The Shortage of Reliable Pitchers Is Worse Than You Think

Pitching! Everyone’s concerned with pitching this postseason, and for good reason. Pitchers are always getting hurt. They don’t throw as many innings as they used to. Even good teams, rich teams like the Mets and Dodgers, are throwing de facto bullpen games deep in the playoffs. And leaving a starting pitcher in past his 18th hitter risks invoking the wrath of the dreaded third-time-through-the-order penalty.
Remember Tanner Bibee? He’s a really good starting pitcher; he had a 3.47 ERA in 31 starts for the Guardians this year. In Game 5 of the ALCS, two trips through the Yankees order got Bibee five scoreless innings. But when manager Stephen Vogt brought Bibee out for a sixth, it was like he’d ordered a punt on fourth-and-short from inside the opponent’s 40-yard line. And sure enough, Bibee allowed three hits to his last four opponents, the last of them a game-tying home run.
And yet, when it came time to evaluate Vogt, Ben Clemens — who was not particularly high on the rookie manager’s tactics throughout the postseason — wrote that extending Bibee was preferable to leaning on a bullpen that had already spit the bit:
“[T]he bullpen was shot. [Cade] Smith was up to eight appearances in nine games. So was [Tim] Herrin. [Emmanuel] Clase had gotten shelled two nights in a row… Bibee came out strong and took a 2-0 lead into the sixth. Vogt had used his bullpen so aggressively and frequently that he really had no choice but to let Bibee face the big boppers a third time.”
On Monday, Jay Jaffe wrote about the state of postseason starting pitching. In short: There’s less of it than normal. When they’ve stayed in the game, the starters have been decent, but there’s been an early hook.
The reason for this is at least somewhat circumstantial. Among the four teams to reach the LCS, Tyler Glasnow, Emmet Sheehan, Clayton Kershaw, Dustin May (I promise there’s a non-Dodger on here eventually), Gavin Stone, Tony Gonsolin, and Shane Bieber are all out with long-term injuries. Kodai Senga, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Alex Cobb, and (I’d argue) Walker Buehler were all limited to some extent by previous injuries. The same goes for Nestor Cortes if he makes the Yankees’ World Series roster. The Royals, Phillies, and Astros — all teams that stockpiled starters — got knocked out early. The Mariners, Diamondbacks, and Rangers — who did the same — missed the playoffs altogether.
So it makes sense that bullpens would have to pick up more of the slack this postseason. Here, have a graph.

It’s a bit uncomfortable to look at. (In all kinds of relief, you never want to cross the streams.) At the turn of the century, starters carried just under two-thirds of the playoff workload. On a per-game basis, that shakes out to six innings for the starter, and three for the bullpen. I imagine that, like, Warren Spahn is relieved he didn’t live long enough to see the postseason starter’s role shrink as much as it has, but ask any baseball fan born after, say, 1975, and they’ll tell you a 2-to-1 starter-to-reliever workload ratio is how the game is supposed to work.
So, like a relief pitcher, I’ll pick up the torch from Jay and try to get this examination of pitcher usage over the line. And I hope I do a better job than this year’s playoff relievers have, because things are pretty grim.
Back in 2015, the Kansas City Royals figured out that a team with a pretty average offense and rotation could cakewalk to a World Series title if it had four knockout high-leverage relievers. The next year, Terry Francona discovered Andrew Miller, and ever since then it seems like playoff teams have leaned on their bullpens more and more.
In a couple instances — most notably Miller in 2016 and Houston’s Will Harris in 2019 — a relief ace carried his team to the verge of a title. But a max-effort reliever can only pitch every day for so long before he runs out of gas. Bad news: Both Miller and Harris ran out of gas in Game 7 of the World Series.
Last October, Ben Lindbergh of The Ringer wrote an article publicizing research by David Gordon and Cameron Grove; that research pointed to the existence of a repeat reliever penalty. The idea behind this theory is that, just as hitters tend to figure out a starting pitcher given multiple looks in a game, they’ll also figure out a one-inning reliever if they face him three or more times in a short series.
