If you’ve followed baseball closely this year, you can’t miss the tidal wave of impact rookies. Fernando Tatis Jr. and Vladimir Guerrero Jr., the two top prospects in baseball, have succeeded in the majors, and they haven’t been alone. Pete Alonso is hitting the stuffing out of baseballs. Mike Soroka and Chris Paddack are pitching like top-tier starters. Tatis is hitting .323 with power and playing a passable shortstop, and he’s not even the clear Rookie of the Year. The competition is just that good.

That’s just the top tier. Go half a level down, and the league is filled with rookies making their presences felt. Keston Hiura has absolutely mashed in his limited plate appearances with the Brewers. Yordan Alvarez has a .353 ISO and a 191 wRC+ over nearly a third of a season. Brandon Lowe is a key cog on the Rays. Oscar Mercado brought the Indians back to life. It’s a good year to be young and in baseball.

Even in this age of constant baseball coverage, though, one rookie has gone overlooked. The best three rookies this season by WAR have been Tatis, Alonso, and Soroka. No one would argue their hegemony. The fourth, though, hasn’t even been named yet in this article. Bryan Reynolds has been the fourth-most-productive rookie, in this year of impact youngsters, and he’s done it in near-complete anonymity.

Reynolds wasn’t supposed to make an impression in the majors this year. He was a good-but-not-great hitter in Double-A in 2018 after being traded from the Giants in the Andrew McCutchen deal, riding BABIP and walks to a 128 wRC+ despite middling power. Prospect evaluators saw him as an average-bat, average-glove regular who could play center in a pinch — in a few years. He ranked ninth in our Pirates’ preseason top prospects list, but didn’t crack Eric Longenhagen and Kiley McDaniel’s top 100. As a 23-year-old in Double-A, it seemed reasonable for him to take 2019 adjusting to Triple-A before reaching the majors in 2020. Read the rest of this entry »

Until they arrive, all trade deadlines feel the same. The air is abuzz with whispers of marquee names finding new homes. The potential for splashy trades is endless. 2019 was no exception. Noah Syndergaard, the God of Thunder! Madison Bumgarner, indomitable postseason hero! Whit Merrifield… alright, I couldn’t think of an exclamation-point-worthy nickname for everyone. All were rumored to be in play in the lead-up to the deadline.

Well, the trade deadline has come and gone, and none of those players were traded. In their place, we got a few blockbusters: Trevor Bauer is taking his unique blend of trolling and analytics to Cincinnati, while Yasiel Puig orchestrated the first ever farewell fight before heading to Cleveland. Zack Greinke is joining Justin Verlander in Houston, the mythical land where former aces go to become legend. There were many lesser moves, of course. Teams upgraded bullpens or shored up weak platoon matchups ad nauseum. A whopping 64 players were traded yesterday alone.

As with most things in life, it’s hard to put this trade deadline into historical context while living in the moment. Yesterday certainly felt busy, with trades being announced seemingly every five minutes and a former Cy Young winner on the move to the World Series favorites. The previous few weeks, on the other hand, felt interminably slow. The Bauer/Puig swap was one of only two deals of consequence to take place before deadline day. How did this year stack up to past deadlines?

To answer this question, I updated methodology first used by Ben Lindbergh in 2015. Using data from Retrosheet and MLB, I compiled a list of every trade made in the month of July starting in 1986, the year baseball’s non-waiver trade deadline moved from July 15 to July 31. In terms of the raw number of players traded each July (excluding players to be named later), 2019 is in line with the latter half of this decade and its huge number of traded players:

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The Tampa Bay Rays are in the thick of a playoff hunt. The Miami Marlins are not. Both teams behaved accordingly today, with the Rays sending Ryne Stanek and Jesús Sánchez to the Marlins in exchange for Nick Anderson and Trevor Richards. This trade, as many trades do, seems to favor the Rays, though all four players changing sides are interesting in one way or another. I wouldn’t fault you for thinking the Marlins might come out ahead in the end.

To my eyes, the gem of the trade is Nick Anderson. An out-of-nowhere success this season, Anderson is the kind of high-octane pitcher modern bullpens covet. He also won’t reach free agency until 2025, which means that he’s doubly attractive to the cost-conscious Rays. A rate monster, he boasts an eye-popping 37.1% strikeout rate, ninth-best among relievers this season, courtesy of a spinny four-seam fastball and devastating breaking ball.

While his results have been inconsistent this year, it’s not for lack of underlying numbers. He surrenders hard contact, with a 6th-percentile exit velocity allowed and 4th-percentile hard contact rate, but makes up for it with the aforementioned heaps and bales of strikeouts. It’s too early in his career to know how much of a problem the contact will be, but if his underlying talent there is close to league average, he’s immediately one of the best relievers in baseball.

