After having typically appeared in the hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have now been released at FanGraphs for half a decade. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Cleveland Indians. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.
Batters
Among those clubs one might reasonably designate as a “super team” — which, for sake of ease, we might simply define as any team projected for 90 or more wins at the moment — Cleveland possesses the lowest current payroll.
Regard:
Projected Wins and Payroll for “Super Teams”
Team
Payroll
Pay Rank
Wins
Wins Rank
Astros
$130.5
13
98
1
Dodgers
$181.1
3
94
2
Indians
$122.8
15
93
3
Cubs
$142.1
8
92
4
Red Sox
$191.1
1
91
t5
Nationals
$170.4
5
91
t5
Yankees
$157.9
7
91
t5
Payroll data care of spotrac.
The constraints both of the market and ownership’s willingness to spend might ultimately render it difficult for Cleveland to sustain their current run of excellence. For 2018, however, the Indians are well positioned not only to compete but contend.
Francisco Lindor (696 PA, 5.8 zWAR), of course, remains the centerpiece of the club’s field-playing corps. He’s forecast not only for a batting line nearly 20% better than league average but also +10 fielding runs at shortstop. Jose Ramirez (643, 4.7) is nearly Lindor’s equal, supplying the same type of value, if not necessarily the same degree of it.
After that pair, the roster is composed largely of players in the average range. ZiPS calls for Edwin Encarnacion (577, 2.9) to continue hitting sufficiently well to compensate for his defensive shortcomings. The greatest weakness, meanwhile, appears to be right field, where even a platoon of Lonnie Chisenhall (421, 0.3) and Brandon Guyer (294, 1.0) fails to eclipse the one-win mark by much.
I noticed an underlying theme in both pieces I’ve written since coming back, along with many others written this offseason at FanGraphs. If you are a fan of a small- or medium-market team that will never spend to the luxury-tax line and thus always be at a disadvantage, do you want your team to try to always be .500 or better, or do you want them push all the chips in the middle for a smaller competitive window? In my stats vs. scouting article I referenced a progressive vs. traditional divide, which was broadly defined by design, but there are often noticeable differences in team-building strategies from the two overarching philosophies, which I will again illustrate broadly to show the two contrasting viewpoints.
The traditional clubs tend favor prospects with pedigree (bonus or draft position, mostly), with big tools/upside and the process of team-building is often to not push the chips into the middle (spending in free agency, trading prospects) until the core talents (best prospects and young MLB assets) have arrived in the big leagues and have established themselves. When that window opens, you do whatever you can afford to do within reason to make those 3-5 years the best you can and, in practice, it’s usually 2-3 years of a peak, often followed directly by a tear-down rebuild. The Royals appear to have just passed the peak stage of this plan, the Braves hope their core is established in 2019 and the Padres may be just behind the Braves (you could also argue the old-school Marlins have done this multiple times and are about to try again now).
On the progressive side, you have a more conservative, corporate approach where the club’s goal is to almost always have a 78-92 win team entering Spring Training, with a chance to make the playoffs every year, never with a bottom-ten ranked farm system, so they are flexible and can go where the breaks lead them. The valuation techniques emphasize the analytic more often, which can sometimes seem superior and sometimes seem foolish, depending on the execution. When a rare group of talent and a potential World Series contender emerges, the progressive team will push some chips in depending on how big the payroll is. The Rays have a bottom-five payroll and can only cash in some chips without mortgaging multiple future years, whereas the Indians and Astros are higher up the food chain and can do a little more when the time comes, and have done just that.
What we just saw in Pittsburgh (and may see soon in Tampa Bay) is what happens when a very low-payroll team sees a dip coming (controllable talent becoming uncontrolled soon) and doesn’t think there’s a World Series contender core, so they slide down toward the bottom end of that win range so that in a couple years they can have a sustainable core with a chance to slide near the top of it, rather than just tread water. Ideally, you can slash payroll in the down years, then reinvest it in the competing years (the Rays has done this in the past) to match the competitive cycle and not waste free-agent money on veterans in years when they are less needed. You could argue many teams are in this bucket, with varying payroll/margin for error: the D’Backs, Brewers, Phillies, A’s and Twins, along with the aforementioned Rays, Pirates, Indians and Astros.
Eleven clubs were over $175 million in payroll for the 2017 season (Dodgers, Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Tigers, Giants, Nationals, Rangers, Orioles, Cubs, Angels), so let’s toss those teams out and ask fans of the other 19 clubs: if forced to pick one or the other, which of these overarching philosophies would you prefer to root for?
I have an early, hazy memory of Benito Santiago explaining to a reporter the approach that had led to his game-winning hit moments earlier. “I see the ball, I hit it hard,” said Santiago in his deep accent. From which game, in what year, I can’t remember. Also, it isn’t really important: it’s a line we’ve heard before. Nevertheless, it contains multitudes.
We know, for example, that major-league hitters have to see well to hit well. Recent research at Duke University has once again made explicit the link between eye sight, motor control, and baseball outcomes. This time, though, they’ve split out some of the skills involved, and it turns out that Santiago’s deceptively simple description involves nuanced levels of neuromotor activity, each predictive of different aspects of a hitter’s abilities. Will our developing knowledge about those different skills help us better sort young athletes, or better develop them? That part’s to be determined.
When I talked to Brady Aiken in August, he claimed that he wasn’t concerned with his radar gun readings, nor was he worried about ”trying to please people with velocity.” He was just trying to get outs any way he could, “regardless of whether (he was) throwing 100 or throwing 80.”
