The White Sox’ Big Bets On Risk
On Tuesday, the White Sox completed their latest trade, sending Todd Frazier, David Robertson, and Tommy Kahnle to New York for a trio of prospects and Tyler Clippard, who was included as a salary offset. In the span of four major trades, the team added 15 minor leaguers, including most of their best-ranked prospects now. And when you look at where these guys rank on the Baseball America mid-season Top 100, it’s easy to see why White Sox fans are excited about the organization’s now-bright future.
| BA Rank | Pre-Season Rank | Player | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | Yoan Moncada | 2B |
| 5 | 11 | Eloy Jimenez | OF |
| 20 | 24 | Michael Kopech | SP |
| 36 | 37 | Blake Rutherford | OF |
| 59 | 23 | Reynaldo Lopez | SP |
| 75 | 40 | Lucas Giolito | SP |
| 83 | 90 | Dylan Cease | SP |
That’s seven Top 100 guys, and by BA’s pre-season rankings, seven top 40 guys. The Braves are the only other team to even put seven guys in the top 100, much less trading for seven top 100 guys in the span of eight months. And we’re not even including international signing Luis Robert, who BA ranked 45th. Throw him into the mix and the White Sox basically created an elite farm system from scratch in less than a year.
Rick Hahn deserves a lot of credit for the moves he’s made in rebuilding the White Sox, and the team certainly has a brighter future now than they did at the end of last year. That said, there’s also a pretty clear pattern emerging among the guys the White Sox have acquired; the perceived upside outstrips the actual performance record right now. Put simply, the White Sox have repeatedly bet on guys whose hype isn’t quite yet supported by actual performance.
Let’s take a look at those same prospects again, only instead of looking at BA’s rankings, let’s look at how they rate by Chris Mitchell’s KATOH system, which is based solely on a player’s performance record. We’ll also include their KATOH+ ratings, which adds in BA’s rankings for an attempt at a holistic stats-and-scouting blend.
| Player | KATOH | KATOH Top 100 | KATOH+ | KATOH+ Top 100 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yoan Moncada | 8.6 | 20 | 15.6 | 3 |
| Eloy Jimenez | 4.7 | 87 | 11.5 | 12 |
| Michael Kopech | 3.2 | 5.1 | 60 | |
| Lucas Giolito | 3.8 | 4.3 | 80 | |
| Dylan Cease | 2.2 | 2.7 | ||
| Blake Rutherford | 1.0 | 2.7 | ||
| Reynaldo Lopez | 2.1 | 2.6 |
For every one of the main pieces returned in the team’s four big trades, the stats-only version of KATOH is lower than the KATOH+ version, which incorporates BA’s rankings. And not in small ways. Based solely on their performance data to this point, Moncada and Jimenez project to produce about half of the value compared to when you include their BA rankings. And Rutherford stands out as the biggest outlier of all, ranking as a top-tier prospect in both the pre-season and mid-season BA lists, but grading out as a fringe prospect at best by his actual performance record to this point.
Of course, stats-only models are ignoring hugely important factors in a player’s development, and no one should look at KATOH’s numbers and think those are the right ones. Performance record is important, but it’s definitely not everything, and you’re always better off including as much good information as you can, which is why KATOH+ will do a better job of projecting players than the stats-only model.
But it’s also not a coincidence that these were the guys who weren’t off limits in negotiations. While it’s not like the Red Sox were eager to give up Yoan Moncada, his performance — specifically his contact rate — raised some red flags, and made him a bit more of an offensive question mark that the usual type of players who are rated as the best overall prospect in the game. The upside is obvious, but as Chris Mitchell noted this morning, the bust potential here is also high enough that KATOH isn’t quite as high on him as everyone else.
The same is true of Jimenez and Rutherford, both of whom project as corner outfielders, and will have to hit really well to be legitimate stars in the big leagues. Jimenez is doing actual damage against low-minors pitchers, but Rutherford isn’t yet showing much power, and both of these guys are basically nothing if they don’t hit. And the history of guys who have to hit in order to be valuable big leaguers is strewn with top prospects who didn’t pan out. Again, plenty of risk here.
Then there are the arms. Michael Kopech still has serious control problems. Reynoldo Lopez still doesn’t miss as many bats as you’d like from a guy with his stuff. Giolito has started getting strikeouts lately, but his walk rate is too high, and he’s still giving up home runs. Thanks to Tommy John surgery slowing down his career, Cease is still in low-A ball at 21, and like all these other guys, walks too many hitters right now.
These seven guys all have really impressive physical tools, but they also each have pretty significant flaws at the moment, most of them revolving around the strike zone. Certainly, these guys can improve from what they currently are, but part of the reason the White Sox were able to acquire all these guys is that their development is anything but guaranteed. Rick Hahn prioritized upside in his acquisitions, and while he’s done a great job picking up guys that have obviously high ceilings, we also shouldn’t be surprised when most of these guys don’t make it.
