Archive for Daily Graphings

Still on the Board (for Now): Ian Kennedy

It’s mid-January, a time when the baseball calendar is usually dominated by the arbitration process and the lead-up thereto, the excitement of the exchanging of figures, pre-hearing settlements, etc. Not in 2016. Material free agents remain unsigned, from Justin Upton, Yoenis Cespedes, Dexter Fowler and friends on the position player side to Yovani Gallardo and Ian Kennedy among pitchers.

Recently, we discussed the respective statuses of Gallardo and new Marlin Wei-Yin Chen in this space. Today, it’s Kennedy’s turn in the barrel. Only very recently has even a hint of a whisper of the recent Padre’s name been uttered in the rumor mill. As we speak, the Royals appear to be homing in on Kennedy. What is his appropriate market value, and is Kansas City a destination where he can thrive?

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Players with Abnormally Strong Walk Years Get Paid More

There is enough literature out there to debunk the theory that players generally play better in the year prior to free agency. Anecdotally speaking, this season, we saw top pitchers like Johnny Cueto, Zack Greinke, and David Price have solid years in line with their established levels. Jason Heyward and Justin Upton also produced seasons that resembled their career numbers. Meanwhile, Ian Desmond, Jeff Samardzija — and, to a lesser extent, Alex Gordon and Jordan Zimmermann — did not quite live up to prior years. The two biggest examples of players with out-of-the-ordinary walk years, Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis, remain unsigned into the middle of January. Out of the top 11 free agents, just two had abnormally strong walk years. Just because the walk-year performance is a myth, that doesn’t mean that players who do perform extraordinarily well receive less in the way of compensation than their more consistent counterparts.

Examining recent contracts, we can attempt to determine if those players who had big jumps in their walk-year performance were paid more than those with more consistently strong performances. Over the past ten offseasons, 39 hitters have received contracts in excess of $50 million. While a broader look at all free agents might reveal a few more interesting players, I set a floor to examine only those free agents who could have benefited substantially from big walk years, as well as similar contracts for those without the same leap in performance during the final season of their contracts.

To establish those players with big walk years, I performed a simple, Marcel-like calculation (weighting seasons by multipliers of 5, 4, and 3) of the WAR of a player’s three previous seasons to establish a base of expectations for their walk-year performance. Then, I looked at the player’s walk-year performance as a comparison. Due to survivorship bias, this group does not represent an appropriate dataset to debunk the walk-year myth, given that most players who would perform poorly (e.g. Ian Desmond) in their walk year have already been purposefully removed. It is interesting to note, however, that only 15 of 39 (38%) players had big jumps in their walk years. Eighteen players (46%) were fairly close to their expected WAR, while another six (15%) had down years (defined here as a 40% drop or worse) ahead of free agency. On average, the group of 39 players was just 0.7 WAR (18%) better in their walk year despite the survivorship bias issue.

Below is a chart with the players who exceeded their expected WAR by 50% or more in their walk years, including Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis. Players are sorted in order of percentage by which they exceeded their expected win totals (denoted as % Over Exp. WAR).

Abnormally High Walk Year WAR: 2006-2015
WAR FA-3 Year WAR FA-2 Year WAR FA-1 Year wAVG WAR Walk Year WAR Diff in WAR %Over Exp. WAR
Victor Martinez 2.1 0.0 0.8 0.9 4.3 3.4 401.0%
Nelson Cruz 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 3.7 2.5 200.0%
Yoenis Cespedes 2.9 2.4 3.3 2.9 6.7 3.8 131.0%
Adrian Beltre 2.9 3.9 2.1 2.9 6.4 3.5 120.7%
Adam Dunn 2.9 0.6 1.1 1.4 3.0 1.6 116.9%
Jose Reyes 5.9 0.7 2.5 2.8 5.9 3.2 114.5%
Jason Bay 5.2 -1.0 3.0 2.2 4.6 2.4 107.5%
Shin-Soo Choo 6.0 1.5 2.3 3.0 5.5 2.5 85.9%
Carl Crawford 3.3 2.7 5.9 4.2 7.7 3.5 84.1%
Gary Matthews 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.1 3.9 1.8 82.8%
Alfonso Soriano 5.1 2.2 2.4 3.0 5.4 2.4 79.5%
Chris Davis 2.1 7.0 0.8 3.2 5.6 2.4 75.5%
Russell Martin 2.4 2.0 4.1 3.0 5.0 2.0 68.1%
Aaron Rowand 5.8 3.8 1.2 3.2 5.4 2.2 67.9%
Jacoby Ellsbury -0.2 9.4 1.2 3.6 5.6 2.0 56.3%
Mark Teixeira 5.9 3.5 4.4 4.5 6.9 2.4 54.2%
Alex Rodriguez 6.6 9.1 3.8 6.3 9.6 3.3 53.2%

