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Maybe we should have seen this coming. It was pretty clear that the Braves were going to trade an outfielder this winter, with both Justin Upton and Jason Heyward entering their final season before they became free agents, and the team apparently preferring to employ Evan Gattis as a left fielder rather than as a catcher. The team tried to re-sign Heyward when they spent last year locking up their young core, but found his price prohibitive, so he almost certainly wasn’t staying in Atlanta beyond the 2015 season, and the Braves probably aren’t good enough to be pushing all of their chips in for the upcoming season.

So, trading Heyward now makes a good amount of sense for the Braves, and they made it clear that acquiring starting pitching was their #1 priority this winter. A natural trade partner would have a hole in right field, some rotation depth, and the potential desire and ability to try and sign Heyward to a long-term deal before hit the open market next winter. No team in baseball fit that description as well as the St. Louis Cardinals, so while we didn’t hear any pre-deal rumors of the deal that sent Shelby Miller and Tyrell Jenkins to Atlanta for Heyward and Jordan Walden, it feels like we should have anticipated something like this. It’s the kind of move that seemingly makes a lot of sense for both sides.

We’ll start with the Cardinals side of things, since they’re acquiring the best player in this deal. Jason Heyward is a stud, and you don’t even have to buy into defensive metrics to agree with that statement. For 2015, Steamer projects him at +4.5 WAR per 600 plate appearances, the 16th highest total of any position player in baseball, and that’s with him grading out as just a slightly above average defender: the +10 fielding projection right field adds up to a +3.5 DEF rating, which includes the positional adjustment for playing a corner spot. In terms of forecast defensive value, Heyward’s projection puts him in roughly a similar group to guys like David Wright, Robinson Cano, Pablo Sandoval, and Josh Reddick.

It’s also a significant step back from what he’s done previously, as his career DEF/600 PA rating is +10. In other words, Steamer is projecting Heyward to take a big step back defensively and still be one of the best players in the game, because the forecast sees a 25 year old with a career 117 wRC+ and positive contact rate trends, so it thinks Heyward is on the verge of a big offensive breakout. From a purely offensive standpoint, Steamer expects Heyward to be as good (or slightly better than) the good Upton, Matt Kemp, Ryan Braun, or Hanley Ramirez. If you combine the offensive level of those players with above average defensive value, well, you’re left with a superstar.

And that’s why the Cardinals have to be pretty thrilled with this move. They’re legitimately getting one of the best young players in baseball, and at the only position where they had a glaring need. Adding Heyward to fill their right field hole will end up being one of the largest improvements any team makes this winter. The question for the Cardinals is how long they’ll get to keep him.

Because of how quickly he got to the big leagues, Heyward is in line to hit free agency after his age-25 season, and he’s going to have roughly +25 career WAR when he reaches the open market. Barring a disastrous 2015 season, he’s going to get paid, and you can be certain that his agents will be pointing to the 13 year, $325 million deal that Giancarlo Stanton has agreed to as the new precedent. Sure, Heyward isn’t going to get 13/$325M, given the massive differences in power, but it seems likely that he’ll demand a deal that starts at 10 years and goes north of $200 million.

Robinson Cano got $240 million as a similarly valuable player entering his age-31 season; Heyward might not have Cano’s offensive track record, but he’s going to be selling his prime years, and the deal won’t extend into the period of his career where you’d expect him to essentially be worthless. If the Cardinals want to lock up Heyward before he gets to free agency, it’s probably going to take something like the contract they refused to give Albert Pujols. Maybe they might be able get him to take a slight pre-free agent discount and get him for 9/$200M or something in that range, but let’s dispel the notion that the Cardinals are going to be able to sign Heyward for anything other than a mountain of cash.

The team definitely has the means to take on a contract like that. They only have $73 million in committed contracts for next season, and Matt Holliday’s contract expires at the end of the 2016 season, so they have the flexibility to make Heyward a franchise-player type offer. And they do have a history of acquiring players on the cusp of free agency, only to convince them to stick around instead, but stretching for a single player the way Heyward will require would be something new for this front office.

For now, this has to be viewed as a rental. A rental with a chance to purchase, perhaps, but this isn’t a trade-and-sign deal like we’ve seen with the R.A. Dickey or Martin Prado trades the last few years. The Cardinals are getting a great right fielder, but they’re only guaranteed to get him for one year, and then it’s either a really large long-term commitment or settling for the compensation pick that comes from letting a premium free agent walk away at year’s end. There’s a non-zero chance that the long-term return on this deal for St. Louis will be minimal.