Obviously, there are risks with every prospect, and saying that a bunch of them are going to fail isn’t breaking news. But it’s notable that the White Sox have landed risky prospects even by prospect standards, and the performance records of the guys Hahn has been acquiring don’t yet match up with their prospect rankings. For these deals to work out as well as the White Sox hope, their player development system is going to have to take some raw materials and turn them into polished big leaguers.
The White Sox system is now very strong, and their future is bright. But it’s pretty clear that Hahn has targeted upside over performance in trades, and that means he’s had to accept a lot of risk to get these returns. Pretty soon, the White Sox might want to start adding some guys who have a bit lower ceilings but better chances of turning into Major Leaguers, because as this teardown shows, having a few stars surrounded by a bunch of busts doesn’t really equal a winner.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
All prospects are risky, and I think looking for the elite level talents is just as safe as looking for high floor/low ceiling players.
As for as the pitching goes; I feel the organization is confident in their ability to develop arms and keep them healthy which leads to the stuff vs non-stuff argument for their trades.
edit: I also think their big acquisitions get a little more publicity but someone like Dunning and Hansen are more revered in the organization than out of it. Hansen has elite stuff and the Sox have greatly helped his command in one season in the organization and Dunning might be the steal of the Eaton trade. I also think someone like Mendick might be a solid big leaguer without all the fanfare, and Guerrero can be a consistent back of the rotation arm. They have a few safer bets in their system, they just rank behind the guys with star potential.
It’s a well-established fact that the White Sox are amazing at developing pitching and preventing injury.
Posted by another guy in this comment chain, but will bump it to the top because you refuse to accept that they keep arms healthier with their pitching program:
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/01/chicago-white-sox-mlb-injury-prevention-disabled-list-days
“Here’s what we know: Since 2005, teams have seen at least four members of their pitching rotations make 30 starts apiece in a single season a total of 30 times. Twelve organizations have never done it at all in that span. Of the remaining 18 Major League teams, only one franchise has had four starting pitchers remain healthy and effective enough to stay in its rotation more than twice since 2005: The Chicago White Sox, who have done it five times.
And there’s way more. In a must-read post to The Hardball Times last month, Jeff Zimmermann looked at every team’s total days spent on the disabled list. Not only did White Sox players miss by far the least time with injury in the 2015 campaign — 353, more than 1,500 fewer than the league-leading Rangers — but dating back to 2001, the South Side club has seen its players miss about 3,000 fewer games than the next healthiest club. Take a look at Zimmermann’s chart here. It’s nuts.”
But you’re right, they don’t keep anyone healthier and they shouldn’t gamble more on injury risk arms because they have no history of keeping those guys healthier and on track…
Why was the sarcastic last paragraph necessary? Nothing you said contradicted what the commenter who you replied to said.
Because the comment by him was sarcastic based on a prior discussion we had in which he said the White Sox were not strong in developing arms.
Here is the link:
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/cubs-and-white-sox-pull-off-jose-quintana-blockbuster/
And his comment:
Bobby Ayala:
Why do the Sox deserve the benefit of the doubt with developing pitching? I’m having a hard time finding a franchise that’s worse at it.
Beside the fact that you’re linking to a USA Today article that links to SB Nation articles and White Sox fanboy blogs, you are continuing to attribute 100% of success of any White Sox pitcher to their miraculous “development,” which is a flawed premise.
I imagine if Giolito or Kopech turns into anything you will say it’s another miracle of development. The irony of your name grows…
Not for nothing, but I’m pretty sure this is the same “Rational Fan” who a few years ago was making the case that Conor Gillaspie was better than Kris Bryant.
Here’s “Rational Fan” posting 2 years ago:
“Kris Bryant is a TWO TOOL player at best. How is his floor higher? My goodness. The hype surrounding this guy is atrocious.
“A 5 tool player – Buxton – is going to have a higher floor than a 2 tool player. If Bryant doesn’t make contact enough to hit for average (which is entirely possible) then his only + tool will be power. He’s slow footed, with a poor glove and an average arm. I’ve never seen a two tool player have so many people drooling over him.”
1. Bryant wins ROY that year.
2. Bryant wins MVP the following year.
3. Rational Fan continues yapping, undaunted.
Never change, Rational Fan.
Yes, I was wrong about Bryant; he has been excellent. This year he has been a below average defender and base runner, but his first two years in the league he was exceptional in all aspects of the game. His contact issues which plagued him in the minors and the first year in the big leagues have disappeared as he has adjusted. These are the same concerns people see in Moncada and I understand them.
Yes, I still have opinions despite being incorrect about Kris Bryant. I am sure you have never been incorrect about players or prospects before. That’s a tough burden to carry.