Given the nature of big free agents, it would be easy to suggest that teams ought to avoid paying big money to players who have huge walk years. On the other hand, that wisdom is relevant to all free agents, as many fail to return complete value for the signing team. Many of the deals above are still ongoing. The Adrian Beltre contract has been fantastic, while Nelson Cruz and Russell Martin have been solid deals thus far.

One easy way to determine if the members of the above group are being paid more than they would have been in the absence of their giant walk year, would be to simply add up the years and salaries and compare the totals to those produced by the player who didn’t produce unexpectedly strong walk years. The above group’s average contract went for 5.9 years and $109.5 million, for an average of $18.6 million per year. Removing the six walk-year underperformers, we are left with 18 players who were within expectations in their walk year. Those 18 players received contracts averaging 5.6 years and $102.8 million, for an average of $18.4 million per year. A slightly higher guarantee in a group of players this small could lead to the conclusion that the big walk year provides some extra benefit. However, this could also be mitigated by the fact that the big-walk-year group had an average WAR of 5.5 during the walk year, while the other group’s average WAR was 3.8 in the walk year. Given that number, it might be fair to say that the walk year is of no benefit.

The evidence so far would lead you to believe that players who have unexpectedly big seasons in their walk year do not see a benefit from that great year. However, we can delve a bit further. Just because they receive the same amount of money, and just because their WAR was higher in their respective walk years, that does not necessarily mean their talent level and expected production over the course of the contract was necessarily higher. By creating an expected contract based on their present talent level, we can better compare who is getting paid more relative to expected production.

To calculate these expected-contract terms, I first set about determining the level of production one could expect from each player in the first year of his new contract. To do this, I used the same method as above, taking each player’s previous three years and weighting them (5, 4, 3 with normal aging). Then, using the first year WAR total, I projected WAR totals over the life of the contract using standard aging curves (-0.5 WAR/year age-31 to age-36, -0.75 WAR/year at age-37 and beyond). That WAR was translated into dollar figures by using $8 million per WAR this season and subtracting $250,000 every year for the value of a win at contract start date. Over the course of the contract, 5% inflation per year was used when valuing a win. Note that for contract years I’ve used the same figures as each player actually received. While it is possible to create an expectation for more or fewer years, using the same length for each expected contract allows for easier overall comparison.

The projected dollar figures overshot the actual dollar figures by about 15%, and there are certainly a few valid reasons for this: (1) it is possible that high market hitters are slightly undervalued when compared to all of free agency, especially pitchers and those who take mid-sized deals, (2) it is possible that the dollar-per-win estimates used are a bit high, and (3) some regression toward the mean might be necessary. While not necessarily solving the above problems, but helping to more easily show the difference between the big walk year group and the rest, the expected figures were downsized to meet the totals actually handed out.

The average expected value of the contract for the average walk year players was higher than those that had a big walk year, but as we know from above, the players with the big walk year got paid a bit more. To be clear, the average walk year players are not players who are average relative to Major League Baseball, but put up a performance that was average for them in their walk years. The chart below shows the difference between the groups.

Effect of a Big Walk Year on Free Agent Contract
Group (No.) Expected $ (in M) Actual $ (in M) Difference
Walk Year Bump (15) 101.6 109.5 $7.9 M
Walk Year AVG (18) 112.8 102.8 -$10.0 M
Walk Year Decline (6) 86.3 96.5 $10.2 M

The walk year decliners have been included mainly to separate themselves from the players who had average years. With just six players who had surprisingly poor walk years, not much can be shown, but the decline did not appear to have had much of an effect on the individual contracts in that group. As for the players with the big walk year, the difference in expectations between those players who produced a typical year is nearly $18 million over the life of a contract.

