Bryce Harper won the National League Most Valuable Player this season, and the vote was unanimous. Kris Bryant won the NL Rookie of the Year, and the vote was unanimous. Josh Donaldson‘s American League MVP victory wasn’t quite as clear-cut — 23 to seven over Mike Trout — and Dallas Keuchel’s AL Cy Young even less so — 22 to eight over David Price.

Still, most of the major award victories were fairly one-sided, and they all came down to just two parties duking it out for the top spot. And this is how it usually goes. Occasionally, there’s some discrepancy between the last couple candidates, but more often than not it’s pretty clear who will take home the hardware at year end. If there is any controversy, it’s almost always between just two guys. Very rarely do you see three players eligible for the same award, all of which with a legitimate case to win.

And yet, the 2015 NL Cy Young vote looked like this:

Jake Arrieta emerged victorious, in my opinion rightfully so, but it’s clear by the vote that there was no obvious winner. And it probably came as a surprise to some that Clayton Kershaw didn’t receive more top-two votes and make the race even closer than it actually was.

I mean, Jake Arrieta finished with an ERA that started with a one, and had one of the best second halves in baseball history. Zack Greinke finished with an ERA that started with a one, and it was the lowest we’d seen since Greg Maddux in ’95. Clayton Kershaw finished with a FIP that started with a one, and it was the second consecutive year we’d seen him do that. The ERA wasn’t much higher.

Trying to pick an obvious winner from those three is like trying to pick which duffle bag full of $100 bills you want to take home without having the chance to count every last note. Just close your eyes and pick at random. Either way you’re walking out of that room with a big bag full of money.

It’s great that Arrieta won, because he totally deserved it, but it’s an equal bummer that Greinke and Kershaw didn’t win, because they totally deserved it, too. It’s a shame that seasons like the ones Greinke and Kershaw just had will go down in the record books unrecognized, solely because “sweet lord the caliber of the pitching talent in baseball today is unbelievable what a time to be alive whiffs everywhere.”

The consolation prize for Greinke and Kershaw is that they’re not alone, and they don’t have to go unrecognized. We just witnessed one of the greatest trios of single-season pitching performances in baseball history, so let’s give the runners-up of present and past their due.

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The title of this post is a question I asked in my own head yesterday. As to what precise set of circumstances led to the question, I can’t say — nor does the effort required to conduct a full audit of my memory seem justified. The main virtue of the question is that it’s led to the production of Content, which one finds below and which has allowed the present author to delay briefly his perpetually imminent dismissal from FanGraphs. And perhaps it possesses a second virtue, as well: that those, having wondered idly the same thing, might now observe an attempt at supplying an answer.

And, in fact, the answer probably does have some real-live implications. Yesterday in these pages, for example, Craig Edwards performed an examination of Chris Davis’s free-agent candidacy. Edwards found something that isn’t likely to surprise anyone — namely that, whatever Davis’s virtues, a broad base of skills isn’t one of them. His power is prodigious; his contact abilities and defensive acumen, decidedly less so. To whatever degree Davis is compensated this offseason, he will be compensated for his power on contact. To the degree that Davis is successful in the future, it will be for that same trait.

Meditating on Davis in this way naturally leads to the equal and opposite line of inquiry: which player is least dependent on a single skill or trait?

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On Tuesday, I looked at five free agents who I think have a chance to provide some positive value for the team that signs them, based on our expectations of what the market will pay out this winter. Today, we’re going to look at the flip side of that coin, and I’ll identify five players who I think pose the highest risk of ending up as expensive disappointments.

Of course, based on my recent suggestions, maybe teams should just sign all of these guys. Last year, I warned teams off of Max Scherzer, Nelson Cruz, and Edinson Volquez, all of whom went on to have one of the best years of their careers. At least I got Victor Martinez right, and I did a little better a couple of years ago, but even Curtis Granderson’s appearance on that list is a reminder that these guys aren’t fated for disaster. Or that I’m an idiot, depending on your interpretation.

But for various reasons, I’m still skeptical of the five players listed below, and wouldn’t want to approach their expected market price this winter.

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Not too long ago, I tried to very simply figure out if there’s any extra value in having an elite reliever. I found some evidence of something, although it could stand to be confirmed, since in retrospect I don’t totally love the method I used. But generally speaking, it makes sense — a team could leverage that reliever particularly well, and bullpens are an area we have some trouble evaluating statistically.