Here’s Dave Cameron questioning Kris Bryant’s ceiling and ability to play 3rd base; eventually being forced to the OF.
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/kris-bryant-and-floor-versus-ceiling/
I guess Dave Cameron should stop giving his baseball opinion as well according to Krisco.
But that WAS you posting about how you’d take Gillaspie over Bryant, right Rational Fan? I haven’t been able to find that one, but it seared into my brain at the time.
It’s okay to admit it—I give you props about admitting how wrong you were about Bryant. (Not that you care a whit about what I think. I understand that.)
I don’t ever recall saying Gillaspie was better. I do recall being critical of Bryant because of his elevated k-rate; similarly to how people have been critical of Moncada due to contact issues.
I also was rather confused in regards to the hype surrounding Schwarber as I viewed him as a left handed Mike Napoli as a comp and not some elite untradeable bat.
You get some right, you get some wrong. That’s the nature of making opinions on volatile prospects.
Definitely should stop giving his baseball opinion!
Dudes a effing tool. Dave said he would not trade Devers for Machado? When the Sox are trying to win THIS year! He has clear favoritism for certain teams– Red Sox, Yankees, Cubs and Da Dodgers. Dude likes his big market teams. Then he is Clearly biased against others like the Astros.. he’s been saying for years Altuve is not good and over performing lol. Now it’s he’s good because the ball is juiced. Also obviously dislikes the orioles(5 years straight saying they would suck), Jays, Indians etc.
Stat people treat him like he’s a messiah.. what a joke
That was pretty spot on at the time. I don’t think anyone saw Bryant’s glove becoming plus (most scouting analysts, iirc, thought he’d be in left sooner rather than later). Few saw Bryant cutting his K rate by 10 points. Just goes to show that prospects can, you know, improve.
Yeah, Rodon looked strong for the first half of this season.
Yup, crapshoot. But the more the better, probability wise, one might succeed.
Their drafting has gone for more college players, bats specifically, and I think that might be a strong attempt to supplement the risky/toolsy acquisitions. Collins and Burger both have their own fair share of questions, but given what they were looking at on draft boards, they opted for the college bat. That says something, I think.
I believe the Sox tried to reduce the “bust factor” by drafting position players with very good plate discipline.
Their first three draft choices this past June (3B Jake Burger, 1B Gavin Sheets, and OF Luis Gonzalez) all had more walks than strikeouts this past year. This is especially enticing regarding Burger and Sheets since they are also considered power bats.
Collins wasn’t exactly a floor over ceiling prospect tho with positional risk he might not stick at C and swing and miss issues
To echo what Rational Fan wrote, all prospects are risky. The high ceiling, low floor players the White Sox are accumulating are no doubt some of the riskiest of the bunch, but from a straight numbers perspective, with so many lottery tickets, you have to figure that several will work out. Hitting on one of these guys (e.g. Yoan Moncada as an MVP candidate) would make the return for all the trades enough to justify them.
One other thing to keep in mind, the White Sox training staff is the absolute best in the bigs.
Here is one article (though I believe I’ve seen several others in a similar vein) – http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/01/chicago-white-sox-mlb-injury-prevention-disabled-list-days
If they’re gambling on health risks like Giolito and Cease, their odds of success are better than another team without the consistent track record of reducing injury.
I just don’t know how much I agree with this premise. Dave does add in the caveat that prospects often fail, but that caveat is really important. Most of these prospects will fail, just like most of all prospects will fail. Saying that they’re risky and they don’t have performance to back it up is going to be true until they’re in the majors and doing well.
Also, using KATOH vs KATOH+ as a way to determine “risk” or even “performance” seems wrong to me. KATOH is great and I love it but it’s not a strict measurement of “performance”, since guys like Eloy Jimenez have been great but have statistical red flags. Nor is it a measure of risk, since it’s not clear whether relying on the stats or scouts is “riskier.” You would think that the White Sox also use a mixture of analytics and scouting reports, just like KATOH+, and many of the differences can be explained by the White Sox trading for pitchers who are old for their level because of injury/suspension (which KATOH+ doesn’t care about) and because they have two little guys with great fastballs (which KATOH doesn’t like and doesn’t care about).
I think a different way of looking at it is that the White Sox are interested in players who used to be considered the best, but who struggled a little bit. Moncada, Giolito, and Rutherford all have had the shine come off them lately (I know some people still think Moncada is the best prospect in baseball, but the strikeouts are an issue). But I think someone (maybe it was Dave) saw something similar at the last deadline, where prospects whose stock had fallen were being traded more than ones with helium.
Another way of looking at it is although BA likes the White Sox system, KATOH is less enthusiastic. I don’t think anyone would say that the White Sox have anything other than a Top-3 system, though.
[Edit: I see wgmcd and Rational Fan have already hit on a lot of these points. Didn’t see them when I was typing this out.]
