Mike Trout is a better player than Bryce Harper and Manny Machado combined. He’s been more than twice as valuable as each of those players in their young careers. And yet Mike Trout is about to agree to a contract that, per ESPN’s Jeff Passan, will pay him like he’s one of the greatest players of this generation instead of potentially being the greatest player of this century, and one of the greatest baseball talents of all time. As first reported by Passan, Mike Trout and the Angels have agreed to a 12-year deal worth $430 million, with Bill Shaikan reporting the deal will come in at $426.5 million. Because Trout was already owed $66.5 million over the next two seasons, the contract is functionally a 10-year extension worth $360 million. Trout is essentially accepting something similar to the Harper/Machado deals two years in advance. This is not the first time Trout has made this choice, which is very much a personal decision, but it is one that has cost him potentially hundreds of millions of dollars.

In 2014, Trout was coming off an eight-win season, which itself came on the heels of two 10-win campaigns. His 29.2 WAR mark through his age-22 season was the best in baseball history. Before he signed a six-year, $144.5 million contract giving away three free agent seasons, Dave Cameron wrote about the potential for a contract extension, and expected a figure more than $100 million higher. When Trout actually signed, Cameron followed up:

You don’t need another 1,500 word explanation of why this is a hilarious steal for the Angels. Trout would have made something like $50 to $60 million in arbitration had he gone year to year, so the Angels are basically getting three free agent years for $85 to $95 million. This doesn’t come anywhere near Trout’s value, and Trout has left an enormous amount of money on the table. Even if his goal was to reach free agency again and sign a second monstrous contract, he still is worth so far more than the roughly $30 million per year he signed away three free agent years for.

That bargain five years ago made the current one possible. Because Trout had two more years left until free agency (instead of entering the market last offseason), he was limited to the Angels when it came to contract partners. Because the Angels’ risk of losing Trout wasn’t going to present itself for another two seasons, any new contract with him was going to come with a discount. In this case, the discount meant signing a deal like Harper and Machado’s instead of one like Alex Rodriguez’s.

After Harper and Machado signed their contracts, I attempted to compare the two deals because it can be difficult to put a 13-year deal and a 10-year deal for differing amounts into proper context. The present-day values of each contract is below, with the numbers translated into a 10-year deal, and Trout’s contract listed with just the extension (2021-2030), as well as with the two years Trout was already guaranteed (2019-2030). The numbers have been updated now that we know Trout is paid $36 million the next two seasons and $35.45 million each year beginning in 2021.

The Angels appear to have looked at Mike Trout and said, “We know we owe you about $65 million over the next few seasons. Keep that and we will give you the Harper/Machado contract right now.” Trout said yes, and now the Angels have one the best players in baseball history locked in for his age-29 through age-38 seasons. Even when you factor in the two years Trout is already owed, that $400 million is significantly below his value, assuming that Machado and Harper are worth $300 million. Those two years left until free agency meant a massive discount for the Angels.

When we call this deal a bargain, we can look at Mike Trout’s contract relative to Harper and Machado’s, and know that Trout is only receiving a little more money despite being a lot better. We can also look at potential future value. I love to look at comps and try to get a sense of a player’s future, but comps aren’t really fair for Mike Trout because there are barely a handful of players who even come close to his level of play. Consider Trout’s career trajectory by year, and the number of players ahead of him by WAR.

Ty Cobb the only comp for Mike Trout. Ty Cobb! Trout ranks third right now through age-27 even though he hasn’t even played the season yet, and he needs just four wins to pass Cobb and Mickey Mantle. He’s already surpassed the average Hall of Famer. Maybe you think that the early start to Trout’s career inflates the numbers. Even taking away his first two seasons, from age-22 through age-26, the only players with more WAR are Mantle and Cobb. Even just looking at the last three years, which includes an injury-shortened 2017 campaign, only Babe Ruth, Mantle, Rogers Hornsby, Jimmie Foxx, Lou Gehrig, Tris Speaker, Alex Rodriguez, and Cobb are ahead of Trout. If Trout plays like any of those players, he’ll cost something like $4 million to $5 million per win over the last 10 years of the deal. If we wanted to conservatively estimate the current value of a win on the free agent market at $9 million without any inflation, Trout wouldn’t need to age like one of the 10-best players in history — aging like the 50th would still be a good value.