In looking at the individual numbers, which I will show in full below, there is a major outlier in Jason Heyward, whose projection had him getting a massive $300 million payday. A few other players are out there, but not quite to that level. Even taking Heyward away, there is still a difference between groups.

Effect of a Big Walk Year on Free Agent Contract (w/o Heyward)
Group (No.) Expected $ (in M) Actual $ (in M) Difference
Walk Year Bump (15) 101.6 109.5 $7.9 M
Walk Year AVG (17) 101.8 98.0 -$3.8 M
Walk Year Decline (6) 86.3 96.5 $10.2 M

Admittedly, 39 players is not a lot of data — nor is the addition of Cespedes, Davis, or Upton likely to move the needle much this offseason unless they end up taking less than $100 million. Looking into the individual numbers, over the last ten years, the players who had a big walk year were more likely to be overpaid relative to expected production and highly unlikely to be underpaid.

While it is not definitive, there is some evidence to suggest that players benefit from having big walk years compared to similarly situated free agents.

*****

Here’s the full chart of free agents in their walk years. Note that Victor Martinez appears twice; he signed two contracts.

Free Agent Performance in Walk Years
Exp Walk WAR Walk Year WAR Diff %Over Exp. WAR AGE at k Exp. WAR First Year of k Years of k Exp WAR Exp. $ Actual $ DIff $
Victor Martinez 0.9 4.3 3.4 401.0% 36 1.6 4 3.1 21.3 68.0 -46.7
Nelson Cruz 1.2 3.7 2.5 200.0% 34 1.8 4 4.2 28.8 58.0 -29.2
Yoenis Cespedes 2.9 6.7 3.8 131.0% 30 4.5 6 19.5 145.3
Adrian Beltre 2.9 6.4 3.5 120.7% 31 3.8 5 14.2 87.2 80.0 7.2
Adam Dunn 1.4 3.0 1.6 116.9% 31 1.3 4 2.4 14.3 56.0 -41.7
Jose Reyes 2.8 5.9 3.2 114.5% 28 3.5 6 18.0 117.7 106.0 11.7
Jason Bay 2.2 4.6 2.4 107.5% 31 2.2 4 5.8 33.4 66.0 -32.6
Shin-Soo Choo 3.0 5.5 2.5 85.9% 31 2.9 7 9.9 71.3 130.0 -58.7
Carl Crawford 4.2 7.7 3.5 84.1% 29 5.9 7 33.8 219.1 142.0 77.1
Gary Matthews 2.1 3.9 1.8 82.8% 32 2.5 5 7.5 44.3 50.0 -5.7
Alfonso Soriano 3.0 5.4 2.4 79.5% 31 3.1 8 11.2 71.9 136.0 -64.1
Chris Davis 3.2 5.6 2.4 75.5% 30 4.4 6 18.9 141.2
Russell Martin 3.0 5.0 2.0 68.1% 32 3.5 5 12.5 88.1 82.0 6.1
Aaron Rowand 3.2 5.4 2.2 67.9% 30 3.6 5 13.0 70.9 60.0 10.9
Jacoby Ellsbury 3.6 5.6 2.0 56.3% 30 5.1 7 25.2 181.5 153.0 28.5
Mark Teixeira 4.5 6.9 2.4 54.2% 29 5.2 8 31.1 192.0 180.0 12.0
Alex Rodriguez 6.3 9.6 3.3 53.2% 32 7.0 10 45.0 282.6 275.0 7.6
Jorge Posada 3.9 5.6 1.7 43.0% 36 4.1 4 12.6 66.9 52.4 14.5
Prince Fielder 3.4 4.7 1.3 37.6% 28 4.3 9 28.2 200.7 214.0 -13.3
Torii Hunter 2.4 3.2 0.8 32.9% 32 2.2 5 6.0 32.7 90.0 -57.3
Jhonny Peralta 2.9 3.8 0.9 31.4% 32 3.1 4 9.4 62.4 53.0 9.4
Aramis Ramirez 3.0 3.7 0.7 24.7% 29 3.4 5 14.0 82.7 75.0 7.7
Jason Heyward 4.9 6.0 1.1 21.8% 26 5.1 8 37.8 298.7 184.0 114.7
Jayson Werth 4.5 5.1 0.6 14.4% 32 4.5 7 20.8 134.8 126.0 8.8
Justin Upton 3.2 3.6 0.4 11.9% 28 3.1 6 15.6 117.0
Nick Swisher 3.6 4.0 0.4 11.9% 31 3.9 4 12.6 80.9 56.0 24.9
Victor Martinez 3.2 3.5 0.3 10.5% 32 2.4 4 6.6 39.4 50.0 -10.6
Hanley Ramirez 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.6% 31 3.2 4 9.8 67.2 88.0 -20.8
Pablo Sandoval 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5% 28 2.6 5 11.5 81.0 95.0 -14.0
B.J. Upton 3.4 3.3 -0.1 -2.5% 28 3.1 5 14.0 92.5 75.3 17.3
Matt Holliday 5.7 5.4 -0.3 -5.8% 30 5.4 7 27.3 170.4 120.0 50.4
Josh Hamilton 4.8 4.4 -0.4 -7.4% 32 4.7 5 18.5 121.9 125.0 -3.1
Chase Headley 4.6 4.2 -0.4 -8.7% 31 4.3 4 14.2 97.4 52.0 45.4
Robinson Cano 6.4 5.8 -0.6 -10.0% 31 5.7 10 33.0 259.1 240.0 19.1
J.D. Drew 4.7 4.2 -0.5 -10.0% 31 4.3 5 16.5 86.2 70.0 16.2
Brian McCann 3.1 2.8 -0.3 -10.2% 30 2.6 5 8.0 54.5 85.0 -30.5
Carlos Lee 3.5 1.9 -1.6 -45.8% 31 2.3 6 6.5 39.5 100.0 -60.5
Alex Gordon 5.4 2.8 -2.6 -47.7% 32 3.8 4 12.2 86.2 72.0 14.2
Albert Pujols 7.8 4.0 -3.8 -48.8% 32 5.5 10 30.0 219.8 240.0 -20.2
Derek Jeter 4.6 2.3 -2.3 -50.3% 37 3.1 3.0 7.1 41.3 51.0 -9.7
Ben Zobrist 5.4 2.1 -3.3 -61.2% 35 3.5 4 10.8 76.5 56.0 20.5
Curtis Granderson 4.4 1.6 -2.8 -63.4% 33 2.8 4 8.2 54.4 60.0 -5.6

