The Most Important Play of Game One
Neither the Red Sox’ four-run margin of victory, nor the ease with which Craig Kimbrel finished off the ninth, really do justice to the intensity of Game One of the World Series. Despite the final score, only 10 of the game’s 80 plays took place with a run differential greater than two runs. There were 11 high-leverage plays overall, and the average leverage index was 1.14, which is higher than normal. It was a game with important, exciting moments — and none were more important than certain moments of the seventh inning.
In terms purely of win expectancy, Eduardo Nunez’s three-run homer in the bottom of the seventh off Alex Wood was the game’s top play. When Nunez stepped to the plate with runners on first and second, two outs, and a one-run lead, the Red Sox’ chances of winning the game were 77% — which is to say, good but far from from certain. After his three-run homer — which came off the bat with a launch angle just under 20 degrees but managed to clear the Green Monster, anyway — Boston’s win probability increased to 96%. The game was pretty much over.
If that ball were directed a little more toward center, it doesn’t make it out of the park. If the launch angle were even a tiny bit lower, it would have just bounced off the wall. Since the beginning of 2015, there have been something like 350 homers over the Green Monster (launch direction -12 or less). Of those homers only eight have had a launch angle below 20 degrees, including a shot by Hanley Ramirez this past April and Alex Rodriguez’s 660th homer back on May 1, 2015. Of those eight homers, five were no-doubters traveling over 415 feet. At 373 feet, Nunez’s blast had the shortest distance traveled, making it the wall-scrapingest homer of the last four seasons.
While, as I said above, Nunez’s homer was the biggest play of the game in terms of win expectancy, it actually wasn’t the most important — or maybe most consequential — play of the game. That actually occurred in the top half of the seventh inning, when Manny Machado came to the plate. If you just look at the Win Expectancy Chart, the Machado appearance might not be that noticeable.
However, if you look at the bottom of the chart, where Leverage Index is visible, Machado’s plate appearances becomes more noticeable.
Ultimately, Machado drove in a run with a sacrifice fly, cutting the Red Sox lead down to one run. Yet the win expectancy for the Red Sox actually went up as a result, from 64.5% to 69.7%. For the Red Sox, the out was more important than the run. Our Play Log indicates that, when Machado stepped to the plate with the bases loaded and one out, the run expectancy for the situation was 1.64. In other words, an average team would score 1.64 runs in that situation. Machado got one run home, but with two outs and runners on first and second, the run expectancy dropped to just 0.47 for the Dodgers. Even adding in the run already scored, 1.47 actual plus expected runs is less than the 1.64 expected runs with which the plate appearance began, so Machado’s sac fly actually made things worse than expected and gave the Red Sox a better chance to win the game.
To explain this further in terms of win expectancy, let’s run through some Machado scenarios and see the change in win expectancy from the 64.5% when Machado stepped up. Using our WPA inquirer, we can see how the game could have changed depending on the outcome of the plate appearance.
| Outcome | Red Sox WE Before | Red Sox WE After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double Play | 64.5% | 88.1% | 23.6% |
| Strikeout | 64.5% | 76.1% | 11.6% |
| Force at Home | 64.5% | 76.1% | 11.6% |
| Sac Fly | 64.5% | 69.8% | 5.3% |
| Groundout RBI | 64.5% | 66.4% | 1.9% |
| Walk | 64.5% | 50.5% | -14.0% |
| Single, 1 RBI | 64.5% | 50.5% | -14.0% |
| Single, 2 RBI, 12_ | 64.5% | 44.1% | -20.4% |
| Single, 2 RBI, 1_3 | 64.5% | 38.9% | -25.6% |
| Double, 2 RBI | 64.5% | 35.7% | -29.6% |
| Double, 3 RBI | 64.5% | 29.6% | -34.9% |
| Home Run | 64.5% | 21.3% | -43.2% |
This table should help illustrate why Machado’s plate appearance was so important. Basically any play that ended in an out was going to improve the Red Sox’ chances of winning the game. On the other hand, Machado could have changed the win expectancy anywhere from an 88% chance for the Red Sox to a 79% chance for the Dodgers with just one swing. Leverage Index measures how critical a plate appearances is towards determining the potential outcome of the game.