But the short-term upgrade is huge, especially if they flip Peter Bourjos for a starting pitcher to replace Miller, which shouldn’t be too terribly difficult. Having Heyward/Walden/Pitcher To Be Named instead of Bourjos/Miller/Jenkins could be a three or four win upgrade in 2015, depending on what kind of starter they get in return, and that’s three or four wins in a year in which marginal upgrades are going to be extremely valuable to the Cardinals.

Adam Wainwright is probably just about finished as an ace, and is headed for a decline. Yadier Molina won’t be able to hit forever. Holliday isn’t a spring chicken anymore. The Cardinals have plenty of good young talent, but their best players are getting worse, and the Cardinals needed a significant upgrade to put themselves in position to win the NL Central once again. This move does just that.

The long-term cost will essentially boil down to what you believe Shelby Miller is. Is he a top-flight young pitcher, the guy who has produced +6 WAR by runs allowed in 370 big league innings, and just turned 24? or is he a two-pitch tease, overrated by run prevention, heading for a short-term crash when his mediocre peripherals catch up with him? A strong case could be made for both outcomes.

Miller throws a lot of fastballs up in the zone, and as Eno noted through multiple conversations with pitchers this year, high fastballs can produce some terrific results, often inducing a lot of useless contact that isn’t captured in FIP-type metrics. If Miller’s approach to pitching up with a good fastball makes him a guy who can sustain a BABIP in the .270-.280 range, the underwhelming strikeout rates become a lot less problematic. If you’re a Braves fan who wants to be excited about this deal, here’s the first ~400 IP comparison you want to use.

Cain was always better at home run prevention than Miller, but the template is similar, and it’s certainly possible that Miller is a (somewhat worse) new version of the Cain skillset. If Miller’s FIP-beating ways prove sustainable to a significant degree, picking up four discounted years of a quality young arm is a very solid return for a single year of Heyward, especially if the Braves don’t see themselves as strong contenders in 2015.

But Cain is notable because most pitchers can’t do what he’s done, and not every young hurler who posts a low BABIP for 400 innings is definitely going to follow in his footsteps. Here’s another, less-rosy comparison for Miller, again with career performance through the equivalent of two full seasons.

A couple of years ago, the arguments for Hellickson were the same as they are for Miller today. Maybe he’s just good at inducing a lot of popups, and because he’s a flyball guy, he’s always going to run lower than average BABIPs, so he’s underrated by metrics that focus only on walks, strikeouts, and home runs or ground balls. Hellickson managed to keep things going through age-25, and then promptly fell apart, pitching poorly and getting injured. The Rays just shipped him to Arizona for two lower level prospects rather than bet on him returning to prior form.

More often than not, guys who post big gaps between their ERAs and their FIPs regress towards the latter, which is why FIP and xFIP work for most pitchers. It doesn’t mean Miller is definitely not an outlier, but he probably isn’t at outlier to the degree that he’s been so far, and he’s probably more of an okay pitcher than a very good one.

But even four years of an okay young arm is pretty valuable. After all, we’re looking at league average starters making $10-$12 million per year in free agency, and Miller will a little more than the league minimum this year, with three below-market arbitration years to follow. Even if Miller is more of a solid arm than a future ace, the Braves are getting a lot more quantity of value here, and they’re allocating it into the years where they think they might be more able to contend.

And Miller isn’t the only thing they’re getting. Tyrell Jenkins was a first round pick a couple of years ago, and while he’s battled arm problems since, Kiley McDaniel remains somewhat intrigued by his potential. Here’s Kiley’s updated take on Jenkins:

Jenkins missed the first half of 2014 recovering from shoulder surgery on a muscle in his shoulder (not the joint itself), something that had been bothering him for years. He turned 22 in the middle of this season and was understandably a bit rusty in half a season at High-A, but started to find his stride in the Arizona Fall League, where I scouted him a few weeks ago. He sat 92-94 and hit 96 mph, flashing above average fastball life at times, with an above average 80-83 mph hard curveball and a changeup at 81-84 mph that’s average when he keeps it down in the zone.

