Let me be very clear: This doesn’t matter. What I’m about to show you is small sample size theater. It’s not statistically significant. It has no bearing on what’s actually going to happen in the World Series. We are here for a fun fact rather than a learning opportunity. Are we all in agreement? Okay, then let me show you something wild. Here are Aaron Judge’s career numbers against the Los Angeles Dodgers.
These Are Some Humongous Numbers, My Friends
PA
HR
AVG
OBP
SLG
OPS
wOBA
wRC+
41
8
.389
.463
1.111
1.575
.621
312
So, uh, yeah. A .389 batting average is good. A slugging percentage in the thousands is good. A wRC+ over 300 is also good. Just in case you were wondering how good those numbers are, here’s a table that shows the best career numbers against the Dodgers, minimum 40 plate appearances, courtesy of our splits leaderboard. Read the rest of this entry »
When it comes to throwing shade in the playoffs in recent years, nothing has caught as much – not even your least favorite broadcaster – than the concept of home field advantage. The reason for the negative feelings isn’t surprising. Other than a possible first-round bye, home field advantage is the main reward for playoff teams that win more regular-season games than other playoff teams.
It’s true that home teams have struggled in recent postseasons, but they actually haven’t been too bad this year. The 19-18 record of home teams isn’t the most scintillating of tallies, but their .513 winning percentage across 37 games is not exactly a stunning departure from the .522 winning percentage for home teams during the 2024 regular season. The most games a team can possibly play in a single postseason is 22, and nine points of winning percentage works out to only 0.2 wins per 22 games.
Postseason Winning Percentage at Home, 1995-2024
Year
Wins
Losses
Winning Percentage
2023
15
26
.366
2010
13
19
.406
1996
14
18
.438
2019
17
20
.459
1998
14
16
.467
2003
18
20
.474
2016
17
18
.486
2012
18
19
.486
1997
17
17
.500
2024
19
18
.514
2001
18
17
.514
2018
17
16
.515
2000
16
15
.516
2015
19
17
.528
2005
16
14
.533
2020
29
24
.547
2002
19
15
.559
2008
18
14
.563
2014
18
14
.563
2006
17
13
.567
2022
23
17
.575
2004
20
14
.588
2011
23
15
.605
2013
23
15
.605
2007
17
11
.607
1995
19
12
.613
2021
24
14
.632
2009
19
11
.633
1999
20
11
.645
2017
27
11
.711
Naturally, the data are noisy given the relatively small number of postseason games, even under the current format, but the recent issues with home field advantage seem to mostly be a 2023 thing, when home teams went 15-26, comfortably their worst year. Smoothing out the data a bit doesn’t really do much, either.
Postseason Winning Percentage at Home, Five-Year Periods, 1995-2024
Five-Year Period
Winning Percentage
1995-1999
.532
1996-2000
.513
1997-2001
.528
1998-2002
.540
1999-2003
.538
2000-2004
.529
2001-2005
.532
2002-2006
.542
2003-2007
.550
2004-2008
.571
2005-2009
.580
2006-2010
.553
2007-2011
.563
2008-2012
.538
2009-2013
.549
2010-2014
.537
2011-2015
.558
2012-2016
.534
2013-2017
.581
2014-2018
.563
2015-2019
.542
2016-2020
.546
2017-2021
.573
2018-2022
.547
2019-2023
.517
2020-2024
.526
You can always find an oddity if you shave data paper-thin like prosciutto, but with data as volatile as this, you’ll mostly end up with bleeps and bloops that don’t really mean anything. Like, sure, teams are 29-31 since 1995 at home in Game 7s and Game 5s, but that’s primarily the odd blip of NLDS home teams going 4-12 in their rubber matches.
Returning to 2023 one more time, I went back and looked at the projections, both from ZiPS and regular-season record or Pythagorean record. Using each team’s actual 2023 record, the average home team in the playoffs had a .562 regular-season winning percentage; it was .551 for the road teams. It’s a .564/.553 split using the Pythagorean records. But I still have all the projected matchups and rosters at the start of the playoffs saved, so I re-projected the results of every actual game that was played. ZiPS thought on a game-by-game basis, with home field advantage completely removed from the equation, the road teams were actually slightly stronger, projecting the average home team at .545 and the average road team at .556. Facing off against each other, ZiPS expected home teams to have a .489 record in the 31 actual playoff games, with an 8% chance of going 15-26 or worse.