Want a best-case comparison for Anderson? Think of Ken Giles. His fastball doesn’t boast quite the same top end as Giles, but they’re both four-seam/breaking ball pitchers who mix the two pitches almost equally and post ludicrous swinging strike rates. Anderson is at 17.4% for the year, while Giles is at 17.1% over his career. Giles has also had intermittent struggles with hard contact, though he seems to have worked through them en route to a 1.6 FIP this year. Anderson’s upside might not be quite that high, but his stuff is tremendous. Read the rest of this entry »

The Dodgers have acquired Jedd Gyorko from the Cardinals, adding a versatile player who can handle any position on the infield in a pinch to their mix of positionally-flexible infielders. He’s still on the IL at the moment with a wrist injury he sustained in early June, though he was expected to begin a rehab assignment today before the Cardinals traded him. Given his placement on the 60-day IL, he’ll be eligible to return to the majors in seven days, though his rehab assignment will likely last longer than that. In exchange for Gyorko, a smattering of cash to cover his contract, and international bonus money, the Cardinals received Tony Cingrani and Jeffry Abreu from the Dodgers.

If he’s healthy, Gyorko is the embodiment of the way the Dodgers build their roster. He’s an average-to-plus defender at second and third base, with sneaky range and steady hands. He’s also manned first for the Cardinals at times, and has performed adequately there. Need him to line up in the outfield? Okay, fine, he can’t do that — he’s only played two innings of left field in his professional career. Still, he’s a very Dodgers infielder, capable of standing wherever necessary and platooning at second base with Max Muncy.

Why platooning? Gyorko is a fearsome hitter against left-handers. He’s compiled a career .349 wOBA against lefties over 766 career PA, good for a 122 wRC+. He’s far less potent against righties — his .237/.298/.410 line works out to a .307 wOBA and 94 wRC+. The Dodgers as a team stack up poorly against lefties — Joc Pederson, Max Muncy, Cody Bellinger, Corey Seager, and Alex Verdugo are all left-handed, and all are starter-level talents.

The main right-handed bats the team uses to spell the starters are all injured. David Freese, Enrique Hernández, and Chris Taylor are all on the IL. Freese, in particular, is the kind of player Gyorko can emulate. He crushes lefties while playing a passable corner infield. His hamstring strain makes his return uncertain. Taylor isn’t exactly the kind of player Gyorko is, but with him on the shelf, the team can’t leave Seager in and slide Taylor to second against lefties, so Gyorko helps there too. Read the rest of this entry »

We’ve reached that time of year once again: the day when Mike Rizzo trades several intriguing prospects for bullpen relief. After earlier acquiring Daniel Hudson from the Blue Jays, the Nationals acquired Roenis Elías and Hunter Strickland from the Mariners in exchange for Aaron Fletcher, Elvis Alvarado, and Taylor Guilbeau. The Nats hope Elías and Strickland, who won’t be free agents until 2022, will be a stabilizing force in the middle of their bullpen for years to come, or at the very least a cromulent bridge to the stars of the pen.

As seems to happen every year, the Nationals came into 2019 with a plan to fix the bullpen. They signed Trevor Rosenthal and traded for Kyle Barraclough in the offseason, both interesting arms with velocity to spare and control issues. They also signed Tony Sipp just before the start of the season, promoted Tanner Rainey, who they acquired from the Reds in a Tanner swap with Tanner Roark, and signed Jonny Venters when the Braves released him in May. It’s clear, in other words, that they knew they had a bullpen problem and attempted to fix it.

As Nationals fans already know, they didn’t fix it. The Nationals bullpen has been among the worst in the majors this year. They’ve compiled a collective 5.99 ERA, last in baseball, and an equally horrific 5.07 xFIP (though their FIP is slightly better, at 4.80). As bad as that 5.99 ERA sounds, though, their results have been even worse than that due to poor timing. The bullpen has been worth -7.98 WPA, meaning they’ve cost the team a staggering eight wins on the year. Eight wins is the difference between fighting for a Wild Card spot, where the Nats find themselves now, and having the second-best record in the NL.