The deal is such a slam dunk for the Angels that it feels a little silly to talk about what it means in baseball terms. The Angels get to keep one of the best players in history. They can now plan for the future knowing they have Trout. It would have been fun to see what an all-in Angels team would’ve looked like in 2020 with Trout a pending free agent, but hopefully this deal means we get to see the fun of a franchise that is secure in its star ensuring that that star gets a ring. After all, Mike Trout in the playoffs is good for baseball.

When it comes to adjusting the biggest contracts in baseball history for inflation, this one is a little tough to assess. We have that $430 million, but we also have that $363.5 million that doesn’t kick in until 2021. To provide some historical context — as I did for Machado and Harper earlier this offseason and later updated — I’ve included two Trout contracts below. The first is the $426.5 million figure representing the total value of the money owed to Trout; the second is Trout’s extension, assuming 5% inflation in the following two seasons.

When stacked up against comparable players and comparable contracts, Mike Trout was a humongous bargain in his last contract and will be one in his the next, but if we can play devil’s advocate a little, it’s tougher to determine how much Trout actually cost himself. Let’s say he had been a free agent last offseason like he would have without a contract extension. What would his contract have been? There’s a reasonable argument for 15 years and $600 million. Look at the Alex Rodriguez contract above. In another two years, might $500 million been on the table? That might have been what Trout was looking at, but what if last year the market didn’t quite develop as he had hoped, and he ended up with just $500 million? What if the top offer had only been $400 million after 2020? Does that seem so far-fetched given the way these past two offseasons have progressed?

Trout is now set to make around $460 million for the remainder of his free agent years. He jumped the gun twice and took a discount. The value he will provide will far exceed the money he is set to earn. It’s possible, however, because of the way spending has progressed, that Trout has actually cost himself little to no money by signing these extensions. Mike Trout was always going to be a bargain; we have a hard time wrapping our heads around the number he’s really worth. He’s the best player in baseball, and simultaneously the most underrated one. That’s a ridiculous feat, but with Mike Trout, we’ve grown accustomed to ridiculous feats.

It has been a few weeks now since Bryce Harper’s contract with the Phillies was finalized, and we’ve all mostly moved on with our lives.

I live in the Washington, D.C. area, and most people around here aren’t happy that Harper left for Philadelphia; many were more upset about where Harper chose to sign than the idea of him leaving at all. I was recently listening to local sports talk radio discussing the Harper signing. They did not make the most glowing comments about the city of Philadelphia, and they couldn’t believe that any player would sign a 13-year contract to play there. They were also taken aback by the full no-trade clause and the lack of opt-outs in the deal.

I’ll give them the latter; the lack of opt-outs in Harper’s contract was indeed a surprise to many. But as for the full no-trade clause, it’s not really as impactful as one might otherwise think.

I present to you Article XIX, Section A, Subsection (1) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, otherwise known as the 10-and-5 rule:

The contract of a Player with ten or more years of Major League service, the last five of which have been with one Club, shall not be assignable to another Major League Club without the Player’s written consent.

Basically, what this is saying is that after a player has accrued 10 years of major league service time, while also spending at least five years with their current organization, they have full no-trade rights. While people made a huge deal about Harper’s willingness to stay in Philadelphia for 13 years, the biggest indication of that willingness did not come through the no-trade clause at all. It’s something that he would have gained after his fifth season with the club. It’s only significant for the first five years of his contract, years during which the Phillies probably had no desire to trade him anyway. And even if the Phillies wanted to trade him, they might have trouble trying to unload his contract either way.

