Archive for Daily Graphings

The Reason Pitching Losses Were Invented

Pitcher wins and losses are poor statistics to use when evaluating pitchers, as many readers here surely know. Wins and losses give full credit to the pitcher for the performance, or lack thereof, of the whole team. As such, it can often miscredit pitchers, such as the 5 IP, 6 ER performance in a 17-8 victory or the CG, 1 ER loss when the offense is shut out.

In Colorado last night, however, the loss was completely deserved – or at least 99% deserved. Cardinals closer Ryan Franklin entered the ninth inning with one out and two on but a 9-4 lead. Despite the threat of runners on base, the leading team will win this game 99% of the time – even a home run leaves the trailing team with a mere 5.5% chance of winning the game.

That means that even after Chris Iannetta, the first batter Franklin faced, went deep, the Cardinals were still in good shape. Dexter Fowler doubled to keep things interesting, but a Brad Hawpe groundout seemed to signal that the end was near for the Rockies, who had already plated one run off of reliever Dennys Reyes before Franklin entered the game. A Carlos Gonzalez single scored Dexter Fowler and made the game 9-8, but with two outs and Gonzalez out of scoring position, the Cardinals, even after allowing four runs in the inning, were still sitting pretty, with an 88.9% chance of victory.

Given the lead of the story, what follows is obvious. Jason Giambi singled, and an error allowed Gonzalez to score, tying the game and giving the Rockies the upper hand, with a 57.2% win expectancy. Miguel Olivo singled to push that number up to 64.2%. The Cardinals could’ve gone on to win the game in extra innings, but Seth Smith squashed any such thoughts with a three run blast to end the game.

Ryan Franklin managed to get one out. He faced seven batters. The Cardinals went from an all-but-assured victory to a loss. Ryan Franklin earned the loss on his record tonight.


Ryan Braun and Infield Hits

While perusing the season’s infield hits leaders, I ran across a fair share of usual suspects. Ichiro leads the pack (as he is wont to do) and names like Juan Pierre, Brett Gardner, Rajai Davis, and Carl Crawford aren’t unexpected whatsoever. The sight of Ryan Braun, however, had me taken aback when really it shouldn’t have.

Braun is of course a former third baseman moved to the outfield who hasn’t latched onto the concept of playing good defense. His skill set as a batter is pretty well-established. He hits for power, doesn’t strike out too much, doesn’t walk too much either, but maintains a high BABIP in part because of his speed – he’s generally good for two or three full hands of stolen bases. I knew Braun stole some bases. Heck, I looked right afterwards to see whether: 1) Braun stole bases, and 2) if he often collected so many infield hits. Yet, I still didn’t feel comfortable with Braun being Ichiro-lite.

So I asked someone with more exposure to Braun than most people about it…Jack Moore. He surmised that while Braun was a poor defender, it had less to do with his speed and more to do with his instincts and angles. It adds up. Still, accepting that Braun has nearly as many infield hits as Derek Jeter (and more than Johnny Damon, Shane Victorino, Michael Bourn, Pierre, Crawford, and numerous others) the last three seasons felt odd because of his defensive limitations.

Thus I was wondering: what other players get poor raps on their speed and baserunning abilities because of their defensive reputations? The one name that I found more absurd than Braun is Jason Bay, who has 56 infield hits the past three years which is a few more than either Jose Reyes or David Wright have. When I think of Jason Bay, I don’t think of him busting down the line and beating out balls hit deep into the hole or down the line.

Who are some others with speed that simply doesn’t show up in the defensive evaluations because they lack other skills?


Prospect Watch: Kila Ka’aihue

Over two months into the season, the OPS leader in the International League is Kila Ka’aihue, and it’s not particularly close. Ka’aihue’s 1.073 OPS is 60 points better than Omaha Royals teammate Alex Gordon, and only J.P. Arencibia joins them with a OPS above 1.000.

Kila Ka’aihue is 26 years old. In over 2800 minor league plate appearances, Ka’aihue has compiled an OBP above .400 and an .880 OPS. Last season at AAA, Ka’aihue walked his way to a .392 OBP and a .825 OPS – Ka’aihue walked over 100 times in less than 600 plate appearances. He had a poor .272 BABIP, too – adjusting for luck and park, according to Minor League Splits, gives him a 2009 line of .293/.424/.474.

