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The Kozma Show

The St. Louis Cardinals won Game Three of their NLD Series against the Washington Nationals on Wednesday, taking a 2-1 lead in said series in the process. Besides Chris Carpenter, who pitched 5.2 scoreless (if not always dominant) innings, the player most directly responsible for the Cardinal victory — by Win Probability Added, I mean — was shortstop Pete Kozma, whose second-inning three-run homer (at .128 WPA) was the game’s single most decisive play and whose 0.11 WPA for the game was tops among Cardinal hitters.

Here’s how you, the reader — provided you’re not a Nationals fan, at least — feel about Pete Kozma, probably: you like him. Here’s why you like him, maybe: because he’s just a little guy. Or here’s why else, maybe: because he was in the minors until the end of August and is now the starting shortstop for a playoff team. Or here’s a third reason, perhaps: because he’s produced better offensively over the last month-plus in the majors than he did at any time, basically, during his previous five months in the very offensive Triple-A Pacific Coast League.

One other possible reason you like Pete Kozma is because you’re his mother — in which case, that’s really great how curious you are about advanced baseball analysis, Mrs. Kozma. Welcome.

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Yu Darvish Thrives By Attacking Lefties

From Yu Darvish’s first start in the major leagues — before, for those who followed his international career — it was clear the 26-year-old phenom had the pure stuff necessary to handle major league hitters, even to thrive against them. The arsenal: a mid-to-high 90s fastball and five other pitches ranging anywhere from cutter to slider to lollipop curve, all with sharp break and solid control.

Darvish had his flashes of brilliance through the first four months of the season, as all with his talent inevitably do, but the results were disappointing: a 4.05 ERA through July with a slightly better FIP. Two issues plagued Darvish: walks, and an inability to retire left-handed hitters. Even as he struggled with his control, righties managed just a .648 OPS off Darvish in his first four months. Lefties — buoyed by 23 extra base hits compared to just 12 for righties — mustered a .721 OPS. With managers playing platoons constantly, Darvish actually faced significantly more left-handers (321) than right-handers (217). This was Darvish’s major trial.

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Will Scherzer’s Shoulder Woes Show in Game Four?

On September 18th, Max Scherzer was removed from his start after two innings because of shoulder woes. There might not be a more troubling word in the world of pitching than ‘shoulder.’ Once it goes, with it goes your velocity, which is much worse than the risk of temporary loss of playing time and control that the elbow offers. We had so much success predicting a low-scoring game for Anibal Sanchez yesterday, let’s wash off the template and start again. Did something happen in mid-September that fundamentally changed Scherzer’s game?

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Zach Collier, Anthony Hewitt & You: Evaluating Hitters

Evaluating a pitcher is simpler than evaluating a hitter.  It isn’t easier, due to pitcher attrition, but pitchers show you everything they have to offer—stuff, location, delivery, athleticism, etc.—pitch after pitch and are dictating the action.  Watching a hitter is more complicated since you’re evaluating their ability to react to what the pitcher is doing, along with the physical tools, ability to use them, approach at the plate, etc.  Hitters can go a couple at bats without swinging and full games without having to show their ability in one of these key areas.

The hit tool is the hardest tool to predict and also is the most important.  Imagine the job of a pro scout grading the hit tool for every player on a team from a five game look.  You’ll have notes from batting practice and every at bat of each player, but the information is asymmetrical.  You don’t know how he responds to a fastball on his hands until one is thrown and maybe he never gets one or he doesn’t swing at it.  You pay close attention to his plate discipline but maybe he doesn’t see any borderline pitches for a game or two.  This is multiplied for every player on the team, some of whom play irregularly, so your notes can have some holes. Evaluating a hitter is difficult because it’s a passive act graded off of a short look but also because it’s very complicated by nature with countless components.

While my method for grading hitters isn’t a revelation, it’s helped me organize my thoughts about hitters while taking notes mid-game and while writing the final evaluations.  I separate the hit tool into three components –tools, plate discipline and bat control—and classify any observation into one of the three groups, then use the grades of each of these components to get to the hit tool grade.  If I don’t take this methodical, checklist-type approach, I end up looking at a mess of notes, outcomes, stats and background info and gut-feeling my way to a hit tool grade.