Just for fun, let’s consider how like it is that the Phillies would want to trade Harper within the first five years of his contract.

To start, the first five seasons are likely to be his best five seasons in the deal. He’s only just heading into his age-26 season, so 2019 through 2023 would only take him through age 30. Looking at the basic baseball player aging curve, these are likely to be the most productive seasons of Harper’s contract and potentially of his career.

Here’s how ZiPS projects Harper to produce through 2023:

Harper is projected to hit a total of 166 home runs, maintain an OBP above .400, and produce nearly 22 WAR. Clearly, if Harper even comes close to meeting these projections, there’s no way that the Phillies would want to trade him. That production is exactly what they were looking for when they signed him.

But what if Harper gets injured? Or worse, doesn’t play well?

That would make things a little bit more complicated. Harper’s contract won’t just disappear, and that itself makes him pretty much untradable anyway. Only teams like the Yankees, Red Sox, and Dodgers would likely be willing to take on a contract of that size, and if Harper is not producing or is injured, there’d likely be even less of a desire to want to take on the final eight-plus seasons of his deal.

There is one other scenario in which the Phillies might want to trade a good Bryce Harper. Similar to the Marlins and Giancarlo Stanton (who was in the midst of his $325 million deal), the Phillies could see their rebuild go awry. In this unlikely event, the Phillies might want to shed Harper’s salary and try to trade him. New York, Boston, and Los Angeles again would make sense as Harper’s likeliest potential suitors; another team could theoretically jump in, but his market would still be limited. After all, it was the Yankees that took on Stanton’s huge contract when the Marlins decided they didn’t want it. Still, it is a scenario that Harper — who told The Athletic’s Meghan Montemurro, “[F]or me, it’s about being somewhere for a long period of time, making my family, digging my roots, for the good, for the bad.” — was likely keen to guard against.

Here’s a breakdown of Harper’s payment structure, as outlined by Baseball-Reference:

The yellow line designates the season in which Harper would have earned his 10-and-5 rights. In a world where he did not have a no-trade clause and the Phillies tried to trade him before reaching those rights, an acquiring team would be on the hook for eight years and $208 million. Of course, the Phillies could kick in some money, but if Harper was so undesirable that they felt it was necessary to dump him, it might not even be worth dealing him. They’d have no leverage, limited suitors, and an aging, expensive star.

This does not mean that Harper shouldn’t have tried to include a no-trade clause in his contract, however. Harper obviously plans to stay in Philadelphia for all 13 years, and this just adds extra protection so he can achieve that goal.

But in a world where there wasn’t a no-trade clause in Harper’s contract, the odds that the Phillies would have traded him before he reached his 10-and-5 rights seem to be minuscule, which would seem to suggest that Harper’s no-trade clause was mostly just a matter of form.

Last week’s ‘Talks Hitting’ interviews featured a pair of prominent big-leaguers. Daniel Murphy and Nolan Arenado have combined to make seven All-Star teams over the past five seasons. Today we feature a far-less-accomplished player. Drew Ferguson, a 26-year-old outfielder currently in camp with the San Francisco Giants, has yet to make his major league debut.

Ferguson has a finance degree from Belmont University, but his true passion is the biomechanics of hitting. He can definitely swing the bat. In 316 plate appearances last year — all but 24 at the Triple-A level — Ferguson slashed .304/.432/.443. He did so in the Houston Astros organization, from which the Giants selected him in December’s Rule-5 draft.

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David Laurila: I understand that you have a strong interest in analytics.

Drew Ferguson: “I’ve been interested in analytics for many years — dating all the way back to high school — but numbers can only tell you so much. From a player development standpoint, it’s more about the biomechanics of the swing. How does the body move? What are we trying to do as hitters? What are the angles of the pitch versus the swing? What is a good approach based on your swing, based on the pitcher’s repertoire?”