He’s made a huge step forward this year. The BABIP is up to a more typical AAA number of .341. He’s walking even more – Ka’aihue has walked 74 times in 307 plate appearances, a 24.1% walk rate which is easily the highest in all of professional baseball, easily eclipsing MLB leader (>100 PA) George Kottaras’s 18.6% rate. The power is up as well, as Ka’aihue has 32 XBH including 16 HRs, good for a .283 ISO.

Ka’aihue has been, simply put, the best hitter in the minor leagues in 2010. At age 26, it’s unlikely that he has much left to learn, and the Royals have been the third worst power hitting team in the league, with a .120 ISO. Ka’aihue (along with Gordon) would seem to be a perfect shot in the arm for a struggling offense.

There are two possible reasons for the Royals leaving Ka’aihue in the minors: first, they simply don’t believe that he’s good enough to hit major league pitching, or second, they don’t believe he fits in the roster as currently constructed.

Given Kila’s fantastic season to date, I find the first to be hard to believe. There was certainly an argument to leaving him in the minors to start the season – ZiPS projected a mere .319 wOBA, and CHONE projected a .333 wOBA, neither of which is good enough given Ka’aihue’s position and questionable defensive skills. However, given Kila’s massive step forward in AAA, there’s reason to believe he can put up a solid, .350+ wOBA in the Major Leagues. His updated ZiPS projection is already up 16 points since the season started.

With many of these AAA players that we rave about (Alex Gordon, Matt Murton, etc.), the damning evidence against them is typically a season or two or marginal MLB performance. That excuse simply isn’t there with Ka’aihue – he’s received a total of 28 Major League plate appearances. At 26, he should still be on the good side of his peak. Yes, there’s a possibility that he flames out in the Major Leagues, but perhaps he rakes and becomes a stalwart .380+ wOBA first baseman – even a .350 wOBA Russell Branyan type would have value.

The second reason carries a bit more weight: Billy Butler and Jose Guillen, the primary 1B and DH, have two of the three best batting lines on the team. Butler’s .376 wOBA is only second to David DeJesus, and Guillen’s .349 comes third. Ideally, the team finds a trading partner for Guillen, but that probably won’t happen given his awful contract. It’s possible that the team could bench Mitch Maier and his .312 wOBA in CF, shift DeJesus there, play Guillen in right, and let Ka’aihue DH. However, this would leave the Royals with a terrible defensive outfield with Scott Podsednik in left field.

The solution for the Royals really isn’t that simple. Guillen is playing too well to simply jettison, and Butler is one of the team’s best players. It seems that Ka’aihue will have to continue paying his dues in Omaha, even though he’s clearly among the best hitters in the league and well deserving of a legitimate shot in the Majors. Still, it’s getting late for Ka’aihue, at 26, and the Royals should do whatever they can to get him in their lineup at this point.


David Aardsma’s Worst

The book on David Aardsma was always the same: power arm with a blessed fastball, but wild command and an affinity for fly balls – and by extension, home runs. He was essentially a major league journeyman. The former first round pick out of Rice had spent the first few seasons of his career within the Giants organization but only appeared in big league games for the club in 2004. His next major league appearance would come for the Cubs in 2006. In 2007 he’d stay in Chicago, but move to the Southside. In 2008 he’d remain a Stocking, but change hues from Black to Red.

Think about that. Aardsma pitched in every season from 2006 to 2009 and never spent time with any one team in consecutive seasons despite a live arm. That all changed in 2010 as Seattle became his home. His first real major league home. Consistency in role and location is supposed to make players better, right? Aardsma probably has a real comfort level with how the Safeco bullpen mound translates to the playing field mound. And how Safeco’s dimensions play on humid days and cool days alike. He mostly knows the divisional foes and how potent or weak their lineups are. That should make a player a little more aware, a little better.

Except it hasn’t; at all. It would be ridiculously unfair to expect Aardsma to fully replicate his 2009 season. He posted a 3.01 FIP, a 4.12 xFIP, and a 2.53 ERA. Those are pretty good numbers from anyone, but he always posted a 4.2% HR/FB and a career low groundball rate (25.3%) which, well, nobody needs to have what regression means spelled out to them. Moving forward, it was simply unrealistic to expect Aardsma to have that kind of luck continue. This season, his HR/FB is up to 12.1%; nearly a career high and well above his average. He’s gotten a few more groundballs than last, but his ERA is over a 5, his FIP is over 4.5, and his xFIP is 4.32.

Not much has gone right for the Mariners this season, and Aardsma is another example. While none of the projection systems figured he’d post an ERA less than 3.5 or a FIP less than 3.97; they also didn’t have him as one of the worst relievers in a bullpen that’s failed to impress. Nobody should’ve seen 2009 Aardsma walking through that door again, but nobody should expect to see 2010 Aardsma to continue at this pace either.