Looking at the Wild Card era as a whole, home teams have gone .540 over 1,045 playoffs games. In the regular season over the same era, home teams have a .537 winning percentage. In other words, the playoffs just aren’t that different from the regular season. (ZiPS assumes a .535 playoff winning percentage for the home team in a game of exactly equal teams.) So why does it feel so bad? I suspect one reason can be found in the charts above. Home teams had a pretty good run in the mid-2010s, on the heels of the expansion from eight to 10 playoff teams, peaking at a .581 winning percentage from 2013 to 2017. In that context, it conveys the feeling that home field advantage is working as intended, and the five-year runs stayed slightly above the historical trend until the 2023 home field crash.
Since that crash feels especially bad, it’s natural that people search for deeper meaning in data that don’t really have a lot to give. One common cry was blaming the long layoffs from the bye round. This argument doesn’t hold up, as Ben Clemens pointed out last postseason.
It also doesn’t have much to do with modern baseball or modern players, either. Home field advantage has been relatively stable in the regular season throughout baseball history.
Regular Season Winning Percentage by Decade
Decade
Winning Percentage
1900s
.551
1910s
.540
1920s
.543
1930s
.553
1940s
.544
1950s
.539
1960s
.540
1970s
.538
1980s
.541
1990s
.535
2000s
.542
2010s
.535
2020s
.531
There’s been some long-term decline, but nothing earth-shattering.
The larger problem is simply that fundamentally, home field advantage just isn’t a big deal in baseball. It’s not as big a deal in other sports as some think, but unlike in the other major sports, the difference in baseball between a great team, a good team, a lousy team, and the Chicago White Sox is not that large. Other sports don’t need home field advantage to be as much of a differentiator, especially in the playoffs. A few years back, Michael Lopez, Greg Matthews, and Ben Baumer crunched some numbers and estimated that to match the better-team-advances rate of the NBA playoffs, MLB teams would need to play best-of-75 playoff series. I certainly love me some baseball, but I can’t imagine I’d still watch World Series Game 63 with the same intensity as I do every Fall Classic game now. Besides, the MLBPA wouldn’t be on board, and the calendar would make that a practical impossibility anyway.
Even giving the team with more wins home field advantage in every single game doesn’t drastically weight the dice. Assuming a .535 home winning percentage and evenly matched teams, the home team would require a best-of-13 series to become a 60/40 favorite; to increase its odds to 2-to-1, we’d have to make it a best-of-39 series. Just to experiment, I simulated series with the normal postseason distribution of home field advantage (one extra game) between two teams, the one in which the home team is .020 wins better than its opponent (just over three wins in a season). I then ran the numbers for how often the better team would be expected to win, based on series length.
Playoff Simulation, Better Team’s Series Win Probability
Series Length (Maximum Games)
Win Probability
3
54.7%
5
55.1%
7
55.5%
9
55.9%
11
56.3%
13
56.6%
15
57.0%
17
57.3%
19
57.7%
21
58.0%
23
58.3%
25
58.6%
27
58.8%
29
59.1%
31
59.4%
33
59.6%
35
59.9%
37
60.1%
39
60.4%
41
60.6%
43
60.8%
45
61.0%
47
61.3%
49
61.5%
51
61.7%
53
61.9%
55
62.1%
57
62.3%
59
62.5%
61
62.7%
63
62.8%
65
63.0%
67
63.2%
69
63.4%
71
63.6%
73
63.7%
75
63.9%
77
64.1%
79
64.2%
81
64.4%
So what does this all mean? In all likelihood, home field advantage in the playoffs hasn’t changed in any meaningful way. And isn’t really all that big of a deal in the first place. Without altering the very nature of the postseason significantly — aggressive changes such as requiring the lower-seeded team sweep in the Wild Card series to advance — baseball has a very limited ability to reward individual playoff teams based on their regular-season results. Home field advantage isn’t broken; it’s working in the extremely limited way that one should expect. If the Dodgers beat the Yankees in the World Series this year, it probably won’t be because they were rewarded one more possible home game.
You are allowed to be sad. You do not have to be psyched about watching two gigantic legacy franchises smash everything in their paths and then start smashing each other in the Godzilla vs. King Kong World Series. You can be bummed that both of the obvious favorites made the World Series even though you also would have been bummed if some undeserving Wild Card team had sneaked in. Anyone who expects you to be rational in your rooting interests is being completely unreasonable. This a matchup designed specifically for fans of hegemony. You do not have to be good. You are allowed to cheer for Team Asteroid.
