The (Lack of A) Conspiracy Against Pitcher Wins

Yesterday, a reader in my chat asked me a question I had no idea how to answer: Are teams increasingly pulling pitchers from games after 4 2/3 innings, even with the lead, in an attempt to cut down on wins and arbitration payouts? Here’s the question in its entirety:

My snap judgment was “probably not.” After thinking about it for a while longer, my answer is still no – but now I have some neat graphs and charts that will hopefully make the point clear. Without further ado, let’s dive into the shape of league-wide starting pitching trends since 1974, the first year in our database of game logs.
In 1974, the concept of a five-inning start existed, but it was almost an insult. More than a quarter of starts went nine or more innings. That’s hard to do, particularly when that’s an impossible feat for a visiting team that trails after the top of the ninth inning. If that’s roughly a quarter of games (it’s not every game the visiting team loses, but road teams lose more than half of the games they play), that means that roughly a third of eligible starts went at least a full nine. That’s downright wild. Here’s a graph of that wildness:

There were a few short starts, even back in the 1970s – 21% of starts went fewer than five innings. More importantly, a pattern we’ll see repeated again and again is immediately evident. Managers like leaving their pitchers in for a whole number of innings. It’s a natural endpoint to the day, mid-inning pitching changes can be tricky, it’s a way of boosting your starter’s confidence – there are plenty of reasons for this to be the case, and I’m not sure which is most true, but that’s just a fact of baseball. Managers like to pull their starters between innings rather than partway through.
Next, let’s fast-forward to 1998, the home run chase at the peak of the PED era, or whatever you want to call that era of the baseball. Starters weren’t going nearly as deep as they used to, with relief pitchers taking up an increasing share of innings. Complete games were no longer the norm, but seven-inning starts were:

Interestingly, there were now fewer starts that lasted under five innings. I always heard growing up that the managers of yesteryear were more willing to pull their starter if they “just didn’t have it” that day. It makes sense on its face – reliever workload management was far less important given how deep starters went into games, so a starter wearing one for the team didn’t make sense. Getting someone in there who gave the team a chance to win was more important than who would pick up innings tomorrow.
In the late 1990s, that was no longer the case, but most of the rest of the patterns of pitching usage from the 1970s were still there. Whole innings were still preferable. Starters threw a ton of innings. There was nothing special about five innings, at least nothing evident in the data. It was merely a whole inning like any other. Two-thirds of starts that ended in the fifth inning went the full five, but the same was true for the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth innings. In every inning past the fourth, a filibuster-proof majority of starts went the full three outs in that inning.
One more fast-forward, and I promise I’ll get to my case. Next, let’s go to 2018, the first year the Rays revived the opener, leading to far more short starts:

The march towards lighter workloads was in full swing. Roughly a quarter of starts lasted longer than six innings, down from 48% in 1998. More than a quarter of starts lasted fewer than five full innings, now easily surpassing 1974 and ’98. The mode start lasted six innings. We’ve all felt these changes implicitly when we watch baseball, so you probably don’t need to see the numbers, but a sea change had already happened.
Meanwhile, managers started leaning into getting their starters five innings. Starters who entered the fifth inning and were pulled before the sixth inning threw the full fifth three-quarters of the time. That’s the highest such share for any inning, and higher than it had been in 1974 or ’98. In other words, managers were working to maximize pitchers’ eligibility for a win. Five innings is a magic number, and a quick look at the data shows that managers knew it.
Finally, let’s get to 2022. Those past years were all a preamble to this:

