of the middle class. Let’s say there’s a veteran free agent who projects for 2 WAR. Now, there’s real value in having a 2-win player. But what if a team with a perceived opening has a young guy who projects for 0.5 or 1 WAR? That player, by the numbers, is worse. Yet the projections might now be fuzzier than ever. That player might be a swing change away from 30 home runs. He might be a defensive adjustment from +10 DRS. There’s already a general preference to stick with what you have, instead of getting something new. Teams have invested in the players they’ve got, and they’ve worked with them for months or years. Now teams believe improvements are more achievable. So it’s easier than it’s been to pass on paying for a marginal upgrade. Worse comes to worse, you can trade for a half-decent player in July.
There’s trouble here. Teams might take this too far. It’s possible some teams already have. Not every player is going to improve. Most replacement-level players are going to remain replacement-level players. I suspect that, in time, teams might somewhat circle back to proven veterans, as they find out that a lot of their suggested adjustments didn’t pan out. But that would still be years away, because for now, so much of this feels fresh, and so much of this feels exciting. More than at any point in baseball’s past, teams think they can analyze their way to player upside. Even if that’s bad for certain free agents, it’s good for the players for whom it works. Teams might be less willing to cast a skilled player aside. Some players would be hurt, and some players would benefit. Some players might reach a level they never could’ve gotten to if they played in a different era. The pool of baseball players is far larger than the pool of veteran free agents.
This isn’t something that’s the same for every club. As always, some teams lean more traditional, and some teams lean more progressive. There are teams that haven’t yet implemented many data-driven tweaks, beyond the ordinary stuff. And there are teams that are presently experimenting with nearly every single pitcher. It’s pervasive enough you could consider it a league-wide trend, and the effect is that, for players who might benefit from making changes, the projections are, I don’t know, squishier. A 1-win player might still have the track record of looking like a 1-win player, but teams might see him as a potential 2-win player, or 3-win player. As the upside is weighed more than the downside, the difference narrows between that guy and a proven, older 2-win player. I’m not saying it’s always going to work out. It’s not always going to work out. But you can understand why teams are where they are. Everybody wants a bargain, and with internal options or cheaper free agents, it feels easier to see potential bargains everywhere.
This is good, and this is bad. It all depends on who you ask. For the decent veteran free agent who doesn’t think of himself as a bench player, this is, at best, obnoxious, and, at worst, insulting. For the 26-year-old who suddenly starts hitting balls over the fence, or getting opponents to swing and miss, this changes an entire career. That same 26-year-old might one day turn into the decent veteran free agent just looking for work. Few things, I suppose, can be good news for everyone. Baseball’s working to find its new balance.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.
Yet on player usage, everyone follows the CYA conventional wisdom in lock step. They use their 3 best RPs for one inning each to protect a 3 run lead. They carry 7-8 RPs, but none are a long reliever, so the starter has to go 4+ IP no matter how crappy he is. If you’re behind by 1 or 2 runs, you use only your crappy RPs, limiting your chance of a comeback. Nobody platoons, b/c everyone has to have more RPs than you could ever need. Nobody uses their 2nd C to DH or pinch hit b/c of this bizarre fear of in game C injuries. The risk aversion is massive.
I think we’re going to see some movement on better leverage-matched reliever usage soon. It’s certainly past time; in terms of effect on the outcome most of the other stuff you mentioned is much smaller by comparison, but reliever leverage blows games all the time.
This. Managers should probably be using their 3 best pitchers up or down 1 (or 2) runs every game in whatever order makes the most sense. Use your 4th best pitcher with a 3-run lead instead of your best one.
You have to have seen how this has been changing (albeit slowly), starting with Cleveland’s use of Andrew Miller, and how teams have been using relievers in the postseason, no?
But yes, there is a lot of risk aversion, for obvious reasons – if you lose by going by the book, at least you went by the book. If you lose by doing something crazy (and would have or could have won if you went by the book), you look like a fool.
So the crazy or experimental thing has to have a *much* better probability of the desired outcome than the normal or “by the book” thing. Just being a little better isn’t good enough to offset the, as you say, “CYA factor.”