Yeah, I have to agree with the central point here — it doesn’t seem like this article actually demonstrates that the guys the White Sox have acquired are riskier than other prospects, or at least than other high-end prospects at their age.
I’d be interested to see what KOTOH and KOTOH+ thought of Bryant and Brandon Wood—two extreme outcomes of top 10 prospects who struck out a ton in the minors in their early 20s, and then… well the rest is history (obviously we can add more names to this list).
I get the concerns over Rutherford, he’s a year older than his ’16 draft HS peers and hasn’t shown much/any power this year… but it’s not like his K rate is all that concerning and he is getting on base. To me, the ceiling might be lowered a little, but the floor is still fairly ‘high’*. And while he was ‘old’ for his class, he’s still only 20. If the power develops without him sacrificing contact, then everyone who liked him six months ago will like him again. Maybe it will just take more time (if it comes of course).
*I am, admittedly, not exactly sure how to judge the floors of most prospects in A ball at 20, so take with a grain of salt.
I like Moncado, and he will likely have some good years, but I just see a very high risk profile. A lot of speed+power+no contact guys out there. Eloy is the guy I like. A true 80 power at that age is amazing.
I think Eloy and Kopech are likely Top 10 prospects for me (if I made a list, but why bother when so many others have done it better?).
I’d have Eloy and Moncada both top 10. Kopech would be way lower tho given walks
If 1 is a star, three are good, four bust, and they use the money saved to buy 2-4 good players, they seem to be pretty far ahead to me. That doesn’t mention anything good they do with the super high picks they’ll likely have for at least 2 years. And, they can still trade for a couple more players if they want.
What if all the pitchers bust except for 1 average starter? That is very well within the realm of possibility. Saying Kopech, Giolito, Lopez are risky isn’t just a throw away statement. Everything supports it. There are many safer prospects.
What if they all turn into good or great players? That’s in the realm of possibility. I think the odds are in their favor, by acquiring lots of high end guys. That was sort of my point, half can fail, and they still look good. Don’t forget about the freed up money either.
Of course there are safer prospects. Most of those won’t turn out to be great, though, either. The key for the Sox is figuring out how not to have scrubs with their stars next time, imo.
I’m not saying this trade is terrible or their plan is. But the more data we get on Lopez/Giolito/Kopech/Fulmer etc and their lack of improvement in areas they need to improve their probabilities continue to go downwards. I really like the system but think past Eloy and Moncada it is overrated and the pitchers (especially Kopech) are very overvalued. Lopez and Fulmer look very likely to be pen arms. Giolito looks very unlikely to be top of rotation. Hanson looks real good but has never thrown strikes except for at low A. Dunning looks like a solid middle rotation to backend arm. Rutherford well time will tell but he needs to hit for power pretty soon.
Kopech is 21 years old in AA and you are pigeonholing him? I also find it funny that you view “Kopech” as overvalued but really provide no evidence why you think that. His prospect ranking has only improved over the past calendar year, it has not decreased. You have a right to disagree with it, sure, but reasoning behind that disagreement would be nice.
Fulmer is better suited for relief; don’t think he ever figures it out. You say Hansen has “never thrown strikes but at low A” when he’s thrown 23 innings above low A and his professional BB rate is more than 1/2 that of his college walk rate showing significant improvement in less than 1 full season removed from college baseball. You ask to see improvement, and he shows it, and you discredit it.
Lopez has had one month where he wasn’t very good but the rest of the season he’s been good; the past month+ he’s been excellent. Progress has been made; which is something that should be watched more closely with an organizational change; his past four starts he’s thrown 25 2/3 innings with 33 K’s, 5 bb’s, 20 hits, 5 ER’s. While the entire season certainly counts, he’s been much better of late.
Giolito has shown nothing but improvement since the rough start and it takes time for new mechanical changes to take place which was something the White Sox were very candid about doing. Giolito has had one bad start in his last 10 – if you take that start out, he has a 3.11 ERA, with 58k’s in 52 innings with 41 hits against and 21 walks (1.19 WHIP) and he’s still young for his level.
Why does Rutherford “need” to hit for power soon? He’s 20 years old.
People expect everyone to dominate every level right away; that’s not the way things work.
edit: as for Kopech, I’d say the biggest risk with Kopech is health. Very rarely does someone stay healthy as a starter consistently throwing 100 MPH; control is something that can be improved through reps and arm slot consistency. I don’t think the Sox are overly worried about the walks yet given his age.
It’s really easy with Kopech, he has a 15.3 BB%. If he can’t get the walks down he’s a back end arm or a bullpen guy
He’s 21 years old and he just recently turned 21. Most guys would still be in college at this point; he’s at AA blowing hitters away. Command is something that can develop with repetition; repeating his delivery. He has plenty of developing to do, but when you have some of the best raw stuff in the world at 21 years old, you warrant a high prospect status and ranking. You expect him to be a finished product as a 21 year old kid in AA.