Laurila: Hitting analytics are obviously becoming a big part of the game.

Ferguson: “100%. A lot of [hitting] is intuitive to players — guys describe things in different ways — but with the technology we have to describe a swing … I was just talking to one of my teammates about how angles are going to line up. For example, your posture and the direction of your swing can tell you that you should probably hit four-seam fastballs at the top of the zone easier than a sinker at the bottom of the zone. You can see that by looking at video, and at the metrics of your swing. Read the rest of this entry »

Photo: Keith Allison

Before the 2017 season, Aroldis Chapman signed a near-record-setting contract to play for the Yankees. The club knew what they were getting, both on and off the field — they had traded Chapman to the Cubs earlier that year, and now they were bringing him back. More broadly, baseball knew what the Yankees were getting — a dominant closer with a dominant fastball. Just how much of an outlier was Chapman’s fastball? Well, when MLB created a fastest pitches leaderboard to show off Statcast, they added a button called the “Chapman filter.” In 2016, Chapman threw the thirty fastest pitches in the majors. It’s not much fun looking at a leaderboard that’s just one guy’s name over and over again.

Fast forward a year, and all the signs were trending downward. Chapman put up a 3.22 ERA and a 2.56 FIP in 2017, both the highest marks since his rookie year. He struck out a career-low 32.9% of the batters he faced (which is still pretty good for a career-low). His average fastball velocity declined by a mile an hour. By early 2018, he’d even been dethroned atop the fastest pitch leaderboard by Jordan Hicks. The human brain is an amazing pattern-matching machine, and we’ve seen this one plenty of times. Closers often break — it’s one of the reasons Chapman’s five-year contract was considered a risk when he signed it. The king has his reign, and then he dies. It’s natural.

Well, a funny thing happened on the way to irrelevance. Aroldis Chapman reinvented himself in 2018, and while he didn’t quite get back to his game-breaking 2014 highs, he recorded a 2.45 ERA and an even more absurd 2.09 FIP. He struck out 43.9% of the batters he faced, the second-highest rate of his career. How did he do it? Did he reach back a little further and take the velocity lead back from Hicks? Not even close, as his average fastball velocity declined another tick in 2018, and he finished a distant third in that category, the first time he wasn’t the hardest thrower in baseball since 2011. Instead, he leaned on his slider — one that may be the best in the game today. Read the rest of this entry »

Pitchers learn and develop different pitches, and they do so at varying stages of their lives. It might be a curveball in high school, a cutter in college, or a changeup in A-ball. Sometimes the addition or refinement is a natural progression — graduating from Pitching 101 to advanced course work — and often it’s a matter of necessity. In order to get hitters out as the quality of competition improves, a pitcher needs to optimize his repertoire.

In this installment of the series, we’ll hear from three pitchers — Jon Gray, Mark Gubicza, and Garrett Richards — on how they learned and developed their sliders.

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Jon Gray, Colorado Rockies

“I started throwing a slider in probably 2012. I first learned how to throw a slurve, and that taught me how to throw a slider. I remember my uncle teaching me to throw one. He was like, ‘Don’t be throwing curves. You need to throw slurves and cutters, so you don’t mess up your arm.’ He didn’t want any action on my wrist.

“I learned how to throw that, a slurve, which is kind of the basics of a slider. In high school, I didn’t really have a grip. I didn’t know how to hold one, I guess. I just kind of made up my own grip and went with it. I didn’t watch baseball growing up — I watched none — so it was kind of hard. Read the rest of this entry »

Some would say that Ahn Woo-Jin of the Kiwoom Heroes is the most high-profile pitching prospect in all of the Korea Baseball Organization (KBO). He has been a highly-touted arm since pitching for the Whimoon High School in the Daechi-dong area of Seoul, topping out at 156 kmph (around 97 mph) and showing solid feel for his secondary pitches. He also has the look of a hurler. He’s got the height (around 6-foot-3), a frame that could fill out as he grows, and long limbs. Ahn was drafted by the Heroes in the first round of the 2017 KBO Draft, and signed with a franchise-record six billion won (around $530,000) bonus.