It reminds me a little of when they asked people what the acceptable decline in rate of accidents would be in order to make self-driving cars mainstream. The consensus was around 90% (as in a 90% decline – meaning that the accident rate would have to be 1/10 of what it is today). Because self-driving cars are the experimental, crazy thing, and even a 50 or 60 or 80% decline in the accident rate wouldn’t be worth it once you consider the people that *do* die in accidents.
This is obviously off topic, but the biggest problem with self-driving cars is the transition where some people are driving manually and some cars are self-driving. Once we get past that and all the cars are self-driving, there will likely be very few accidents, and you will get your 90+% reduction.
Agree 100%. And traffic jams (at least those caused solely by density and breaking) will be a thing of the past. I just hope it happens in my lifetime. What I think will happen, and soon, is “self-driving only lanes” where we will get some of the benefit. Sorry to stay off-topic!
And there are also massive financial factors at play here, which in turn drive emotions. Pitchers get paid (in arbitration at least) for saves. It’s not a coincidence that the relievers who have already signed big FA deals seem to be the most open to filling any role their manager’s want (see Miller, Robertson, etc.).
It’s also why some smart teams sometimes use their best arb or pre-arb relievers as setup men, and use a lesser FA as the closer.
I think things are changing. The Rays are going with 4 traditional starters, and the 5th spot will be pitched by the bullpen. I am looking forward to seeing how that shakes out.
I don’t follow the AL very well. Are catchers rarely used at DH? It seems like if the starting catcher goes down with an injury, the C at DH can shift to C. If you do that, do you lose the DH for that game? That really does not seem like much of a penalty at all, especially since AL teams rarely exhaust their bench during any particular game.
Yes, you lose the DH in that situation. I’d argue it’s a pretty significant penalty – not only are you filling the pitcher/DH slot with a series of pinch-hitters (who are presumably worse than the non-catcher who would have been the DH), you’ll have to pull your pitcher at less-than-opportune times.
Combined with the low probability of the starting catcher getting hurt though, you’re right – it may be worth trying it.
Yes, you would lose the DH and have to hit the pitcher.
I think the larger problem is catchers tend to be comparatively poor hitters that you wouldn’t want to DH in the 1st place.
Good point. One example where it would work is when the Giants play in an AL stadium. Against a lefty, they could have Hundley DH and Posey catch (or vice versa).
There are definitely situations where it could make sense as there are a few good hitting catchers, but last year there were only 4 catchers with more than 300 PA and a wOBA over .330 – Chirinos, Sanchez, Avila and Zunino. All 4 of those teams had dedicated DHs so there just wasn’t a lot of opportunity there for a catcher to DH.
It’s just not going to happen very often unless you happened to have a very specific situation where a team has 2 good hitting catchers.
“The risk aversion is massive.”
You’re talking about the major league games, though. The changes have to happen at the lower levels, and they are – slowly, but they are. Eventually, they will start happening at the higher levels. You already see some of the changes in the more progressive organizations, but there’s far more coming down the pipeline in 5 years or so.
So you are saying Mike Trout could be better? Are we thinking Ohtani teaches him to be a 2 way player?
I kind of assume Mike Trout will teach Ohtani to be one. Just like he caused the Eagles to win the Super Bowl. Trout is all-powerful.
Yes! I’ve been rambling about something like this argument in the comments all offseason as a “most reasonable explanation” alternative to collusion theories.
If you pinch enough pennies not spending $5-15 MM / year a piece on OK not great vets with little upside you can accumulate enough money to sign one or more higher impact players. If you believe you can turn your in-house scrubs into acceptable regulars for next to no salary commitment there’s never been a better time to try a stars and scrubs style roster build.
How sure are you that experimentation is a new idea? I think the thing that has changed the most is the way that it is promoted. From the point-of-view of those previously not associated with the game it is really easy to say how much things have changed. How would they even know? I am not putting anyone in that bucket as I know none of you. In fact, that is how people with no previous value to the baseball community need to sell the application of data. Otherwise, it is just the players playing baseball and making adjustments, which is always how things have worked. Baseball is a game of adjustments – any player will tell you that. What we are looking at right now is a juiced ball that has never been seen. I think previous generations would have flourished as well. From the player’s view I am not sure how much they have changed. It would not have taken data for players to realize that they are playing in a juiced ball era. I am of the mind that players would have found this on their own… and that they did. If they didn’t see it with their own eyes, they would discard that data. I think is more a case of data superimposed over the top of good old fashioned player-driven change. Lowering the mound would have been marketed as data-driven hitting improvement if we could somehow manipulate time. A year ago this community was committed to the idea that juiced balls were fiction as that doesn’t support the idea of data-driven change, despite the data showing a different environment. There is a nasty conflict of interests at play which makes it all very difficult to analyze any of this. One party wants to claim success for the other, which isn’t impossible, but it is tough to identify the role that each plays. I advocate for the players in the field, and I feel bad for dumping on baseball progressives, but players out in the field don’t get the credit they deserve, in my opinion.