He’s incredibly athletic and the breaking ball has flashed plus at higher velocites, so there could still be even more in the tank than what I saw. I’d like to get a full, healthy 2015 on the books for Jenkins before i give a projection with some certainty, but he seems to be headed in the right direction now with enough starter traits to project him in a rotation. I’d grade him as a 50 FV/#4 starter now, but I could edit that up a notch by the middle of next season.

The combination of Miller and Jenkins give the Braves two live-arms that they’re buying somewhat low on, and if both end up pitching to their previously-believed potential, this would turn into a huge win for Atlanta. If either of them turn into quality mid-rotation starters, or if you think Miller is already that now, then this probably is a smart enough move for a somewhat-rebuilding team to divest a short-term asset into some future value.

Of course, if Miller is Hellickson 2.0 instead of Cain 2.0, and Jenkins is just another power arm who can’t miss bats, then this could look pretty terrible for the Braves as well. If Steamer is correct about Hewyard’s impending breakout, this could turn out to be a franchise player for a couple of arms with legitimate question marks who might turn out to be nothing at all. This move could be great, okay, or terrible for Atlanta, and it all depends on how the young arms develop, which is maybe the most difficult thing to project.

The fact that there’s no obvious most likely outcome suggests this is a pretty fair move for both sides. I probably prefer this a little bit from St. Louis’ perspective, since I lean more towards assuming Miller’s strikeout regression is a concern, but even I’d still say this is a fair return for a single year of a player looking at a monster paycheck next winter. The Cardinals get better now, and get a chance to make Heyward the new face of their franchise, while the Braves probaby get better for the future.

And that makes this seem like a smart trade for both teams. The Cardinals get the better player and a chance to extend a player the Braves weren’t going to keep, while the Braves get some good young pitching to make a stronger run in 2016. This is a deal that serves the purposes of both sides. It might end up favoring one or the other, but at the time of the deal, it makes sense for both Atlanta and St. Louis.

In past years, I’ve often compared shopping in free agency to shopping at Whole Foods, in that everything is just more expensive than it should be. But given that I’m currently writing this post at my local Whole Foods — their oatmeal is actually pretty good, and not too expensive for mornings when work-from-home writers just have to get out of the house — I feel like that would be a hypocritical analogy to make today.

So, Whole Foods, you get a one-day reprieve from being the example of an overpriced market. And to be fair, maybe it isn’t the best analogy anyway, given that Whole Foods does sell mostly high quality stuff, while the free agent market is full of things other teams didn’t really want anymore. Maybe free agency is more like a really expensive Craigslist?

Regardless, you get the point. Free agency is expensive. The winner’s curse often applies, as teams are initially happy with their purchases, but eventually realize that the shiny new thing they just bought isn’t shiny or new. The average age of free agents is going up, and aging curves appear to be getting steeper, and that combination leads to a lot of players selling the last few years of their decline phase, which is not a great time to be investing heavily in an asset.

But, occasionally, the market does undervalue a player. Often it’s health related, but sometimes a bad platform year performance can convince too many buyers that decline has already begun to set in, and teams can buy low on a player poised for a rebound. It does happen, so today, I’m going to try and identify five potential bargains in this class. Of course, I tried this last year too, and came away with Brian McCann, the short Chris Young, Roberto Hernandez, Scott Kazmir, and Omar Infante; a whopping 20% of those guys were worth their contract last year. So, you know, take these opinions with as many grains of salt as you think are necessary.

But let me take another stab at this. Here are five guys I think could prove to be decent buys this winter. For reference, I’m going to list both the expected contracts from our Contract Crowdsourcing project and my own expectations. On to the list.

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Over the summer at ESPN and FG+, I wrote a piece that investigated just how terribly the recent trend of long-term extensions for players at least two years away from free agency had gone. While Ryan Howard was the obvious poster boy for “Wow, that was a bad idea,” the future deals given to Ryan Zimmerman, Ryan Braun, Joey Votto, Justin Verlander, Evan Longoria and others all look a little questionable now, either because of unexpected decline/injury in the period between the signing and the actual start date, or because of how much payroll space it’s taking up. Not all have gone badly — Felix Hernandez and Troy Tulowitzki have been worthwhile investments — but many have, and that’s without even knowing what’s going to happen when Miguel Cabrera’s eight-year extension kicks off in 2016.