The 19-year-old rookie’s 2018 regular season numbers weren’t pretty. He went 2-4, 7.19 ERA (5.74 FIP) with 46 strikeouts, 28 walks, and six home runs allowed in 41.1 IP. Besides the strikeouts, the numbers indicated a clear rawness from a kid who was the age equivalent of a college freshman. However, after a series of adjustments, he became a formidable force out of the pen in the 2018 postseason. In 15.2 IP, Ahn struck out 18 and walked only one, while allowing just two earned runs and a home run. A 15.2 IP sample size isn’t as big as 41.1 IP, but it seemed clear that the tweaks made a difference.

One of the masterminds of Ahn’s mechanical changes was his pitching coach, Brandon Knight. Knight is a man of ample pitching experience. The right-hander had a cup of coffee with the Yankees in 2001 and 2002, and with the Mets in 2008. He also pitched in Japan, Venezuela, and South Korea, and had a couple of independent league stints. In the KBO, Knight pitched for the Samsung Lions in 2009 and 2010, and the then-Nexen Heroes from 2011 to 2014. He made a solid impression pitching in Korea for the last few years of his pro career, going 48-38, with a 3.84 ERA in six seasons in the KBO. The Heroes hired Knight in late 2015 to be their pitching coordinator for the Futures League team and promoted him to pitching coach for the big league team in the middle of 2017 season. Read the rest of this entry »

Chuck Cottier made his MLB debut in a star-studded environment. Playing second base, he was in the Milwaukee Braves lineup alongside the likes of Hank Aaron, Del Crandall and Eddie Mathews. The first ground ball he fielded on that April 1959 afternoon came off the bat of Roberto Clemente, on a pitch thrown by Warren Spahn. Harvey Haddix, who a month later would take a a perfect game into the 13th inning against the Braves, was on the mound for Pittsburgh.

Cottier’s first professional game was also memorable. Just 18 years old at the time — he’d signed at 17 out of a Grand Junction, Colorado high school — Cottier was playing for the Americus-Cordele Orioles in the Georgia-Florida League. It was 1954, and the minor league landscape was different than it is today.

“The lowest league was class D,” explained Cottier, who is now 83 years old and a special assistant to the general manager with the Washington Nationals. “From there it went to C, B, A, Double-A, Triple-A, and many of the organizations had two teams in each classification. We had three Triple-A teams at one time.”

Displaying a sharp-as-a-tack memory, the venerable baseball lifer told me that his first-ever game was played in Fitzgerald, Georgia, in a ballpark with a skinned infield. One play in particular stood out. Cottier remembers a “big left-handed hitter named Thompson” smashing a one-hop line drive that hit him just above the wrist, caromed over his shoulder, and rolled all the way to the fence.

Several hours later, his ride stopped rolling. Read the rest of this entry »

One of the more contentious issues facing Major League Baseball, the Major League Baseball Players Association, and baseball’s fans is the potential use of a pitch clock at the major league level.

The pitch clock, which has been in use in the minor leagues since 2015, was not among the wealth of changes announced in the latest agreement between MLB and the MLBPA, but it has been present and enforced during all of the 2019 spring training games played. Or so we think.

As it turns out, in MLB’s initial announcement of the spring training pitch clock, the league made one very important point:

Later in Spring Training, and depending on the status of negotiations with the Major League Baseball Players Association, umpires will be instructed to begin assessing ball-strike penalties for violations.

