The Padres Must Think That They’re Not Far Away
The last time the Padres won at least half of their games was 2010. Last year’s team finished with 71 wins and 91 losses, and, according to the underlying numbers, the club was actually even worse than that. Looking immediately ahead, the picture doesn’t look much better. Steamer thinks the Padres are the worst team in the NL West. PECOTA agrees. We don’t have everything we need from the ZiPS projections yet, but that system’s probably in agreement with the others. The 2018 Padres almost certainly aren’t going to make the playoffs. They’re just another organization that’s tried to rebuild.
The 2018 Padres are also going to play Eric Hosmer just about every day. News came out Saturday evening that Hosmer finally decided between the Padres and the Royals. The terms from San Diego, given to the 28-year-old first baseman: eight years, $144 million. There’s an opt-out after year five. Hosmer will get $105 million over the first five years, with the last three worth $39 million, in the event Hosmer sticks around. Reports recently had the Padres offering seven years, while Scott Boras wanted nine. These things so often end up with the obvious compromise.
Hosmer has been out there so long, and he’s been polarizing so long, that there’s hardly even anything new to say. If you’re a regular reader of FanGraphs, you know what Hosmer is, and what he isn’t. I wrote about the idea of Hosmer signing a big contract with the Padres back in the middle of December. Everything I said then still applies. This is an interesting deal, of course; Hosmer is admittedly fascinating. But what might be even more interesting is the signal this sends. The biggest contract of the offseason was given by a last-place team. That last-place team clearly has no intention of remaining there very much longer.
There’s no getting around the humor of this. It was just last month the Padres hired away our own Dave Cameron. It was an odd pair, because, while the Padres were enamored of Hosmer as a free agent, Dave wasn’t quite so enthusiastic.
Matt Adams got 1/$4M to be a backup. Eric Hosmer is probably getting $100M+. So I’ll just share these career numbers and walk away. https://t.co/Na60BaIsKU
— David Cameron (@OneDaveCameron) December 20, 2017
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In November, Dave wrote about his biggest expected free-agent landmines, and Hosmer ranked at No. 1, with an expected deal of six years and $126 million. Hosmer is being guaranteed even more than that. He’s coming with an opt-out clause. It was interesting a month ago, because the Padres were hiring a guy who had publicly disagreed with their evaluations. It spoke well of their willingness to be challenged. Now, there’s a lesson here. I can’t imagine it’s that the Padres sold Dave on Eric Hosmer. Rather, the lesson is that the decision-makers are the decision-makers. Let it be remembered that one person has but one voice in a room, and in the Padres’ room, A.J. Preller’s voice is the loudest. At the end of the day, he gets to do what he wants.
I do think people have gotten carried away with the idea that the numbers hate Eric Hosmer. There’s this whole stats-versus-eye-test thing people love to bring up, but it’s overblown. Yes, there’s disagreement regarding the quality of Hosmer’s defense. Observers think he’s fantastic, while DRS and UZR think he’s literally one of the worst defensive first basemen around. Neither side can be entirely dismissed. But if you look at Hosmer’s last five seasons, he’s had three seasons in which he’s been worth at least three wins. The projections believe that Hosmer is solidly above-average. That’s just…it. And he’s followed a weird path, one that’s seen his WAR bounce around every single season.
In Hosmer’s three most recent odd-year seasons, he’s been good. In his three most recent even-year seasons, he’s been replacement-level. Hosmer broke in back in 2011, meaning he’s gone year-to-year six times since. Over that duration, Hosmer’s WAR has moved by a sum total of 22.1. That puts him in second place out of everyone who’s played since 2011, behind only Chris Davis‘ mark of 24.1. Hosmer has been a volatile player. It shows up in the regular numbers, just as it shows up in the advanced ones.
I don’t know what to do about volatility. I don’t think anyone does. When you think about Eric Hosmer moving ahead, you can’t expect that volatility to continue. Hosmer is assumed to be an above-average player. He’s getting a long contract because he’s only 28. As you might’ve gotten sick of reading about, Hosmer’s been a pretty good hitter, but he’s teased the ability to be a great one, if he can ever consistently get his batted balls off the ground. It seems so simple, but Hosmer’s been a ground-ball guy since he was a rookie, and he might not want to change. I’m sure the Padres aren’t unaware of the upside.
As far as that upside goes, I should make a note. There is one quirk to how this contract is structured. This deal is front-loaded, before the year-five opt-out. If it were front-loaded without an opt-out clause, that would make some sense, because Hosmer’s best seasons are probably his nearest ones, and the Padres have few other places to spend that money. But as the contract is written, Hosmer will get more money up front, and then it won’t take very much for him to opt out. The Padres have made it harder for themselves to get a premium return. Overall, it’s a somewhat minor point, but Hosmer essentially can’t be a bargain.
We should get back to the nature of this match. It was strange that Hosmer wound up having to pick between the Padres and the Royals to begin with. Neither team is competitive, and good free agents tend to sign with better teams. And given the choice, it would’ve been easy to see Hosmer sticking with what he knows. He’s always been with Kansas City. He’s won with Kansas City. The people there love him. He could be a franchise icon, the rare one-team player. I don’t know Eric Hosmer, so I don’t know why he picked the Padres, but maybe he just wanted a change. He’s already been a leader through one rebuild; maybe he simply thinks the Padres are closer to emerging from theirs. The Royals might be down for a while yet. Hosmer might see the Padres on the rise.
You can’t talk about Eric Hosmer without at least mentioning the perceived intangibles. He’s considered a leader, a heart-and-soul type, and the Padres are hoping that translates, to a different clubhouse full of different players, who’ve had different experiences. Every young team needs its positive role models, and in that sense, the Padres like Hosmer for the same reason they like Clayton Richard. I do imagine the Padres sold Hosmer on the idea that he could steer the ship. He’ll be the guy, for an up-and-coming ballclub. Hosmer’s someone who could command instant respect.
But to go all the way back to the original point, at last, I doubt the Padres wooed Hosmer by saying he could guide their rebuild another three or four seasons. And that wouldn’t even make much sense for the team, since Hosmer’s next few years will probably be the best ones he has left. I think there was a message delivered to Hosmer, the same message that’s now being more widely broadcast. This would be silly if the Padres didn’t think they were almost competitive. It’s hard to see how that could happen in 2018, but, come 2019, the Padres might attempt a real push.
This is a club that just ranked third in Baseball America’s organizational rankings. The quality and depth of the Padres’ farm system is no secret, as Preller has turned the organization around in a hurry. What’s missing, very obviously, is a sufficient number of talented major-league players, but sometimes teams like this can arrive sooner than expected. For all I know, Preller is growing somewhat impatient. He could be getting ready to cash some chips in, just as others start to graduate from Double- and Triple-A.
The risk is that, well, prospects are prospects, and they fail all the time. The Braves ranked No. 3 in the Baseball America list pre-2016, and they still don’t look competitive. Teams can’t always predict their timelines. But while the Padres can’t compete with, say, the Phillies’ resources, Wil Myers — who’s now an outfielder again — is the only other player with a major long-term guarantee. The Padres have financial flexibility to play with, since so many of their players over the coming seasons are going to be arbitration and pre-arb guys. It allows the Padres to take a chance like this, and even though Hosmer is being acquired early, the same was true of Jayson Werth. Werth joined a 69-win Nationals team. It won 80 games, before it won 98. The Diamondbacks, Rockies, and Giants are more set up to win now than they are to win in the future. The Padres have long been excited about the next wave, and this contract is like a commitment to trying to make the most of it, quickly.
It’s putting a lot of faith in very young players. If even just Fernando Tatis Jr. disappoints, I don’t know where the Padres will be. Many of you probably came to FanGraphs looking for us to rip this deal to shreds, and I won’t do that, because it’s not stupid. I think it’s just an overpay, by a team with nowhere else to spend. I certainly wouldn’t have wanted to give Eric Hosmer this contract, myself, if I were in charge of a team that’s not good. But now we get to see the Padres try to follow up. By signing Hosmer, the Padres are placing a bet on themselves. They must believe that they’re getting very close. It’s up to them to prove it. Baseball’s more fun when there’s pressure.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.
Wow that is a strong commitment. 144m over 8 means they bet on him producing 2 war per year or 16 war and this is including decline years. Basically the Padres must somewhat bet on him improving and also think his bad 2016 was a fluke.
If you think steamer is right his projection for next year is 2.8. Applying “normal” aging the curve would be
28: 2.8
29:2.8
30:2.8
31:2.3
32:1.8
33:1.3
34:0.8
35:0.1
36:-0.6
Total:14.1
So the contract is under water around 18m. Not terrible but not good either and it could get worse if 2017 was the fluke and 2016 closer to normal. sure he could also learn to elevate and become a star but what is the incentive for a 28 year old with a big contract to change his swing?
The backloaded nature makes the last two years less bad but i still wonder why they had to give him the 8th season, opt out and ntc in this market. Big time win by boras.
I just want to point out that this is almost certainly not what the Padres are calculating. They are definitely counting on him producing more than 2 WAR per year, because they are almost certainly counting on him to produce more than 2.8 WAR next year.
There are two reasons why this is likely.
First, 2.8 WAR would make him somewhere between the 50th and 60th most valuable position player next year (I just looked it up on Steamer, and FWIW for some reason it has him projected for 2.4 WAR now anyway). That’s a ridiculous amount of money to pay for someone who wouldn’t sniff the all-star team.
Second, that $/WAR figure is taken from Matt Swartz’s work, which is the amount of WAR teams got for their money…not how much they expected to get. Swartz’s methodology takes the 3 year rolling average of contracts and actual WAR numbers and averages them out. What this means is if a Jason Heyward busts, the $/WAR figure goes up. If a Logan Morrison breaks out, the $/WAR figure goes down. This is mostly independent of the expectations teams have.