I don’t doubt that a new set of ideas are circulating the baseball world, but I am skeptical that business is all that different for the players. How different is this from some new coach that wants to shake things up or a new hitting coach etc? The thing that has changed is who is taking credit as well as the degree to which they do. Coaches generally do not pat themselves on the backs, they help put players in positions to succeed and use cliches like that. For people on the outside it is a very new world – people are listening and they want to feel valued, or better yet, paid. I get where they are coming from, but it is inherently oversold – it has to be or it is just charity and that is not the case. Its more like a gold rush and it is similarly unsustainable. The danger is that people are pushing one-size-fits-all ideas like never before and I don’t see that as a positive. Players are unique, what works for one will not work for another – this revolution seems to be distancing itself from that fact. I think that is what has changed the most is the lack of respect for the individuals that play the game. Players are still working their asses off to adjust, experiment and succeed or fail. Player development is now being marketed as a new phenomenon, which is crazy to me. I get that teams are looking for an edge and they are more willing to look anywhere, which is a good thing, but I question the implementation and the marketing of it all. It is so frustrating for me to read about how revolutionary and disruptive this is – the adjectives themselves are the epitome of buzzwords, but also quite thoughtful I am sure. It just doesn’t seem honest to me, but I guess business rarely is. Down vote away or not, a discussion is yet another idea. I don’t expect a great deal of support.
“players out in the field don’t get the credit they deserve”
I agree with this. The players do the work, they seek the info, they open their minds. No one should forget they are the ones throwing, fielding, and hitting the ball. I am being serious, lest anyone think otherwise.
That being said, there is a massive, massive shift in player development in pro baseball. Six years ago it was just accepted the food for every team was complete trash. Today, most teams serve real food and some go overboard like the Dodgers, Rangers, and Phillies, offering organic/nitrate-free food and steak/lobster on getaway days in Rookie ball (!). That was the start of “caring about players.”
“Player development” wasn’t – and primarily isn’t – a thing. All that means is shuffling 180+ minor leaguers around the various levels, extended spring training, instructs, and the draft. It’s a misnomer. Actually developing players using anything resembling a process is a very new thing in pro ball.
I’d like to think there’s ample room for players putting in the work / getting credit for it and “the data driven approach change revolution” engineered by the FO/analyst types without the two being mutually exclusive.
We all appreciate the stories of work put in to make adjustments by Josh Donaldson / JD Martinez / Daniel Murphy / Jose Bautista etc etc. Their hitting coaches / private instructors have also gotten their names out there in much of the coverage about them and folks buzz about the latest players working with them.
That the data / presentation therof available to the players has changed does not take away from the work put in by the players. If every player could just will himself to hit the ball harder / in the air more often we wouldn’t be talking about the [still uncommon] success stories undoubtedly driven by hard work. I also suspect that very few players/coaches are willing to talk very deeply publicly about really specific mechanical tweaks lest they give up the secret sauce so to speak so there’s limited material to cover there in a sense.
Your perspective is more than valid and I’m sure many of us here are guilty of talking about the players more like stocks and commodities than human beings. However this is a baseball stats/analysis site frequented by a lot of number crunching analyst types. The work of Tony Blengino and others that blend scouting and inside baseball stuff with the statistical analysis really stands out on these pages for a reason.
A simple question. Let’s say you’re an MLB team with a 26 year old player who rates at 1 WAR (for $550K or whatever), and you have the market opportunity to acquire a 2 WAR player, aged 30, in the same position for $8M.
You choose to stick with your original player, because, hey, upside and analytics and altered swing and stuff. But here’s the question:
Why would that upside and analytics and altered swing not work equally as well for the 2 WAR guy? After all, the assumed floor is still a 1 WAR difference.