How Zach Britton Blew His Saves

There were only four of them. Blown saves, that is. I presume you’ve read the title. Zach Britton blew four saves last year, which actually isn’t a particularly noteworthy fact. Britton blew four saves in 40 tries, which is great, but it certainly wasn’t the best, and Britton blew four saves the year before too, in one more try. It’s great but not spectacular, especially relative to Britton’s season as a whole, which was both great and spectacular and plenty of other adjectives like awesome (in the literal sense of actually inspiring awe) or remarkable or astonishing or breathtaking or historic. Britton struck out nearly a third of all batters he faced and posted the highest ground ball rate in history. That’s spectacular. “History” in this case dates back to just 2002, but Britton stands alone at the top by a comfortable margin, 3.5 standard deviations above the mean and a full standard deviation above the guy in third place. History doesn’t reach back super far in this instance, but given the magnitude of his lead, we can expect Britton’s place in history to continue for some time, given Britton doesn’t go and break his own record.

The save is a mostly silly statistic anyway, which by proxy makes it’s cousin, the blown save, equally frivolous. But what if I told you that simply by watching how Zach Britton blew his four saves in 2015, you’d come away knowing more about Zach Britton, more about the nature of saves and blown saves, and maybe more about other things, too? Well, you’d either continue reading the blog post or you wouldn’t. That’s what would happen if I told you what I just told you. I’d prefer that you continue reading the blog post, but let’s be honest it’s 2016 and you’ve probably got a phone to look at, so really you could just scan the moving pictures and get the gist. I’m not gonna lie to you. Just know that my words would feel left out and sad. 🙁
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Jake Odorizzi: A Budding Craftsman on his Development

Jake Odorizzi is a wanted man. The 25-year-old right-hander is reportedly a trade target for multiple teams this offseason. It’s easy to see why. Last year, in his second full season with the Tampa Bay Rays, Odorizzi logged a 3.35 ERA and a 3.61 FIP over 28 starts. Arbitration eligible after the coming campaign, he’s under team control four more years.

Odorizzi isn’t a power pitcher, nor is he a control artist. He’s certainly not a sinker-baller. What he does is mix-and-match with a full repertoire that includes a riding fastball and a dipping splitter. Thoughtful in his approach, he might be best described as budding craftsman.