The pitch clock has seemingly been tabled in the mid-CBA rule change discussions, with Jeff Passan reporting in late-February that MLB will “scuttle the implementation of a pitch clock until at least 2022.” At least to me, that did not necessarily mean that the pitch clock would automatically go unenforced during the remainder of spring training, but despite there having been no announcement to this effect, that appears to be exactly what happened. Beat writers haven’t tweeted about its use; no stories have been written about a rattled pitcher who had a ball called against him; league officials haven’t commented on it. The clock has largely faded from the rule change conversation since Passan’s report. But I was still curious whether it was really being used as intended, and what effect that might have on time of game.

From the beginning of spring training through March 10, I recorded the game time of every single game, with the exclusion of exhibition games that weren’t played between two major league clubs. In my 254-game sample, I found that the average spring training game lasted two hours and 57 minutes. Read the rest of this entry »

I have a long history of abhorring of structural or rule changes in baseball. I wasn’t alive in 1969 to get upset, but going from two divisions to three seemed like an affront to everything that was right and decent in fifteen-year-old me. And a wild card? A team that can’t even win the division would make the playoffs? Somewhere in the WBAL-TV video archives is me in late 1994 arguing with Josh Lewin about how much I loathed the wild card. Hopefully it can’t be found.

Interleague play? Hated it. I still haven’t gotten to the point where I only mostly hate it. If I look deep into my soul, I still think of the Milwaukee Brewers as an AL East team with the best logo in baseball history and the Houston Astros as NL West stalwarts.

On Thursday, the announcement came down from Major League Baseball and the MLB Players’ Association that several of the significant rule changes proposed in recent weeks would now be implemented for the 2019 and 2020 seasons. Yet I flipped no tables over, and went on no weird Twitter rants that involved Norse gods smiting Rob Manfred under a vermilion sky (we’ll save that imagery for the CBA negotiations). I’m…happy? Apart from the decided lack of robots, that is.

First, the changes for 2019, in no particular order.

An Actual Trade Deadline, Not a Trade Deadline That Also Has This Weird Second Deadline With Secret Lists and Stuff

Baseball’s post-July 31 “bonus” deadline never really made all that much sense. It’s something we accepted because we were used to it, like how neon blue became the official color for raspberry-flavored candy for some reason. Why have a trade deadline if you’re going to have an additional one, before which some players can be traded, but only if they pass through a series of convoluted hurdles?

The August trade season was an opaque mess, full of waiver claims and revocable waivers and irrevocable waivers and pullbacks and teams trying to finagle a way to get prospects moved via players to be named later. It had largely become the “swap bad contracts” deadline and where’s the appetite for that?

The objections to removing this later deadline don’t make a lot of sense to me. I’ve heard a number of baseball and baseball-adjacent people wonder “What if you don’t know whether you’re contending or not?” or “What if something happens and you don’t have a Plan B in the minors?” Not these exact words perhaps, but you get the gist.

My answer: So? It’s good for the sport to have an element of risk in the decision-making process and it’s good for teams that plan their roster depth well to receive a benefit. One simple, straightforward trade deadline is the way to go. And really, if you need until the end of August to know if you’re a contending team or to receive the revelation that pitchers frequently become injured, you’ve got way bigger problems to worry about.

All-Star Election Day (Guest Starring: Extra Cash)

I’ll save the political parallels of election winners directly receiving cash bonuses for someone else!

All-Star voting has always been kind of weird, in that if you try to vote based on in-season performance, you end casting a ballot for an All-April team since the voting process starts very early and continues over a long period of time.

The All-Star Game has been the least interesting part of All-Star Week since interleague play started, but I do think there’s an opportunity here for baseball to create an event where they can market their top players. Hopefully upping the Home Run Derby prize to $1 million will prove a strong incentive for more top-tier sluggers to participate. Joey Gallo is already considering it.

MLB also snuck in the rule that for the All-Star Game, extra innings will start with runners on second base. Since this still won’t affect the real games, I’ll just hope this thing that nobody asked for, wants, or likes will die a quick death and just be a joke in 30 years, much like AfterMash.