Barring something outlandish happening in the World Series, my enduring memory of this postseason is going to be of the best relievers in the league getting pantsed in high-leverage situations. Just one All-Star after another giving up dingers upon nukes upon tanks with the season on the line. I’m going to quantify this effect later, but I wanted to signpost it up here because, on the surface, it makes no sense.
Like, nobody hit Jeff Hoffman or Devin Williams or Emmanuel Clase this regular season, and yet all of them turned into pumpkins in the playoffs. It beggars belief. There must be some rational explanation, and a combination of fatigue and the repeat reliever penalty must be to blame.
Mike Petriello, MLB.com’s resident brain-in-a-jar, is not so certain. Mike’s a smart guy; I know this because he and I once won SABR research awards on the same day. He not only figured out that the repeat reliever effect is historically finicky, but that it’s reliant on a small sample of data. So small, in fact, that it’s not too difficult to go through each individual datum to look for confounding variables.
And he found one: High-leverage relievers don’t actually see the same hitters three times in a series very often. In the NLCS, there were 21 instances of a Mets hitter getting a third look at a Dodgers reliever; 14 of those came with Brent Honeywell on the mound. Honeywell is Dave Roberts’ mopup guy, and in a six-game series composed entirely of blowouts, he got a ton of work. More to the point, nobody gives a damn what happens when Honeywell is on the mound, because by the time he enters the game, the outcome has already been decided.
Either way, the repeat reliever penalty can’t explain… well, any, really, of this postseason’s biggest reliever meltdowns. There have been six relief appearances this postseason in which a pitcher posted a WPA of -.500 or worse. And they tended to come early in the series, not later.
| Player | Team | Opponent | Round | Game | WPA | Appearance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Devin Williams | MIL | NYM | NLWC | 3 | -0.843 | Second |
| Phil Maton | NYM | MIL | NLWC | 2 | -0.615 | First |
| Emmanuel Clase | CLE | NYY | ALCS | 3 | -0.608 | First |
| Jeff Hoffman | PHI | NYM | NLDS | 1 | -0.514 | First |
| Edwin Díaz | NYM | PHI | NLDS | 2 | -0.507 | First |
| Jackson Jobe | DET | HOU | ALWC | 2 | -0.500 | First |
I’m entirely open to the idea of a repeat reliever penalty in the abstract. I just don’t think that’s what’s happening here.
Mike points out in his article that overall reliever performance this postseason has been within historical bounds; the leaguewide reliever ERA, opponent SLG, and opponent OPS are all within a few points of the averages from 2016 to 2023. And on the whole, starters and relievers have been similarly effective this postseason.
| Role | K-BB% | AVG | WHIP | ERA | FIP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Starters | 13.7% | .242 | 1.30 | 4.12 | 4.10 |
| Relievers | 12.6% | .218 | 1.30 | 3.73 | 4.34 |
That’s worth remembering, but I’m interested in a slightly different question. You might think relievers ought to be way out in front of starters, but again, not all relief situations are created equal, and nobody cares how many runs Brent Honeywell gives up.
On the other hand, they care deeply how many runs the high-leverage guys give up.
We’ve still got one round to go, so this could still change. But as it stands, 2024 is the worst postseason for relievers, by WPA, since 1986. What’s so special about that postseason? Well, in the NLCS, the Astros’ bullpen got tagged for two walk-off losses and ended the season by getting beat in 16 innings in Game 6. Nobody remembers this because it came in the same season as two of the most famous bed-encrappenings by any bullpen in the history of baseball: Dave Henderson’s three-run home run off Donnie Moore in Game 5 of the ALCS and Boston’s five-alarm meltdown in Game 6 of the World Series, which was likely lost irrespective of Bill Buckner’s lackluster hip mobility.