Teams can’t exactly always wait until precisely one minute before free agency to give extensions to valuable players, but giving out these deals so far ahead of time is such a hugely risky proposition, because so much can go wrong, both on and off the field. Organizations may be buying the security of knowing that their player can’t walk away in the near future, but they’re trading off the very valuable ability to gain an extra year or two of information on that player, and it’s easy to see that some of these deals never would have been signed if the teams knew at the time what they knew when the original contract would have ended.

It’s with all that in mind that today I’m interested in looking at a youthful and valuable shortstop who is just about to start an eight-year extension he agreed to with his team two seasons ago. Texas’ Elvis Andrus is only 26, but he’s also coming off the two worst wOBA years of his career, years that came after ink hit paper. Is this contract doomed to sink the Rangers? Or is he still a valuable asset? Read the rest of this entry »

Two things stood out when I talked to Miami Marlins president Michael Hill in Phoenix this week. One was the importance of character when building a roster. The other was seemingly contradictory and had to do with the team’s home ballpark.

Hill brought up character after first citing track records, scouts evaluations, and statistical data.

“We look at if a player is a fit for what we are trying to do, and that’s a holistic statement,” Hill told me. “There’s more that goes into it than just the pitching, fielding and hitting. We’re bringing a personality into our clubhouse and put value in how a particular player may fit the context of our club.”

I wasn’t particularly surprised to hear Hill say that. When I visited the Marlins’ clubhouse this summer – technically, the visiting clubhouse in Atlanta – the vibe was positive. I spoke to several players and all were personable. But I did find it notable that Hill brought up character, so I asked just how much of a factor it is. Read the rest of this entry »

Over the last few years, the Pirates have developed a bit of a reputation for being exceptional at extracting value from discarded pitchers: Francisco Liriano, Edinson Volquez, and Mark Melancon are three of the more recent examples, for instance. However, before any of those three got to Pittsburgh, the Pirates worked their voodoo on A.J. Burnett, taking him off the Yankees hands in the winter of 2011 and extracting two excellent years from him after New York decided to pay him to play for anyone else but them.

Over the 2012-2013 seasons, Burnett threw 393 innings with a 92 ERA-/85 FIP-/82 xFIP-, providing well above average performance and durability, and because the Yankees were financing his costs, the Pirates paid just $13 million for those two seasons. However, the cost-conscious organization declined to make him a qualifying offer last offseason, and despite some mutual desire for another contract between both sides, Burnett ended up taking a two year contract to go pitch for the Phillies.

It didn’t go well for either side. Burnett was bad, his teammates were worse, and so both sides decided to opt-out of the second year of the contract, allowing Burnett to become a free agent again. And now, with the choice of where to pitch once again, Burnett has decided to go back to Pittsburgh, signing on for the 2015 season for $8.5 million. By opting out of his Phillies deal and signing with the Pirates, he ended up leaving $4 million on the table, so this represents a pretty significant pay cut for Burnett, but as a 38 year old who has made over $100 million in his career, happiness clearly came ahead of maximizing dollars earned.

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The Detroit Tigers are in an unusual position. There’s nothing unusual about a team trying to win now, but there’s something unusual about the Tigers’ particular sense of urgency. We can acknowledge it has something to do with Mike Ilitch, and his age, and that’s a little weird to talk about, but it’s out there. Ilitch wants to see a winner and people don’t live forever, so this is the current line of thinking: the Tigers will do anything to try to win right away, no matter what it means for the future, because what if there isn’t a tomorrow?

It’s pretty obvious where the Tigers’ priorities are. They just gave four more expensive years to a soon-to-be 36-year-old Victor Martinez, and that contract’s been identified as one that’ll look mighty bad pretty soon. But I think people might’ve gotten too far ahead of themselves in declaring that the future will be a mess, myself included. It’s easy to observe some of the parallels between the Tigers and the Phillies, but the future Tigers aren’t sure to be screwed. There’s a way to survive, such that the window doesn’t have to slam shut.

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Last offseason, the Yankees signed infielder Yangervis Solarte — who’d left the Rangers by way of minor-league free agency — to a decidedly more robust minor-league deal than is the standard in the industry. The result for New York was ultimately a positive one: not only did Solarte record the highest major-league WAR figure in 2014 of any player who’d departed his club the previous offseason by way of minor-league free agency, but the Yankees were able to parlay him (along with right-handed prospect Rafael De Paula) into a trade for Chase Headley.