Reduced Commercial Breaks

Anything that increases the baseball-to-no-baseball ratio is fine with me. The reduction from 2:05 to 2:00 in local games probably won’t be noticed, but the 2:25 to 2:00 in nationally televised games is a significant trimming. Saving a dozen views of the year’s horribly overplayed commercials in the World Series could do a lot for our collective mental well-being.

After 15 years, I still can’t completely forget the advertisement for Skin in which Ron Silver loudly reminds his daughter that her boyfriend’s father is the district attorney. If you weren’t old enough to remember the 2003 World Series, consider yourself blessed.

MLB/MLBPA Joint Committee

This isn’t really a rule change, but I’m hopeful that the MLBPA and MLB meeting years before the expiration date of the current collective bargaining agreement will result in more productive changes than we’ve gotten in recent agreements. Baseball’s revenue system is in serious need of modernization and it’s not something you can paper over by both sides agreeing to take money away from those rich, robber baron…uh…17-year-old international players. From incentivizing teams to win baseball games over subsidizing lower revenues, to gaming the service time clock, both sides have a lot of things to talk about. Rule changes aren’t likely to be quite as contentious as provisions that directly impact player compensation, but a constructive dialogue about what baseball should look like and how it should be played can only help to shape the harder conversations set to take place in 2021.

Visitation Rights Revoked

Baseball implemented a 30-second limit on mound visits before the 2016 season and capped the total number of mound visits per game without a pitching change at six before 2018. For 2019, this number has been further reduced to five visits, and while this won’t result in a significant change in total game times, it’s another moment where for the viewer, nothing is actually happening but some standing around and talking. Baseball isn’t a pub crawl, after all.

And coming in 2020…

Return of the 15-Day Injured List

The injured list (formerly the disabled list before the name change) will now return to being a 15-day list instead of a 10-day one; the minimum assignment period for pitchers sent to the minors will also increase to 15 days. The idea of the shorter injured list stint was to nudge teams into putting players with short-term injuries on the IL instead of keeping them active in the fear of having to lose them for a full two weeks, thereby risking further or worsened injury. In practice, some teams were using it as a taxi-squad, and baseball would prefer to not have to be the injury police to enforce whether or not injured list visits are due to chicanery. Unlike machinations such as openers or two-way players, exploiting rules meant to protect injured players isn’t what I consider in-game cleverness.

The LOOGYDämerung Beckons

Baseball’s rule changes frequently involve structural alterations to things like divisions and playoff spots or equipment. Changing how a player is allowed to be used on such a wide basis is a good bit rarer. There has always been some tinkering around the edges, like as the Pat Venditte rule, which is intended to keep baseball from degrading to an infinite loop as switch-pitchers and switch-hitters fight an endless battle for platoon superiority.

Going from a minimum of one batter faced to three, or until the half-inning concludes, is a significant change, and one I feel has been a long time coming, simply due to the nature of pitching vs. hitting in terms of how baseball itself is designed.

A left-handed pitcher can be rostered just for an ability to get out left-handed hitters as that’s all they have to do, but carrying a left-handed pinch-hitter to do nothing but hit righty relievers is much more difficult. There were always a lot more Randy Choates than Dave Clarks.

As players became more specialized, bullpens ballooned, and benches withered away. Knowing that a pitcher may have to pitch to three batters, or until the inning concludes, brings a bit of balance back to the issue as I see it. It makes the batting order more tactically relevant and instead of bringing in the lefty to face the lefty almost by reflex, managers will have to assess the risk-reward of bringing in that pitcher without the option to remove him easily.

One important thing to note is that people also greatly overestimate just how many one-batter stints there are in baseball.

Even in the season with the most one-batter appearances, 2015, teams still averaged only about eight a month. It’s too soon to be certain about the trend, but based on 2017 and 2018 at least, this type of usage may have hit its peak in 2011-2015.