All that did was look at the potential impact of one guy. It was interesting to me, but there are other ways to try to break this stuff down. So for this post, I’m moving from the impact of an elite reliever to the impact of an elite bullpen. Why focus on one late-inning pitcher, when every team needs a few? Can we see any hidden extra value in having an overall strong group of relievers?

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The introduction of batted-ball data, first to the clubs and then to the public, certainly has caused a revolution in player evaluation. While the entirety of HITf/x and now Statcast data isn’t likely to be available to the masses anytime soon, the portions that are, including fairly complete PITCHf/x data, have changed the way fans, analysts, club personnel, and, yes, even players look at the game.

As I have often written on these pages, this data needs to be placed into context to be fully understood. There are ongoing issues with data capture, and the simple fact that not all hard or softly hit baseballs are created equal adds levels of nuance that must be understood before meaningful conclusions can be drawn. Another concern expressed by many is the uncertain predictive value of the batted-ball data, particularly with regard to pitchers. Today, let’s take a look at how this data correlates from year to year, from the pitcher’s perspective.

It’s been fairly well established over the years that a “ground ball” or “pop up” pitcher is a real thing: ball-in-play (BIP) type frequencies correlate quite well from year to year. The same applies to strikeout (K) and walk (BB) rates, both from the hitter and pitcher’s perspective. How about batted-ball authority? To examine this issue, I identified the 45 starting pitchers who qualified for the ERA title in either league in both 2014 and 2015. (Players who were traded mid-year and qualified overall but not in either league specifically were omitted.)

For each of these pitchers, the following statistics were scaled to 100 both for the 2014 and 2015 seaosns, with correlation coefficients calculated thereafter.

First, the rate stats:

• Strikeout rate
• Walk rate
• Pop-up rate
• Fly-ball rate
• Line-drive rate
• Ground-ball rate

Then metrics concerning projected production allowed (based on BIP authority):

• Fly ball/line drive combined
• Ground ball authority
• All ball-in-play authority

And, finally, runs-allowed measures/estimators:

• Earned run average
• Fielding independent pitching
• “Tru” ERA (based on BIP frequency and authority)

One note on the middle line item above. Fly balls and line drives were combined when calculating and scaling the Projected Production Allowed data. This was done due to the different manner in which was data was captured in 2014 (Sportvision) and 2015 (Statcast). In 2014, balls in play were classified as fly balls or line drives based on available vertical exit angle data. In 2015, such data was not available, so Statcast’s subjective classifications of BIP as either fly balls or liners had to be accepted.

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Ben and Sam banter about award apathy, Hall of Fame voting, and Francisco Rodriguez, then answer a couple listener emails.

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The Cleveland Indians finished in third place in the AL Central last season, but just 4.5 games out of the Wild Card, and 13.5 behind the eventual World Series champion Royals. With a pitching staff fronted by Corey Kluber and a young talented infield headed by superprospect Francisco Lindor, the Indians are looking at 2016 as a chance to take the next step and make the playoffs for the first time since 2013. But, being the Indians, they have a problem.

Taking that next step towards the playoffs means adding to the team’s offense. Last season Cleveland scored 669 runs. Only Seattle, the Angels, the White Sox, and Tampa scored fewer, and nobody scored much fewer. The Indians were 47 runs ahead of the last place White Sox, but 222 runs behind first place Toronto. The team wasn’t wholly without merit, though, as they also allowed just 640 runs, the second fewest in the AL and one fewer than those darn Royals. So, if we can speak in broad generalizations for the moment, we can say that the Indians have pitching and fielding, but to become a championship-caliber team, they need to score some runs. They need offense. So get some offense. That’s it. The end! Thanks for reading!

But, wait! This is the Indians we’re talking about. They can’t just go out and get offense. They can’t sign Jason Heyward or Chris Davis. Like your roommate, they’re perennially short on funds, dude (but if you front them for some pizza they’ll totally get you back next Thursday). So the problem is twofold: the Indians don’t have the ability to simply sign someone at market rates because to do so would blow up their salary structure. This means a trade. And, as shell-shocked Red Sox fans trying to talk themselves into the Craig Kimbrel trade will tell you, you have to give up something to get something.