I’m not seeing any indication that Lopez is headed for the pen at this point. He has surged through the minors as a starter and after a slow start to his AAA season, which was preceded by very little experience above A-ball, he has done very well. He will be starting in MLB sooner rather than later.
They’re all going to bust, because all prospects are going to bust until proven otherwise. Trying to predict which ones are going to succeed is a fun parlor game, and you can say that these guys are “riskier”, but if they have an 80% chance of busting instead of 70%…I kind of don’t care that much. Better to get the guys you like.
Their 2017 draft was made up of mostly polished college bats. That should mitigate some risk. But as a White Sox fan, this the happiest I’ve been with the team since 2006. I’m going to assume all of these players will be superstars while I still can.
Anyone else surprised they called up Moncada so soon?
A little bit but he’s 22 and has almost 500 upper level AB spanning 2 years with success.
You see if he can handle MLB pitching and next year call him up after 6 weeks (or whatever it is) to preserve his service time.
It makes sense, in other words.
Chris Sale is Chris Sale. But Michael Kopech could be anything! He could even be Chris Sale!
He’d have to lose about 30lbs.
And you know how much the White Sox have wanted one of those! We’ll take the mystery box.
Not sure we are really talking about risk here. We could be to an extent. But it wasn’t really fully addressed. Risk is probability times the consequences. Specifically here we are talking about the probability that the prospect fails. That was the focus of the article. Talking about how player X may not make the majors for valid reasons only really addressed the fist half of risk. To really talk about risk, you would need to include something that speaks to the consequences of the failure which could include but not be limited to: not trading the players that were traded, impact of future losing seasons on the organization, or other prospects that could have been traded for. The KATOH piece captures a limited portion of consequences by using WAR and holding these players to the replacement player baseline, but that is not the complete picture of the consequences.
That’s kinda the point though, isn’t it? It’s the same philosophy behind Bill Belichick trading down half a dozen times in a single draft or Sam Hinkie getting the Sixers seven lottery picks in three years– talent evaluation is risky with individuals but pretty solid in aggregate, so you can hedge your bets by acquiring as many elite prospects as possible. There’s basically a 0% chance that Moncada and Kopech and Jimenez and Rutherford all pan out, but there’s a much better chance one of them becomes at least a plus starter.
“because as this teardown shows, having a few stars surrounded by a bunch of busts doesn’t really equal a winner.”
I think the point Dave is making, perhaps not clearly enough, is that one of them being a plus starter isn’t enough.
Watching their rebuild play out will be very interesting.
Stars and scrubs is easier to fix when your stars are all making 500k though. Lets say kopesch turns into sale, giolito turns into robertson, rutherford turns into eaton (replacing the stars) and the rest bust.
Well, that’s only $1.5M in salary. Easier to fill the rest of the roster now.
Ummm, but the Sox inability to identify average to above average starters to fill out the rest of the roster is exactly why the White Sox are in this position.
That only way that works if they are all very very productive through their early years, or you hedge any free agent signings to not run during the time of their respective arbitration pay outs.
While yes, these players are cheaper than what the sox had with sale, quintana, eaton right now, those players were also all underpaid. And unless you expect the team to be very good as soon as those 3 hit the majors, they are still going to be making some decent money in the later years of their arbitration. How much extra money are they going to have from those 3 vs. sale/eaton/Q and what does that really buy a team on the free agent market?
Won’t everyone in the BA top 100 have a higher KATOH+ than KATOH, by the nature of KATOH+?
At the top of the list, that is true. Vlad Guerrero, for instance, is the #3 prospect in KATOH and is projected for six (SIX) more WAR in KATOH+. But he was ranked #20. Rowdy Tellez, on the other hand, is ranked #95 and he is projected for about one less WAR in KATOH+. But Triston McKenzie (ranked #68) is projected for 1.4 more WAR and Tyler Beede (at 89) is projected for 0.4 more WAR. The cutoff is somewhere between Beede (at 89) and Calhoun (at 92) for when it ceases to be more valuable.
In order to get someone with a higher KATOH than KATOH+, you would have to only trade for prospects rated below #90 on the BA list. That doesn’t seem like a good way to operate.
This almost seems like a half-written article. If the central point is the White Sox brass are rolling the dice on high-risk prospects, who are the ‘safe’ prospects they should’ve traded for (or attempted to trade for)?
A perfect addition to this article would have been “What Might Have Been Better”, for instance:
The Sale trade to Boston should have had Rafael Devers as the centerpiece not Moncada.
The Eaton trade to Washington should have been for Victor Robles straight-up
not the three pitchers.
Then provide reasons for these alternative trades.
After all, if you’re going to point out the risky route, then you should also provide the safer route.