I’m only half-joking when I say Bruce Bochy’s retirement would have reduced this number on its own. Three of the top four seasons in one-batter reliever usage in baseball history were Bochy-managed teams — the 2012, 2015, and 2016 Giants. There were 112 one-batter relief stints on the Giants in 2012 alone; only 15 other teams ever topped 70.

The players did not embrace this rule change, but agreed not to fight this particular adjustment. I suspect when we look back on this in 10 years, we’ll be surprised by how extreme people thought the change was at the time.

The 26/28 Man Roster

The size of standard active rosters will expand to 26. This strikes me as an eminently fair attempt to reverse the disappearance of benches. A team can still carry 13 pitchers (or whatever number is selected in the final rule) if it chooses to do so, but now American League teams will have at least a reasonably sized bench. My hope is that limits on resources cause innovation in both the bullpens and benches. If we see a wider variety of bullpen roles when combined with the three-batter rule and a comeback of situational hitters, I think this is a win.

Naturally, with a limit on pitchers, there needs to be a bright line to separate actual two-way players like Shohei Ohtani and Matt Davidson. Players will now have to be designated as either a pitcher or a position player in advance, and two-way players will have to meet certain criteria. The limit initially chosen of 20 innings pitched and 20 games of at least three plate appearances strikes me as a bit too steep. I have serious doubts that teams would try to “fake” a pitcher by allowing a .400ish OPS hitter to start ten games a year. For 2020 Ohtani, he’ll already have the required number of plate appearances from 2019 to qualify as a two-way player, but absent an injury exemption, until he gets the 20 innings thrown, he’ll have to be considered a pitcher, meaning he will take up one of the team’s pitcher slots for that period of time. After those 20 innings, he wouldn’t count against the team’s pitcher cap and could be reclassified.

Along with the three-batter rule, the pitcher limitation also seeks to improve the aesthetics of the game. I’ve long argued that baseball’s problem isn’t games that are long so much as it is games that are long and nothing is happening. A parade of constant reliever changes grinds things to a halt.

Where I’m not-so-excited is the effect on September rosters. I like seeing teams out of contention call up some of their minor leaguers to the 40-man roster. With 28 players on the roster, teams save on MLB salaries. If you think of some of that money going to the 26th-man during most of the season, it will likely function in many cases as a subsidy to older players from younger players. And this is sadly a theme of some changes the MLBPA and MLB have happily agreed to over the last decade.

Update: Following Seager’s surgery, it appears that he will now miss 10-12 weeks, rather than the six weeks or so estimated at the time this article was written. Please update your misery accordingly.

Last Friday, Kyle Seager dove for a ball that was smacked down the third-base line by the Cubs’ Javy Báez and hurt his hand in the process. Scott Servais removed Seager from the game during a subsequent pitching change, and the Mariners announced Monday that the third baseman would undergo immediate surgery to repair an extensor tendon in his left hand. I am not intimately familiar with extensor tendons as a matter of course, but I understand they’re what allow you to straighten your fingers and thumbs. Since you need to be able to do those things in order to play baseball, Seager will be out six weeks.

Because the Mariners aren’t expected to be very good this year — their 75-87 projection is better only than the Rangers’ in their division — this isn’t the kind of injury that you’d expect to materially affect the way the season plays out for Seattle, but it is kind of a bummer for Seager, who had a pretty bad year last year and could use a bounceback. Here are Seager’s numbers for 2011-2017 and 2018, respectively:

There’s a reasonable argument to be made that some of Seager’s under-performance last year was due to an unusually low BABIP (.251, compared to a career mark of .281), and that .178 ISO isn’t too far off his career mark of .183, but it’s hard to write off the sudden spike in strikeout rate — Seager posted a 14.3% full-season mark as recently as 2015 — especially when it comes, as it does, alongside a three-year slide in contact rate, from 83.4% in that 2015 season to 78.8% last year. Last year, for the first time in his career, Seager had a negative run value  on fastballs (-0.69 per hundred seen). Something, clearly, was a little off. Read the rest of this entry »