Chris Young is in camp with the San Diego Padres, looking to extend a pitching career that began in 2000 when he was drafted out of Princeton University. It may be a tall task. The 6-foot-10 right-hander turns 39 in May, and he put up a 7.50 ERA last season in 30 ragged innings with the Royals. This could be his last hurrah, a fact he readily acknowledges.
“At some point my career will come to an end, as it does for everybody,” Young told me earlier this week. “I’m realistic about that. Over the offseason I had some of those conversations with people that I respect and admire within the game, but right now my focus is on playing. I feel good physically and the ball is coming out well, so I’m excited to compete for a spot.”
The conversations Young was referring to — with the exception of one coaching opportunity — were all in regard to front office work. Several organizations approached him about the possibility, and while no specific roles were discussed, there will undoubtably be follow-ups in the future. How soon that happens is the question that may be answered by opening day. Read the rest of this entry »
Eric Hosmer signed with the Padres…wow, was it only last weekend? Eric Hosmer signed with the Padres last weekend. I wrote up the whole post, and then sat back, eager to look at the comments, given how Hosmer is so famously polarizing. And, yeah, those expected comments rolled in, just as you’d think, but there was also another comment that stuck in my head. Here is most of it:
Maybe it’s kind of obvious, when you think about it, but we probably haven’t given it enough consideration. With all the tools we have, it’s been easy to dream on Hosmer’s power upside. Similarly, it’s been easy to dream on Christian Yelich’s power upside. This is supposed to be the era of data-driven player adjustments, so you can imagine a version of Hosmer and a version of Yelich who are able to generate consistent loft. But this isn’t as easy as it seems. It’s not even necessary, and there’s always the chance a change could backfire. See, the thing about Hosmer and the thing about Yelich is that both of these hitters are already good.
The last time the Padres won at least half of their games was 2010. Last year’s team finished with 71 wins and 91 losses, and, according to the underlying numbers, the club was actually even worse than that. Looking immediately ahead, the picture doesn’t look much better. Steamer thinks the Padres are the worst team in the NL West. PECOTA agrees. We don’t have everything we need from the ZiPS projections yet, but that system’s probably in agreement with the others. The 2018 Padres almost certainly aren’t going to make the playoffs. They’re just another organization that’s tried to rebuild.
The 2018 Padres are also going to play Eric Hosmer just about every day. News came out Saturday evening that Hosmer finally decided between the Padres and the Royals. The terms from San Diego, given to the 28-year-old first baseman: eight years, $144 million. There’s an opt-out after year five. Hosmer will get $105 million over the first five years, with the last three worth $39 million, in the event Hosmer sticks around. Reports recently had the Padres offering seven years, while Scott Boras wanted nine. These things so often end up with the obvious compromise.
Hosmer has been out there so long, and he’s been polarizing so long, that there’s hardly even anything new to say. If you’re a regular reader of FanGraphs, you know what Hosmer is, and what he isn’t. I wrote about the idea of Hosmer signing a big contract with the Padres back in the middle of December. Everything I said then still applies. This is an interesting deal, of course; Hosmer is admittedly fascinating. But what might be even more interesting is the signal this sends. The biggest contract of the offseason was given by a last-place team. That last-place team clearly has no intention of remaining there very much longer.
Ben Lindbergh and Jeff Sullivan banter about the Orioles’ Andrew Cashner signing, recent “super-teams” that missed the playoffs, and Marcus Stroman’s arbitration tweets, then preview the 2018 Cubs (16:27) with The Athletic Chicago’s Sahadev Sharma, and the 2018 Padres (46:43) with The Athletic San Diego’s Dennis Lin.
After having typically appeared in the hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have now been released at FanGraphs for half a decade. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the San Diego Padres. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.
Batters
San Diego hitters recorded the lowest collective WAR figure in the majors last year, compiling just seven wins as a group, or about 26 fewer than the Houston Astros’ cohort. This offseason, meanwhile, has seen the departure of Yangervis Solarte — who, for whatever his shortcomings, has nevertheless been the club’s most productive position player over the last three years. This would appear to spell trouble for erstwhile managing editor Dave Cameron and his new colleagues.