Further, if Cleveland is going to acquire a major league player who can hit and play the outfield passably well, the likelihood is they’ll have to give up major league players to do it. Sure, the Brewers might be inclined to deal Ryan Braun and the Padres will gladly give you a steaming helping of Matt Kemp, but that will detonate the ol’ salary structure as well, and then there’s that whole “we’re trying to win” thing. So that’s a polite no thanks. This is all by way of explaining why the Indians, a team that is trying to win now, have been mentioned so prominently in trade rumors recently and even going back to the end of last season.

And, in fact, even while I’ve been writing this, here it comes again. Via MLB Trade Rumors:

The Blue Jays, Dodgers and Yankees are among the teams that have reached out to the Indians and had “preliminary” trade talks about Cleveland’s starting pitching, reports Jon Morosi of FOX Sports (links to Twitter). The still-very-early frameworks being discussed would each send a controllable starter away from Cleveland in exchange for an everyday outfielder, he continues.

The problem with this is obvious. It robs Peter to pay Paul, as they old saying goes, and I’m not sure it doesn’t rob Peter’s wife, and their neighbor Frank as well. The cost of giving up a Carlos Carrasco or Kluber is significant. Sure, you’re saying, the Indians would get something significant back, and I’m certain you’re right. They would. But this is simply a reallocation of resources. This is taking four WAR and moving it from your rotation to your outfield, and that’s if you do it right. If you don’t, like the beaming ray in Spaceballs: The Movie, you lose something in the translation.

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Chris Davis is a man of prodigious strength. His efforts, or sometimes lack thereof, have been chronicled by FanGraphs multiple times. Since Davis’ first season with the Baltimore Orioles in 2012, he leads all of major league baseball with 159 home runs and only Edwin Encarnacion is even within 20 home runs of him. Just 10 players are within 50 home runs of Davis over the last four years, which means even if Davis had hit zero home runs in 2015 instead of 47, he would rank in the top 10 over the last four years. As power has become increasingly rare over the past decade, Davis made a great comeback after a disappointing 2014 and is set to get paid in free agency this winter. Looking for comparable players, we can attempt to find out how much that great power is worth as Davis heads into his 30s.

To find historical comps for Davis, first I looked for players from 1960 through 2008 who’d produced a similar number of wins in a similar time framce — in this case, between 10 and 20 WAR through their age-29 seasons. As this is not an incredibly high bar, there were more than 300 players in resulting pool. To further narrow sample, I looked for players who fit a similar offensive profile, so within 10 points of Davis’ 121 wRC+ mark and at least a .200 isolated slugging (Davis’ is .251). This narrowed down the list to 42 players. Limiting the list only to players within 25% of Davis’ 3,512 plate appearances left just 31 players. Davis is coming off 47 home runs, a 147 wRC+, and a 5.6 WAR. Eliminating all players with a wRC+ below 125 or under 400 PA in their age-29 seasons left 15 players, many of whom appear very Chris Davis-like.

Chris Davis Comps Through Age 29

Name	PA	HR	ISO	wRC+	Off	Def	WAR
Lee May	3716	176	0.214	127	107.9	-58.2	19.6
Kirk Gibson	3104	126	0.205	128	112.9	-31.8	19.1
Trot Nixon	2739	106	0.218	122	77.9	-1.4	16.8
Carl Everett	2726	103	0.202	117	63.0	19.2	16.4
Tino Martinez	3495	157	0.211	115	67.4	-19.1	16.4
Cliff Floyd	3556	132	0.209	121	107.4	-54.8	16.3
Ryan Klesko	3369	165	0.242	128	120.8	-61.3	16.0
Jason Bay	3259	149	0.234	130	141.4	-88.2	15.9
Frank Howard	3445	162	0.210	127	108.2	-77.1	15.4
David Ortiz	3584	177	0.252	129	116.9	-89.3	14.9
Bobby Higginson	3434	134	0.208	118	80.9	-60.3	13.5
Dave Kingman	3385	204	0.252	115	55.4	-44.8	13.2
Pat Burrell	4145	188.0	0.221	117	73.1	-78.5	12.9
Tony Clark	3212	156	0.225	117	67.8	-61.8	11.5
Jay Buhner	2944	129	0.215	122	73.4	-69.3	10.2
AVERAGE	3341	151	0.221	122	91.6	-51.8	15.2
Chris Davis	3512	203	0.251	121	86.8	-67.6	14.5