If It Counted: National League

Same premise as this afternoon, only we’re dealing with the Senior Circuit this time around.

Andrew McCutchen, CF
Chase Utley, 2B
Hanley Ramirez, SS
Albert Pujols, 1B
Adrian Gonzalez, DH
Matt Holliday, LF
Ryan Zimmerman, 3B
Jayson Werth, RF
Brian McCann, C

Bench: Yadier Molina (C), Joey Votto (1B/PH), David Wright (3B), Jose Reyes (SS/PR), Colby Rasmus (OF)

Roy Halladay, SP

Bullpen: Jonathan Broxton (R), Billy Wagner (L), Luke Gregerson (R), Hong-Chih Kuo (L), Sean Marshall (L), Matt Belisle (R, long guy)

With the American League putting a left-handed Cliff Lee on the mound, the NL line-up leans pretty heavily to the right-hand side. It would anyway, as most of the NL’s best hitters are right-handed, but it would be interesting to see how the match-ups unfolded after Lee left the game. For those wondering about the starter/reserve decisions, Zimmerman gets the nod due to his better defense, which is more important with Halladay’s sinker, while Gonzalez edges out Votto because I had to pick someone – there’s no wrong answer between those two.

In terms of in-game management, you’d probably pinch-hit Wright for McCann at some point when the AL had an LHP on the mound and Votto for McCutchen if there was a righty on the hill, but besides that, you’re not making a whole lot of changes. Even using Reyes as a pinch-runner would be tougher because you’d lose your only reserve shortstop, but the need to have both a RH and LH bat off the bench for pinch hitting limits the flexibility.

What the team lacks on the position player side of things, though, they make up for on the mound. Even as good as the AL hitters are, I don’t see them putting together a lot of offense against Halladay and that bullpen. An extreme groundball guy with great command being relieved by four guys who are nearly impossible to hit, plus a couple of nifty multi-inning relievers from each side if the game goes into extra innings? That’d be quite the challenge for American League hitters to overcome.

All told, this would be a fascinating game to watch. If MLB wants to give home field advantage to one league or another based on one game, how about having this affair right after the World Series ends? Who wouldn’t watch that? It’d be great theatre.


Tom Gorzelanny Is Starting to Reach His Potential

Lefties, especially the hard-throwing variety, get every chance to succeed in the majors. If they come as highly touted prospects, or show positive results early in their careers, they’ll get plenty of chances even after their original team gives up. The Pirates have experienced this twice in the past few years, with Oliver Perez and then Tom Gorzelanny. While they made the right call in the case of the former, it appears they gave up prematurely in the case of the latter.

Something happened to Oliver Perez when he went to Pittsburgh in the Brian Giles trade. Almost immediately upon arrival he added a few ticks to his fastball and his slider. That might have been skewed due to a small sample, but he repeated those results again in 2004, when his fastball averaged 93 mph. At age 22, he ranked among the league’s best starters. His 2.98 ERA went nicely with a 3.45 FIP, and his 10.97 strikeouts per nine lead the league. The Pirates looked to have absolutely robbed the Padres, having also acquired Jason Bay, who posted a .378 wOBA in 2004, in the trade.

The following years would not be so kind to Perez. His fastball velocity dropped down to 91 mph, where it had been previously in his career. He also lost command of it and started walking hitters like crazy, 6.12 per nine in 2005. After another poor showing in 2006, the Pirates had apparently seen enough. After 15 horrendous starts they traded him to the Mets, though they received only Xavier Nady in return. They did, however, trade Nady two years later in a trade that got them Jose Tabata and a slew of pitchers, so that can be considered a win. It’s not like the Pirates had much of a chance to contend in the years between anyway.

The move appears to have worked out. Perez did have a good year for the Mets in 2007, but he has steadily declined since. Why the Mets signed him to a multi-year contract, never mind one for $36 million, defies comprehension. They have paid for it, though, as Perez pitched 66 horrible innings last year and managed just 38.2 this year before hitting the DL. While the Pirates might have gotten more for Perez had they hung onto him and experienced his quality 2007 season, there is no guarantee that things would work out that way. By all appearances they got rid of him perhaps not at the right time, but at time when they could still get something useful in return.