And yet, not that. A brief examination of the depth-chart image below reveals a Starting Eight that projects as profoundly average. And while that might not be regarded as welcome news for some clubs, it represents a promising development for the young Padres. There isn’t anything in the way of star-level power here — Manuel Margot (585 PA, 3.2 zWAR) and Wil Myers (648, 3.2) both profile more as above-average regulars than clear All-Stars — but there is also little in the way of glaring weakness.
Of some interest is how the team handles second base. Cory Spangenberg (527, 1.3) earns the top forecast of the players likely to receive time there, but Carlos Asuaje (609, 1.2) started about half the club’s games at second last season. Prospect Luis Urias (558, 1.8), meanwhile, has a better WAR forecast than either of them.
To be completely honest with you, I’ve been kind of bored. Bored and feeling uninspired. Maybe it’s just a winter funk, but there’s also the reality of the slow-motion baseball offseason. I know I’m not the only writer whose topic well has begun to run dry. It’s not a big deal; everything’s cyclical, and writing has its ups and downs. I’m just trying to explain to you how I got here.
When I’m feeling stuck, I frequently just play around on various leaderboards, searching for inspiration. I’ll run through leaderboards here, I’ll run through leaderboards on Baseball Reference, and I’ll run through leaderboards on Baseball Savant. Most recently I was bit by the Statcast bug, so I found myself on Baseball Savant’s familiar pages. I was looking at the exit velocity page. I was looking at the sprint speed page. Suddenly, a name jumped out I didn’t expect. And the more I thought about it, the more I realized I couldn’t ignore this.
I considered all the current Padres position players for whom there’s a decent sample of 2017 Statcast information available. The player with the fastest average sprint speed? It’s not Manuel Margot. It’s Franchy Cordero. And, the player with the fastest average exit velocity? It’s not Wil Myers. It’s Franchy Cordero. A few days ago, I knew next to nothing about Cordero’s skillset. I knew only of his existence. Now I realize he’s one of the more exciting young players around.
Could Scott Boras do for Eric Hosmer what he’s done for Prince Fielder and Matt Wieters in the past? (Photo: Cathy T)
Because of the nature of inactivity this offseason, we’ve explored, among other things, whether MLB teams have learned how to wait on free agents and how agents and players may need to adapt. These are trying times for a baseball scribe. We could use some transactions!
One agent who has tried to adapt, who is arguably the game’s greatest at his chosen profession, is Scott Boras.
In recent offseasons, when only a tepid market has developed for his clients, Boras has on occasion attempted to circumvent front offices — which are increasingly operating with less emotion and more reason — and appeal directly to owners. It worked with Prince Fielder in early 2012 in Detroit, for example.
Wrote FanGraphs alumnus Jonah Keri of that deal when it happened:
In short, Dave Dombrowski knows his stuff.
Which is exactly why Scott Boras wanted no part of him.
Mike Ilitch’s role in the nine-year, $214 million contract the Tigers gave to Prince Fielder has been well documented. … If you’re an agent representing a big-ticket client, do you negotiate with a GM who has 10 baseball ops guys at his disposal breaking down player projections to the smallest decimal point? Or do you approach the octogenarian owner who’s far more likely to make decisions from the heart, far more likely to say, “Eff it, I don’t care what happens in 2018, I want to win now”?
Boras perhaps didn’t pioneer this end-around approach in this age of data-drenched, free-agency-averse front offices. Rather, it might have been Dan Lozano, who appealed directly to Angels owner Arte Moreno while attempting to find a home for Albert Pujols.