If you want to find out how much the Padres expect Hosmer to produce, just take whatever projection system you think is closest to the Padres’ line of thinking. What other teams paid other free agents to produce independent of what they actually did doesn’t help us much here.
To be clear, I do not disagree that this is a ludicrous move for the Padres. I just don’t think the Padres see it that way at all.
the bit about inferred preference is a piece of standard economics style. in this case tho, it is possible that teams are operating far below a sustainable market clearing budget, so there’s a lot of room for them to overpay before being forced to confront the cost.
This means that the observed market clearing price is in fact not a perfect reflection of team preferences, and there can exist systemic over-valuation of free agency for long periods of time. Considering that the portion of baseball WAR available on the free agent market vs the portion of WAR in controlled players is in steady decline since the late 90’s, an increase in $/war could certainly have contribution from teams behaving as fairly silo’d organizations, with imperfect tracking of efficiency to adjust for relative efficiency of various sources of talent.
the above described effect shouldn’t account for all of the rising $/war, but it does say that an adjustment is possible as teams become more aware of more efficient teambuilding strategy.
*revealed preference.
I more or less agree with what you have said, but one other note on the the “revealed preference” thing: Yes, it is a pretty standard economics approach and I think that this is the sort of market where it doesn’t work at all. Revealed preference only makes sense as a construct if people know what they are buying.
So let’s say I go to the grocery store, intending to buy a bag of 100 pretzels. I go and find a bag that looks like it has 100 pretzels, but lo and behold when I get home and open it up I only find 80 pretzels. Or worse, I find potato chips instead. What does the “revealed preference” tell us in this case? It doesn’t at all. What “revealed preference” do we figure out from Jason Heyward busting? It mostly tells us we suck trying to figure out how many pretzels are in the bag.
In this case, you really do need to figure out what the expectations are, or make some kind of a guess. Manski has some ideas on how to do this, although I’m not sure how realistic they are in an MLB environment: https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/4797-final.pdf
I don’t think anyone should be that shocked that Heyward is a bust, or that the highest bidder among 30 may be overly optimistic (or in that case, just plain nuts).
The revealed preference approach is not without merit, but one has to keep the timing the same, and this can be murky. Is the pitching market the same now that Darvish has signed? Yes and no. I would say mostly yes since he signed where he was expected to, but it is possibly that the uncertainty was large enough that this did change things for some teams.
Certainly, expectations are not the same as actual performance so retroactively applying the revealed preference logic is silly.
In this market, Scott Boras lands an eight year deal for a 1B with most of the money upfront and an opt-out after the upfront money is paid.
Boras is a stud among studs.
I’d say the MLBPA should make Boras the head of the union, but I doubt he’d be willing to take the pay cut.
If Boras thought he could do enough at the MLBPA to increase overall player compensation, he might figure that that could make up for the pay cut by increasing the size of his commissions when he went back to being an agent after leaving the MLBPA.
Well it’s really a five year deal at 21/yr with a three year insurance policy in case he is the bad hosmer instead of the good hosmer.
Padres get him for his 5 prime years.
Boras got an NTC too which is a free option if they want to deal him
This doesn’t seem like a “great” Boras deal. It seems ok. It signifies to me that the market is very soft.
Boras got Hosmer more guaranteed money than Dave or the crowd predicted with an opt out giving him the chance to get another roll through free agency at 33 if he produces. That sounds like a huge win. And there’s the no trade clause so the Padres can’t exactly move him if their rebuild goes downhill.
So, a 25 HR .318 hitting, 66 walk-drawing, team leader, who runs well, plays decent defense and is in his prime, got a good deal.
It looks like he just got what he is worth to me, not much more. I don’t see the “great deal by great Boras”. Then again, I’m not here to celebrate great agent-performance.
Based on the totality of his career, he’s a lot more likely to be .290/23/60. You know that.
Id say that a new peak at age 27 > earlier seasons. But, there is really only one way to find out.. see what happens going forward.
But he doesn’t play decent defense. And all of his good offensive years came with unsustainably high BABIPs. He’s had 3 good offensive years, and they each came on BABIPs above .335. When his BABIP has been normal or average (below .312), he’s been a below average hitter.
It’s not impossible for him to post some high BABIPs going forward, but it is virtually impossible for him to be above .335 every year.
The issue, of course, is that we don’t now that “he doesn’t play decent defense,” because UZR and DRS only measure 1B range, not how many throwing errors he saves (which is, of course, the main selling point on his defense).
If the Padres’ metrics evaluate Hosmer’s fielding ability as closer to his FSR numbers than his UZR/DRS, that’s nearly a full win added to his WAR.
It’s always critical to be aware of what we don’t know.
DSR includes scoops for 1Bmen.
The backloaded nature makes the present value of the deal greater. Time value of money is a thing.
I know what you’re saying, but it’s actually frontloaded.
That’s what I meant. I wish comments were editable after more than a few minutes!
Front loaded but even the front loaded portion was in line with projections and he may opt out before the back loaded if he is good for 5 years.
If he stays at 13 million a year, by the last year that is worth under 10 million in todays dollars plus he can be traded.
Actually, no, he can’t be traded without his permission. When he serves the five years, he becomes a 10/5 player and can block a trade. If he’s really bad, the Padres are stuck with him.
Whoops, that’s nine seasons. The total should be 14.7.
I think the total $/WAR figure should be higher than what you’re using, which would make this a good deal for the Padres. But I also don’t think he’s going to be nearly this good, which would make it a pretty big overpay.
Actually, Matt Schwartz’s work (which is the best public research on the price of a win) puts expectations at $11.1M per win, with 5.9% inflation going forward. While a lot of time has spent wondering if it would be lower than that this year, the deals made are largely in line with expectations.
However, the lack of decline you gave Hosmer for his age 29-30 seasons more than makes up for it. The average player declines about a 1/3 of a win per year over those years (link to my own research on this matter at the bottom).
My value calculator puts Hosmer as worth $113M over 8 years, though if you stop playing him when he reaches replacement level it rises to $123M. Even with giving the Padres that benefit, adding in the opt-out and the loss of a draft pick means this deal could project to be something like a $40M overpay. He needs to be considered something like a 3.3 win player right now to worth $144M plus the value of an opt-out and lost pick. It’s also how good he has to be to still project above-replacement-level (0.1 WAR) by the end of the deal in the mean outcome. If they buy into the intangibles and like his defense better than the public metrics than I guess they could reasonably believe that.
Average WAR/600 aging curve:
https://www.vivaelbirdos.com/2016/10/15/13283054/taking-stock-of-jedd-gyorko
Again, let’s remember: Matt Swartz’s work does not calculate expected value. That calculates total efficiency. It is a retrospective accounting of how much teams got, not how much teams expect to get. (The example I used up above is that when a Jason Heyward busts, $/WAR goes up, and when a Logan Morrison breaks out, $/WAR goes down.)
This might seem like kind of an arbitrary difference but what it means is: Many analyses using Swartz’s $/win number says something like “Because Jason Heyward and a bunch of other free agents totally busted, and we don’t project Eric Hosmer to totally bust, that means he’s a good value.” The part of that sentence that makes sense is not the part about Jason Heyward and his fellow free agent busts…it is the part about what we expect out of Eric Hosmer.
I think a more productive way of thinking about this is by thinking of opportunity costs. Say your goal is to improve your team by 5 wins this offseason. What is the most efficient way of getting there? How about if your goal is to improve your team by 3 wins three offseasons from now? And is Eric Hosmer really the most cost efficient way to get to whatever your goal is? I would think it is not, even at this late stage of the offseason, but someone on the Padres (I don’t know who) has some kind of an analysis where it is.
Don’t be ridiculous. Schwartz’s research looks at all players with more than 6 years service time, single players busting has an extremely little effect on the average.
That his work is accounting after the fact rather than the team’s internal estimate is true, and a valid criticism of using a general $/WAR figure to judge a deal. However, *we can’t know any individual team’s internal valuation of a win or even of any certain player*. The best tool we have is to use this along with noting other relevant factors like the team’s market/revenue, place on the win curve, etc. The observed average cost per win isn’t perfect, but pointing it out does nothing to change the fact that it’s the best metric we have to judge contracts. Obviously if there was credible public analysis that gave us a way to understand each team’s individual marginal benefit per win at each point of the win curve in terms of dollars that would be better. If that exists somewhere I’d love to see it.
“Say your goal is to improve your team by 5 wins this offseason. What is the most efficient way of getting there? How about if your goal is to improve your team by 3 wins three offseasons from now? And is Eric Hosmer really the most cost efficient way to get to whatever your goal is?”
These are all complex situations where knowing the average observed cost of a win in free agency helps us answer them in a quantitative manner. It also gives us an understanding of Surplus Value of both MLB players and prospects, so it gives us away to quantitatively measure trades/draft pick compensation. That way we can compare trades and free agent signings in an apples to apples fashion. Tell me, what public tool exists that allows us to better answer the questions you posed above?
A single player busting is not likely to have an effect, unless the player has an enormous contract. If several players with big contracts bust, it will dramatically inflate the $/WAR.
More generally, the “revealed preference” construct just isn’t valid here. I’ll use the analogy from above: Let’s say I go to the grocery store, intending to buy a bag of 100 pretzels. I go and find a bag that looks like it has 100 pretzels, but lo and behold when I get home and open it up I only find 80 pretzels. Or worse, I find potato chips instead. What does the “revealed preference” tell us in this case? It mostly tells us I suck trying to figure out how many pretzels are in the bag.