Now, obviously, there are other elements involved. You probably have other 1 WAR guys around. And there’s future value in a 26 year old, assuming he gains that extra WAR. But I have the suspicion that a lot of FOs are using the latest data to justify saving dollars on free agent position players … which they will then use to overpay free agent relievers, because their interpretation of the numbers tells them that this is “efficient.”
Nice to see relievers (who are a volatile lot at the best of times) get their financial due, I suppose.
“Why would that upside and analytics and altered swing not work equally as well for the 2 WAR guy?”
It would. But you already know the answer. Players in situations like Neil Walker have been told by their agents and the players’ association that they are worth X dollars and their future contracts will reflect that, and to that player, there’s very little upside to changing.
Until it’s too late.
Players like Ryan Zimmerman and Justin Turner became the players they are because they started to see the end. Not when they were league-average and felt they could do better.
These mental gymnastics to explain away the obvious. LOL. Thirty teams dont suddenly move in the same direction without collaboration. CBA weak as it was does not explain it. Deal with it.
And thirty people don’t suddenly downvote you without collaboration. I think you’re onto something here!
I have identified Max Fried as a Braves pitcher that should pick up a two-seamer/sinker. His four-seamer has very little rise due to a poor spin rate, and I think it could lead to a sinker with above average drop.
The issue that you’re missing is that if he has a poor spin rate on a 4-seamer, he’ll probably have a poor rate on a 2-seamer as well. Sure, the relative lack of spin likely suggests the Magnus effect will be reduced and it won’t “rise” as much, but the sidespin will also be lacking, which I assume means the pitch will lack some bite.
“And if we take it to be true that free agency is changing, that should raise the level of urgency to shift more money to players earlier in their careers. ”
I would hope that the player’s union is looking strongly at this. Indenturing a player for six or seven years via service time/arbitration ends up skewed much more heavily in favor of teams/owners as they’re increasingly shying away from signing older players.
In turn, how many fewer athletes are going to turn towards a potential career in baseball if they’re less and less likely to be able to land the multiple multi-million dollar contracts which players were previously able to sign? If a player’s options are basically nil through the first seven years of their careers, they’ll realistically have one chance, maybe two, to cash in before their career is done because they’re too old.
If I were the player’s union, I’d bargain heavily in favor of shortening those service time requirements so that their players don’t end up with just the pie’s crust.
“In turn, how many fewer athletes are going to turn towards a potential career in baseball if they’re less and less likely to be able to land the multiple multi-million dollar contracts which players were previously able to sign? If a player’s options are basically nil through the first seven years of their careers, they’ll realistically have one chance, maybe two, to cash in before their career is done because they’re too old.”
Few athletes will turn away, if any. We may see more Latin players as a result, but that’s not a downside.
“how many fewer athletes…?”
I would wager, none. If a player lasts seven years in the big leagues and is expecting to earn a multi-million dollar payday in free agency, then it is almost a certainty that he has already made multiple million dollars through his arbitration plus pre-arb years, and the league average of those salaries continues to rise steadily.
If I’d had a chance to play pro ball, I would have done it because I love to play baseball; any money thrown my way to do so would have been a bonus. I’m not saying that my motivations are universal, but I suspect that (nearly all, if not all) young guys who want to play pro ball make (or dream) that career choice out of their passion for the game rather than a numbers crunch of potential future earnings probabilities. Perhaps guys coming from poverty bank on the future earnings more desperately, but I would still assert that it was their passion for the game that brought them to the point of that career decision becoming a realistic question.
I’d have played pro ball too, because I love it and have loved it since before little league.
That said, if I knew I’d have to spend a decade or more in the system, as wiIIl points out below, hoping for one shot at a big payday versus half that time or less in another sport, well…let’s just say there’d be a long internal war between love and logic.
And I suspect that as income inequality rises across the board, more and more young athletes will be fighting that same war with themselves.
“Indenturing a player for six or seven years via service time/arbitration”
Try 9-15 years!
High schoolers or IFAs often take five or more years to crack the major league roster. College players take fewer, but still once they reach the majors have another 6-7 years of indentured servitude.
All things said, players who enter into the professional baseball system won’t be able to enter the free agent market until 10 years later.
And now teams have decided they don’t value that type of player. No wonder players are pissed!