So yeah, that’s how bad things are right now.
As the importance of elite relief performance — and elite relief depth — became important in the mid-2010s, teams have rejected, or at least updated, the doctrine that reliever quality is volatile and that chasing it is a waste of resources. You might be able to get away with throwing some unpolished fastball-slider guy in a high-leverage situation, but it’s much better to have some studs back there. Remember how dominant the Astros bullpen was in 2022, and how easy their World Series title looked as a result?
Here, we return to the idea of the best relievers in baseball getting completely torched. I thought this was just a case of me remembering the outliers. I was at the first two games of the Mets-Phillies NLDS, which included three blown saves by relievers who have made an All-Star team in the past three seasons. Plus the worst week of Clase’s life, plus the Pete Alonso dinger off Williams that flipped the Wild Card series.
Turns out, that’s a pretty common occurrence this postseason. Here are the top 20 relievers who appeared in at least one game this postseason, sorted by regular season WAR. The names highlighted in gold appeared in at least two-thirds of their teams’ games. The cells highlighted in red are postseason WPA marks of -0.30 or worse. Half of these elite relievers posted a negative WPA this postseason, and 14 of them have a K-BB% ratio worse than what they posted in the regular season.
| Regular Season | Postseason | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Team | WAR | WPA | K-BB% | ERA | G | IP | WPA | K-BB% | ERA |
| Cade Smith | CLE | 2.7 | 3.04 | 29.8% | 1.91 | 9 | 10 | 0.13 | 37.8% | 3.60 |
| Emmanuel Clase | CLE | 2.3 | 6.40 | 20.7% | 0.61 | 7 | 8 | -0.85 | 18.4% | 9.00 |
| Matt Strahm | PHI | 2.1 | 1.20 | 28.7% | 1.87 | 3 | 2 | -0.44 | 10.0% | 18.00 |
| Jeff Hoffman | PHI | 2.1 | 2.47 | 27.5% | 2.17 | 3 | 1 1/3 | -0.52 | -10.0% | 40.50 |
| Joe Jiménez | ATL | 1.8 | 1.49 | 21.3% | 2.62 | 1 | 1 1/3 | 0.03 | 0.0% | 0.00 |
| Lucas Erceg | KCR | 1.7 | 1.16 | 22.1% | 3.36 | 5 | 6 | 0.58 | 12.5% | 3.00 |
| Tanner Scott | SDP | 1.6 | 3.27 | 16.3% | 1.75 | 5 | 4 1/3 | 0.18 | 29.4% | 0.00 |
| Jeremiah Estrada | SDP | 1.6 | 0.38 | 28.2% | 2.95 | 4 | 4 1/3 | -0.19 | 21.1% | 0.00 |
| Hunter Gaddis | CLE | 1.6 | 2.44 | 18.7% | 1.57 | 8 | 7 1/3 | -0.51 | 19.4% | 4.91 |
| Orion Kerkering | PHI | 1.5 | 0.96 | 23.2% | 2.36 | 4 | 3 2/3 | -0.22 | 17.6% | 2.45 |
| Keegan Akin | BAL | 1.4 | -0.35 | 24.9% | 3.32 | 1 | 2/3 | 0.03 | -33.3% | 0.00 |
| Jason Adam | SDP | 1.3 | 2.62 | 20.6% | 1.95 | 5 | 5 1/3 | 0.12 | 30.0% | 3.38 |
| Clay Holmes | NYY | 1.2 | -1.55 | 17.0% | 3.14 | 8 | 7 2/3 | -0.10 | 9.4% | 3.52 |
| Carlos Estévez | PHI | 1.2 | 2.21 | 17.9% | 2.45 | 3 | 2 2/3 | -0.31 | 25.0% | 3.38 |
| Mark Leiter Jr. | NYY | 1.1 | 0.58 | 25.0% | 4.50 | 2 | 2 1/3 | 0.02 | -8.3% | 3.86 |
| Adrian Morejon | SDP | 1.1 | 1.00 | 18.4% | 2.83 | 2 | 2 1/3 | -0.08 | -10.0% | 3.86 |
| Will Vest | DET | 1.1 | 0.23 | 15.6% | 2.82 | 6 | 6 | 0.23 | 40.9% | 1.50 |
| John Schreiber | KCR | 1.1 | 1.54 | 11.6% | 3.66 | 5 | 3 2/3 | 0.27 | 0.0% | 0.00 |
| Aaron Bummer | ATL | 1.1 | -0.44 | 20.9% | 3.58 | 1 | 2 2/3 | 0.07 | 0.0% | 0.00 |
| Edwin Díaz | NYM | 1.1 | -0.07 | 29.6% | 3.52 | 6 | 8 2/3 | -0.33 | 16.2% | 3.12 |
Also, notice who’s not on this list: Williams, who was hurt half the year but would be near the top of any list of the best closers in the game. Or Josh Hader and Ryan Pressly, who conspired to allow four runs in the eighth inning of Game 1 of the AL Wild Card series, putting Detroit on the path to an upset win.