It’s safe to say that the team has a clear objective, but the way they’re addressing it differs from past years. They’ve previously traded middle relievers with years of team control left for dominant closers, sending Felipe Vázquez to the Pirates for Mark Melancon and Blake Treinen plus prospects to the A’s for Sean Doolittle and Ryan Madson. Those trades came back to bite the team — Vázquez and Treinen have since been among the most effective relievers in baseball, while Melancon and Madson left in free agency. Read the rest of this entry »

The Cubs and Blue Jays agreed to a trade this afternoon, sending David Phelps to the North Siders in exchange for pitching prospect Thomas Hatch. The Cubs are locked in a tight divisional race with the Cardinals and the Brewers, tied for first place entering today’s play. They are the favorites to win the division (we have their division odds at 56.8%), but they have been hampered by a weak bullpen all year. The Phelps trade is an attempt to shore their biggest weakness up.

The Cubs relief corps is a motley assortment of over-30 stalwarts (Steve Cishek, Brandon Kintzler, Brad Brach, and Pedro Strop), converted starters (Tyler Chatwood and new addition Derek Holland), and Craig Kimbrels (Craig Kimbrel). Out of the entire bullpen, only Kyle Ryan, Rowan Wick, and Kintzler have provided even 10 innings of sub-4 FIP performance, which explains the group’s collective 4.22 ERA, 4.66 FIP, and 0.1 WAR. While some of that dicey performance was traded (Mike Montgomery) or optioned to Triple-A (Carl Edwards Jr.), it’s still a position of need.

Can Phelps fulfill that need? It’s an interesting question, and Phelps is about as interesting as you can get for a journeyman reliever with 0 WAR on the year. As recently as 2016, Phelps was a dominant reliever (in his first year after converting from starting), throwing 86.2 innings and amassing a 2.28 ERA and 2.8 FIP. In the middle of a strong 2017, he was traded, as all players must eventually be, to the Mariners, where he promptly had elbow problems. A bone spur in his throwing arm cut that season short, and if that sounds ominous to you, it should: he subsequently tore his UCL in spring training, and missed all of 2018 and the start of 2019 recovering.

Before his injury, Phelps was a prototypical bullpen arm. He sat 94-95 with a sinker/four-seam combination and occasionally touched 98. The velocity hasn’t come back, at least not completely; he’s closer to 92-93 in his 17 appearances with the Blue Jays this year. To compensate for that lost velocity, he’s featured a cutter much more since returning (32.3% of his pitches this year). He also boasts a swooping curveball that he uses mainly as a change of pace. Read the rest of this entry »

If you just glanced at his player page for a second, you might think Lucas Giolito was falling apart. After a triumphant first half, during which he paired a 30% strikeout rate with a 9.5% walk rate on his way to a 3.15 ERA and 3.23 FIP, he made the All-Star team. And this was no automatic invite extended to the best available White Sox player; he was simply one of the best pitchers in baseball, running comparable park-adjusted numbers to Stephen Strasburg, Walker Buehler, and Zack Greinke.

From that great height, Giolito’s second half has had a rocky beginning. In three post-break starts, he’s compiled a 5.6 ERA, with a FIP over five. A lot of that ugliness is driven by a pasting at the hands of the Twins, when he allowed four home runs and seven runs over five innings, but it’s not as though there weren’t other warning signs. In his last pre-break start, he went only four innings against the Cubs, walking five batters on his way to giving up six earned runs. All told, it was a beyond-forgettable July for Giolito.

Situations like this are among the most difficult for writers to assess. Pitchers are fickle, and there’s no better example of that than Giolito. In parts of three seasons from 2016 to 2018, he was below replacement level, whether you’re into runs allowed or FIP; over 240 innings, he ran a 5.48 ERA and 5.68 FIP. He only struck out 16.2% of batters he faced while walking 11%. He still had some prospect shine, but projection systems weren’t buying it: ZiPS projected him for a 5.03 ERA in a lower-scoring environment than what we’ve realized in 2019, while Steamer foresaw an even higher 5.32 ERA.

Of course, Giolito proceeded to make those projections look ridiculous. Through 16 starts, roughly the first half of his season, he pitched nothing at all like the projections. That 30% strikeout rate was nearly double what the two projection systems expected, and his walk rate was significantly lower — you get the idea. Essentially, Giolito looked like an ace. If there was cause for concern, it was unsustainable home run suppression — he’d allowed a 9.7% HR/FB rate in the first half, and for a fly ball pitcher, that adds up. The point, though, is that Giolito went from replacement-level disappointment to deserving All-Star. Read the rest of this entry »

Recently, I’ve been pondering the strange way I think about HR/FB ratio. On one hand, it’s a way to explain away a hot or cold stretch from a hitter. When Joc Pederson got off to a blazing start this year, I looked at his HR/FB, a spicy 33.3% through the end of April, and told myself it was a small sample size phenomena. That’s the first way I use HR/FB for hitters — as a sanity check.