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Giants Win, Make Incredible Postseason History

So far, the San Francisco Giants and the Cincinnati Reds have played three games in their Division Series, with the Reds winning two of them. In one game, the Giants’ offense finished with seven hits and six walks in nine innings. In another game, the Giants’ offense finished with two hits and three walks in nine innings. In the last game, the Giants’ offense finished with three hits, a walk, and a hit batter in ten innings. From that information, spot the Giants’ lone victory.

It was the last one, by the way. In Tuesday’s must-win Game 3, the Giants racked up all of three singles in an extra-innings contest, but good pitching and a timely or untimely error by Scott Rolen allowed the Giants’ postseason dreams to stay alive. They might not survive through Wednesday, but given Tuesday’s offense, it’s a minor miracle they’ve gotten this far.

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Wilin Rosario: Estimating BB and K Using Plate Discipline

In September, teams are allowed to expand their rosters and the Rockies did that in 2011 by calling up Wilin Rosario. Rosario showed a bit of pop, but had some problems making contact. Going into 2012, questions about his ability to not strike out existed. By using a small sample size of a hitter’s swing and contact values, a better estimate of his walk and strikeout rates can be estimated.

The Rockies began the 2012 season with Ramon Hernandez as their #1 catcher and Wilin Rosario was slated as the backup even though Rosario was a highly touted ranked prospect (#49 in 2011, #87 in 2012). The main reason the Rockies didn’t have any faith in Rosario was his plate discipline. In the minors, his BB% ranged between 4.5% and 8.7% and his K% between 19.2%-29.9%. In 57 MLB plate appearances, his BB% was 3.5% and his K% was 35.1%. These values forced people to have reservations about him being able to stick in the majors.

In the 2011 FG+ fantasy preview, Paul Swydan wrote the following on Rosario:

Swinging at every pitch thrown to you is only a good strategy for a hitter if you have enough bat control to hit or foul off nearly every pitch thrown to you (see Guerrero, Vladimir). Wilin Rosario is not this type of hitter, and his acceptable plate discipline in the low minors has steadily worsened as he has moved up the Rockies’ organizational ladder.  ….. Rosario still needs to fine tune his game — particularly his plate discipline — and is unlikely to contribute to your team no matter where he starts the season.

Instead of using BB% and K%, a player’s estimated K% and BB% can be determined by using swing and miss values. To get an idea of this value, I created a formula using (See Appendix) O-Swing%, K-Swing%, O-Contact% and K-Contact% plate discipline values.

By plugging Rosario’s 2011 plate discipline numbers into the spreadsheet, his 2011 plate discipline numbers would be 22% K% and 6% BB%. While the BB% is fairly close to his actual value (4%), the K% is off by 13 percentage points.

With questions surrounding his plate discipline in 2012, he saw is K% end up at 23%. This was within 1% point of what his 2011 estimated K%. With reasonable plate discipline, he was able to put up a decent season (1.8 WAR in 426 PA). Using a second method to calculate a Rosario’s K% and BB% helps to get a better picture of his true talent level.

Rookies, like Rosario, are called up and get a small number of plate appearances. By using a player’s plate discipline numbers, the player’s walk and strikeout rates can be estimated. The estimate can help determine if the player’s talent level is significantly different than their stats suggest.
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Appendix

I wanted a formula to help estimate a player’s K% and BB% using the plate discipline values available at FanGraphs. The formula create wouldn’t be a prediction (as it contains no regression) or stat that stabilizes fast.

I took every player that had over 200 PAs in a season from 2002, when plate discipline numbers are first available at FanGraphs, to 2012. I ran a linear regression against over 3500 seasons and came up with the following two formulas:

BB% ((NIBB-IBB)/PA)
BB% = -0.228 x O-Swing% -0.139 x Z-Swing% – 0.030 x O-Contact% -0.257 x Z-Contact% + 0.437
R-Squared = 0.45

K% (K/PA)
K % = 0.248 x O-Swing% -0.345 x Z-Swing% – 0.153 x O-Contact% -0.837 x Z-Contact% + 1.169
R-Squared = 0.79

I have gone ahead and saved people some time and uploaded a spreadsheet to the Google Docs that will automatically do the calculations.