Overall, relievers have been fine. Except when it counts most.
This postseason, there have been 47 relief appearances with an average leverage index (aLI) of 1.75 or higher. And generally, the guys who have pitched in those situations have been the players you’d want there; 38 of those 47 appearances have been executed by a pitcher who produced at least 1.0 WAR this season, had an ERA under 3.00 or both.
In those high-leverage situations, the best pitchers in the league have been absolutely horrendous. Here’s how those relievers compared to relief pitchers in comparable circumstances in two previous seasons: 1986, the nadir of playoff relief pitching, and 2015, the last season in which relievers accounted for less than 40% of the postseason innings total.
| Year | G | IP | WPA | aLI | ERA | Opp. OBP | K% | BB% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | 17 | 29 | -2.61 | 3.26 | 4.66 | .348 | 17.4 | 12.1 |
| 2015 | 45 | 47 | 0.117 | 2.48 | 3.83 | .346 | 24.5 | 10.6 |
| 2024 | 47 | 41 2/3 | -2.03 | 2.61 | 7.13 | .440 | 21.6 | 16.1 |
The best teams in the league are built to get the ball to world-class relief pitchers when the game is on the line. And time and time again, those elite relievers are going to pieces. Except for the Dodgers and Yankees, which I guess is why those two teams are in the World Series.
Even if it’s not directly attributable to fatigue or the repeat reliever effect, I think we’ve reached yet another historical inflection point. The paucity of healthy and effective starting pitchers had led to a massive overreliance on relief pitchers; turns out we’re running low on those too. A decade ago, the Royals won a World Series because they built the entire bullpen out of unhittable relievers. Now there’s no such thing.
Michael is a writer at FanGraphs. Previously, he was a staff writer at The Ringer and D1Baseball, and his work has appeared at Grantland, Baseball Prospectus, The Atlantic, ESPN.com, and various ill-remembered Phillies blogs. Follow him on Twitter, if you must, @MichaelBaumann.
Relievers are fickle and the playoffs are a crapshoot. But hey, atleast we get Yanks vs Dodgers.
I wonder if expanding the league would help or hurt with this. If lineups are less deep, then top end pitchers would be able to go more innings with less of a risk. If bullpens are less deep as well, this incentivizes leaving in your best pitchers for more innings.
But, more bottom-end pitchers would have to throw. So it might have the opposite effect.
It would hurt. A big part of the offensive explosion of the “PED era” was just the effect of expanding twice within a decade on the pitching pool.
There’s not enough pitching to go around now because the injury rates are so high. Expansion basically requires us to figure out a way to reduce injury rates among pitchers so that there’s enough to support two more teams.
I do wonder if the average pitcher and hitter is a lot stronger now than 30 or 40 years ago. So pitchers throw a lot more max effort pitches, because they don’t just want to save them for the top of the order guys. And pitchers are injured more often because they reach their breaking point before hitters do.
