Calculating the WAR Threshold for Qualifying Offers
We recently went through the 2015 qualifying-offer season, the basic facts of which Five Thirty Eight’s Rob Arthur provided a helpfully summarized back in November. In that piece, Arthur asserts that “Each offer is essentially a bet that the player… will be worth 2 or more WAR in the coming year.” He adds that “the math works out so that teams tender offers to almost every remotely deserving free agent [and] [w]ithout fail, those free agents refuse them.” Arthur was writing before the deadline for players to accept their offers, and for the first time this year, there were players who accepted their qualifying offers (Brett Anderson, Colby Rasmus, Matt Wieters).
While teams may have been very liberal in giving out qualifying offers in the past, now that there is a precedence of players accepting the offers, teams will likely need to be more cautious about giving out offers in the future. This article attempts to build a model that determines at what WAR threshold it makes sense for teams to give out qualifying offers.
In order to keep this model relatively simple, we will assume that WAR is the only factor in play when determining whether a team should give out a qualifying offer to a player. In reality, WAR is likely the most important consideration, but far from the only one.
Let’s define the following terms:
- PWAR = Player’s projected WAR for the upcoming season
- P(accepts) = Probability the player accepts the qualifying offer
- P(rejects) = Probability the player rejects the qualifying offer
- P(signs | rejects) = Probability another team signs the player before next year’s amateur draft, given that the player rejects the qualifying offer from his original team
Note that P(accepts) + P(rejects) = 1, since a player must always either accept or reject the offer (these are the only possibilities).
We will now derive a formula for the expected value of change in team wins if the team gives out a qualifying offer. Under the terms of this model, team wins can change if the player accepts the offer, or if the player declines the offer and signs with another team before next year’s amateur draft, thus giving the first team a compensatory draft pick. Team wins can also change if the player declines his qualifying offer and the re-signs with the team, anyway, but this model will ignore that possibility.
Below is the formula in question. (Note that E denotes “expected value of.”)
E[change in team wins] = E[change in team wins if player accepts] + E[change in team wins if player rejects and signs with another team]
= E[change in team wins | Player accepts] * P(accepts) + E[change in team wins | Player rejects and signs with another team] * P(rejects and signs with another team)
= (PWAR – Qualifying offer salary) * P(accepts) + (WAR of compensation pick) * P(rejects) * P(sign | rejects)
= (PWAR – 2) * P(accepts) + 1 * P(rejects) * P(sign | rejects)
For the first expectation term, we reason that the change in team wins if the player accepts is the player’s projected WAR minus 2. This is because:
- The player will give the team PWAR more wins compared to a replacement-level player
- The $15.8 million dollars paid to the player could otherwise be used to signed a free agent with a WAR of 2
For the second expectation term, we use the reasoning from Arthur pieces that the compensatory draft pick offers about 1 WAR of value on average.
Now we want to enumerate P(accepts), P(rejects), and P(sign | rejects) in terms of PWAR. Let’s tackle P(accepts) first. This is not a particularly easy task, but we can be confident about these two data points:
- A replacement-level player with a PWAR of 0 will certainly accept the offer. By definition, a replacement-level player should be paid around the minimum salary, so if he is offered significantly more than that, he will be happy to take it.
- A player with a PWAR of 3 or higher will certainly reject the offer. Other teams will be willing to pay $15.8 million for 2 WAR of production. Coupled with the additional 1 WAR hit of surrendering a draft pick, that implies that other teams will be willing to pay $15.8 million for this player, and the player is going to get an offer of at least $15.8 million from some team.
Since P(rejects) = 1 – P(accepts), these two points also apply for P(rejects).
There are two similar data points for P(sign | rejects):
- Another team will certainly not sign a replacement-level player with a PWAR of 0, since they can sign another replacement-level player at around the minimum salary without surrendering a draft pick.
- Another team will certainly sign a player with a PWAR of 3, based on the same reasoning as above.
Let’s model these probabilities in the simplest way possible, with a linear function between these data points:
- P(accepts) = 1 – PWAR/3
- P(rejects) = P(sign | rejects) = PWAR/3
Plugging these functions back into the previous formula, we get
E[change in team wins] = -2/9*PWAR^2 + 5/3*PWAR – 2

A team will only want to give out a qualifying offer if the expected change in team wins is positive. Looking at this formula and graph, this is true if PWAR is greater than 1.5.
Now, let’s try to do a better job of modeling the probabilities. We know that since the large majority of qualifying offers are rejected (because the player thinks he can get more money and/or more years as a free agent), we can lower the values across the board of P(accepts), which also increases the values of P(rejects). Similarly, since the majority of players who reject the offer sign with another team before next year’s amateur draft, we can increase the values across the board of P(signs | rejects). Let’s try modeling these probabilities with exponential functions:
- P(accepts) = e^(-3*PWAR/2)
- P(rejects) = P(sign | rejects) = 1 – e^(-3*PWAR/2)
Note that for a projected WAR of 3, P(accepts) = 1.1% and P(rejects) = 98.9%. This isn’t exactly equal to the 0% and 100% values that we established earlier, but it is close enough.
Our new formula for expected changed in team wins is:
E[change in team wins] = (PWAR – 2) * e^(-3*PWAR/2) + (1 – e^(-3*PWAR/2)) ^ 2
This formula is much more complicated than the previous formula, but when you graph it, you see that it’s still a monotonically increasing function:

This function has a value of 0 when projected WAR is about 0.73, which means that the model suggests that teams should give out qualifying offers to players with a projected WAR of 0.73 or greater.
To make this model more precise, we should include other factors. Such factors would include attributes specific to individual players (such as the player’s age and injury history), specific to the different teams (such as roster budget and value of draft picks), and specific to the depth of the whole free agent class, among other things.
Roger works as a software engineer by day, writes for The Hardball Times and FanGraphs by night, and has also worked for a Major League club.


Love it Roger!
I doubt I’ll be the only person that is surprised it is that low, though it seems to have worked out for most clubs when they’ve offered them to mediocre players.
Looking at the guys who took the offers this year, it is hard to see exact corollaries between the three. I would say that for all three there are three things that are the same: they are young for free agents, they may have struggled to get a good long-term deal, and they have a good chance of not getting another QO next year. I think the last is a major consideration for players, who definitely don’t want to go year-to-year even at a high salary.
For Anderson and Wieters, a good season might mean another QO, but they also might be better positioned to succeed even with draft pick compensation. For Rasmus, I think there is something of a bet that he won’t get another QO. They will probably go up a good bit next year (maybe ~$17.5 million or so), and Rasmus’ already has by far the highest salary on the Astros. Are they going to do that again?
I think the QO decisions at the margins are kind of a game of chicken. They don’t really benefit either side in a lot of cases, but since the team get’s to offer first and then the player has to either accept or reject, the team is advantaged.
If Rasmus can continue to be a league-average CF, a 17.5M 1-year contract seems quite reasonable.
Cool stuff
One observation: The assumption is that with the $15.8 million can be spent for, on average, a 2 win player. In calculating for this, I do not see any reasonable adjustment for the expectation level that the team would actually RECEIVE that production. If there is a finite number of wins available on the FA market, we would need to find a way to calculate the odds of a team getting that production from the player(s) they substitute for the player not signing the QA. Obviously, in that calculation you would have to account for occasions where the player(s) acquired with the $15.8m outperform the 2 win expectation. however, I would expect that to be rare, while occasions where the player(s) acquired achieve less than 2 wins is much more plausible.
Just a thought, and if I am missing where this is factored in, by all means point that out. It would just seem to me that if we are pointing out the difference in a player accepting or declining the offer, the risk a team brings on by having to make a decision in the FA market would need to be factored somehow, accounting for “boom” or “bust” scenarios in FA signings.
The same adjustment would be made for the player you are offering the qualifying offer. Whether you are giving a QO or spending on the FA market, there is a chance you get a better or a worse outcome. As these are just median projections all around, you don’t need to worry about that.
The conclusion seems wrong to me. And I think it’s mainly in the function of the likelihood of the player accepting the offer.
According to the function, a projected 0.6 WAR player is only 40% likely to accept a qualifying offer of $15.8M for one year. But:
* Chase Utley is projected for 0.6 WAR by Steamer. He signed a one-year contract for $7M.
* Ryan Vogelson is projected for 0.6 WAR. He signed for $2M.
The function says there is a 35% chance than a 0.7 WAR player accepts a qualifying offer. But:
* Chris Young (OF) is projected for 0.7 WAR. He signed a contract for $13M over two years.
* Steve Pearce is projected for 0.7 WAR. He signed a one-year contract for $4.5
* Mike Napoli is projected for 0.7 WAR. He signed for $7M.
The function says there is a 26% chance than a 0.9 WAR player accepts a qualifying offer. But:
* A.J. Pierzynski is projected for 0.9 WAR. He signed for $3M.
* Nori Aoki is projected for 0.9 WAR. He signed for $5.5.
* Dioner Navarro is projected for 0.9 WAR. He signed for $4M.
I didn’t look at every free-agent contract, but I think these illustrate that the function is underestimating how likely these players would have been to accept a qualifying offer.
I think the shape of the curve is part of the problem. You only have to be barely above replacement before the model predicts there’s a 1 in 4 chance you’d reject a qualifying offer. I think the actual behaviors would look more like a dose response curve, with players below 1 WAR being highly likely to accept the offer, players above a certain threshold (2 WAR? 2.5?) being highly likely to reject it, and all of the real action in the curve coming in the middle area, where the likely hood of accepting would fall off fairly quickly.
Thanks for your comment. I agree with you, we could make a better model for the P(accepts) function. I chose to use an exponential function more so as a matter of convenience rather than accuracy, as the math was already fairly complicated as it is.
Ideally, we would base the function on previous data of players’ decisions, but given that only 3 people have ever accepted the offer, this isn’t possible.