Davis comes up a little bit higher in terms of power, but in offensive value, he is right around the midpoint of the group. In a comparison Scott Boras is likely to love, Davis’ career through age-29 looks a lot like David Ortiz’. Nor is it just through age 29 where the comparison exists. As only players with good age-29 seasons were included in the group, here are the above players’ age-29 seasons, among which group Davis compares favorably.

Chris Davis Comps at Age 29

Name	PA	HR	ISO	wRC+	Off	Def	WAR
Tino Martinez	685	44	0.281	141	35.9	-5.9	5.3
David Ortiz	713	47	0.304	157	45.7	-17	5.3
Trot Nixon	513	28	0.272	152	33.6	-0.2	5.0
Carl Everett	561	34	0.286	135	27.1	3.3	4.7
Bobby Higginson	679	30	0.238	131	30.5	-8.5	4.3
Cliff Floyd	609	28	0.244	139	35.0	-18.4	3.7
Kirk Gibson	521	28	0.224	136	27.3	-9.5	3.6
Ryan Klesko	590	26	0.233	135	29.2	-13.7	3.2
Jason Bay	670	31	0.236	133	32.8	-24.8	3.0
Lee May	647	29	0.206	137	26.6	-24.0	3.0
Jay Buhner	436	21	0.263	138	21.5	-10.6	2.5
Frank Howard	549	18	0.164	127	16.4	-10.4	2.3
Dave Kingman	448	28	0.276	131	14.5	-8.8	2.2
Tony Clark	497	16	0.194	125	15.3	-14.7	1.7
Pat Burrell	567	29	0.245	126	14.6	-18.1	1.5
AVERAGE	579	29	0.244	136	27.1	-12.1	3.4
Chris Davis	670	47	0.300	147	36.3	-5.5	5.6

While Davis’ age-29 season puts him even with some great seasons by David Ortiz and Tino Martinez, his inconsistent past, including a 2014 season in which he hit just .196/.300/.404, keep his comps on a more terrestrial level. The end of 2014 resulted in a 25-game suspension for Davis after he tested positive for Adderall twice. He had a therapeutic use exemption for the drug prior to 2013, but did not have one for either 2013 or 2014 when he was suspended. He gained an exemption this past season for a different drug to treat his attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, so the matter is unlikely to cause trouble again.

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Dallas Keuchel won a Cy Young last night, becoming the second pitcher in as many seasons to complete the two-year transition of “some guy with a 5.15 ERA” to “American League Cy Young Award winner.” Keuchel’s career turnaround, as was Corey Kluber’s, is absolutely remarkable, though the similarities between the two elite hurlers mostly end there.

Kluber, of course, is a righty, while Keuchel throws left-handed. You think of the way Kluber pitches, and you think of all the strikeouts. You think of the way Keuchel pitches, and you think of all the ground balls. Granted, Kluber gets his grounders, and Keuchel started getting his whiffs this year, too, but their primary methods of success lie on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Despite what FIP may lead you to believe, contact management is a real skill that certain pitchers have. Sure, the ability to miss bats entirely is a more reliable skill, and if you had to take one over the other you’d take the whiffs over the weak contact. But some pitchers miss bats, and some pitchers miss barrels. The best pitchers in the world do both, and that’s how Dallas Keuchel got to where he is today.

The whiffs are easy to see. The pitcher throws the amazing curveball and the batter tries to hit it but doesn’t. That’s a whiff. Do that a bunch of times and you have a bunch of whiffs. Soft contact isn’t quite as obvious. I mean, we can see it when it happens, but how? Why did the ball come off the bat like that? I know this is something people struggle with, grasping what it is exactly that a pitcher does to consistently generate weak contact. I’ve seen it asked in chats, live blogs, on Twitter and in comment sections. Understandably so. There’s only one kind of whiff. There’s like a million different ways the ball can come off the bat.

That being said, there’s plenty of ways we can examine the nature of Keuchel’s contact-management game. For now, we’ll stick to one.

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