There is no credible public analysis telling us what each team thinks a player is worth–that is a closely guarded secret. Charles Manski argues we should measure expectations directly, but I just don’t think that is likely to work here. However, we do have pretty good systems for figuring out how much a player is likely to be worth. It seems much more likely that a prospective projection system like ZiPs, combined with the amount they actually pay them, will tell us how much a team values a player and its contributions than player outcomes. You could even aggregate it to get a similar $/win number as you get from retrospective data.
(Important note: If anything, the “revealed preference” we see here is not how much the player performs, but how much the team pays.)
I would then compare them to other opportunities on the free agent market, or even via trade (which I actually like the concept of the surplus value framework a lot for, more on that later).
I also actually think there’s a lot of analysis here about whether you’re on the “right place on the win curve” to determine whether an acquisition makes sense, how it fits into contention windows, etc–I think you mention doing that too, so I don’t know why you think it can’t be done.
Short version:
1) I would urge using prospective, not retrospective measurements to get at how a team values $/win
2) I would urge looking at opportunity costs available to a team to determine whether it was a good move
3) I would urge using Swartz’s work to look at how efficient spending was, either in aggregate or by team
4) I would be quite wary of combining #2 and #3. Retrospective and prospective judgments of worth are not really the same thing.
(I don’t really have a problem with using the “surplus value” framework to evaluate trades and prospects and whatnot, as long as it is all pegged to the same system. The irony is that the thing that it would seem to be best at–evaluating free agent contracts–is the part where it stumbles. To the extent that my post was seen as a critique of the whole surplus value framework, that was not my intention.)
This is silly. Is it impossible to know how much a team values a win or a certain player? Of course. Does the average observed cost of a win give us a better idea? Of course.
The average observed cost of a win is likely biased by two factors: The team’s individual value system and the discrepancy between performance and expectations.
There is nothing to do about the first one…you’re always going to have team-level heterogeneity because teams will guard that information carefully.
For the second one, it would be better to measure expectations more directly rather than inferring that how assets collectively perform after purchase. The expectation is what the value system is trying to explain. If you can model the value system (as opposed to efficiency of purchase) you can get a lot closer to an actual value framework.
This article gives some more theoretical background as to why expectations should not be judged as equivalent to outcomes.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.9.5406&rep=rep1&type=pdf
I have serious doubts that Manski’s specific analytic suggestions are feasible here because valuation systems effectively constitute trade secrets. But if there has been a convergence of analytic methods across teams (through some sort of isomorphic process, and which has been written about here before) then ZiPS would be a good stand in (or if you like to be fancy, a factor score of ZiPS, PECOTA, and Steamer).
That’s a lot of words for not addressing anything i said. Guess this is a good spot to stop.
I’m sorry I wasn’t clear, but I’ll just leave with this:
1) The average observed win is better than nothing.
2) Measuring how much a team “values” something is actually a measurement of expectations of rewards, not what you actually get.
3) We have better measurements of expectations than what actually occurs in the following 12 months. We should use those instead.
4) I think the surplus value framework is really smart. I just think the way we calculate the $/WAR on the free agent market captures something other than expected value.
5) I think Matt Swartz’s work is excellent, but most people are using it to answer an unrelated question.
This is something I am happy to discuss any time, but if you still feel this doesn’t address anything you said, then you’re right, it is time to stop.
He is being paid through age 35 (8yrs) and not age 36 and is far more likely to be a 4 WAR player away from Kaufmann stadium his first 3 years than 2.8 WAR. Thats 17.1 WAR
Entering age 28 season coming off a great age 27 season and going to a stadium and division that may encourage him to elevate the ball more, we may be seeing the next David Ortiz, one who plays 1B .
WAR is stadium/league/position neutral…
Petco plays like Kauffman Stadium anyway. It’s a little smaller, but the sea humidity kills the high fly ball which doesn’t carry. Ryan Ludwick went nuts hitting moon shots that fell straight down into gloves, rather than carry into the seats.
Hosmer has already adjusted to that, and there’s still plenty of grass for line drives to grab. Unfortunately, the humidity prevents low liners from dropping, so a ball in the gap will hang up long enough for a fielder to catch it. Petco will suppress his doubles like everyone else’s. A high liner over the outfielder’s head is a triple though.
Well, it tries to be stadium neutral. I don’t know how successful it is.
I’m not sure what you mean by position neutral, since there is an adjustment for position. A good offensive season for a average fielding shortstop would be worth more WAR than the same offensive season for a first baseman, no matter how good his defense was.
Last summer, Matt Swartz looked at forecasted $/WAR on the free agent market through 2022 and projected an increase from $11m/WAR in 2018 to $14m/WAR in 2022. With $/WAR costs increasing steadily year by year, is there any value to locking in the cost for 2024 production in 2018? Would the 18m overpay partially or fully evaporate through rising inflation of $/WAR for free agent signings on the market at that time? I suppose this all hinges on the assumption that there would still be positive WAR production to value in 2024.
I think the contract is structured with the money up front. If so, doesn’t this deal have the characteristics of a dump and run?
It seems like it has be noted that the last time the Preller Padres though they were really really close, they signed James Shields and traded for Matt Kemp, Wil Myers, Justin Upton, Craig Kimbrel, and Derek Norris in the offseason prior to the 2015 season.
That team promptly went 74-88, finished 4th, and had to be torn down.
I know its EXTREMELY popular to do so here, but not everyone can actually predict the future. Some times, in real life, one takes his best shot at things.
He also forgot to include the fact that attendance skyrocketed that year, and that the resultant teardown accrued significantly more valuable prospects than the ones he gave up.
It went up by 11%, that’s nice but hardly a skyrocket.
The Craig Kimbrel deal definitely fit that description of getting back better players than they traded. Not so much Justin Upton or Matt Kemp or Wil Myers (Trea Turner would look awfully good in San Diego right now).
But the Kimbrel trade…that was black magic by Preller.
Many would disagree re: comparing the two Kimbrel trades. The Braves dumped a ton (~56 million!) of salary when they sent Kimbrel to the Padres, mostly Melvin Upton’s huge albatross, so the lesser prospect return is to be expected.
…and the Padres proceeded to also acquire an asset for Upton, after using him to drive down the prospect cost of Kimbrel.
Yonder for (essentially) Espinoza could look really good, should Anderson come back strong,
Nobody expects anybody to perfectly predict the future.
It doesn’t mean you should take a shot in the dark, though.
If most people suspected you were wrong and then the result shows that your prediction was off by a LOT (18 games in 2015), then you probably were wrong.
Also it is not just preller in the room but also the owner. I think the Padres owner is rather aggressive. I don’t think their 2015 plan to tear down the farm and go all in was all on preller. Maybe this is another case of boras bypassing the FO and winning over the owner.
I agree with you, but I can’t help feeling a pause in doing so when I think about the Freddy Galvis trade.
Explain?
I think it would be amusing one of these days to see a cheeky GM go around Boras and send a proposal directly to the player.
Eh, I think Preller realized that the 2015 farm sucked, and that a “tear down” of it wouldn’t actually hurt the team longterm.
Kimbrel cost them Matt Wisler and Jordan Paroubeck, along with flipping Maybin’s contract for Melvin Upton’s.
Wisler and Paroubeck have since cratered, while Kimbrel fetched Margot, Asuaje and Allen from the Sox…and Melvin’s seeming turnaround let them flip him for Hansel Rodriguez.
The only real black eye from that entire season is flipping Yasmani Grandal.
You forget trading Trea Turner, in a 3 team deal, for Wil Myers. That one has the potential to suck for a long time.
If Myers gets back to his 2016 form, playing average RF defense, he’s a building block.
Not a 5 win SS like Turner, but a perfectly solid longterm piece.
Yeah that is the kind of deal that sinks a ship. You can do a lot right and not be able to recover from a mistake like that.
In 2014 it was Mike Dee who made the hiring decision and it was he who pushed the aggressive line. Preller got hired because unlike Billy Eppler, he agreed that bypassing the rebuild and going all in could result in a playoff team. Dee’s hold on the job was already loosening, so this reflected more his own desperation and lack of baseball knowledge than anything else.
As a Padres fan, I have researched evidence of the “it was someone else’s idea for 2015” and came up with nothing. The most direct public quote I got was Fowler putting it on Preller. I hope Hosmer and the rebuild works but don’t re-write history to scrub out all Preller’s mistakes to make your confidence in future higher. Hosmer might be a goldmine but it might not and pretending otherwise seems a bit borderline delusional. From the article:
“In 2014, the Padres hired A.J. Preller as general manager. As Fowler tells it, Preller thought the Padres’ pitching was good enough that the team could boost its offense and make a run at the playoffs in 2015. The offense turned out to be better, the pitching much worse, the defense weak.
“We felt it was worth the risk of going for it,” Fowler said. “It was very difficult for me to approve the contracts, but we did, I did, and it was a disappointing year.””
http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-baseball-shaikin-20160410-story.html
You seem to assume that I have confidence in Preller and the Padres’ future. I do not. I also feel the signing of Hosmer was very big mistake, fwiw.
As for the Preller hiring, the story was that Dee was ready to hire someone else (presumably Eppler) when Preller met Dee at the airport and made an inspired second impression. This I seem to remember coming from MLB trade rumors, though I can’t swear to it 🙂
The guess is that in Preller’s first interview he sketched out his plan for a normal rebuild over 3-5 years. After finding out he wouldn’t be offered the position, he then presented his bold, go for it now plan during this airport meeting.
Either Dee was blown away by this idea (which is my memory of what I read) or he was looking to hear this to begin with, or some combination of the two.