As noted by Kiley McDaniel earlier this month, the Solarte signing wasn’t an anomalous one for the Yankees: they’d completed similar deals with reliever Jim Miller and catcher Bobby Wilson, as well. And while neither of those players did much of anything at the major-league level, the strategy was ultimately a very profitable one for New York based on Solarte’s production alone — profitable enough, as McDaniel notes, to fund 10 seasons of such an experiment.

“Who might be the next Solarte?” one wonders. On Tuesday afternoon, the St. Louis Cardinals signed one possible candidate, infielder Dean Anna, to a major-league contract despite the fact that Anna enters his age-28 season with just 25 major-league plate appearances ever. The projections offer some logic to St. Louis’s decision: despite that limited major-league track record, Anna’s projected to produce an 89 wRC+ and slightly above-average second-base defense — a combination of skills which, when taken together, produce a nearly league-average major leauger. That’s a considerable value for a league-minimum contract.

This post was originally going to be called something like The Top-Five Minor-League Free Agents by the Projections — written with a view, that is, towards identifying those minor-league free agents most likely to receive that Solarte-type money and produce the Solarte-type production. In fact, it’s quite possible I’ll publish a post along those lines next week. But what becomes clear as one inspects the issue more closely is that, while the computer math of a projection system like Steamer is capable of translating without too much difficultly a player’s minor-league batting numbers to a major-league environment, producing a defensive projection for that same player is more difficult. And those defensive projections, if taken without any sort of healthy skepticism, can alter one’s understanding of a player’s value.

In particular, this is true of those players who’ve lingered long enough in the minors to have reached free agency. For, while an 18-year-old shortstop prospect is likely to remain a shortstop into his age-19 season, those players who began their careers a decade ago have very possibly become a different sort of player.

Consider the case of Mark Minicozzi, for example. Selected by San Francisco in the 17th round of the 2005 draft out of East Carolina University, Minicozzi made every one of his minor-league starts in the Giants system between 2005 and -07 at either second, third, or shortstop. Following a elbow injury, however, he was released by the organization and spent the entirety of the next three seasons in the independent Atlantic, Can-AM, and Northern Leagues — after which he was re-signed by the Giants in 2012.

Now, he enters his age-32 season with a decidedly different physique and set of skills than that 23-year-old version of himself originally drafted by San Francisco. And while he’s made starts at both second and third base as recently as 2013, he made the majority of his defensive appearances in 2014 at first base and left field.

With that thought in mind, let’s consider his Steamer projection for 2015, prorated to 600 plate appearances:

Minicozzi’s projected batting line is nearly major-league average — and this oughtn’t be too shocking. Over a span of three seasons since his return to the Giants organization, Minicozzi has produced a batting line about 30% better than average relative to the various leagues in which he’s played. This year with Fresno — his first at the Triple-A level, incidentally — the 31-year-old Minicozzi produced reasonable walk and strikeout rates (13.2% and 22.4%, respectively) while also hitting 12 home runs and exhibiting above-average batted-ball skill (.371 BABIP) in 370 plate appearances. That he would profile as a slightly below-average major-league batter is entirely reasonable.

The question of Minicozzi’s defensive value is a more difficult one to answer, however. For while, as noted, Minicozzi played mostly first base and left field in 2014, he did make those starts at second and third base in 2013, and has, at points in his career, played exclusively those more difficult infield positions. It’s possible that his starts at less demanding positions are reflective of a loss of agility and athleticism — not an unreasonable proposition given Minicozzi’s age. (Defensive skills peaks quite early in player’s career.) That said, it’s also possible that the organization has moved Minicozzi to those less demanding positions to allow younger, more promising players their due repetitions at the position (second or third, for example) they’re likely to play in the majors.

The way Steamer handles Minicozzi, specifically, is to offer no projection of fielding runs saved (which is typical for Steamer of minor-league players) and to assess the positional adjustment of a second or third baseman (+2.5 runs per season). That explains the +2.2 figure in the defensive column (Def) of Minicozzi’s projection above.

From what we know of Minicozzi, projecting him to be a major-league-average second or third baseman — or a decidedly above-average left fielder, for example — seems ambitious. In the specific case of Minicozzi, it almost certainly is. Producing 4000-plus projections, however — such as are available by means of Steamer for position players alone — necessarily requires the employment of some assumptions — chief among them, what position the player in question is likely to play adequately. And while those assumptions might work well for the majority of players, it’s also true that in specific instances — such as the case of players like Minicozzi — that one will be required to apply some reasonable alterations.