Last year, Pirates’ GM Neal Huntington apparently took a cue from his predecessor. Littlefield was the man behind the Perez move, and in similar fashion Huntington cut his losses on Gorzelanny, trading him to the Cubs at the deadline. Like Perez, Gorzelanny showed potential at a young age, a 3.88 ERA against a 4.24 FIP at age 24. Also like Perez he lost his control in the following years and produced terrible results. Perez had his excellent season in 2004 and was traded at the deadline a year and a half later. Gorzelanny had his good season in 2007 and was traded at the deadline a year and a half later.

The similarities continue. Upon joining their new teams, both Perez and Gorzelanny raised their strikeout rates and cut their walk rates. Both made seven starts, though Gorzelanny also pitched six times in relief. In their second years both realized further improvement. Perez kept his strikeout rate high and got his walks somewhat under control. In 177 innings he had a 3.56 ERA, 4.35 FIP, and 4.65 xFIP. It’s not ace material, but it’s serviceable for a middle of the rotation pitcher. Gorzelanny has proven even better during his first season with a new team, a 3.31 ERA with a 3.46 FIP and 3.98 xFIP.

Despite the similarities, Perez and Gorzelanny are different pitchers and so we cannot expect the parallel paths to continue. In fact, Gorzelanny has enough going for him that he can be expected to continue pitching well. I’m not even sure exactly why Pittsburgh, a team desperate for pitching, traded him in the first place. He was quite excellent in the high minors prior to his full-time MLB promotion, and even when the Pirates demoted him in 2008 and 2009 he pitched very well in the minors. Perez, on the other hand, struggled with his control even against lesser hitters.

Control seems like the biggest issue going forward with Gorzelanny. His walk rate, 4.63 per nine, can continue to hold him back, though he does make up for it by striking out a ton of hitters, 9.13 per nine this year, and keeping the ball inside the park, partly the effect of his 43.8 percent groundball rate. That’s not stellar, but it’s very good for a pitcher who strikes out more than a batter per inning. His walk rate is a bit better when looking at him only as a starter, 4.23 per nine, but even that will have to improve if he’s going to fulfill his promise as a No. 2 starter.

Performances like the one he turned in against the Diamondbacks don’t help his case. He lasted just five innings and needed 104 pitches along the way, only 61 of which were strikes. That led to six walks, his highest total of the season. Yet because he stranded eight of 11 baserunners he held Arizona to three runs and eventually earned the win. Strangely, it was only the 159th time since 1920 that a pitcher went five innings, walked six, and still got the win. Even more strangely, both Jorge de la Rosa and Kyle Davies accomplished it last year, on back-to-back days no less.

Like Perez, Gorzelanny’s resurgence could be a temporary thing. His control still isn’t where it needs to be, and that will be an important component of his game going forward. Yet Gorzelanny’s peripherals, both in the minors and the majors, make him look like a better case for permanent recovery. The Cubs, to their benefit, have three more years of team control, so they’ll get a long look at what Gorzelanny can do in the long run. Considering the state of the Pirates’ pitching, I’m sure Hungtington would love to get backsies on this one.


Three Rookies Under the Radar

With the likes of Stephen Strasburg, Jason Heyward, and Carlos Santana in the majors this season, I wanted to take a look at some rookies who have performed well under the radar in 2010.

OF Chris Heisey, Cincinnati Reds
2010 Debut: 5/3
2010 WAR: 0.9

Despite playing in just 39 games this season, Heisey has put up 0.9 WAR for the year, which would be worth 3.5 WAR over 150 games. At twenty-five, Heisey is a little older than some of the more hyped-up rookies, and his Triple-A numbers this year (.241/.307/.430) weren’t too pretty. He started 0 for his first 7 big league at-bats, striking out three times. However, Heisey has hit .271/.371/.542 for the entire campaign, good for a .386 wOBA. He’s also done well in the field with 3.1 runs saved (UZR) while playing all three outfield positions.

1B Gaby Sanchez, Florida Marlins
2010 Debut: 4/5
2010 WAR: 2.2

Sanchez, twenty-six years old, had two cups of coffee in the big leagues prior to 2010 totaling 31 plate appearances. However, he’s broken out in a big way this season as the Marlins’ regular first baseman by hitting .308/.376/.481; that’s a .379 wOBA and 137 wRC+. His .342 BABIP may be above his true talent level, but ZiPS still projects a .356 wOBA going forward. Sanchez has also played well in the field with 1.9 runs saved at first base.