Ah, it was not MLB trade rumors after all. Here’s the link: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/padres/sdut-padres-mike-dee-hired-preller-2016mar21-story.html
As a Padres fan, I really wish they wouldn’t have gone and done this. I mean, in a way I like the aggressiveness, but I don’t think this particular guy warranted handing out the largest contract in team history.
I would have preferred Logan Morrison for a few years (if they were THAT hot on picking up a first baseman) and waiting until 2019/2020 when the core comes together to spend big and fill a gap or two.
I’d rather have taken a chance that JD Martinez could play first base for the same money
Or Corey Dickerson!
I would honestly rather have Corey Dickerson try to play first base for the same money. The fact that he’d be way cheaper is more of a bonus.
I wouldn’t rather have Dickerson. He had 30 less walks, 50 more Ks, same power, and doesn’t play 1B. I think Hosmer just entered into being the player most thought he could be.
I am starting to think I went too far with the Corey Dickerson love. He is just as inconsistent as Hosmer, and the same age. I thought he was younger and more consistent at the plate, and the big advantage he has over Hosmer is playing left field (which ironically would have made him a better fit for the Padres).
That’s a decent point.
This reminds me of a talk I had about Byron Buxton though back in May. I couldn’t PROVE he was about to start playing really well, but it seemed very likely to me. Same as here, I cant prove that Hosmer will play really well in SD, but I have a strong feeling he will.
1B is the worst possible position for SD to upgrade. Wil Myers now has to move back to the outfield, where he was one of the worst defensive players in baseball for multiple seasons when he was in his mid 20s.
The numbers on FG suggest he was one of the worst defensive 1Bs too, so I guess they figure how much worse can he get?
The point is that he will be producing substantial negative value in the outfield now, rather than whatever defensive value the players they otherwise would have played in the outfield would have produced.
The bonus is that they also now get substantial negative defensive value at first base!
Especially if LF would’ve been played by Jankowski. But Preller doesn’t care about defense. In 2015 he had Upton in LF, Kemp in RF, and Myers (a former catcher) in CF. It was ugly.
I remember making a few comments about how that was probably the worst defensive outfield in a long time.
He was awful in center, not “the outfield.”
He’s got a career UZR/150 of -1 in RF.
The problem with waiting to buy is that many of the big spenders will be shopping in a year or two but not now. This might be their only chance to be high bidder on a premium player. It might not, but this is clearly a risk.
That said, unless something has changed, PetCo is a lousy place for left-handed power, and every division rival has at least 2 lefty starters, so this feels a bit like swimming upstream. Given that the Padres know this, they might see this as a unique winter where they can improve the 2020 team better than they will be able to in 2019 or 2020.
If Petco is lousy for left-handed hitters, doesn’t that INCREASE the importance of having better left-handed hitters than your opponents do? Also, wouldn’t that be primarily on balls hit in the air? That would make Hosmer’s swing more optimal there.
It means you strongly favor right handed hitters. Signing Wil Myers to play first base made sense even though he isn’t exactly Paul Goldschmidt.
Since the Padres will strongly favor right handed hitters elsewhere, they are at risk of having a lineup with exactly one non-platoonable lefty hitter. Such an arrangement means this batter will face a lefty specialist very, very often.
I agree that if a player hits the ball in the air less and to the opposite field more often than is typical, the park is probably less of an issue. But as players get older or change their swings, they tend to increasingly become pull power hitters, and potential gains (or mitigation of age-related decline) from this avenue are kept on a leash at Petco.
Luckily Hosmer hits lefties as well as righties, and isn’t old.
He has more than a 150 point OPS gap between LHP and RHP each of the last two years, and platoon splits tend to increase with age. He certainly is not old now, but the Padres paid for both “current Hosmer” and “old Hosmer” so whatever he becomes is theirs (unless it is awesome and he opts out).
Travis made a key point in today’s chat – they got a very good player to take their money in free agency – their choice may have been “Hosmer or no one”. Given the park and roster situation, the presence of Wil Myers for the next decade, and their non-contender status in the near term, it seems likely this was the dominant factor in this decision.
Since they moved the fences in and shortened the wall its more of a neutral park for LHH in terms of HR than for RHH
Using the Baseball Prospectus park factors by handedness, there was a modest edge for RHB over LHB in 2017 and a large edge for RHB over LHB in 2016. If these are not trustworthy please let me know.
“Hosmer is admittedly fascinating.”
No he’s not. I get that’s it’s slow with news, but for fucks sake come up with something better than this nonsense.
Different things are fascinating to other people, so this cant be solved. For instance, “trashing someones good writing with ones own fairly lazy writing”, fascinating to some.
It sort of delights me that this comment is about 100 votes less popular than the average “make $183 working from home!” spam post.
This deal is like Eric Hosmer – probably not terrible, but likely to disappoint and lacking in upside.
i mean, there’s upside if he can get a lot more loft into his swing. but that process is by no means automatic.
Oops, wrong comment
There will also be more loft in his WAR if he can hit the ball upside.
“In Hosmer’s three most recent odd-year seasons, he’s been good. In his three most recent even-year seasons, he’s been replacement-level.”
Sounds like he would be good at making the Giants more consistent from year to year.
I am skeptical that everyone can do that so easily. There are actually some rumors he already tried and that is why he had that big slump to start the years.
While what you say here is true, and it was also said in the article by Jeff, Hosmer has shown an unwillingness not only to change, but even to think about changing. So, without a monumental attitude adjustment (and why would he since he just signed an 8-year deal), he is most likely to be the same old Hosmer.
$100 million will buy a great pair of earmuffs.
It is hard to forecast how someone will react to a new team and a gigantic sum of money. They might be far more willing to take risks and try new things that might make them better at what they do. They might also dig in to what they think got them to where they are and refuse to budge no matter what evidence is presented to them [insert any applicable political analogy here].
Agreed, while not a Hosmer fan does it not make just as much sense for him to attempt to get better for that opt out? If a swing change can change those last three years into big money on a more successful team why not go for it when you have guaranteed big bucks now?
As a Royals fan, I think there’s a fair question as to whether Hosmer has ever been encouraged to change his swing. All the comments from the Royals’ front office and management over the years suggested that it wasn’t ever something they were interested in pursuing. While I suspect that Dave Cameron isn’t a big fan of this contract, one thing he probably will suggest is for the coaches to look at changing Hosmer’s swing. We’ll have to see if anything is done on that front.
You mean he’s worth it if he totally changes his approach at the plate?
yea it makes no sense unless they think they can change his swing.
Also what is the incentive for him to change. He has won a ws and signed a big contract.
Most of the swing changers were guys who were forced to do that. Donaldson, bautista and JD all were failed ex prospects who would have been out of baseball soon, alonso was a quad A type of player.
That is why I’m sceptical of guys like yelich and hosmer changing, they don’t really need a change especially since there is a chance a change makes it worse (remember the annual Hayward new swing…).
Maybe hosmer will change in his early 30s like zimmerman and alonso if he is forced to do it.
Maybe hosmer can achieve a little bit with pitch selection, he is very bad inside and down, so if he can focus a little on up and out over the plate to away he might make some moderate batted ball changes without a swing change.
Andrus changed in the midst of a huge deal. He realized he needed to get the ball in the air a lot more and he did.
I’d imagine this is one of the key points during negotiations.
I see two questions here. Not just “is Hosmer willing to try to change?”, but also “is he capable of changing?”. It’s possible to answer the first question affirmatively but find that whatever swing changes he makes simply don’t work for him to increase his overall production as a hitter (per the point of the Heyward example).
OTOH, you could argue that Hosmer, having been paid, is now free to tinker with his swing without worrying about performing worse. Like you say, a lot of the swing changers didn’t have much to lose, and a guy like Hosmer could have ruined his chance at a big contract if he tried a swing change last year and it didn’t work. Now he has $144M guaranteed, so he’s set for life either way. But if he does change his swing and reaches his potential, he could get paid again in five years. So there’s still plenty of incentive to improve, but not as much downside as there was a year ago.
Looked at this way must be how San Diego sees it. I could see them saying to Hosmer: “look, go ahead and suck for a year or two as you learn how to hit with more loft. we’re not going to be any good anyway, but in year 3 you will have learned how to hit with more loft and the kids from the farm will have arrived”
The thing I got out of this signing is that the players aren’t getting as screwed as Fangraphs has been telling me over the past few months. Players are signing later than usual but unless their position is blocked like 3b they’re generally getting a ton of money, and generally what was expected by Fangraphs or the fan projections.
Apparently the Padres didn’t get the collusion memo.
100%. I’d love to see an explanation (and a mea culpa?) from Travis and some of the more hysterical writers here on how they misread this so badly.
Credit to Jeff for keeping his head during what looks like an offseason that will turn out to be pretty ordinary other than being time-shifted a few months.
i mean. seeing as hosmer was signed for more than anyone predicted pre-strange offseason, i think this one single signing doesn’t imply anything about their analyses on the offseason.
it’s idiotic to use one data point, an outlier especially, as enough to conclude someone or something is right or wrong.
Is North Korea a nuclear-armed state?
Or preller just used his collusion opt out and won’t be a defendant in litigation.
If you look at past seasons players tend to get way more than fan/Cameron projections. The fact that they are coming down to projection level is in of itself sign that prices are down.
That does not follow. Readers and Cameron were aware of past misses and may have built this into their expectations this year. It’s not exactly a law of nature that projections have to miss low.
Not a law of nature, but in general I’d expect projections, especially the fan projections, to miss low. Players are (almost) always going to sign with the team that puts the highest value on them. By definition, this will be more than the average.
Plus, fans here are mostly projecting what they would pay if they were a GM, not what the player will get.