I understand where you’re going, but I don’t think anyone would argue that getting 1 player opposed to 3 players is a safer acquisition; especially given the quality of all the players involved. For example, Dunning was supposed to be the lesser prospect, and he’s been fantastic. Quantity is king in the prospect game.
Quantity is king in the prospect game when reviewing a team’s overall minor league system.
Quantity is not king when reviewing one specific trade.
BTW, Dunning was indeed fantastic at low A Kannapolis, but now at high A Winston-Salem not so much.
He’s been fine at high A. While his FIP is a bit escalated, he’s still dominating hitters with 75 K’s in 65 innings, and his walks are a little escalated but he’s approaching rare air as he was a reliever in college and has already eclipsed his career high in innings pitched. He’s also been a bit unlucky in the BABIP category. In his first “year” as a starting pitcher (in professional baseball at that) he’s sporting a 2.23 ERA, 1.06 WHIP and 4.12 K/BB ratio. He’s still only 22 years old too, so he’s not exactly old. He’s been pretty fantastic as a prospect and if he finishes the year well he may be the fastest rising pitching prospect in baseball.
Your name seems to be rather ironic when it comes to discussing the White Sox.
Hypothetically, let’s say the success rate of 22 year old SS with 300+ ab in AA with at least a 100 wRC+ is 50%. Let’s also say the success rate of 18 year old pitchers in A ball with a below average ERA+ is 5%.
You would rather have 1 of the 22 year old SSs than multiple 18 year old pitchers.
It’s quality. Aggregate quality.
The problem is, there is no easy way to show that it’s less risky. The KATOH vs KATOH+ comparison doesn’t help with that.
It’s likely the only way to reduce risk to diversify your portfolio of prospects, so if anything, they should have tried to get many FV 45 and 50 prospects from the Yankees/Astros/some other team instead of swinging for fewer FV55s and FV60s (and I think Eric has Moncada even higher).
I don’t have any easy answers either, but maybe Cameron has some thoughts as to high-quality lower-risk prospects. If so, I would have genuinely enjoyed reading them which was the point of my comment.
One way could be to focus less on pitchers, since they tend fail at a higher rate, maybe?
Robles was never an option for Eaton, though (which is why Dave’s “Eaton fetched nearly as much as Sale” argument from the trade value posts was silly).
At the time of the Sale trade, Devers hadn’t played above High-A, while Moncada had 20 games at the MLB level. How would Devers have been a safer bet?
Maybe because some baseball people have concerns about Moncada’s hit tool (specifically strikeouts) that they don’t have regarding Devers.
For instance, shortly after the Sale trade, Keith Law came out with his top 100 prospects listing Moncada at 17 and Devers at 11. He expressed concerns about Moncada’s bat wrap and that Moncada during his MLB time looked like he had never seen a breaking ball before.
The fact that Moncada has MLB time and Devers doesn’t is irrelevant. The only thing that matters from a prospect evaluation perspective is which player will ultimately have a better MLB career.
So you would ignore the dozen or so OTHER prospect lists that had Moncada #1 because Keith Law is lower on him, and that means that everyone knew Devers has flawless in December, whereas Moncada, someone who has mashed AAA in his age 21 season, was higher risk?
This collection of prospects that the White Sox has assembled is loaded with gushing scouting reports but mighty short on performance. Maybe Moncada is better than Tim Anderson, he of the negative WAR, he better be after the contract Anderson got, and Giolito and Lopez are a lot better than they have looked but these prospects have to perform. Performance, more often than not, seems to be given the back seat when evaluating(guessing) who the most likely studs are during their minor league development. “Don’t scout the box score” is the old cliche. Betts hit 15 HR’s at Greenville and Salem in 2013 at the age of 20. Come on guys, open your eyes, that is major power, but the scouts couldn’t believe this little guy could hit like Jose Altuve. Goldschmidt hit 35 and 30 HR’s in his A and AA seasons but was still ranked far below Mike Olt. The list of flops is long, and these are the top of the top prospects. On the other hand, it takes a few years of failure for a hyped bust to fall, Buxton never hit after he reached the Florida State League but everybody is shocked that he can’t hit a lick in the majors. Search Profar’s history and you will not find a single season in which he hit .300 and with no power and there are many, many other toolsy top 10 overall selections that nobody has ever heard of. Mark Appel has never gotten anybody out at any level yet it took until this year for him to finally drop from the prospect tree. Just think, it was assumed he would be the #1 pick in 2012 but the Astros went for Carlos Correa, instead, and the rest, as they say, is history. What will be considered a successful return? My opinion is that the White Sox lineup in 2020 must have two out of Rutherford, Jimenez and Moncada on the field and three of the pitchers on the staff of a team that is a contender for this to be success.
Let’s go down the list:
1. Jurickson Profar had an 820 OPS, with 14 HR’s and 16 steals in 126 games as a 19 year old in AA; the year prior, he walked more than he struck out as an 18 year old in A ball. He wasn’t toolsy. For his age, he was incredibly accomplished; more accomplished at his age than say a guy like Devers.