For Minicozzi, as we’ve noted, a probably reasonable assumption is that he’s more well-suited to left field now. Applying the generic positional adjustment for a left fielder (-7.5 runs per season) to Minicozzi’s projected 2015 line (again, prorated to 600 plate appearances) yields this result:

Is that ultimately more accurate? I don’t know — although, it’s probably true that, in the case of an older minor leaguer, assuming that he’s closer to a replacement-level player than league-average one is probably smart. Ultimately, though, this post isn’t about Mark Minicozzi and his 2015 season. It’s about projections — and specifically it’s about how one needn’t entirely abandon a projection merely because one aspect of it (like the defensive part) appears not to fully depict the reality of the player’s situation. The projections are wildly useful as a starting point to a discussion about a player’s ability. In those cases where more major-league data is available, those starting points are decidedly accurate. In those instances where no major-league data is available, however, the projections still have their uses — so long as they’re complemented by reason on the part of the one considering them.

It was an astonishing figure that Ken Rosenthal reported. On some level the figures are always astonishing, but this one was especially so. Allow me to jog your memory:

Would Giancarlo Stanton turn down the biggest contract in professional sports history?

The Miami Marlins apparently intend to find out.

The two sides are discussing a deal that would be for at least 10 years and at least $300 million, according to major-league sources.

There used to be some talk that Clayton Kershaw would become the first $300-million man, and then he signed for about seven-tenths of that. Miguel Cabrera came close, but now it’s Stanton who’s threatening to break through the barrier. It’s astonishing, really, for multiple reasons. There’s the raw amount of money. There’s the team said to be considering the raw amount of money. There’s the player said to be considering the raw amount of money, what with Stanton’s reaction a few years back to the Marlins’ most recent fire sale. The snarky way to explain this is that it would take $300 million for the Marlins to convince anyone to trust them. Why sign with that team if you don’t have to?

But the Marlins have insisted for a long time that they’re committed to keeping Stanton around. Maybe, finally, they’re going to turn over a new leaf. We can’t predict where the Marlins are going to go. We know only that they have some talent now, and that they might soon sign their brightest star to a contract worth almost a third of a billion dollars. That seems like a lot. But, is it crazy, or is it entirely reasonable?

Read the rest on Just a Bit Outside.

There is no disputing that offense is down. Teams are scoring fewer runs and hitting fewer balls over fences. Strikeouts numbers have grown precipitously. Some of the reasons behind those changes are clear. Others are more speculative. The bottom line is that the offensive environment isn’t what it was as recently as a handful of years ago.

The downturn begs two questions: 1. Is this an irreversible trend (barring rule changes), or is it simply a cyclical dip? 2. How does it impact roster-building decisions?

With the GM meetings taking place in Phoenix this week – yes, the weather was pristine – I decided to ask those very questions to a cross section of the decision makers. Not surprisingly, opinions varied.

Let’s start with the first of the two questions: Trend or Cycle?

Rick Hahn, Chicago White Sox: “There are elements like the strike zone and the velocity we’re seeing out of pitchers. Those have had a dampening effect. Defensive shifts have conceivably brought down the offensive effectiveness of some players. So, there are some tangible reasons to point to, but I do think part of it is just the cyclical nature of the game.”

Chris Antonetti, Cleveland Indians: “I’m not sure how far into it we are, but I think there are a number of different factors that have impacted the offensive environment in baseball. I don’t think it’s just a blip on the radar. I don’t necessarily see that dynamic changing if we don’t consider measures to maybe make some adjustments.”

Terry Ryan, Minnesota Twins: “No I don’t (think it is an irreversible trend). In fact, I absolutely don’t. Pitching is better, and sometimes you go through streaks where there just aren’t that many hitters coming up, or people producing on the offensive side of the game. I think that will correct itself.”

Doug Melvin, Milwaukee Brewers: “You have to be careful to make sure the cycles of offense and pitching are really that – a cyclical thing. There are probably some things affecting it a little bit, like bullpens and match-ups. The schedule is still a grind. There were also some good-quality hitters hurt over the course of this year – guys like Joey Votto – which affects offense. It could bounce back.”