I noticed an underlying theme in both pieces I’ve written since coming back, along with many others written this offseason at FanGraphs. If you are a fan of a small- or medium-market team that will never spend to the luxury-tax line and thus always be at a disadvantage, do you want your team to try to always be .500 or better, or do you want them push all the chips in the middle for a smaller competitive window? In my stats vs. scouting article I referenced a progressive vs. traditional divide, which was broadly defined by design, but there are often noticeable differences in team-building strategies from the two overarching philosophies, which I will again illustrate broadly to show the two contrasting viewpoints.
The traditional clubs tend favor prospects with pedigree (bonus or draft position, mostly), with big tools/upside and the process of team-building is often to not push the chips into the middle (spending in free agency, trading prospects) until the core talents (best prospects and young MLB assets) have arrived in the big leagues and have established themselves. When that window opens, you do whatever you can afford to do within reason to make those 3-5 years the best you can and, in practice, it’s usually 2-3 years of a peak, often followed directly by a tear-down rebuild. The Royals appear to have just passed the peak stage of this plan, the Braves hope their core is established in 2019 and the Padres may be just behind the Braves (you could also argue the old-school Marlins have done this multiple times and are about to try again now).
On the progressive side, you have a more conservative, corporate approach where the club’s goal is to almost always have a 78-92 win team entering Spring Training, with a chance to make the playoffs every year, never with a bottom-ten ranked farm system, so they are flexible and can go where the breaks lead them. The valuation techniques emphasize the analytic more often, which can sometimes seem superior and sometimes seem foolish, depending on the execution. When a rare group of talent and a potential World Series contender emerges, the progressive team will push some chips in depending on how big the payroll is. The Rays have a bottom-five payroll and can only cash in some chips without mortgaging multiple future years, whereas the Indians and Astros are higher up the food chain and can do a little more when the time comes, and have done just that.
What we just saw in Pittsburgh (and may see soon in Tampa Bay) is what happens when a very low-payroll team sees a dip coming (controllable talent becoming uncontrolled soon) and doesn’t think there’s a World Series contender core, so they slide down toward the bottom end of that win range so that in a couple years they can have a sustainable core with a chance to slide near the top of it, rather than just tread water. Ideally, you can slash payroll in the down years, then reinvest it in the competing years (the Rays has done this in the past) to match the competitive cycle and not waste free-agent money on veterans in years when they are less needed. You could argue many teams are in this bucket, with varying payroll/margin for error: the D’Backs, Brewers, Phillies, A’s and Twins, along with the aforementioned Rays, Pirates, Indians and Astros.
Eleven clubs were over $175 million in payroll for the 2017 season (Dodgers, Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Tigers, Giants, Nationals, Rangers, Orioles, Cubs, Angels), so let’s toss those teams out and ask fans of the other 19 clubs: if forced to pick one or the other, which of these overarching philosophies would you prefer to root for?
Manny Margot had a breakout within a breakout last year. After accounting for his offensive and defensive contributions, the Padres’ rookie center fielder was worth roughly two wins in slightly less than a full season’s worth of plate appearances. Even for a player who was highly touted as a prospect, producing league-average work at 22 years old represents, in itself, a kind of breakout.
Hidden within that strong end-of-year line was a drastic change in the second half, though. Margot started hitting the ball in the air. That’s a change that has powered many other breakouts. But before we book the skinny center fielder for all of the homers next year, we have to ask: what’s happened with launch-angle surgers in the past?
I wrote my first post for FanGraphs on April 14th, 2008. It was about Gabe Kapler’s return from managing to be a productive big leaguer. It referenced WPA/LI as our version of a modern statistic and talked unironically about how Kapler was keeping up with Casey Kotchman. It wasn’t great.
Since then, I’ve published 3,501 other posts (or chats). Hopefully, most of them were better than that first one. In these last 10 years, the site has changed a lot. In 2010, I went from a freelancer to the company’s first full-time employee, then was joined by a host of absurdly talented coworkers, many of whom now also get to do this for a living. FanGraphs went from a niche site into the mainstream, and along the way, I’ve seen our little corner of the baseball world help change the language of baseball fans.
It’s been a remarkable run. But for me, it comes to an end today. This will be my last post at FanGraphs.