Agreed, and this in spite of all the articles on FA’s overplaying their hands this off-season. This was revealed by the Cashner and Vargas signings. As bad as this Hosmer deal is, those are worse.
Yeah, since Dave and Eno left, Fangraphs has had a player-friendly tone (or anti-owner tone). Here’s hoping that Fangraphs doesn’t become the next media outlet to be usurped by left-wing liberal ‘elites’.
Just a historical note, left-wing liberal elites founded and built this country.
I agree this is way too much for too long, but I’m going to make a counterintuitive argument on the opt-out and the way the contract is structured. SD is expecting Hosmer to opt out. If he can be a 3 WAR player for the first five years, they spent $105M on it–not cheap, but not horrible–and not impossible given his age. The Padres don’t really expect a premium return–what they want is what they perceive Hosmer’s value is right now–including whatever intangibles he’s supposed to be bringing. If Hosmer plays well enough to opt out after 5, the Padres can either bid on him, or let him go elsewhere. If he doesn’t then the spend in the last three years is $13M per, which is not so large to carry if he’s a 1 WAR player, or release if the bottom completely drops out.
This argument gets made every time an opt out is in a contract and it never makes any sense. If Hosmer opts out, it’s because he’s going to make more than 3/39 on the open market. In which case the Padres would have a surplus asset that they would prefer to keep or trade to someone else. If he doesn’t opt out, it’s because he’s an underwater asset, which is never good even if it’s not a Pujols level albatross.
I’m very much a part of the ‘Boo! optouts’ crowd, but I actually don’t mind it here. Much. Given Hosmer’s lack of upside, I just think it’s very unlikely he will be worth much come 5 years from now. And if he does crater, well, $13 mill a year shouldn’t hurt that much.
It makes sense because it’s a way to get players to sign contracts below what they want.
Essentially the team is telling the player that if they think they’ll be good in 5 years, then we’ll give you opt out but you’ll sign for less. A straight 8yr contract with no opt out would for certain be higher in AAV.
Giving opt outs is generally favorable for team because players betting on themselves rarely work out. Sure, every once in a while get you Grinke but majority of the time they opt in because they are older and less desirable and can’t get more after opting out
“players betting on themselves rarely work out.”
Citation very much needed
Opt outs are a valuable consideration for the player. They make sense for teams sometimes because it is something valuable they can give to the player which is not “more cash now.” Let’s not kid ourselves, though. Opt outs are nothing but pure upside to the player and pure downside for the team.
This is 100% true. But if teams are getting value (in the form of paying less cash now) in exchange for opt-outs, I think they make a lot of sense for both players and teams. I think the opt-out has more positive value to the player than negative value to the team, for two reasons. First, teams are generally in a better position than players to assume risk, which is the primary effect of an opt-out. Second, teams probably discount future money more heavily than players, so the present value of an opt-out is likely lower to the team than to the player.
“Opt outs are nothing but pure upside to the player and pure downside for the team.” I agree with you for hitters, but not necessarily pitchers.
If we say that the average pitcher has a 10% chance of blowing out his arm in any given season, and it goes up as he gets older, an opt out can actually work out for the team. (10% is just a random number, and I’m sure it’s way off)
Let’s look at David Price’s deal: 7 years for $217 million with an opt-out after year 3, when he will be 33.
If Price has a 10% chance of suffering a major arm injury in year 1, 15% in year 2, 20% in year 3, 25% in year 4, 30% in year 5, 35% in year 6, and 40% in year 7, the opt out could potentially work.
If Price were effective in the first 3 years and had no arm injuries, he would probably opt out, thinking he could get more than 4 years $127 million. If he does opt out, the Red Sox are off the hook for the remaining money, but more importantly, they can then make an updated estimate on the risks going forward. If they think he is more likely to suffer a major decline or army injury going forward, they can bake that into any offer they make him. Especially since they presumably know more about his health and habits than any other team, they are at least going into it with their eyes wide open.
Maybe they are comfortable with 4 years, $100 million at that point. Maybe they will give 4 years $127 million. I can’t envision a scenario where it makes sense for them to give a healthy 33-year-old David Price 4 years and $140+ million. But if it does, at least they are likely basing that on clean physicals, 3 years of healthy pitching, relatively few “aches and pains,” etc.
If he suffers the injury or decline in the first 3 years, that sucks for the Red Sox. But they are no worse off than if they didn’t give him the opt out. In fact, they are probably at least a little better off because Price presumably traded the opt-out for slightly less money overall.
Now, Price DID have his injury in the first 3 years, and I doubt he opts out. But that doesn’t make the Red Sox any worse off than if he had signed a deal without an opt out.
It’s not zero-one, players make inefficient decisions on contracts with some regularity (see some recent QO decisions), passing up better contracts for lesser ones by misreading value.
Opt outs may heavily favor players in the aggregate, but they will work out beneficially for some teams occasionally. Consider if Hosmer is considered- by all- to be worth $11m AAV by the end of year 5. SD will not want him at that price, as he is -$6m under water to them at 3/$39. But what if some other team wants Hosmer to opt out and sign 5/50. SD wins, the signing teams wins, and Hosmer wins.
So if the player opts out for more years and total money but less AAV, or if the player/agent overvalue their market and opt out mistakenly- the team can benefit from the opt out. The frequency that one of these two situations will occur is not 0%.
Saving cash is not an upside for the team? Sure, the opt out is all in the player’s favor, but maybe the teams feel that the money saved is worth the potential money lost on the opt out? For a team like the Yankees or Dodgers who are trying to reset the luxury tax penalty, the savings are on the books, and the losses are more theoretical. That doesn’t explain why the Padres would want to offer an opt out, except that seems to be necessary anymore to sign an above average player.
While opt-outs lower upside of contracts from team perspectives, they can also raise the floor. A good example is Jason Heyward. Without the opt-outs, the Cubs would likely have had to guarantee him well over $200 mil. Heyward is obviously not going to opt out, but it costs the Cubs less money than they otherwise would have had to pay if they didn’t give him opt outs.
this. saying an opt out is pure pro player and anti team is incorrect.
it’s merely another method to lower the dollar cost of the contract. it has a ton of negative (for the teams) features but saves them money.
I believe the opt-out and the three years after the opt-out were added by the Padres so that Hosmer would have a lower AAV for CBT purposes. It gives the Padres flexibility, if he’s performing well after year three of his contract but the Padres young prospects around him don’t pan out, to trade him and get value back.
His AAV, since the player options are included, is $18M. A team acquiring him would most likely only be worried about years four and five of his contract because Hosmer would mostly like opt-out if he’s performing well enough to merit a trade.
I seriously doubt that the Padres are worried about hitting the luxury tax.
I agree with Maguro, because the Padres are not near the luxury tax as far as I know (and not likely to be players on guys like Harper, Machado, Kershaw, and Donaldson next year). But I am fascinated by the possibility of team’s trying to do that in the future and how MLB will police it. Obviously, if a team gives Harper a 1 yr/1 mil or 2 yr/2 mil option at the end of his contract, it’s clearly just to mess with the tax hit. How far would they have to go for it to be acceptable, though? Is a 1 yr/5 mil option at, say, his age 36 year enough? 1 yr/10 mil? I suspect this might get tested out a bit in the future
@Don Zimmer: the luxury tax calculation in the CBA already includes a provision that addresses this exact idea. Player opt-out years are treated differently if the salary in a year after the opt-out is less than the greater of (i) 80% of the lowest salary in a pre-opt out year and (ii) 75% of the AAV of the contract. It’s on page 122 of the CBA – http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf
Oh, cool. Thanks for educating me on that
Thanks, Dave T. Did not know that.
Doing the math, 75% is $13.5, and 80% of the first 5 is larger than that, so it would qualify.
Players/agents don’t make 100% efficient choices on opt outs, nor do they on QOs, or draft offers.
Compared to one-year player options, opt outs can be a little bit trickier for players/agents to execute with near 100% efficiency, because opt out decisions must accurately assess multiple years.
Further, Hosmer doesn’t have to be a surplus asset to opt out-even if he is right to do so. Hosmer might be worth less on an AAV basis than 3/39 when his opt out triggers, but he might be able to get 4/48 from KC or someone. That would be a win-win for Hosmer and SD, while SD wouldn’t necessarily have anything to lose from trade value since KC wouldn’t necessarily consider Hosmer’s 3/39 surplus value.
And that’s without mentioning that (1) opt outs only go to players with no-trade clauses, which means that the supposed lost trade value is limited; and (2) Hosmer/Boras is a very good pair to bet on as far as rolling the dice on the FA market and pursuing a price-point that the market won’t pay.
Boras just set off to get Hosmer $200m and got him $144- a good contract for Hosmer that overpays him, yet there is some suggestion that this duo might still disagree with advanced valuation models 5 years from now, regardless whether performance has been strong.
The idea that Hosmer will only opt out if his WAR projection renders his remaining contract surplus value is of course untrue. A gold glove, 20 HRs and 8 game-winning-RBIs in year 5 might be enough for Boras/Hosmer to be on themselves in open market.
Yeah I think we can essentially think of this contract as 5/$105m, with a $39m insurance policy in case he sucks. Which is awfully nice of the Padres to provide him with.
I sort of agree with this. I think the
logic is sound in the sense that you normally want to be rid of a player before the decline years hit, so even if a guy is raking you would probably be relieved if he opted out.
Let’s walk through it. If Hosmer sucks, he’ll never use it. Hence, the team should never worry about giving it in negotiations. If Hosmer is awesome, he will probably opt out. If you think he’s going to stay awesome in his mid 30s then that’s unfortunate for the team but most players don’t stay awesome for your mid 30s. Most of the time, the player benefits from the opt out because they get some other idiot to pay them a fortune and you benefit because you don’t have to worry about the player falling off a cliff.