Goodness gracious, are five-inning starts popular these days. Relievers are rapidly replacing innings starters used to throw. Twenty percent of starts have gone exactly five innings this year, the largest share of five-inning starts in history. The average start length is way down, of course: 37% of starts have gone fewer than five innings. It’s all down, every imaginable category. Just 2.3% of starts have gone longer than seven innings. Only 42.8% of starts have lasted more than five innings, the second-lowest mark in history, trailing only the weirdo 2020 season.
Despite that, managers are still giving their starters a chance at a win – at least, on a relative basis. The starter may not be long for the game when he takes the mound for the fifth inning, but he still stands a very good chance of completing that inning. It’s not the 75% share from 2018, but it’s still 63%, higher than every inning other than the first few, where most of the starts are planned whole-inning stints by openers. Managers are increasingly willing to make mid-inning pitching changes – but they still show some deference in the fifth.
In other words, managers don’t appear to be tilting the scales one way or the other. They’re still erring in favor of letting their starters complete any inning they start, just like they always have. The fifth is the inning where they’re most willing to do it, a trend that picked up as starter workloads declined. The result is an interesting wedge between long starts and win-qualifying starts:

I don’t have any special knowledge to impart here. For the most part, it seems like managers are behaving like you’d expect a lot of former players who nonetheless answer to the front office to behave. Are they trying to get their starters five innings? It seems like it. But they’re also exercising ever-tighter leashes.
Of course, this isn’t exactly the question I was setting out to answer. What about starts that go exactly 4 2/3 innings, with the starter still having the lead when pulled? If that specific thing is what you’re interested in, well, you’re not exactly in luck, because it almost never happens. I culled our database for every time a starter left the game after 4 2/3 innings while holding the lead. Here’s the percentage of starts in a given year that have ended with two outs in the fifth inning, with the pitcher being replaced an out away from qualifying for a win:

Hey, wow, there’s something here! It’s not exactly new this year, but nearly 1% of starts are now ending with the starter angrily walking off the mound, a win just outside of his grasp. Those dastardly managers, socking wins away for their own nefarious purposes (to give to relievers, I guess?).
Yeah… no. There’s a sampling issue here. Starts are much shorter these days! Very few starts ended with the starter getting pulled in the fifth inning with the lead in the 1970s, but a huge reason for that is that very few starts ended with the starter getting pulled in the fifth inning, period.
To control for this, I took another number: the number of starts where a starter completed the fifth inning with the lead and then never threw another pitch. In other words, these are starts where the manager could have pulled the starter after 4 2/3, but let them get the last out otherwise. It’s not perfect – it doesn’t include starts where the manager left a starter in, only for them to surrender the lead – but it’s about as robust as I could design a query for. That ratio is far less interesting:

That graph is the ratio between just-enough starts (exactly five innings, leave with the lead) and just-short starts (4 2/3, leave with the lead). Higher means managers are letting pitchers finish the fifth more often. It’s been quite stable over the past six years; in fact, managers have given a higher proportion of starters just enough rope in the past two years. Leaving pitchers in is happening far less than it did in the early 2000s, when the rubber of shorter starts met the road of managers who placed a huge value on wins. But it’s still pretty stable overall. Managers want to get pitchers their wins, even if they’re five-and-dive types.
So is there a grand conspiracy to suppress starter wins in favor of reliever wins? I don’t think so. There are more starts of 4 2/3 innings than ever, and more starts where a pitcher leaves with the lead but short of qualifying for a win than ever, but that’s just because starters are throwing fewer innings these days. Sure, it’s not as fun as the Baseball Illuminati pulling strings and subtly altering arbitration, but it has the advantage of being true.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
A very interesting article, Ben. I have no good way of quantifying it, but I suspect some of it is managers realizing how much more hittable pitchers are the third time through the order. I have no way to research how true that was decades ago. (In Tyler Mahle’s case, as he was the first pitcher to come to mind for me, the numbers say the second time through the order this season!)
The grander conspiracy is in workloads themselves, teams are incentivized by the lower earning potential environment for player this creates. Passan said it in The Arm, and I tend to agree, that teams *could* develop higher quality pitchers if they wanted but its not incentivized on pretty much any front (including obvy Vegas/gambling inflating the demand for robotically high and efficient performance)
I have some hopes for SP bounceback, not much and def still under Their terms, under this current CBA so there’s that
Higher quality from the perspective that throwing innings is a skill too…Every bit the athletic feat throwing hard with spin is, and the latter isn’t eliminated by the former
I guess I’m not following the logic that teams are specifically not developing pitching that they could develop. Even if true that teams would not like one specific pitcher to be more expensive than necessary, and that such pitcher would increase their arbitration earnings by pitching more innings (and by also generating more wins), there are a number of countervailing factors.
I can think of at least 5 reasons off the top of my head: 1) innings are zero sum, so the more innings Pitcher A eats, the less there are for B, C, and D and their earnings may decrease as a result.
2) Even if an arb eligible pitcher gets more expensive by pitching many innings, they’re still going to be a lot cheaper than going out and buying a free agent pitcher who can do the same thing.
3)There is also the not insignificant factor that winning games is still probably more valuable to even the most jaded owners/front offices than the marginal earnings difference a good starter going 5 innings vs 6 or so. At a minimum, this applies to the large majority of teams that are actively attempting to make the playoffs.
4) If a pitcher goes longer, they are likely to do worse by ERA, WHIP, etc in the later innings mitigating some of the gains they would get by increasing innings and wins.
5) You are gonna piss off your entire clubhouse if you screw with the earnings of your lower earning pre-free agency players. This may be the least significant consideration, but I imagine teams would like to avoid pissing off their own players all things being equal (especially managers who I think have more personal relationships with players, are often former players themselves, and mostly like to look out for their guys).
1) Middle relievers make peanuts compared to starters. Giving SP innings to them isn’t a dollar-for-dollar swap.
2) Keep the SP cheap through arb, worry about the FA deal if he makes it that long without his arm exploding
3) Absolutely. But that speaks to #4
4) This is the ACTUAL reason for all of this. Not some nefarious attempt to nickel and dime arb-eligible starting pitchers. All of modern pitching development and management is about maximizing velocity, and going to the bullpen before fatigue and familiarity sink the ship.
5) I don’t expect this is an actual issue
Agree with CC’s overriding point – I don’t think most owners are going to cut off their nose to spite their face, so to speak (i.e., order their managers to “cost” a starter 3-4 wins this year so we don’t have to pay him an extra mil in arbitration). For one, you’ve got to have a manager willing to implement that scheme. For another, a starter (or FG’s crack writing staff) would notice “hey, this guy was cruising along and was pulled after 4.2 innings five times this year! What gives?” That would be easy enough to suss out in a player’s game logs.
I also totally agree with Mr. Happy’s 4th point that the “X times through the order” penalty has become so engrained that its leading to a parade of shorter-working pitchers all firing max effort at all times.
If you had a prospect who could show themselves to be as effective in inning 7-9 as they are in innings 1-3 I don’t think managers would necessarily be averse to letting them ride and resting the bullpen, but why let the starter face these guys a 4th time when his ERA- facing guys a fourth time is 93 and you’ve got a fresh reliever with an ERA- of 68? The game is all pushing small edges, all the time, hundreds and thousands of times over the course of the season. These little edges accumulate.