2. in 2015 – the year of Buxton’s call up following missing the majority of the year prior – in 72 games he hit 304 with a 407 OB, hitting 7 homers, 13 triples, 10 doubles while swiping 22 bases. Making him on pace for roughly 15 and 40 while being the best defensively outfielder in the minor leagues. Please enlighten us on how he “never hit” after the Florida State League. Buxton is still only 23 years old – 2 years younger than Aaron Judge – but you would like to proclaim him a bust? A bust, who despite his god awful offensive numbers would still be roughly a 2 WAR player as a 23 year old.
3. There’s nothing wrong with Anderson’s contract; if he maintains a roster spot and makes adjustments to the adjustments made against him he’ll be fine. His defense has regressed a bit this year – but the skills are still there from last year that made him a ++ short stop. He’s still young, and he’s always been a raw prospect due to the lack of reps as a high school kid.
You seem to think 22 and 23 year old kids are finished products solely because they were called up. The MLB game takes adjustments and time to master. You bring up Altuve… well Altuve, in his 3rd MLB season at the age of 23/24 had an OPS of 679. JD Martinez had a .650 OPS as a 25 year old with the Astros. Springer hit 231 with a 336 OBP as a 24 year old. Rizzo hit .233 with a 742 OPS his first full season with the Cubs at 23/24 years old. Once you are called up, it does not mean you are going to dominate the league right away. It takes time.
Simple question: Which prospects on BA’s list would you say are not “risky prospects even by prospect standards”?
Torres, Robles, Barretto, Adames and Rosario spring to mind.
Sure, but 4 of those 5 are top 10 guys. Only 2 of the White Sox’ guys are/were in the top 10 — obviously there’s more risk the farther you go down the list.
I’ll repeat the point others have made: It’s not entirely clear what the White Sox should have done differently in these trades to have reduced their prospect “risk”.
Ozzie Albies and Nick Gordon are another two.
But you’re right, prospects who project as having a high likelihood to be MLB starters (like, for example, Dansby Swanson) are usually going to be in the Top 10-30 of BA’s list.
I could be way off here, but it seems the failed heap is filled with guys who either k’d too much or couldn’t throw strikes. Perhaps focusing on guys that didn’t have these fundamental issues that seem to plague prospects could be safer.
Torres, Rosario, Eloy, Devers, Rodgers, Robles, Senzel, Honeywell, Mejia, McKenzie, Albies, Sisco, Perez, Soroko, Verdugo, Urias, Woodruff, Kelly, Frazier among others
I’ll go from the start:
1. Torres is going to be coming off Tommy John surgery as a 20 year old kid coming back to play SS or 3rd base; he’s going to miss an entire year of development. While he should fully recover, to say there’s not risk attached to him seems like quite the reach. Just last year, Torres had an OPS of around 750.
2. Rosario is 4 months younger than Moncada, and while he’s a very defensive SS which adds value, he had an wRC+ of 116 to Moncada’s 129. While Rosario doesn’t strike out much, he also rarely walks (5.3%) and he hits a lot of ground balls (51%). While his glove gives him a nice floor, there is some risk attached to his bat at this point.
3. Brendan Rodgers has taken 100 AB’s above A-Ball and has a 690 OPS. Obviously the sample needs to grow, but there’s always risk with guys who don’t have significant data above A Ball (see Eloy as well).
4. Honeywell is running a 4.27 and 1.41 WHIP; obviously his 2.84 FIP is impressive, and he’s certainly had some bad batted ball luck (379 babip) but his ground ball rate so far leaves a lot to be desired.
I’m not going to go through the entire list, but you get the point. Everyone has risk. As for Urias…? Really?
Torres is not “going to miss an entire year of development.”
As a position player, with an injury to his non-throwing elbow, he’ll be ready to go by spring training.
And “an OPS of around .750” for a 19 year old in the FSL is fantastic. That comes out to a .359 wOBA and a 120 wRC+.
The least risky prospects are the ones closest to the big leagues or who are performing at an elite level despite being way younger than the competition. And probably they’re position players.
Of those, I’d say Torres, Rosario, Devers, Robles, Senzel, Acuna, Tucker, Mejia, Albies, Verdugo, Barreto, Dom Smith, and Kyle Tucker are the lowest risk guys on the list (I’m not counting Zimmer and Frazier, because that seems like cheating).
The only pitching prospect I can think of that is “low risk” is Honeywell. Reyes was before the TJ surgery.
That’s 14 guys, most of whom are off-limits for one reason or another. It’s not clear whether Dave thinks they should have held out to get Torres instead of trading Quintana for Jimenez (who himself is not a particularly risky prospect, especially given how far away he is) or preferred Tucker to Jimenez (despite the fact that Jimenez is considered a better prospect by almost everyone).