With that said, the players aren’t innocent. They’ve been selling out all those players they stepped on to rise to the top for years now. Hopefully, this will spur them to reconsider their disregard for minor league baseball players.
I agree with you stating that players aren’t innocent. As in every other walk of life, the prevailing sentiment seems to have been “*#@$ you as long as I get mine”.
Jeff makes the point that a fundamental problem in the industry is getting more of the total money pool allocated to the pre-free agency players. I agree, and I don’t recall reading anyone posit a thoughtful dissent to that notion. It’s fine and on-point to say that the players’ union should attempt to negotiate such changes to the next CPA, but short of a labor stoppage, which I suspect would be a lose-lose proposition for both sides, what bargaining points can the union bring to the negotiations that might affect a relatively radical redrafting of the rules?
People here and elsewhere have proposed starting arbitration earlier, realigning arbitration settlements closer to full FA value, or reducing the number of years of team control. Those changes all seem like good ideas, but owners have no incentive to accept them without some trade-off.
Now, I am just brainstorming here, but maybe the solution to a compromise could be found in actually giving teams _more_ years of control before unrestricted free agency, in exchange for the other concessions. Here is an example of a package of changes that would (relatively) radically reform the process; (I leave it to the community to weigh and dissect and offer improvements):
* Significantly reduce the number of days on the 25-man roster required to constitute one year of service time (perhaps to 100 or less). The aim of this is to benefit players on the cusp of promotion by eliminating service-time manipulation; the hope is that if the number is reduced sufficiently, teams will be disincentivized from holding players in the minors who would otherwise be expected to contribute to winning games at the major league level.
* Eliminate Super-Two status and begin arbitration eligibility for all players after two years of service time.
* Institute a restricted free agency after four or five years of service time wherein a player’s original team has the option to match any offer from another team, and in the event that an offer is not matched, the team acquiring the player must make an additional, significant payment (perhaps 20% of the total) to the team losing the player.
* Unrestricted free agency is granted after seven or eight years of service time (depending, perhaps, on whether restricted free agency is granted after four or five years).
Adding years of conditional team control might result in players remaining with their original teams longer, a continuity which benefits the clubhouse and the fan base. Adding a “purchaser’s premium” to acquiring restricted free agents disincentivizes high-budget teams from simply buying all the players they want and compensates teams that lose prized players, with the hope of enabling them to retain or acquire others. The option, though, might incline both large and small market owners to view the idea more favorably.
As I said, this is essentially just a brainstormed proposal. I’m not ‘married’ to any of the specifics, but I think there must be consideration of what sort of concessions to ownership could be offered that would persuade them to accede to the reforms that would benefit the younger players. I didn’t mention raising the wages of minor league players in the points above, but I think that ought to be discussed and included, too.
These are good suggestions. Other things the union could ask for are better standard pay for minor league players, and higher minimum MLB salaries pre-arb. Let’s say 1mil? Just throwing a figure out. And they always have leverage….it’s called a strike.
I love all of these suggestions. I’d suggest 31 days of service time = 1 year, as I did on another article. That means September callups are not affected, but there is no reason to leave a guy down past when he is ready (unless he isn’t ready until July or August and you are willing to wait to September 1st).
I love the idea of restricted free agency, and I think you could alternatively use draft picks instead of money if that makes more sense. That would give an incentive to teams to develop their own players and would help them get better if those players were signed by bigger market teams.
So imagine if the Pirates develop Austin Meadows into a star (which seems less and less likely). They get him for 4 or 5 years. If the Yankees then sign him, they have to give up say a 2nd round pick. That may help the Pirates more than just money (though I’m sure the owners would prefer the cash).
These ideas have a lot of merit, but would still result in players having little agency in determining their career path until past their prime years. Not that I have any better suggestions.
1. When the “fly-ball revolution” happened (or didn’t, at least quite like it was initially advertised)) it was championed as a data-driven change. Then we discovered that many players very quickly recognized the ball had changed and become bouncier so they altered their swings to try and take advantage of it and hit home runs when they could not prior to the change.