To use the sheet.

1. Download the spreadsheet by using the “Download As” feature under File.
Go to the players page at FanGraphs, minimize minor league data, go to the Standard stat area and copy the all the data going back to 2002.

2. Go to the downloaded spreadsheet and paste the data with the upper left corner being the left yellow box.

3. Go back to the player’s FanGraphs page and copy the (non-Pitch F/X) Plate Discipline values.

4. Go back to the downloaded spreadsheet and paste the data with the upper left corner being the right yellow box.

5. Once the data has been added to the spreadsheet, the player’s real and estimated K% and BB% will be calculated.


Almost Reasonable Predictions re: the Nats and Cards

Allow me to state an obvious thing about the Nats-Cards NLDS, which is that it (i.e. the Series) is now tied at 1-1 after St. Louis’s 12-4 victory on Monday (box).

Allow me to state another (mostly) obvious thing, which is that the following predictions about the remainder of the Nats-Cards NLDS — while almost reasonable — are also almost certain to be wrong.

In any case, here they are — three almost reasonable predictions regarding the Nats and Cards:

Trevor Rosenthal Will Post the Cards’ Second-Highest gmLI Henceforth
Leverage Index (LI) is a measurement for how “critical” any given moment of a game is, where 1.00 is average and above 1.00 is “more critical.” So, for example, the most critical moment in Game Two on Monday — which featured a 2.08 LI (just over twice as important as a regular at-bat) — was when Jordan Zimmermann was batting in the second inning with Washington up 1-0 the game tied 0-0, runners on first and second, and one out. This represented the moment by which the game’s fate would be most significantly decided. By contrast, the game’s lowest LIs (zero, basically) occurred in the eighth and ninth innings, with St. Louis having established a considerable lead.

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A Friendly Reminder About A-Rod and October

In the first two games against Baltimore, Alex Rodriguez is 1 for 9 with a walk and five strikeouts. Last night, he came to the plate five times and made five outs, though his first inning double play was a line drive that could have easily been a base hit had it gone a foot further to the left. Still, with his game-ending strikeout that followed a seventh inning whiff with the tying run on first base, the “Alex Rodriguez is Not Clutch” narrative is popping up again. And, after just two games, some are calling for A-Rod to be dropped in the batting order due to his regular October slumps.

The problem, as always, is that the evidence just doesn’t support the storyline.

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September or August Anibal for Game Three?

Tonight’s game three between the Tigers and Athletics features two starters that weren’t on their team’s active roster when the season began. But since Brett Anderson’s absence was due to injury, it was Anibal Sanchez that has given us a full season’s worth of stats to digest and so he’ll be the subject of our inquiry.

The fact that he’s given us stats all year isn’t to say Sanchez has been the same guy all year. If August Anibal shows up, the Athletics might be able to take advantage of their depth, defense and speed. If September’s version of the Tigers’ pitcher takes the mound, it will instead be the story of Detroit’s depth in the rotation that will end the series.

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Scrabble and the Rookie

At this point, it might not make a whole lot of sense to talk about Sunday’s Game 1 of the Cardinals/Nationals NLDS, since Game 2 is already well underway at this writing. And if we’re going to talk about Sunday’s Game 1, it might not make a whole lot of sense to focus on just one single pitch. Game 1 featured several pitches, dozens of pitches, and each was important. But where many have discussed the decision to replace Mitchell Boggs with Marc Rzepczynski in the top of the eighth, I want to discuss the result of Rzepczynski’s first at-bat.

The controversy, if you want to call it that, is that the Nationals had two runners in scoring position with two out, and instead of letting Boggs face the left-handed Chad Tracy, Mike Matheny chose to have the left-handed Rzepczynski face the right-handed rookie Tyler Moore. Moore singled home two runs, turning a 2-1 deficit into a 3-2 lead, and the win-expectancy swing was about 47 percent. That single won Game 1 for the Nationals — it was a pretty important single.

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