Odorizzi, who remains a Ray for the time being — Tampa Bay’s interest in dealing him is of course speculative — discussed his development in the final week of September.

———

Odorizzi on his 2015 season: “The biggest change from last year to this year is maturity. I’m learning the league, plus there’s the confidence you gain. As a rookie, everything is kind of an unknown, and now I have a better idea of what to expect. That’s been big, given all of the injuries we had early on. Chris Archer and I have had to grow, and step up to fill the void. Even with as young as we are, we’re kind of the veteran guys in the rotation. Circumstances forced us to have what I guess you could call an older approach. Read the rest of this entry »


Dee Gordon’s Biggest Improvement

I’m not going to lie to you — I didn’t think much of Dee Gordon. Two years ago, I thought he was barely a big-leaguer. Even last year, when the Dodgers sent Gordon to the Marlins, I thought the Marlins were buying high on a utility sort. I was critical of the move when I wrote up the trade, and I felt pretty strongly, and now it’s been another year, and the Marlins have signed Gordon to a five-year deal worth $50 million. And now it’s not a case of the Marlins overpaying. It’s a case of Gordon having proven me wrong. The Dee Gordon that exists now is considerably better than the versions that have come before.

Overall, it’s not like the player profile has changed that much. Gordon puts the bat on the ball, and he puts the ball on the ground, and his legs take him toward first faster than some cars take people to work. Gordon will forever be built like someone who could fit in a suitcase, so you can’t expect any kind of power, but the selling point is his mobility. He can move as a hitter and he can move as a defender, so his game is almost about pure athleticism. Gordon has all the same general skills — he’s just added some polish, and in order for that process to occur, he had to leave Los Angeles for Miami. Only there did he meet the man who could get the most out of his tools.

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Projecting Baseball’s Freakiest Pitcher

We don’t talk a whole lot about minimums, even though we’re always using them. Sometimes the minimums are obvious, but other times, they’re completely arbitrary. For example, let’s use a minimum of 60 innings pitched last season. Going from there, you could say the Yankees have assembled something hilarious, when you sort pitchers by strikeout rate:

  1. Aroldis Chapman, 41.7% strikeouts
  2. Andrew Miller, 40.7%
  3. Dellin Betances, 39.5%

If you were to just bump the minimum down to 50 innings, though — which would be perfectly defensible — then you get an intruder to spoil the party.

  1. Chapman, 41.7%
  2. Miller, 40.7%
  3. Kenley Jansen, 40.0%

Adjusting minimums is one of those ways you get to sort of manipulate the statistics. If not that, directly, then you get to manipulate statistical arguments. And, you know, while we’re playing around with minimums, why don’t we just drop the minimum to 30 innings, for fun, and-

  1. Carter Capps, 49.2%
  2. Chapman, 41.7%
  3. Miller, 40.7%

You forgot about Carter Capps. Un-forget about him. See, at the end of this post, I have a question for you. I want to know your guess for Capps’ 2016 strikeout rate. It’s a simple and straightforward poll, but before we get to that, we need to talk about Capps so you remember fully what he’s all about.

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A Thorough Consideration of Ian Kennedy

You probably didn’t wake up today thinking “today I’d like to read something about Ian Kennedy.” That’s fine. You probably didn’t wake up yesterday thinking “today I’d like to read something about Wei-Yin Chen” or “today I’d like to read something about the Marlins,” but both those things got folded into the same post. It’s the middle of January. This isn’t the time of year when people are thinking about baseball. Even when people are thinking about baseball, they’re only very infrequently thinking about Ian Kennedy. Even he knows he’s not the most high-profile starting pitcher around.

It’s just — okay: Posts have to be written. They might as well be written about what’s going on. And at the moment, Kennedy remains a free agent, with reports indicating his market has heated up. At any moment now, Kennedy could officially end up with a new employer, and he’s going to get a mid-eight-figure deal. Maybe it’s going to come from the Royals. Maybe it’s going to come from the Orioles or somebody else, but a deal will materialize. Right now Kennedy is of some interest, so it’s time for him to be thoroughly considered. The following will be conducted with points and counterpoints.