Expansion is occasionally touted as a solution to the endless parade of short-burst relievers, but this postseason it definitely feels like if we had expansion, we would just get a bunch of shittier short-burst relievers, not a return to starters and/or longmen.
It just depends on how teams react. If Cleveland had a worse bullpen, and the average hitter was worse, would they leave Boyd and Bibee in longer? As the replacement player gets worse, there will eventually be a point at which the replacement reliever is worse than the three-times through the order penalty.
Even with the expansion draft, while the average hitter would get worse league wide, you would mostly see a wider range of skill. The quality of the best playoff lineups would not be noticeably worse after a season or so, and it wouldn’t have any real impact on playoff decision making in that regard
Yes, it’d be easier in the regular season. But the best teams won’t lose that much, and they’ll refill their expansion draft losses quickly.
The pitching will be the problem
Teams quite routinely use 50+ pitchers in a season now. Even 10 years ago that number was significantly lower. There’s effectively no limit on how many backup arms you can get now.
Expanding means taking the next 100-110 dudes who can’t get into MLB even when teams use so many relievers and having them pitch a lot of innings (two teams x 162)
There’s a reason that the last expansion created not just the awful 1998-2005 Rays but the incredible 1998-2005 Yankees in that same division. You create more stratification by widening the talent spread.
Good teams aren’t gonna handle pitchers differently. They still want to win, and the bad teams won’t pay for the extra arms any more than they do today
“Teams quite routinely use 50+ pitchers in a season now.”
I agree with your overall point, but that’s exaggerated.
Record is 42 (by the 2019 Mariners), and this year’s Dodgers came very close to that.
It depends on the objective. My personal preference would be less max effort pitching to maximize short term results, and more emphasis on keeping pitchers healthy. Almost no one in a position to make this happen agrees with this
I think this might be a little too either/or. I bet a substantial number of people in front offices, for instance, would love to see things change so that preservation of pitcher health and what’s most effective to win games weren’t nearly directly opposite of each other.
MLB needs to look for things that they can do via rules changes that make this come true – more difficulty/greater penalty in the various roster-juggling shenanigans and injury list placements, and probably in-game benefits that could give starting pitchers more run prevention advantages, and therefore give you reasons to want a starter to go deep into a game.
Its the job of front offices to pursue winning. We generally get angry when they don’t do that (tanking, low payroll profit skimming, etc). Its the job of MLB as an organization, and the MLBPA, to tweak the game’s rules so that preserving player health is a winning choice and not a losing one.
It would take some experimenting, but I do think its possible.
I’m not sold that “more difficulty/greater penalty in the various roster-juggling shenanigans and injury list placements” would be a positive for pitcher health.
Maybe it would incentivize having pitchers adjust from a max effort approach to reduce injuries.
I think it’s equally plausible, though, that it would just impede load management strategies and lead to more injuries due to fatigued pitchers who are more often pitching through minor ailments.
Long term loosing while healthy doesn’t help anyone
but the healthy well paid pitcher
Sad, but true. You have to impose a cost on them for burning out what they see as a standing reserve of guys that can throw 97+ for an inning. Don’t know the solution: require starters to go 5? Limit the number of pitchers per game? Have all players accrue days of MLB service while on the 40 man? Those change the cost equation…
I am sure the Dodgers, Mets, and Yankees would field nearly identical teams with those checkbooks. So expansion takes talent mostly from everyone else. The expansion teams themselves would not be in large markets unless you put them in Newark (NY Area) or Mexico City. I doubt the first is possible. The second requires a political shift in the country we may not be ready for. So it wont happen easily either. So the Pirates get worse and the dodgers remain the same. Ugh!
As someone who reads every box score, my impression is that when Clase pitched in the regular season it was almost always in the 9th inning. And it was only in ONE inning. That was not the case recently.