For reference, compare Machado’s plate appearance to the Nunez home run in the bottom half of the inning. The best case for the Red Sox in that latter case was the homer itself — which facilitated a 19-percentage-point increase in win expectancy. If Nunez made an out to end the inning with a one-run lead, Boston’s win expectancy would have dropped by only four percentage points. That potential spread is nowhere near Machado’s plate appearance, making the out that Ryan Brasier got more important than Nunez’s home run given all the potential negative possibilities for the Red Sox.
As for the out by Brasier, he got himself into trouble by loading the bases, but made a near-perfect pitch to Machado to induce the sacrifice fly.
A 96 mph four-seam fastball on the outer edge of the plate to Machado to open the at-bat induced a very good outcome for Brasier. I looked at all four-seam fastballs at least 95 mph in that zone (Detailed Zone 16 at Baseball Savant) to righties from righties, and looked at the outcomes this season. Of the 3,681 pitches in the sample, just seven were hit for homers. The pitch is called a strike two-thirds of the time when it is taken, and as many balls are put in play as whiffed.
| Outcome | Frequency |
|---|---|
| Called Ball | 17.3% |
| Called Strike | 33.4% |
| Swings | 49.1% |
| Whiffs | 13.0% |
| Batted Ball | 13.7% |
| HR/Batted Balls | 1.4% |
| XBH/Batted Balls | 7.9% |
| wOBA | .210 |
This season, Machado saw 31 pitches like the one Brasier threw him. He took 12 of those pitches, with half going for strikes. Of the 19 swings, though, he put the ball in play just three times, leading to two easy fly balls and one single. This isn’t to say that those results against Machado are meaningful, but that they do line up with typical behavior on that type of pitch. Brasier got himself and the Red Sox in trouble, but thanks to one really good pitch, he was able to retire Machado at the most critical juncture of the game.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
This is a lovely discussion of WE and LI using a vivid and concrete example. I’m passing it along to my baseball buddies who need a little coaxing to get on the analytics train.
Exactly what I did halfway through the article!
Particularly good as an illustration of the principle that the moments when it looks like something big happened aren’t always the biggest moments. (This is a cognitive bias that all of us have to some degree, traditionalist or stat-head, so it’s nice to have a solid empirical reminder either way.) Sometimes the run-prevention side of baseball gets short shrift like this, because when it’s working right, it can look like, well, preventing things from being done by the other side, rather than like doing something big and important yourself.
Cool analysis!!!
What if the runner were able to tag and go to 3rd? How would that have changed the run expectancy?
Would have only increased the run expectancy by about .04.
Knowing the increased frequency of passed balls and wild pitches recently, I wonder if it should be a touch higher.
That’s what the run expectancy values for 2018 show. Unless you have more recent data.
I looked it up and saw a change of RE of .14. Seems to make sense- a passed ball/wild pitch, and also an infield single could score a run.
The one that I don’t get is not pinch hitting for Freese with Muncy in the 5th with 2 on and no out when the Red Sox brought in Barnes.
Freese had had 2 hits to that point, so Roberts went with his gut (maybe for the first time during Dodger-platoon-o-palooza.
(for me, Taylor, Muncy and Bellinger are quite significantly better all-around players than Kemp, Freese and Dozier, and the fact they split halves of games is frustrating. Especially on defense where Freese missed the 1st inning catch and dozier contributed to two slow non-DPs)
That’s my issue. I defend all of Robert’s platooning decisions but why decide to go to your gut this time? It made all the sense to pinch hit for Freese and he did it later in the game with Grandal.
Doesn’t matter. The man successfully stole 2nd base when everyone at the Park and watching knew he was going to try and so single-handedly began the greatest comeback in a MLB playoff series. He is beyond criticism of mere mortals.
You might defend his platooning decisions but what about misjudging the Baez-Devers vs. Wood-Nunez matchup. It might have made sense if Baez wasn’t throwing very high-octane gas past Sox hitters.
Also many people try to attribute platoon-loving to analytics, when it’s really the traditionalists… Tradition says go right on right, left on left. Analytics says use the correct matchup based on (large enough sample sized) matchups against similar batters (ground ball pitcher vs ground ball batter, velocity vs guy struggles with it, etc).
Yes. And much like last postseason, Dave Roberts’s gut is once again turning out to be one of the Dodgers’ biggest handicaps.
Anyone else notice when Freese fouled one off down the 1B line in that AB? Really looked like the ball he hit over Cruz’s head to me when it came off the bat. The ball sliced foul, but I got struck with de ja vu.