Here is why I think this might not work for the Padres: The other idiot cannot be you for this to work. If you panic and swoop in with a massive deal to let him retire a Padre the opt out is a huge negative! And given that the Padres “ won” the bidding here I’d put them up there as the
most likely idiot in the future.
So when the Cubs do this I think it is pretty smart…it doesn’t cost much and you probably get to offer less money overall. Sometimes it might even work in your favor, but since the Padres just did something really dumb it feels weird to assert they will do the smart thing later.
Player options are, by definition, an opportunity for the player and an obligation for the club. That’s a bad thing for SD, all else equal.
Think of it as two separate deals:
Hosmer got 105/5 (with a no trade).
He ALSO got a 39/3 for 2023-2025.
“But he’d only want that if he stinks in 2023!”, you might say.
Yes. That’s exactly right.
It’s a $39M insurance policy for him – paid for by the Padres – while maintaining all the upside for himself.
The magic words there are “all else being equal.” Between 8/144 with an opt-out and 8/144 without an opt-out, the latter is always better for the team and the player would always prefer the opt-out.
But in reality, all else is never equal. 8/144 with no opt-out wasn’t an option – either it was never on the table, or Hosmer wouldn’t take it. Obviously the Padres thought this made more sense than 8/155, or 7/140, or whatever other combination of dollars and years Hosmer would have agreed to with no opt-out. Depending on how good they think Hosmer is and will be, that may be a completely reasonable choice on their part.
Not disagreeing with you at all, just expanding on why teams give opt-outs if they’re player-friendly.
Understood/agreed, and it’s a good clarifying point.
If the alternative was 5×26, then it’s easy to make the argument that this deal is better for the Padres than that one *even if they think it’s likely that he’s a total loss during the out years*.
IE: 40% chance he’s good and walks, 60% chance he’s a donut and they’re hung with the $39.
0.6 x 39 < 5×5 incremental, even before the PV. (And this is obviously not binary; he could be worth 8/yr and they’re paying him 13, eg. I’m just trying to simplify).
And I totally get your point (that I now see above) that there may be an asymmetry of value in player options for the player vs the club that argues for them becoming ever more common.
I just don’t get the commenters who somehow rationalize to themselves that 5×21 + 3/13 player option is a better deal for the club than just the first part of that.
Whether the counterparty is a pitcher or a hitter or a batboy, it’s just not so.
(It’s also why I continue thing this narrative that players aren’t getting paid is bogus. The nominal AAV for this deal is 18, but when you factor in the value of the option that Hosmer owns, it’s clearly greater.)
I haven’t studied this contract so I’m not as familiar with it, so maybe this is an exception (and now that I look at what you wrote, this is probably an exception…contracts that dramatically frontloaded probably don’t fit what I’m about to write well).
But the big issue I see (and why the opt out can be very good for the team) is that you shouldn’t be comparing the scenario where a player is terrible and opts in to the scenario where he is awesome and opts out. If the player is terrible and opts in, your decision to give him the opt out has no bearing on the situation at all. He was going to stick around and lie like a slug all over your salary structure no matter if you gave him that opt out or not.
Consequently, the more important comparison is whether the post-opt-out salary is a good deal for the team or not. And it is almost never a good deal. Most deals are structured so that the back half subsidizes the first half (upon reflection, this may not be the case here, since it is heavily frontloaded). If it is a bad deal for you, then a player opting out is excellent news and you should let some other idiot pay them (this assumes the “other idiot” is not you, in which case you lose no matter what comes up).
Overall, I’d strongly agree with the thesis that opt outs are way more valuable to the player than the club, and should be used as bargaining chips when possible.
That is not true IMO- if you disagree, please tell me the odds you give to the following two scenarios.
(1) a player can make a mistake and passes up a good contract offer (3/39) in November that turns out to be better than what the market bears. Consider that at least several FAs this very November turned down 1-year player options (QOs) that will likely pay them more than the 1 or 2 year deals they end up signing this offseason- Holland for example. It is easier to avoid a mistake on a QO decision than it is on an opt-out covering 3 years. Surely the rate of such mistakes will not be 0%, agreed? What percent would others suggest?
(2) a player can opt out despite having an underwater contract and a market that won’t match AAV- so long as the player gets more years. In this sense, some of the QO decisions probably involve a total-money priority rather than an AAV focus. If, after 5 years, Hosmer is objectively and actually worth 3/30m, but is getting paid 3/39- then perhaps some other team might be set to offer Hosmer 4/39+iota: in which case, both SD and Hosmer would benefit from an opt out. This may require team to believe that Hosmer will age better than is typical, but I’d suggest that this ‘years/total value over AAV’ opt out calculus could lead to players worth less than their option choosing to opt out anyway. Might that be Greg Holland’s situation? He figures to fall into either scenario 1 above of this scenario 2. What odds would others suggest on this scenario?
IMO the odds on these scenarios is certainly not 0%.
If you think the players and their agents won’t be vastly better at evaluating their markets in five years, these examples may have merit. This seems like a gigantic “if”. I was writing a contract now, I would not assume that the players will not adjust in the next few months, let alone the next few years, and get a lot better at these decisions, especially since they really aren’t that hard.
I don’t know that we need to use terms like “”if”” when the Holland example is present now as an example of how players can and will mis-read the market.
Can’t say I like this contract at all. The Pads play in a very difficult division. I’m not sure I see the near term talent that would justify a signing like this. And yeah, there goes the collusion argument.
Collusion agreements can be broken by one or more team, it does not mean collusion is still not in play or was not in play for much of the offseason
I wonder how much the early off-season projected contract talk led to the Padres bidding this high. Boras was touting a $200 million dollar deal before the off-season started. You wonder if San Diego feels like they got a steal because the original asking price started so high.
I doubt that MLB teams set their valuations of players on what the players agent says.
You’d hope not, but I’m pretty sure putting that big number out there made a real difference in how much Hosmer ended up getting. Nobody’s 100% analytical all the time.
When your job is to write 7,8, and 9 figure checks, you can satisfy any desires to be non-analytical at the grocery store. People expect you to do your job well. This may include weighing “non-numeric” factors and strategic effects, but this does not mean giving in to nonsensical arguments or bidding against yourself.
Oh, I agree. But Boras starts every offseason by making outlandish demands for his clients. We all comment on how ridiculous they are. Then his clients sign for something less than the outlandish demands, but more than you’d expect from a straight $/WAR analysis.
IMO, Boras gets these big contracts for his clients far too consistently for it to be chance. I’m forced to conclude that some MLB GMs (and in some cases owners) are susceptible to nonsensical arguments.
Anchoring is a real thing in negotiations.
I feel like this is Dave’s punishment for leaving us.
Please, he probably didn’t even blink when he heard the news
Seriously though, how awful must he feel right now to have left a place that he invested so much in to find out the people that hired him aren’t going to listen to him? Condolences DC.
Dave is one voice amongst many in the organization.I dont think he went there thinking he was going to be have ultimate, unquestioned authority on player moves.
They might think he’s the Hosmer-whisperer.
If a club is set to invest ~$150m in Hosmer, and if he’s up to the challenge of bringing in a baseball ops guy to offer constructive criticism, then Dave is a top choice.
Still a poor deal obviously.
2/18/18: Eric Hosmer signs with the Padres.
2/19/18: Dave Cameron makes triumphant return to FanGraphs.
LOL “Boras wanted nine”
Give him this–he’ll never be accused of underselling a client.
Agreed, Boras is objectively very good at his job. He had to know that Hosmer was never going to get 9/$200, but just by putting that number out there, he made it look like Hosmer settled for 8/$144 in a down market, when in fact that is a very, very good contract by almost any standard. Not only did he get his guy paid, he controlled the narrative from start to finish. I’d hire him if I were a player.
God, I wish I could afford him to negotiate for my raises at my job.
In typical negotiation situations, you don’t want to start out with a ridiculous position and make the other side walk away from the table and swear off ever dealing with you again because they think you are unreasonable. With Boras, he represents such a large number of good MLB players that it’s virtually impossible for a team to say “We’re never going to negotiate with Boras”. That gives him the leverage to start the negotiations for his players very high, which usually results in settling at a midpoint that is still relatively high.
I’m picturing Dave down in San Diego right now re-enacting the birth of Vader scene from Episode III.
Pads just signed the third or arguably fourth best first basemen in the division, so of course it was worth it.
Perhaps they’re simply recognizing that, unless totally bereft of talent, no roster is far away from contending. Sure, rebuilders won the last 2 WS, but the last 10 years also includes 3X Giants and one Red Sox title with duct taped rosters.
Thats a pretty valid point. Even the Royals were a fair amount of duct tape in 2015. Sure they had a lot of homegrown guys but you also had guys like Paulo Orlando and Alex Rios playing 80+ games and the much maligned Kendrys Morales signing DHing in 2015. The rotation was anchored by Edinson Volquez of all people. Hell, Chris Young The Tall started 18 games and their best reliever came over as a throw in on another trade.
I think that the “super teams” of late have maybe skewed our perception a bit but the reality is that a lot of teams that won were pretty flawed and maybe not considered much before they won.
Even if you think Hosmer is worth 8/$144 based on projections (spoiler: he’s not), this is a terrible deal for the Padres specifically. The first two years this team is so far from contention that all a good year does is get them a worse draft pick and less money to spend. The last three years are $39M and hoping he generates 2 wins. So really all this money is for 2020-2022 and hoping by some miracle the team is a contender in 2019. Even if this deal “works” it doesn’t work.
You also have to factor in the WAR that they lose by playing Wil Myers in the OF full-time rather than at 1B. I imagine that’s about 0.5 WAR lost per season.