The Dodgers and Yankees have both had reliever issues in the postseason as well, they’ve just managed fewer?
3/4 of the Dodgers’ losses this postseason were due to performances from their starting pitchers that were either below-average or awful. The other was a bullpen game where Landon Knack got rocked and Roberts decided to punt the game by leaving him in to eat innings. LA’s bullpen is what got them here.
Similarly, outside of the meltdown in G3 of the ALCS (which followed 4.1 innings of 1-run ball from the bullpen, it should be noted) the Yankees’ relief corps have also been a major plus. The Guardians lost because they relied on their bullpen and it failed them; the Dodgers won because they relied on their bullpen and it delivered. Baseball.
I broke this down elsewhere, but the core trusted relievers in the Dodger bullpen (eg not Knack/Honeywell) have combined for 8 runs in 50 IP, while the Dodgers as a whole have allowed 47 in 97 IP. You can do the math about the rest of the staff (though Honeywell’s runs in particular shouldnt be held against him, since he just pitched mop-up duty in a lost game and they were very happy with him for doing so).
Yes, Honeywell is the unsung hero for the Dodgers in NLCS Gm5. Eating 4.2 innings, while also generating enough offence to force the Mets to use three (four, if we count Peterson) relatively high leverage relievers in a blowout win was a major consolation prize that paid off in the end.
I mean I think the Mets also just had to use those guys, evidenced by Diaz pitching when the score was like 9-2. The Mets were in an elimination situation and you cannot take risks and hold guys back in that spot with a travel day following.
Honeywell sparing everyone else was great and it’s even better that it was so directly recognized both in his own dugout and in the telecast, but I think that the Mets basically have to pitch their best guys in that game until the gap is so big that position players are pitching for the Dodgers.
Elimination game for the Mets, of course. Mets were up 5 runs when Diaz came in, which was start of 8th inning. Ohtani and Betts were due up 2nd and 3rd that inning. And Diaz had last pitched in Game 2, so he’d had 3 days off prior to entering Game 5. And Mets had already used Stanek for 2.1 innings.
Even if Diaz didn’t start off the 8th inning, I’d say he’s a lock to enter the inning if 2 baserunners reach. So I agree it’s very reasonable to just to let him start the 8th inning given all the factors involved.
I really dislike the “punt the game” narrative about the Dodgers’ early game pitching decision-making in Game 2 of the NLCS. It’s at best an oversimplification. What Roberts *didn’t* do was get really aggressive on using higher-leverage bullpen arms at a very early point (2nd inning) of a planned bullpen game.
Knack was pitching the top of the 2nd inning, after Brasier had pitched the 1st inning. Brasier allowed 1 run in the first.
Knack had allowed 1-run to that point in the 2nd, so score was 2-0 Mets. Situation was 2 outs, runners on 2nd and 3rd, Lindor due up. Intentionally walked him, and the RH pitching Knack was facing the RH hitting Vientos. And Vientos hit a grand slam (after initially falling behind 1-2 in the count, btw).
After that point, with a 6-0 game, Roberts stuck with using low leverage arms for the rest of the game, including letting Knack pitch the 3rd. The low leverage arms actually got good run suppression results after that point, btw: 1 run allowed over 7 innings (in the 9th). Closest the Dodgers got was a 3-run deficit after 6 innings, which Roberts didn’t deem close enough to use higher leverage arms in Game 2 of a series where the Dodgers had won Game 1.
In an elimination game, I’m sure most managers would pull Knack in the 2nd to go to a higher leverage bullpen arm. So, as I wrote earlier, Roberts wasn’t going with the most aggressive strategic option.
But, the “punt” phrasing relies on after the fact knowledge of the outcome of a probabilistic situation. The Dodgers got the worst outcome possible for them, but the most likely result was that Knack retired Vientos to end the inning.
There’s a spectrum of decisions on overall pitcher usage in a game between “punt” and “hyper aggressive”, and that’s how Roberts acted in Game 2.