If Freese makes the catch in the first, the RE when Benintendi steps to the plate with one out and nobody on is like 0.56 rather than the 1.2something it was in the actual game for that PA. So a swing in RE of .6 or more. That is kind of a big deal.
Imagine that the official scorer had judged the Freese play as an error. Under the scheme for deciding earned/unearned runs neither of those first inning runs would be earned. So, in a sense, that one play led to 2 first inning runs, not to mention extra pitches, some of them (6, maybe?) stressful, what with there being RISP and all.
I think there’s an argument to be made that the Freese play was the most important one. There may be a similar argument for the dropped Joc pop being more important than the Machado sac fly also.
Giving a great offense like the Red Sox extra outs is a good way to get beat
Agreed. Looked to me as if Kershaw got Mookie out twice (pop up and missed called strike 3). Pretty tough to get Mookie out once, let alone three times to lead off the game.
Obviously the numbers don’t bear that out as well as the Machado plate appearance, but from a psychological level starting the game like that was pretty demoralizing as a Dodger fan (and probably for Kershaw too).
Kershaw might have gotten him out once with a pop-up, but the Dodgers didn’t get him out any times and this is in fact a team sport.
Reading this article I was again reminded of why baseball is like no other game. In no other sport can an action in the middle of a game, or at any point, have such a tremendous impact on the eventual outcome. A touchdown in the 1st period is important but does not impact the outcome by 66.8%, a basket in the 3rd period is inconsequential and while a goal in hockey or soccer has considerable significance those usually occur spontaneously, almost by surprise, and are not preceded by the building anticipation and rising tension of a crucial moment in a baseball game. A moment that HAS to happen, in some form or another, and will do much to determine the outcome of the game.
I love baseball as much as the next guy and agree with your overall point, but this part is just not true. Every hockey/soccer play is predicated on anticipation. Most plays/possessions will end in failure (just like most ABs), but when it clicks the rewards are huge swings in win expectancy. People who find those sports boring are likely just not keen to that flavor of fluid anticipation (and that’s okay).
I am also an avid hockey fan and will be at The Garden next on 11/8 to see Bruins play Vancouver and, while I understand your point, the difference is one of intensity. Despite the fact that are many opportunities in hockey the anticipation is one of failure so there is not the same level of importance given to each separate rush. We expect a few goals but only one is scored at a time and we can’t anticipate when they will occur. In baseball, while a HR might happen at any time, a crucial situation might have several different outcomes, as was the case in the 7th inning in Game 1, and completely change the game situation. We are trading a lot of low expectation opportunities, not without some excitement, for fewer moments that are certain have a major impact in the result and we are able feel the building excitement as the play develops.
I think the play that goes down as the most important one was the IMO missed call of the foul ball by Mookie Betts to lead off the 5th. Totally changed the game IMO. That looked clear as day like it was a fair ball…. 2 batters later Kershaw is out of the game and 2 runs get scored in the inning….
It wasn’t really the most important play of the game. It was the most important *situation* of the game. The at bat could have gone strongly the red sox’ way or strongly the dodgers’ day. What actually happened–going slightly the red sox’ way–might have been the least dramatic result possible in that particular situation.
Well said. The outcome was just a mere formality. It was the situation, the lead in, Act One, the at bat and it’s outcome , Act Two, and the eventual completion of the inning, Act Three, that sets baseball apart. The fact that it could have gone dramatically in either teams direction is what makes these moments in baseball so different from all the other sports. The closest I could think of is a pick 6 from the defensive teams end zone or a short-handed goal late in a close game. Exciting, game-changing plays, of course, but unusual occurrences that do not happen often and lack the drama that precedes the denouement.
I love this article, thanks Craig! A really thoughtful view into what makes baseball so special.
Sac flys, that fail to add to a lead or give the team a lead, when the bases are loaded or on second and third, have always felt like a mistake to me even though players are often complimented for them. I guess this shows that I am right sometimes.
Great article, the tables were easy to follow specially for the Win Expectancy part of the piece. Really enjoyed Brasier’s pitch breakdown of possible outcomes.
Why the subtle difference for the ground out RBI versus the sac fly? Is that assuming the out at first and the runners advance to 2nd and 3rd? I see that you account for the double play possibility, so I guess I am answering my own question – it would have to be a super slow roller with the only out at first ya?