Just for the record, Wil Myers’s career UZR /150 in 1B is 0.4
while his career UZR/150 in corner outfield is 1.2.
Assuming that keeps up, he will actually gain 0.5 WAR per season.
While I don’t think that is likely to happen, your guess is quite unfounded.
Positional adjustment. So-called advanced metrics don’t love 1B.
There’s that and then there’s what I thought you were going to say:
Even if Hosmer is worth 8/$144M, I’m not really convinced the next-highest bid was 8/$143M. Or 8/anything. Or anything/$140M.
It’s been a clear buyers’ market and the Padres paid a sellers’ market price.
Good point, KC’s offer was rumored to have been 7 years and presumably around $130-$140 million. Although the Padres may have had to make a substantially better offer to get Hosmer because I’m guessing he would have preferred to stay with the Royals, where he is already a beloved fan favorite and a well-liked teammate, if the offers were identical.
I struggle to believe that 7/140 is appreciably worse than 8/144 (if reports on KCs offer are true – and they might /not be/) but I also wouldn’t know directly that Dayton Moore did NOT offer any opt-out either.
I want to point out how great Jeff’s writing is here. This article demands attentiveness from the author on points he knew he had to cover to satiate the audience – which could make an article clunky – and he nailed it while incorporating his own narrative as well. Very mature, sensitive, concise, and honest writing, Jeff.
If the recent turnover has proven anything, it’s that Jeff is a fucking gem.
1. Why did the Padres bother hiring someone like Dave, if they’re going to make decisions that are inconsistent with what someone like Dave would recommend?
2. How long will Dave choose to stay with the Padres, if the Padres are going to make decisions that are inconsistent with what he would recommend?
My reading of Dave’s hiring was that it was in good part managerial. He’s integrating/interfacing the analytical department’s input into the overall decision process. If the owner then insists on a Hosmer (what this whole thing screams to me), so be it.
To be fair, Dave’s opinions were always based on publicly avaialble data/metrics which we know is a ~4-5 years behind what MLB teams have. For all we know Dave showed up in SD and found/was shown something that totally changed his mind (or at least made it easier to swallow) RE: Hosmer.
We have no idea what the Padres internal metrics and analysis are or what they say about Hosmer. It is entirely possible that they see him at least a little differently than Dave did from the outside looking in. Circumstantial evidence (AKA: the contract he just signed) definitely suggests they do.
(This contract was also being negotiated long before Dave was hired)
Yup! I wouldn’t be surprised if we find out, five years from now, that Hosmer’s much touted “vacuum glove” actually saves 10 errors per 150 over the average 1B, which more than makes up for his shitty range.
Defence really is the great unknown where teams potentially have a massive advantage with all the statcast data and such. The fact that statcast gives teams the exact starting position of every single fielder on every single play is a ridiculously, laughably huge advantage. It would not surprise me at all to learn that every single public defensive metric is virtually obsolete now.
Tom Tango even alluded to this in an interview a few years ago when he started working for MLB.
If one insists on using numbers to evaluate defense, yes, this is a huge advantage, but I doubt that statcast will be wildly better than a scouting report or even a pretty good eye test. I do not doubt that it will be wildly better than recent defensive metrics.
More interesting thing for me was that Dave signed up under a GM whose professional ethics he called out here on Fangraphs, that I recall. Irrespective, if this signing does signal that the owner wants to start winning darn soon dadgumit!, Preller’s likely headed for the exit soon anyway.
One thing this signing does make me question is not Dave’s being there, but the possible ‘why?’ of his leaving here. After years of writing as to how much better he had it writing here rather than slaving away for humongous hours there in MLB, Dave nevertheless does bolt. And with a young kid now in tow. And for an organization GMed by a guy he questioned here, and that thinks it’s much closer to contending than it really is. Starting to think Appelman decided on this Fangraphs turn toward advocacy and ran it by Dave, Dave said ‘no that’s a bad idea I’ve resisted all these years’, Appelman ‘well I think it’s a good one so there’, Dave ‘OK might as well take this managerial option then that just popped up; bye’.’
I think we’ve gone well-past the ridiculous line of this idol worship when people start making up imaginary scenarios that strongly deviate from the facts.
1. Because — as Cameron himself reminded us constantly — people like him come incredibly cheap. You can hire a lot of people with good information and ideas, even if you’re planning from the beginning to basically ignore them 80% of the time, for the price of one replacement-level player.
2. However long he wants, duh. I don’t think Cameron is dumb enough to have thought they hired him to make all the team’s personnel decisions and then leave in a huff when he realized they didn’t. If you thought he was going to be the GM you’re the idiot here, don’t put that on him.
So now Myers moves back to the outfield, where he’s shown he can’t stay healthy and the Padres get an average 1B, great move.
Myers’ has/had a reoccurring wrist problems due to him breaking his wrist running into Desmond Jennings in 2014. Playing the OF has really nothing to do with his ability to stay healthy.
I wonder if SD thinks they have to poach potential stars to have a shot at competing with the Dodgers. Hosmer hasn’t developed into a star, but has always been a scout’s dream for 1b. SD may be moving forward with a strategy focused on optimizing ML player approaches in an attempt to unlock previously untapped potential and WAR. Wil Myers suddenly spiked his FB% last year even coming off a career year, so I don’t think it’s unreasonable to think this could be a part of a bigger experiment. Dave Cameron even said in his last post “When I met with Andy Green, I was inspired to think about the possibilities of using analysis to help players improve on the field.”
Even so, it’s an overly expensive bet on upside with the opt out, so at some level the Padres must just love Hosmer.
Padres probably expect to be good in 2019 or 2021.
I think my opinion on this deal differs than most. I think it is a good one. Not that I like Hosmer as a player. I like him as a leader. This is exactly what a young team that is about to be loaded up with talented young prospects need. The Royals were all in on Hosmer over Moose. I have to believe it was his leadership qualities that they wanted.
The Pad’s have two young OF. In the next two years two talented MI will be in the majors. The current SP sucks but in 2 years none will be here. The Pads system is loaded and most of the talent is SP. I would not be surprised if the entire 2020 starting rotation starts this year in the minors. I would be surprised if the YE 2020 starting rotation is not all current minor league arms. Who will be the leader of these men. We now have our answer.
But I agree his bat is not deserving of this contract. Of course I believe that is not why they are paying him either. They are paying him to bring a championship to SD and to do so you need pitching, offense and leaders. The leader part is taken care of. The Pads are betting the 10 or so talented SP in their system can handle the pitching and are betting Margot, Renfroe, Tatis and Urias join Hosmer and Myers to create a formidable offense.
“The Pads system is loaded and most of the talent is SP.”
Doesn’t this suggest that if they wanted to sign a big free agent for leadership purposes, it should have been a pitcher rather than a 1B?
Pretty much every team has leaders; it’s just that the ones of teams that also have hitting and pitching get all the publicity. Freddy Galvis won a lot of plaudits for his leadership on a 95-loss Phillies team last year.
Bringing the affordable Galvis in to fill a need and be a mentor young guys makes sense. Making an 8/144 commitment to a player that figures to be more-or-less average does not.
Exactly. “We could have Kendrick Perkins for $2 million or Matthew Delevadova for $10 million per year for 4 years.”
Great article! I am writing about baseball myself and from time to time I find articles I wish I had written – this is one of those.
Over last 4 years Eric Hosmer has put up 7.5 WAR. Corey Dickerson has put up 7.1 in 115 fewer games. Hosmer just signed for 144m, and Dickerson got released due 5.9m.
As with alot of WAR comps There is some context missing there.
Hosmer put up that WAR despite being replacement level half the time. Peak Hosmer has historicly been worth about double peak Dickerson. IF he can be more consistent (or just not worthless every second year) he is unquestionably more valuable than Dickerson.
The Padres obviously think he can do that and I tend to agree. Not saying he is worth that money but there is more to it than “player A had Y WAR and player B had X WAR”
Actually if you combine their last two years Dickerson has been better. If they can keep Hosmer at his peak obv he is better…but why do you assume they can? Hosmer did the same thing in the minor leagues, entire seasons where he was one of the worst players in the entire minor leagues.
Like alot of people I think Hosmer could reach another level with a better approach. And sometimes that is as easy as just having a fresh set of eyes/brains studying you which he presumably now has.
It also honestly almost defies logic that he can continue to be that inconsistent (3+ wins one year 0 the next). At some poibt it has to normalize a bit?
The problem is that if you like him, what you expect him to do is stabilize at 3+ wins.
We humans are really good at motivated reasoning.
If you think you can keep him at a ~120 wRC+, and have data showing that his lack of range belies the true value of his glovework, it’s easy to convince yourself he’s a 4 win guy.
Hosmer is as likely to be better by being more consistent as Dickerson is by having a higher peak.
The difference is merely sequencing with respect to season end-points.
Since the players have the same median and average (50th percentile) performance levels, and since performance levels are normally distributed: Hosmer’s year-to-year habit of clustering high or low performance is only a sequencing effect different than Dickerson’s mixture of low-and-high performance in given seasons.
One mistake I think a lot of commenters are making is evaluating this deal in a vacuum. The fact is, the Padres have essentially no significant salary commitments outside of Wil Myers, and that money has got to go somewhere. I’m all for efficient spending, but you don’t get a prize for coming in under budget when you’re a baseball team. You can quibble about whether Hosmer was the right person to give this contract to, but there is no reason for the Padres not to give SOMEONE this kind of money given their resources (small market or not, they are still a Major League Baseball team), and in this relatively weak free agent class they must have decided that Hosmer was a better bet to return decent value on a big contract than anyone else they could get. That could turn out to be wrong, but the Jayson Werth contract turned out better than most people thought it would, so you never know. I’m not going to complain about an MLB team deciding to spend some of the piles of money they’ve been saving up (partially at taxpayer expense). Better that than turning teams into debt service instruments like the Mets or Marlins.