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FG on Fox: The Case for the Cardinals’ Big Move

Yesterday, Ken Rosenthal published a piece at Fox, suggesting that the St. Louis Cardinals don’t need to chase any more high-end free agents after finishing as runner-up in both the Jason Heyward and David Price sweepstakes. Their willingness to put something close to $200 million in guaranteed money on the table for each of those two players shows that the Cardinals had money to spend this winter, and so far, they’ve also reallocated $92.5 million of that money to three free agents: starter Mike Leake, reliever Jonathan Broxton, and catcher Brayan Pena. As Rosenthal notes, these depth pieces add to an already deep roster, and the team has internal options to replace Heyward.

But I’m going to disagree with my esteemed colleague’s conclusion anyway. In summation of his argument, he wrote the following.

The Cardinals never panic when constructing their roster; people within the industry routinely laud general manager John Mozeliak for staying disciplined. Mozeliak will jump on a remaining free agent only if he views the price as too good to ignore. And if the team stumbles, he can react before the July 31 non-waiver deadline, when he normally does some of his best work.

It is certainly true that the Cardinals can go into the 2016 season with their roster as it stands, and if it proves to be insufficient to keep up with the Cardinals and Pirates, they could go out and make second half improvements, as suggested. However, I’d suggest that taking advantage of a soft market for the remaining free agent outfielders is a better path forward.

Read the rest on Fox Sports.


The Decline of Carlos Gonzalez: Star Player

It’s tough to admit that time has begun to pass you by. This is how we end up with middle-aged woman wearing Phat Farm sneakers at the mall or that 60-year-old dude who only shoots threes and never gets back on defense playing basketball at the rec with the college kids every day. And, hey, I’m not here to judge those folks. Matter of fact, I respect the hell out of them. The old dude can really splash and the mom just values her children’s opinion and wants their adoration. I’m sure she’s a wonderful parent, albeit one with a very questionable fashion sense. At the end of the day, it comes down to whatever makes you happy, and if wearing Phat Farm sneakers or being the local wellness center’s version of Mike Miller is what makes you happy, then do it up!

Take the Rockies, for example. Following Tuesday’s acquisition of Gerardo Parra, it’s a near-certainty that the Rockies will be trading an outfielder. The most probable outfielder to be moved is Carlos Gonzalez, at least if the rumors we’ve heard over the last year-plus are any indication. And so if they want to ask for two top-100 prospects in exchange for Gonzalez, then, sure, more power to ’em! If that’s what makes them happy. They’re never going to get two top-100 prospects for Carlos Gonzalez, but there’s no harm in hoping.

There used to be a time when Gonzalez would have commanded two top-100 prospects or better. From 2010 to -13, Gonzalez was a top-25 hitter and a top-25 overall position player, according to WAR. He was a legitimate star. He hit both lefties and righties, he ran the bases well, he was a lock for 20 homers as well as for 20 steals, and the defense graded out fine in the corners. The only thing that ever kept from CarGo from elevating himself from star to superstar status was that he had trouble staying on the field. When he wasn’t hurt, though, there weren’t many better than CarGo.

Thing about injuries, though, is that they’ll take a toll on you quick. Gonzalaz fractured his right wrist way back in the minors, and in 2011, it started hurting again, sending him to the disabled list. The next year it was a hamstring. Then it was a finger sprain in his right hand, then a tumor on his left hand the following year that required surgical removal. The big one came later in 2014 — left knee surgery to repair a torn patellar tendon. Gonzalez remained mostly healthy in 2015, aside from the occasional day off due to “tired legs,” “right knee discomfort,” “sprained left hand,” or the ever-present “flu-like symptoms.” But these last couple years, after the hand surgery and the knee surgery, Gonzalez hasn’t looked like himself.
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August Fagerstrom FanGraphs Chat — 1/13/16

11:32
august fagerstrom: heyyo! back online. we’ll start this thing up around the top of the hour

12:11
august fagerstrom: I’m here!

12:11
august fagerstrom: Was putting the finishing touches on my post. Apologies. Will run longer than usual to make up for it

12:13
august fagerstrom: Chat soundtrack: all things Bowie

12:14
Steve: Who has the most long term value: Daniel Norris, Aaron Nola, Raisel Iglesias or Chi Chi Gonzalez?

12:14
august fagerstrom: Iglesias/Nola are in a tier for me, then Norris and then Gonzalez

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