I believe they only obtained 14 minor leaguers in these trades (they got back a 15th piece, Clippard, who is not a minor leaguer). But that point should be made, and others seem to have mentioned in these comments, that did not make these 4 trades and just got back 7 prospects that may or may not have more risk than any other collection of 7 top-100 prospects, they got back 14 prospects. Not all of those other prospects are just throw-ins. Many are decent prospects and a few may turn out to contribute at the MLB level. I think these seem to be striking a good balance of getting both quality and quantity in return.
Definitely a lot of risk in that system. Jiminez is as low risk as an A ball prospect can be but an A ball prospect is always risky.
And then you have moncada who has strike out issues,giolito who was struggling, kopech who is a fireballer with some command issues and cease and rutherford who are also quite far away although rutherford is not super risky and quite advanced for a low minors high school pick in his second year.
But overall the risk is big although he tried to offset that by getting “safe” college bats with burger and Collins.
I think hahn almost bought a little low on some of the prospects, he wanted maximum talent and not safety.
People would have loved “safe” prospects like benintendi or bregman but those mlb ready high floor prospects rarely get dealt.
So hahn had to choose between high floor and lower ceiling and vice versa and he went for the upside.
In the worst case they again have 3 stars and the rest scrubs like 2016 if some of those top guys bust but I think he will be smart and acquire more depth.
“In the worst case they again have 3 stars” – that is certainly not their worst case…
Apostrophe after an X. Don’t think I’ve ever seen that before.
The X in “Sox” probably deserves a style-manual entry of its own — and I assume it has one at most sportswriting outlets. My knee-jerk sense is that it ought to just be treated exactly like “cks,” as here. It’s the weird singularized-plural case when you want to say it as a short form of “a player on the Sox team” that really ties people in knots.
KATOH+ has a plus, so it is obviously better than KATOH. Good work to Rick Hahn and company in choosing the correct metric to evaluate your trades.
When rating draft picks, it seems like pundits usually give all the credit or blame to the prospect. But there are 30 organizations out there. Isn’t it feasible that a prospect that busts in Organization A might have done better if drafted and developed by Organization B?
And vice versa: a prospect that developed into a star in Organization C might have been far lesser of a prospect if drafted by Organization D.
I guess there’s no real way to know for sure: but I’d like to at least hear or read this type of caveat when a top draft pick flames out.
This is a good point and something I tend to think about especially with off-the-radar guys who were throw-ins in trades and not well-regarded before later breaking out. The development may have only occurred in the place that it occurred.
uh it’s more like they are rebuilding, trading present wins for future wins.
Hahn is taking a high risk strategy because prospects are just that. But he is taking the high ceiling risk to get a very high reward: a WS champion roster. What was the alternative? The team couldn’t win with two elite starters and 23 others. Hahn has urged Sox fans to be patient. He said late Tuesday night that Moncada will still be developing while at the MLB level. I believe Hahn’s plan is to acquire young talented high ceiling baseball players, not just athletes, get a core group of these guys to Chicago as major leaguers at more or less the same time, and fill in any gaps in this core with good MLB free agents available at the time. It’s quite possible that NONE of the guys that came over in the trades for Sale, Eaton, Quintana et al will be part of that core, and that it will be other guys in the organization who emerge into that core, or more prospects who come over in future trades. It’s possible, too, that the plan is sound but the execution is lacking, and the whole thing busts. But at least there’s a plan and the team has moved away from trading the best of a weak farm system in order to “win now” or trying to win with marginal players picked up from the rummage rack.
“The team couldn’t win with two elite starters and 23 others.” This is exactly the risk you run when you go for the high risk/high ceiling guys. Dave even mentions this.
Yes, but this team didn’t have 10 top tier prospects, plus an additional 5-8 legit prospects behind that to build their stars and scrubs roster. Sale was the only drafted player – Eaton came via a savvy trade, and Quintana via a FA signing. Abreu another FA signing.
You have to figure that the Sox are going to add one or two more top 3-5 draft picks to this bunch, and their draft this past season was highly regarded throughout the league although that means very little until they produce.
It doesn’t matter how you acquire the player. Unless you are just assuming the white sox will be able to make more valuable trades and signings like Quintana. If you want to put your eggs into that basket, be my guest.
I’ll just quote my comments from the Sale trade:
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A lot of people like to say that all prospects are lottery tickets, but not all lottery tickets are equal. The White Sox do have a history of playing the Powerball, both in trades and with their own draft picks. They like going for the biggest payoffs even though they have longer odds of reaching them, whereas other organizations might prefer to play the Pick Six with a lower jackpot but better odds of winning something.
The Sox confronted the risk of sucking for years had the organization not made these trades. The Sox now have a base upon which to build a team. They lacked that base before.
Of course, the organization needs to draft well.