It’s a very boring an unsatisfying answer, but I just don’t think post-season sample size is large enough to draw definitive conclusions about much of anything. The regular season is different and we have better sampling, but … the regular season is different and managers run their bullpens in the post season in ways that they didn’t a month prior.
There’s just too much noise in the signal
Yeah, we’d need to see several post-seasons in a row with the same trend before I’d think there was something behind it.
It is boring, and it’s probably right. Every year we try to make sense of whatever’s happening that year, and next year will be different. There have been 38 games played so far in the postseason. During the regular season Fangraphs would never have a story like “How should front offices permanently adjust to what’s happened over the last 2 1/2 days?”
Plus you can definitely manage differently knowing there’s apparently 3 weeks or so between the end of the championship series and the start of the World Series
This undersells just how ludicrously bad the bullpens were in ’86. The WPA that the league’s bullpens put together in the two round format that year? -3.40. This season is currently -1.24 (a hair above 2009’s -1.23).
Only 10 of the 38 seasons in that list finished negatively.
I watched every inning of that postseason in 1986. I got emotional watching Donnie Moore and his reaction. I could absolutely feel his pain! Although, clearly not as deeply as he did.
I watched the Pittsburgh bullpen implode repeatedly this year. The industry is definitely short on quality relief pitching too.
Shout out to Tanner Bibee being in two articles in one week, when his team didn’t make the World Series.
Maybe these relievers just aren’t that good. Of the ones in red, only Clase and Diaz were ever considered air tight at any point in their careers, and Diaz wasn’t himself all season. I may have missed someone but most of them seem to have been unexceptional until 2024
Another thought I had is depth of scouting. In the regular season, you might not take too much time to go really deep on the back end of a bullpen of a team you’ll face one series. In the post season, you may spend a lot more time focusing on how to hit Clase’s cutter, for example. In the regular season the Yankees might have seen him once, so the value is better spent focusing on whatever starter is thrown out there; post season you’ll likely see him multiple times in very important situations.
Plus the hitters can take BP off pitching machines that are able to mimic the movement of specific pitches so they can get a couple dozen hacks at a 100mph cutter to prepare better.
I wonder how much is teams doing far more research into relievers in the post-season vs regular season – with each game meaning so much the focus has to skyrocket. Same with players being more willing to listen. In the regular season they might be more willing to go on instinct and personal knowledge vs playoffs when one PA might be the difference being a ring and going home.
Is the simpler explanation just that relief pitchers are more exhausted than before? I know we don’t have the biometric data to bear that out (unless velo + spin rate + release consistency could proxy), but … I imagine the combo of
Could do a doozy on postseason reliever success? This wouldn’t totally explain why it happened so badly this year, but some of it can be variance and some of it can be trend. The pitch clock at least is new, and perhaps there is a compounding effect over many seasons of higher effort, as the league graduates pitchers who were selected to be good-even-with-less-effort and more of the reliever population is dependent on max effort (which may in turn depend on rest, either between games or between seasons).
The Cleveland Big 4 certainly pitched a lot this regular season: 74 to 78 appearances for each of them.
As long as there is no prescription for getting rid of the pitch clock in the postseason, it’s a solution in search of a problem. No one wants to return to 4.5-hour affairs that end at 1 AM on the east coast.
(luckily, I don’t think that horse is going back in the barn)
It’s notable that the ratio of High-Leverage Relief Performances for games to innings pitched is 2x higher in 1986 vs 2024, the starters must have really been quite poor that October.
I don’t know, but that Yankee Team and that Dodger team have some pretty elite hitters. Guys well above the norm. They stress dudes more than most. That must matter for some of this.
Well written and argued. Thank you. Most teams will continue to rely on relievers because it’s less expensive to do so…as long as maximum effort on each pitch is king, better to blow out the arms of those who are “unreliable” from year to year anyway (sigh).