3B David Freese, St. Louis Cardinals
2010 Debut: 4/5
2010 WAR: 1.4

Freese may be the most interesting prospect of the bunch. At twenty-seven years old, his relatively low .404 SLG this year is odd considering his minor league rate of .532. With a .361 OBP, that’s a .342 wOBA and a 115 wRC+. His .376 BABIP is generally unsustainable, and with a 7.8 BB%, his rate of getting on base may see a dip in the future. His defense has been slightly below average this year according to UZR, but his 1.4 WAR overall has to have the Cardinals happy.


If It Counted: American League

Next week, the AL and NL will hook up for an exhibition game. MLB is still pushing the “it counts” theme since home field advantage in the World Series is on the line, but no one treats the game like it really matters; the best players come out halfway through the game, guys are used out of position, and the roster is assembled with goals that directly conflict with putting the best team on the field. So, no, it doesn’t count.

But what if it did? What would the roster look like if the American League and National League were to play one game that really mattered, and their singular goal was to win that day? That’s what we’re going to take a look at today.

Below is my take on the 21 guys that would comprise the AL Roster. We won’t bother filling out the #2-#5 starter spots in the rotation, since this is just a one game deal, and we’re not going to convert starters into relievers for a day. The rosters are put together with not just the goal of having the best players, but the ones who make the most sense from a line-up construction/match-up standpoint, as well as tactical advantages for late game maneuvering. If the AL had to win just one game, this is the team I think they would put on the field.

Carl Crawford, LF
Kevin Youkilis, 1B
Joe Mauer, C
Miguel Cabrera, DH
Josh Hamilton, RF
Evan Longoria, 3B
Robinson Cano, 2B
Derek Jeter, SS
Ichiro Suzuki, CF

Bench: Victor Martinez (C/1B), Justin Morneau (1B/PH), Ben Zobrist (UT), Brett Gardner (OF/PR), Elvis Andrus (SS/PR)

Cliff Lee, SP

Bullpen: Mariano Rivera (R), Matt Thornton (L), Neftali Feliz (R), Scott Downs (L), Rafael Soriano (R), David Hernandez (R, long guy)

The line-up is balanced, going from left/right from top to bottom, and it gets high on base guys in front of the guys who can pound the ball over the wall. Even Roy Halladay would have a tough time getting through that line-up too many times. Because of the high quality of hitters, you won’t do much pinch-hitting, which is why Morneau is the only “big bat” guy on the bench. You would probably have him pinch hit for Jeter against an RHP in a high leverage situation at some point in the game, which is why there are two guys on the bench who can play shortstop.

Gardner is on the team to steal a base, as he’s probably the best runner in the game right now. There are enough slow guys on the team that it’s tough to say who he would run for, which is why a guy like Zobrist is necessary, since you don’t know which position you would be subbing out when you need a late game stolen base. Having the guy who can play anywhere gives you a lot of flexibility. Martinez gets the nod over all the other catchers because he can also play first base, so you can pinch run for Youkilis after you’ve used Morneau as a pinch-hitter and still have a first baseman.

The pitching side is more straight forward. Lee is the best pitcher in the league right now, and should be able to give you six innings, even against a loaded NL line-up. Rivera is the obvious pick to close out the game, and then it’s just a mix of good RH and LH guys to get it to him. David Hernandez gets the call as a long reliever who can bring some heat if the game goes to extra innings and you need a guy to stay out there until it ends – his overall numbers aren’t great, but he’s been lights out since moving to the bullpen and the stuff is certainly there.

Could the NL put 21 guys on the field to match this squad? We’ll find out at 5 pm.


Rentals, Processes, and “Flags Fly Forever”

One rumor that has been flying around twitter is that the Twins have offered outfield prospect Aaron Hicks and catcher prospect Wilson Ramos for Cliff Lee, which would be a solid haul for only half a season of Lee, as Aaron Gleeman outlines over at Hardball Talk. Hicks is a top 20 prospect according to Baseball America and Ramos is top 60. Gleeman calls giving both away for merely a rental to be “uncharacteristic” for the Twins.

Dan Wade of TwinsMVB tweeted the following upon hearing the rumor:

Losing Hicks and Ramos in the Lee deal would forever taint my opinion of Bill Smith. Beyond stupid to part with Hicks for a rental.

David Brown of Big League Stew then asked the obvious question: “What if the Twins win the World Series?”

I think the answer would be clear for most Twins fans. “Flags fly forever” – The World Series is the ultimate goal for the organization (outside of the business side, of course), and so a couple of good prospects and some future wins could easily be sacrificed to attain a World Championship. Praise would almost certainly be heaped upon Bill Smith for bringing in that key piece that would bring the Twins up past the level of the Johan Santana teams which simply couldn’t escape the first two rounds of the playoffs.