Dave Dombrowski, Detroit Tigers: “That’s a great question and I’m not sure I know the answer. In my estimation, the game is probably going to look at that topic. Right now, unless some things change, I think run production will continue to be down. I don’t think it will go down much more, but the trend will stay down from an offensive perspective.”

Michael Hill, Miami Marlins: “We evaluate trends, but I would say it’s more pitcher-driven than anything. It’s pitcher driven with power arms in rotations and power arms in bullpens. Who knows what that will mean long term?”

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The second question — does the trend/cycle impact decisions-making? — also resulted in mixed views. GMs are typically coy when it comes to anything related to player-acquisition, but a few of them offered interesting perspectives.

Farhan Zaidi, Los Angeles Dodgers: “Just when you think you’ve identified a trend, it seems like things go the other way. It’s really just about building the most-balanced team. It’s not like we’re going to think to ourselves, ‘This team had success with guys who steal a lot of bases, so let’s go that way.’ We learn every season there’s more than one way to skin a cat. I don’t think we’re going to be overly dogmatic in our approach.”

Mike Rizzo, Washington Nationals: “I think you build a team depending on a lot of factors – talent level at the big-league level, talent level on the minor-league side, who’s coming up, the type of ballpark you play in, what the division looks like. All of those ingredients go into how you build a roster. We’re going to approach this season no different than any other.”

Neal Huntington, Pittsburgh Pirates: “Players in their mid 30s are players in their mid 30s. Very rarely do they suddenly get better, as happened with some in the 1990s and 2000s. Depth is important. You look at what Kansas City and Baltimore have done, having deep and talented rosters. They can rest players and not have a huge drop off. Youth and depth are absolutely crucial to roster building as we go forward.”

John Mozeliak, St. Louis Cardinals: “Your most knee-jerk reaction is to adjust to what you need now. You look at your offensive projections and how that’s going to translate into wins. But when you start thinking more long term, guys with a 1.000 OPS are rare. Our 2004 team had three – Edmonds, Pujols and Rolen – and those days seem so foreign. One thing you might start to see is a little bit more small ball and speed back in the game, teams trying to figure out a way to manufacture runs.”

Rick Hahn, Chicago White Sox: “You’re always having conversations about staying ahead of where offense, defense, and pitching are going. You want to be on the cutting edge, whether it’s acquiring undervalued players or players you can project to play a greater role based on their ability or the environment you’re going to drop them into. The conversations haven’t changed much, but the targets have altered in recent years. I think athleticism and the ability to contribute both offensively and defensively has become more important.”

Dave Dombrowski, Detroit Tigers: “You have to be cognizant of everything that’s taking place at a particular time. You analyze, and you have to decide how you’re going to use that information when building a club. Power is diminished, but how much more are you going to pay for somebody based on that lack of power? Where does that fit in with your philosophy of making contact? There’s just so much that goes into it.”

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Look for more from this week’s GM meetings in my upcoming Sunday Notes column.

As I noted on Tuesday night, I was privileged to be selected to vote on two postseason awards this year; the National League’s Manager of the Year and the Most Valuable Player. As was just announced, the MVP award went to Clayton Kershaw, edging out Andrew McCutchen and Giancarlo Stanton for the top spot. You can see the full results of the voting at BBWAA.com. Below, I’ll explain each of my selections, and why I voted as I did.

First, a very quick overview of my philosophy. I generally think the best player and most valuable player are the same thing, and I don’t really care too much about a team’s performance when trying to determine the quality of an individual player. However, I also don’t think it’s entirely correct to focus solely on context-neutral numbers, as we generally do when trying to evaluate a player’s true talent level. Context-specific specific performance absolutely drives some of the variation in team win-loss records, and distributing your performance into the most critical situations can definitely affect your teams record one way or another.

My goal was to identify the players who added the most wins to their team in 2014, and even though “clutch performance” doesn’t really appear to be a thing a player has much control over, it still matters when tallying up wins and losses. The Royals won 89 games instead of 81 games primarily because of the distribution of their performances, and if we focused solely on the context-neutral contributions of their individual players, we’d come up eight wins shy of their actual total.

So, on my MVP ballot, the timing of performances mattered. I leaned more on RE24 rather than wRC+, and attempted to incorporate high leverage performance into the calculations as well. It might not be a repeatable skill, but I don’t think that’s what we’re trying to measure. We’re just trying to look for who added the most value in 2014, and for that question, I thinking including the timing of events is important.

Okay, now to my ballot.

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