You don’t get a prize for coming in under budget. But you know what you do get? An extra $50 million to spend when your team is about to be good. Or average. Or at least mediocre.
Now, most owners probably just pocket the savings. But a smart owner would set that under-budget money aside and use it when they are actually moving up on the win curve.
They should trade for ‘bad contract + prospect’ packages- not sign FAs and lose a pick/int’l money.
It’s a shocking poor deal unless Hosmer is reasonably expected to add fly balls.
Unless, of course, they think that they’re not far away.
Who is offering such a deal? If anyone was entertaining such a move, and I doubt they were, they aren’t now that all the truly exciting free agents are signed. I suppose Arrieta is also “exciting”, but mostly in ways that are not good.
Royals just dodged a huge bullet…now they’ll tank for a while to follow the Astro model. Hopefully it doesn’t take them another thirty years before they contend again.
Maybe the Padres are simply trying to score points with Boras, hoping that he can steer Harper or Bryant their way when they hit free agency.
“This would be silly if the Padres didn’t think they were almost competitive.”
Also, it could just be silly.
By the way, I could think of one possible factor influencing this signing – it puts the Padres in the news and drums up interest and excitement for what would otherwise be a mostly faceless team.
Whether a team is exciting doesn’t necessarily line up with whether the team is good. The Angels, for example, are probably the most exciting team to watch this season, even though they have a rotation held together with gum.
In the same vein, the Hosmer contract makes the Padres more interesting and gives them someone who is recognizable, which is important because the Padres have been entirely irrelevant this decade. With the Hosmer signing, people suddenly remember that the San Diego Padres exist, and as far as big contracts go, it’s not quite as much dead weight as JD Martinez would likely have been, for example. The important thing is that it gets people talking about the Padres for something other than AJ Preller’s medical database or the desiccated remains of Matt Kemp (who himself might have been acquired for the same purpose). It might keep their three fans interested in the team long enough for it to become good, and get people to come to the ballpark quicker – remember how interest in the Astros suffered from years of tanking even as they began to emerge as a contender.
Eric Hosmer was better in 2017 than Anthony Rizzo. Meaning that the top 4 1st baseman are now in the NL. Votto, Goldy, Freeman and Hosmer.
I bet if you polled the 30 GMs and asked them “You can have Hosmer or Rizzo, which would you take?” It would be 30-0…and I think we all know who would win.
The question becomes: In 2026 (the last year of Hosmer’s contract, assuming he doesn’t opt-out) what is more likely? Hosmer is still a starter, or Dave Cameron has ascended to the level of head baseball decision maker of the Padres?
I like that the contract is front loaded. I know hating back loaded deals is irrational,you don’t really pay more for decline years as it is the overall amount what matters and inflation actually helps back loaded contracts but the padres won’t have a high payroll anyway the next years and if they ever choose to spend more they still will be flexible.
I think you are right. The problem with backloaded (or regularly loaded) deals is not the overall money. The problem is that owners either don’t understand or don’t like the concept of “sunk cost.” If Pujols is awful again this year, he needs to be released. But owners hate that because it just “feels” worse than if they had paid the whole amount of the contract over the first 4-5 years of the deal and didn’t owe him anything going forward.
Instead, they traded CJ Cron to make room for Pujols/Otani/Valbuena. Now Cron is no superstar, but he’s worth something and almost certainly better than Pujols now and going forward. So one cost of Pujols’ deal is giving up Cron for a non-prospect.
Let’s assume the contract is $40M underwater. That does not take into account intangibles. That does not take into account being a little more competitive. The goal is to win a championship but it doesn’t have to only be about that.
So Dave drives down Hosmers perceived value then leaves for a team who signs Hosmer mainly because no other team besides KC is interested and gets him at lower than predicted AAV even without considering the premium one must pay for theninfavorable tax situation For a player on a California team in the NL West
Interesting
Not defending the deal, but the Matt Adams comp by Cameron is a bit flippant. Adams is Hosmer, if Hosmer was abysmal against lefties. Their overall wRC+ similarities is a result of major selection bias.
wRC+ Against Lefties, career:
Adams: 58
Hosmer: 83
wRC+ Against Righties, career:
Adams: 123
Hosmer: 123
You could platoon Adams with a righty 1B to build-your-own-Hosmer for cheap, but that costs you a bench spot.
It’s definitely a significant difference, but they’re still similar in that neither should ever play against lefties. Hosmer won’t hurt you nearly as much as Adams, obviously, but an 83 wRC+ in the split from a 1B is still unplayably bad.
Is the opt-out a player or team opt out ( or either ) ?
By ZIPS, Hosmer makes SD worse right away.
ZIPS projects Hosmer at 1.7 WAR/600 (1.9 WAR in 654 PAs).
Here are the players SD already had at 1B/LF/RF:
1B Wil Myers: 3.0 WAR/600
LF Jose Pirela, by comparison, is projected for 2.1 WAR/600,
RF Hunter Renfroe: 2.0 WAR/600
Hosmer bumps one of these guys to a lesser role or position switch.
The plan may be to move Pirela to 2B- but he’s been terrible there, and hasn’t played 60 games there since 2014. He posted 2.1 WAR and 122 RC+ last year in 344 PA, after mashing 160 RC+ at AAA in 201 PAs. Urias already projects to be average at 2B, so Pirela going to 2B would have limited upside or longterm utility.
Jeff already wrote a great piece on how OF Franchy Cordero could be an elite power/speed combo- he projects for 1.6 WAR/600. KATOH identified Franmil Reyes (projects for 1.1 WAR/600). Even Alex Dickerson projects for 1.0 WAR/600, posting a 126 RC+ at all 8 of his minor league stops, with a respectable 110 RC+ and 0.7 WAR in 285 major-league PA last year (1.5 WAR/600 rate).
SD actually has a handful of 1-2 WAR/600 players- Asuaje, Spandenberg, and Villanueva all project 1.2 WAR/600 or better and stand to lose some supplemental PA opportunities due to the Hosmer addition.
To be fair, Steamer is more bullish on Hosmer (2.3 WAR/600) and bearish on nearly all the Padres players I’ve mentioned above.
Still it’s notable that the ZIPS forecast for SD will likely decrease a tad with the Hosmer addition- even when adding up the cumulative value of improving the bench (as Hosmer merely bumps Pirela, Renfroe or Asuaje to the bench, in turn bumping Cordero, Reyes, Spandenberg or Villanuev to AAA- the decreased starter production (~0.2 WAR) being similar to the increased bench production).
SD is a bottom 4 projected team that spent $144m to lower their ZIPS projection, while giving up a pick/int’l pool money and blocking some of their moderately interesting break-through candidates.
Why does a team always have to be either “going for it” or “rebuilding”??? There are other factors in play too…you can’t have an entire team full of no-name prospects and Hosmer’s youth is something worthwhile. They now have a true face-of-the franchise, which hasn’t existed in San Diego for a long time, and they have 5-years before the opt-out to try to build something around him. I mean, seriously, look at the last 5-years of all-stars:
Brad Hand 2017
Wil Myers 2016
Drew Pomeranz 2016
Justin Upton 2015
Tyson Ross 2014
Huston Street 2014
Everth Cabrera 2013
Huston Street 2012
Compared to basically every other team in baseball, this is a pretty motley group. You’ve got 2 closers and 2 decent, but not great starting pitchers. These aren’t voted on but guys that had to be put on the All Star roster to meet the 1-player from each team requirement. Seriously though, Will Myers is the closest thing the Padres have had to a face-of-the franchise type player since Adrian Gonzalez. Let’s try to step back from the numbers from time to time and consider bigger picture aspects of the game too.
A lot of the disagreement on Hosmer comes from defense. So-called advanced metrics see one thing and they continue to try to improve from the old buckets and bins and pizza slices days while the eyeballs see that the Royals play a lot of prevent defense on the lines and that Hosmer, with his length and agility, elevated Escobar and Moustakas to near Gold Glove levels with his ability to turn a throwing error into an out and by giving the confidence to his SS and 3B to make throws they’ld never try to Billy Butler.
The padres think their window starts to open in 2019. That might be optimistic, betting on guys coming in and immediately contributing in the big leagues, but they will add Tatis and Urias at some point in 2018 or the beginning of 2019. That will leave them in desperate need of LHBs and the best place to put them at either corner OF/1B or SS/3B depending on where Myers and Tatis play.
By 2019 they will have so many interesting SP options with more on the horizon that it doesn’t make sense for them to spend money on a free agent SP. They are better off seeing what they have in the young dudes. A SP would block prospects better than those blocked by Hosmer.
Hosmer helps the team 2019-2022 as much as any free agent they could have signed this year or next. They have 2018 to try get more loft in his game and allow him to settle in as a team leader, which they obviously value. It also allows Myers to get comfortable in the corner OF again.
As far as the value of the contract goes it is not unreasonable for the padres to expect him to add closer to 3.5-4 wins/year the next few than the Steamer projected 2.8. I imagine they have a better way to evaluate first base defense than UZR. I would bet scouting does a much better job on that front than the advanced defensive metrics. There’s just so much that is missed by UZR when it comes to first base defense. Adrian Gonzalez was fantastic in the field for the Padres and had a negative UZR 3/5 years, the same as Hosmer’s last 5.
It’s not crazy to think the Padres could contend in Years 4-5 of this deal. Personally, I applaud the Padres for still spending some decent money and not completely tanking while they rebuild.