Clearly teams could draft among babies and grow them like Spartans in special compounds to be pitchers. So, they are not doing enough!
Should we expect the length of innings that starters pitch to normalize to the 2018 chart later this year? I imagine that across the league, starters are being pulled earlier due to the lack of a proper spring training?
^^^came here for this. Also, recency bias–every year, we spend the first 6-8 weeks of the season wondering why this year is an outlier only to find out that, in the end, it was mostly normal with a few empirically-measurable quirks that may be part of larger trends. It would seem especially prudent in a pandemic, lockout-impacted season to maybe wait a bit before jumping to conclusions?
I generally enjoy learning things from FG articles, or, at least, learning more about how things come to be. I know not every article can be for everyone, but in this case, the prompt was specious, the methodology not particularly insightful, and the conclusion obvious.
Innings by starters
2014: 6.0
2015: 5.8
2016: 5.7
2017: 5.5
2018: 5.4
2019: 5.2
2020: 4.8
2021: 5.0
2022: 5.0 (so far)
2020 was obviously an outlier for various reasons
but the overall leaguewide trend is clear and historically unprecedented.
The calculus is pretty simple.
For many, if not most, teams, their no. 2-3 starter with 80+ pitches facing batters third time around the order in the 6th inning is not necessarily more effective than their 4th best reliever fresh out of the bullpen.
Maybe, at the end of the season, it will go back to 2019 numbers,
but expecting it to go back to 2018 numbers is highly unrealistic.
Not sure what the style guide is for graphs around these parts, but for my money, the pitching length plots would look much better as bar charts or just simple scatterplots. You’re not trying to imply a relationship between data points so the use of a line graph is misleading.
Hit this site where it hurts, dang.
Very interesting and very damming of MLB that this was even reasonable to investigate.
I’d love to see two related historical trends:
#1: The number of mid-inning pitching changes by season.
#2: Same as #1, but excluding teams managed by Tony LaRussa.
I think the old adage “never let the truth (data) get in the way of a good story” is more true today than ever. We all know the compensation system is screwed. It can’t be fixed according to Ben’s analysis without revenue sharing (between owners) AND a negotiated revenue split between MLB and the MLBPA.
So we’ll have the same conversations-conspiracy theories, greedy owners/players until the next CBA. At which time player share of revenue will probably have declined because clubs will try to operate as efficiently as possible. And Scott Boras will argue he needs to set the high end of the market to save baseball.
It’s not an easy fix, but we have models in the other major sports- hopefully national TV/media contracts share increases and makes revenues more equal. But at some point this current system must change.
What’s the difference between a start > 5 IP and a win-qualifying start?
The just-enough starts; five-and-dive where you don’t come back out for the sixth.
Ah inequalities strike again. Thanks!
Granted, this is partly driven by the phrasing of the question, but I do think this article places a bit too much focus on intent, rather than describing what’s happening.
I agree that there doesn’t seem to be evidence that there is some “conspiracy” to deliberately suppress pitcher wins by removing pitchers early. But there *is* evidence that, over the past few years, pitcher wins *are* being suppressed, at least a little bit, because pitchers tend to be pulled earlier.
Is that trend large enough to affect arbitration results? I’m not sure, and the article doesn’t look at that. But it seems at least plausible that it’s having some effect, at least for some pitchers. Which means it’s at least plausible that some pitchers are making less money through arbitration because they’re getting fewer opportunities to get wins.
And that does matter, even if it’s not a conspiracy. Just because the problem is that the arbitration formula is outdated doesn’t mean there’s not a problem.
(All that said, I think it’s also worth noting that “pitcher wins are falling mostly for in-game strategic reasons” and “teams are taking advantage of falling pitcher wins to pay less for pitchers” are not exactly mutually exclusive. If the situation was reversed and cutting down on pitchers’ innings *increased* their arbitration salaries, for example, I somehow doubt the Rays would be so gung-ho about openers and whatnot.)
Interesting. I would have assumed that — in the olden days of split DH/no-DH rules — there would have been a difference in the whole inning use between AL and NL. NL pitchers would be more likely to go whole innings because of pinch-hitting for the pitcher in the offensive part of the inning. That’s a natural reason to change pitchers after a whole inning. So, I would have assumed that, in the 2022 all-DH environment, there would be more mid-inning changes, instead of roughly the same number.
I expect one of two things have caused the counter-intuitive persistence of this phenomenon. First, the three-batter minimum, which reduces the freedom to make mid-inning changes. Second, just inertia from old managers who instinctively do what they have always done.
Of course, the three-batter minimum would only explain having relievers end at whole innings, not starters.
suggestion: combine charts 1, 2, 3 with different line colors for better visualization and easier to discern the change in time.
with runs down, starters get yanked early because if you go behind 2-3 runs you are usually toast