2. Yea, that’s cool, I like that whole “throw this pitch because your arm-slot and spin dictate it” thing. I think pitching is where analytics and data could be most well-applied, but lets not pretend that data is useful without being coupled with a rationally formulated model, and then let’s not pretend like there’s actually evidence of such coupling being genuinely widespread among club analytics departments and among all areas and aspects of the game. I find myself writing this in a comment at the beginning of every baseball year on a Jeff Sullivan article.
3. The change to the ball probably accounts for the massive paradigm shift as to what is considered a skill requisite for success. Most successful pitchers have a great curve and/or throw many breaking balls today. Many pitchers try to stay outside the zone. Raw power is no longer quite as distinguishing, because someone with moderate power can also hit the ball out of the park on worse pitches. If the MLB decides not to tinker with anything for a few years, I expect we will hit an equilibrium in terms of what works best in these conditions considering all factors. The optimal game strategy has been changed and white doesn’t beat black 55% of the time yet.
I don’t think it’s so much that clubs have this huge faith in their mediocre talent. I think that there’s no reason to drop huge dollars for a club yet, because there is still risk that the best way to exploit the game with the new ball has not been found and any investment can suffer it’s way into zeroing out more easily than most time-periods of baseball if you consider that. This is like if you swapped the rooks with the horses on the chess board and reset the ELO rankings. No one has any idea who will ultimately rise to the top if you wait long enough.
Agree with Mascera. Lots of industries, like medicine, have tried to shift to being data driven. They call it, evidence based medicine, and after at least a decade of concerted effort at well run hospitals, there’s an agreement that this is the right approach in say labor and delivery. But the diffusion into actual in-room decisions, that is, application of a model that is prescriptive, is still low (see increasing C-section rates). Data is now a critical input in these delivery rooms but it’s used to feed a still intuitive decision tree. No doctor or coach will voluntarily give up agency. Maybe that’s why so many new managers are inexperienced.
This was a great piece, with some truly original content.
So does this all mean that MLB careers are going to get much shorter? To take it to an extreme, have we seen the end of the 3,000-hit career? Very few players reach 3,000 hits when they’re still valuable contributors and they can almost all be replaced with cheaper talent at that point.
Obviously, 3,000 hits is just an example.
I don’t think so. For those players at the tail end of their careers, they’ll just have to realize that their path in their mid- to late-30s will be full of one-year and minor league contracts, rather than getting multiple years at (throwing out a number) $5 million per year.
(I mention the minor league contracts in the sense that some players sign those every offseason, but realistically some are almost locks for the 25-man roster on Opening Day before spring training has even started.)
And just as Jeff writes an article titled “The Era of Experimentation”, MLBTR publishes this bit of MiLB news: https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2018/03/minor-league-baseball-announces-pace-of-play-rules-changes.html#comments
To wit: “…a rather notable change in extra innings. In a measure that’s sure both to shorten contests and engender consternation among purists, teams will start each inning with a baserunner on second from the tenth frame on. (The runner will be the player that occupies the spot in the order prior to the one that’s due to lead off the inning.) This procedure was utilized with less-than-enthusiastic reviews at the most recent World Baseball Classic.”
I would like to read some analysis and critique of this change in these pages.
I think there was a recent piece on ESPN talking about the huge issue with starting every inning with a runner on 2nd, namely that these innings play out the exact same way 90% of the time – team bunts guy over (or hits ground ball to the right side to move runner over) and defense intentionally walks the next guy. You might as well start every inning 1st and 3rd with 1 out.
I like the idea of starting every inning with the bases loaded better. You can’t just play for 1 run in that situation since you know the other team is going to get the same thing.
I also like the idea of having every PA start with a 3-2 count. Games might still go 18 innings, but pitchers could easily pitch 4 or 5 innings with that rule and innings would last mere minutes.
I always thought that college was the time for experimentation …
Sounds like there’s growing information asymmetry between teams and players. I wonder if savvy players/agents will invest more in their own data analysis. (I get the sense that some players already do this. Boras seems to bust out numbers, too, when he pitches his guys.)
As long there is team control the better player development will hurt the salaries. Why pay a player when you can make a new cheap one? Even the players for who it works don’t benefit that much because once they get expensive the next guy is waiting.
Now of course it is still better to make 5m than to be a career minor leaguer, but unless you are a3+ war player the teams won’t pay you anymore. The 1-2 war span is where teams save a lot of money with player development (occasionally there is a Donaldson but most success stories are more 0 war to1.5 war player