At the same time, HR/FB is something we’ve all used to explain someone’s power. Joey Gallo is powerful, obviously. How do we know that? Well, he hits the ball really hard, which gets expressed by more of his fly balls turning into home runs. Gallo had a 47.6% HR/FB at the end of April, and even though I didn’t expect that to continue, I was willing to accept high numbers for Gallo’s HR/FB much more easily than I was for Pederson.

This leaves HR/FB in a weird spot. It’s a number we use to see if players are getting lucky or unlucky relative to average, but it’s also a number we use to look for underlying skill. Problems arise when it’s unclear what is noise and what is signal. Is David Fletcher unlucky to have a 5.4% HR/FB? Surely not — he’s a contact hitter. Is Jose Ramirez unlucky to have a 6.5% HR/FB? I assume so, but I only assume so because he hit 39 home runs with a 16.9% HR/FB last year. What if last year was the outlier, not this one?

Another way to think about this conundrum is that HR/FB contains an inherent contradiction we have to work around mentally. Putting fly balls as the bottom of the ratio implies that all fly balls are created equal, and that’s clearly untrue. Gallo is unloading on the ball, crushing many of the fly balls he hits into orbit. Fletcher, meanwhile, sports one of the lowest average exit velocities in the game. Even though a home run counts the same for each, the population of fly balls is tremendously different. How do we handle this contradiction? Read the rest of this entry »

Watch a baseball game. Pick a side. Now, wait for a pitcher on the team you’re rooting for to fall behind in the count 3-0. It feels pretty bad, doesn’t it? There is, I think, no feeling quite like the helplessness that comes when your team is behind in the count 3-0. There are worse feelings, sure, even within the confines of baseball. There’s the feeling of losing a close game, coughing up a lead, or seeing a favorite player injured. Nothing is quite the same, though, as the long dread of trying to escape from 3-0.

Why does 3-0 feel so uneasy? I think it’s because there are no good quick ways out of the jam. You feel nervous, and you’re going to feel nervous for a while. Next pitch a ball? That’s disappointing for obvious reasons, but at least the tension is over. No, the real problem is that a strike doesn’t feel much better than a ball. So what are you hoping for? You certainly don’t want a swing — swings on 3-0 are tremendous for the batter.

Do you want a take, then? The pitcher grooves a fastball, and the batter watches it fly by? Sure, that’s probably the best outcome you can hope for in the situation, but that’s small consolation. Get a strike, and it’s still 3-1; time for another 30 seconds of watching your team in a tough situation. Even then, what are you hoping for? Batters are producing a .475 wOBA after 3-1 counts this year, better offensive production than any player in baseball’s overall line.

Even if, and this is a huge if, your team gets two straight strikes — now it’s 3-2. This is after a nerve-wracking minute of real time, potentially involving some loud foul contact. You’ve worried about walks for two straight pitches, wondered if the pitcher has it today, and still — 3-2 is a hitter’s count. At the beginning of the at-bat, if I told you it was headed for a 3-2 count, you wouldn’t have been happy. That’s the best case scenario after you reach 3-0. No wonder 3-0 feels so bad. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, FanGraphs wrapped up our annual Trade Value Series. As a window into teams’ valuation of players, it’s an invaluable resource, built as it is from a mixture of industry sources. One thing it isn’t, though, is a list of players we realistically expect to be traded. The top 10 players on the list, for example, have an average of six years of team control remaining, and all of them except Vladimir Guerrero Jr. play for teams that are currently contending. They’re great theoretical trade pieces, in other words, but not likely to actually be traded.

That conundrum, the fact that the most valuable players are among the least likely to be traded, has always been a feature of the exercise. Mike Trout topped the list for five straight years at one point, for example, and was quite literally too valuable for teams to be able to acquire, even if the Angels had been willing to deal him. Evan Longoria, likewise, was a repeat Trade Value champion, but his first extension with the Rays made him so valuable to the team that they couldn’t even contemplate moving him.

Most of the time, then, the Trade Value Series is more of a Theoretical Value Series. Most isn’t all, however, and that’s where this article comes in. One of the benefits of having 12 years of trade values is that we can look at things that don’t happen all that often. If only 1% of top-50 players get traded, we should still have six results in our sample. With the benefit of aggregation, then, let’s take a look at how often the trade in trade value comes into play.

The first question you probably have is how often a player on the Trade Value list gets traded at all. The answer to that is tricky. For example, here are the number of Top-50 and honorable mention players traded within the next year after appearing on a FanGraphs Trade Value list:

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