Two years after the Indians drafted him in the first round — and two years post Tommy John surgery — Aiken spent his summer pumping low-octane gas. A heater that touched 96 in high school was now hovering in the high 80s, and only occasionally inching north of 90. Other numbers were a concern as well. The 21-year-old southpaw had a 4.77 ERA and walked 101 batters in 132 innings for low-A Lake County.
Aiken was amiable yet defensive when addressing his performance and his velocity. With the caveat that “everyone wants to throw hard,” he allowed that he’s not where he once was. And while he’s not sure what to expect going forward, he sees positives in what is hopefully a temporary backslide.
“I’ve had to learn to become more of a pitcher, because I can’t just blow balls by guys anymore,” said Aiken. “At this level, you’re also not facing high school or college guys — this is their job, and you have to be better at your job than they are at theirs. If you can command the ball well at 90-92 you should be able to find holes in bats, and be able to get outs.” Read the rest of this entry »
On Thursday evening, Cleveland agreed to a two-year, $16 million deal with air-ball revolution poster boy Yonder Alonso. The contract includes an option for a third season.
Free agent 1B Yonder Alonso in agreement with #Indians on two-year, $16M contract, sources tell The Athletic. Deal includes $8M vesting option for a third year. Agreement first reported by @BNightengale.
There were a number of potential first-base fits for Cleveland in a deep class that included other left-handed options like Matt Adams (who reached a one-year, $4 million deal with Nationals), Mitch Moreland (two years, $13 million with Red Sox) Lucas Duda, and Logan Morrison. Eric Hosmer’s ask, and perhaps inconsistency, likely pushed him out of consideration for the club.
Since the Orioles started listening to offers for Manny Machado, people have been trying to find the best trade partner for Baltimore to match up with. Unfortunately for Dan Duquette, the list of teams that have a glaring need at either SS or 3B and are in position to pay what it will take to land a one-year rental is pretty short. Teams like the Astros, Dodgers, Nationals, Red Sox, and Cubs are pretty well set on the left side of the infield. Peter Angelos doesn’t want Machado on the Yankees. The Phillies make sense as a bidder for Machado next year, but not really this year.
That has led to a situation where teams like the White Sox and Diamondbacks are being mentioned as leading suitors, even though they don’t really fit what we’d think a Machado buyer would look like. The Cubs and Red Sox have gotten some mentions, but deals with those teams don’t actually make all that much sense. Especially with the Orioles apparently looking for big-league ready pitching in exchange, finding a team that lines up with Baltimore on a trade for their franchise player isn’t particularly easy.
But there’s one team that has the assets Baltimore is looking for, the incentive to make a substantial upgrade in 2018, and a spot for Machado in their line-up. The team that should land Manny Machado? The Cleveland Indians.
One player whom the baseball industry and vacationing families might not have expected to see this week at Disney’s sprawling Swan and Dolphin Resort, the site of this year’s Winter Meetings, was Melvin Upton Jr. You might have — particularly if you’re a Braves fans — erased Upton from your memory. But Upton was there to sell himself to interested clubs. He was ultimately successful.
More on that in a moment. First: a brief tour of Upton’s career, which has followed an unusual trajectory.
The former No. 2 overall pick and elite prospect was moved to the outfield early in his major-league career by the Rays due to his shortcomings at shortstop. And it was in Tampa’s center field where he emerged as a star-level player, averaging 3.6 WAR per season from 2007 to -12. Upton possessed a rare blend of plate discipline, power, and speed. He then signed a lucrative free-agent deal with the Braves. Things didn’t go well. He posted a -0.6 WAR in 2013 and a 0.3 mark in 2014. To rid themselves of the three years and $57 million remaining on Upton’s contract, the Braves included him with Craig Kimbrel in a package that sent both players to San Diego before the 2015 season.
The Indians signed reliever Dan Otero to a deal yesterday. It wasn’t for much in baseball terms, $2.5 million over two years, and that might make sense. He doesn’t strike anyone out and is only projected to be a little bit better than league average. That’s if you look at his overall arsenal. If you pick one pitch, he’s got a good one.
Not every team approaches the offseason looking to get better in the same way. That much is obvious: budget alone can dictate much of a club’s activity on the free-agent market. A little bit less obvious, though, is how the present quality of a team’s roster can affect the players they pursue. Teams that reside on a certain part of the win curve, for example, need that next win more than teams on other parts. That can inform a team’s decisions in the offseason.
What’s so remarkable about Corey Kluber’s second Cy Young Award, the receipt of which was announced Wednesday evening, is he won it despite missing a month of the season. At the All-Star break, it looked like Sale in a runaway, but Kluber found another level and produced one of the great Cy Young comebacks of all-time. That’s how dominant he was from the point at which he returned in June through the end of September following a trip to the DL with a back strain.
How good was Kluber?
Starting with that appearance against Oakland on June 1, Kluber struck out 224 batters (!). That’s 224 strikeouts in two-thirds of a season. That’s 224 strikeouts against 619 batters faced, good for an astounding 36.2% rate. He walked only 3.7% of those same batters.
The difference between Kluber’s strikeout and walk rate (K-BB%) from June to September was 32.5 points. To put that mark in context, consider: among all pitchers, only elite bullpen arms recorded Craig Kimbrel, Kenley Jansen and Chad Greenbetter marks for the season. (It should be noted that Chris Sale led MLB starters over the whole season with a 31.1-point differential. Kluber finished second to Sale among starters, with a 29.5-point mark.)