How should we evaluate Smith’s part of this potential trade and situation, though? His job is to put the Minnesota Twins in the best position to win as many World Series as possible, while working under a certain amount of restraints. I don’t know enough about Hicks and Ramos to say for sure, but given their lofty rankings in prospect circles, there’s a good chance that they could be major contributors for the Twins in the coming seasons. We could potentially run simulations, based on how good Ramos and Hicks project to be, and see how many World Series victories we would expect from the Twins with them and instead how many we would expect if the Twins execute the trade. The attitudes of people like Wade and seemingly Gleeman suggest that the Twins would likely win more World Championships with the two prospects as opposed to obtaining Lee for the 2010 stretch run and playoffs.

Consider that hypothetical situation – a Twins franchise with Ramos and Hicks is likely to win more World Championships than the Twins with Cliff Lee.

If that is indeed the case, even if a Lee trade results in a World Series victory, the trade would be a poor decisions on Bill Smith’s part. It all comes back to the “processes over results” mantra of sabermetrics, and this would be the ultimate result. The trade is still a bad trade, process-wise, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the franchise for 2010 is reached. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that this trade would be constantly listed among the best deadline deals ever, simply because, as above, flags fly forever.

The heartless mathematician and economist screams at me about the potential loss of utility from this trade. Apart from a mathematician and an economist, however, I’m also a human being, and perhaps more importantly, a baseball fan. I was along for the Brewers ride to the postseason in 2008, largely fueled by a rental of CC Sabathia, which cost the Brewers Matt LaPorta, Michael Brantley, and Rob Bryson. The Brewers were eliminated in the first round, and a top-half farm system is now consensus bottom ten. But I don’t care that the Brewers sacrificed a large amount of talent and likely some wins in the future – that playoff ride was a phenomenal emotional experience, especially given the fact that my hometown team had never won anything in my lifetime. Forget the revenue and other tangible benefits that the playoff appearance brought the team – it was fun. Every time I think back to the trade for Sabathia, I always decide, once again, that it was the right move, because I can’t imagine that 2008 season without the magical playoff run, and I certainly give a large part of the credit to Doug Melvin, whether objectively right or wrong, for pulling the trigger.

Wade’s reaction makes logical sense given his estimation of the talent levels of the three players involved in this deal – it appears that it would be a heist for Seattle, despite how supremely good Cliff Lee has been this season. Still, if we see the Twins raising the Commissioner’s Trophy in November and a new World Series Championship banner in Target Field, I’m not sure that his current attitude towards the trade and Bill Smith will remain.


Arrieta and Davis

Jacob Arrieta and Wade Davis are both aged 24, right-handed, and rookie starting pitchers cutting their teeth in the frenzied American League East. Neither is recording the kind of whiffs their stuff would seemingly demand – as David Golebiewski covered with regards to Davis just a few days ago – and they share something else in common: their inability to finish batters after getting ahead 0-2.

It seems odd to discuss that attribute of pitchers with an FIP over 5.00 apiece. After all, isn’t the problem that they simply don’t get ahead enough? Well, no. As it turns out, Davis and Arrieta both go 0-2 on 25% of their plate appearances; that figure places them within the top 20 of American League pitchers- more often than Jon Lester, James Shields, John Danks, and equal to Felix Hernandez – worthwhile company, to say the least.

Davis is actually just behind David Price for the best rate amongst Rays’ starting pitchers, while Arrieta leads the Orioles’ staff. League average is 23%, so both get to the optimal pitcher’s count at a steadier rate than a good number of their peers. The issue, though, is finishing. Golebiewski noted how Davis used his heater more often in two strike counts than league average, and while Arrieta doesn’t have that issue when it comes to non 0-2 counts, he does rely heavily on his fastball on 0-2 counts.

The results are Davis striking out batters after 0-2 counts less than 31% of the time while Arrieta is at a modest 35%. Compare that to some of the better pitchers in the American League, like Cliff Lee and Jered Weaver (45%) or David Price (44%) and the youngster’s strikeout rates look subpar. Major League average is at 42% while American League average is nearly identical.

Causation and correlation aren’t always bedmates and one of the byproducts of being a good pitcher is finishing batters after getting ahead- meaning it’s no surprise that bad pitchers struggle to finish while good pitchers excel at it. The issue just seems like a case where young pitchers need to make adjustments. That’s good news for these youngsters, although it could quickly turn sour if either fails to make those required adjustments in a reasonable frame of time.