That said, there’s still a lot to be excited about in this matchup. The World Series offers itself to your imagination. I doubt that there’s one person reading this who doesn’t enjoy watching Aaron Judge, Shohei Ohtani, Mookie Betts, Juan Soto, or Freddie Freeman play baseball, who doesn’t thrill at the thought of seeing them on the biggest stage the game has to offer. It’s just inconceivable that a baseball fan could be so hopelessly lost.
Judge hit 58 home runs this season. He led baseball with a 218 wRC+. That’s the seventh-best qualified offensive season since 1900. The only players who have topped it: Barry Bonds, Babe Ruth, and Ted Williams. Judge is blasting his way onto Mount Rushmore in front of our eyes. Ohtani’s 181 wRC+ ranked second. While rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, he put up the first 50-50 season in history. When you combine his offense and baserunning, Ohtani was worth 80.7 runs this season, the 35th-highest total ever. Over 11 postseason games, he has a .434 on-base percentage with 10 RBI and 12 runs scored, and somehow his offensive line is worse than it was during the regular season. Soto was right behind Ohtani at 180. In seven big-league seasons, he’s never once been as low as 40% better than average at the plate, and he is still getting better. Read the rest of this entry »
Travis Ice and I have begun early work on the Los Angeles Angels and Sacramento Athletics prospect lists, and because both franchises’ prospects are on the Mesa Solar Sox roster, I spent most of last week seeing whatever game they were playing.
At this point in the Fall League, the leaders in games played have laced up their spikes only eight or nine times. Anything you’ve read about this year’s AFL so far has encompassed just two weeks of part-time play for any given player. Remember this is a hitter-friendly league for a number of both developmental and environmental reasons, and that triple slash lines in this league are not a reliable proxy for talent.
Offensive standards at first base are quite high, and even though the collective performance of this year’s group was down relative to recent norms (by kind of a lot), it’s still a position from which we expect good players and prospects to provide impact power. Morgan has been a relevant prospect since high school, but a relative lack of power has tended to cap his projection into more of a part-time first base/outfield role.
During the 2024 regular season it looked like Morgan was more often taking max-effort swings and selling out for power. He reached Double-A and slugged .483 across three levels, but his middling raw strength and opposite-field tendency as a hitter (plus elevated chase rates relative to his career norms) suggested this was maybe not the best approach for him. In the Fall League, Morgan has been more balanced, really taking enormous hacks only in favorable counts. He’s still stinging the ball in a way that indicates he’ll be a doubles machine, and he seems less vulnerable to fastballs up and away than he did during the summer. We don’t have a way of truly knowing how Morgan will handle elevated big league fastballs until he faces them, but a more balanced, contact-oriented style of hitting is going to give him a much better chance of covering the top of the zone and being a more complete hitter. (An aside: Watch A’s prospect Denzel Clarke go first-to-third at the video’s 1:55 mark.)
I think the absolute ceiling for his production looks something like Brandon Belt’s or Daniel Murphy’s pre-Juiced Ball era statline. More likely Morgan’s output will look something like Ji Man Choi’s or LaMonte Wade Jr.’s. Morgan is not a guy who is going to hit 20 homers per year, but a heady, well-rounded offensive skillset coupled with his excellent, profile-seasoning first base defense make him better than the 40 FV grade player I evaluated him as during the year. He is making a case to be elevated into the back of this offseason’s Top 100 list.
I gave Durbin short shrift last year even after his .353/.456/.588 line in the 2023 Fall League. He had a good 2024 at Triple-A Scranton, including a strong second half after he returned from a fractured wrist. Durbin is short — really short, he’s 5-foot-6 — but he’s not small; he’s built like a little tank. His compact, stocky build helps keep his swing short and consistently on time to pull the baseball. His quality of contact in 2024 was commensurate with a guy who slugs under .400 at the big league level, but he was dealing with an injury that typically impacts contact quality for a while after recovery.
Perhaps most importantly, Durbin looks fine at both second and third base and has also been playing all over the outfield. Defensive versatility might be his key to being rostered consistently. Durbin ran a jailbreak 4.10 for me last week, but his home-to-first times have been close to 4.4 seconds on normal swings. That’s not blazing and slower than what’s typical of a decent center fielder, but any kind of outfield viability would help the former Division-III standout become an improbable big leaguer. Durbin has played sparingly in center field during his career, and it’s going to be very difficult to evaluate him there this Fall League unless he starts getting reps there every day, which I think is unlikely. It’s more of a thing to watch develop into next spring.
Alderman, a 2023 second round pick out of Ole Miss who had some of the best exit velocities in that draft class, is currently leading the AFL with six home runs. He hit one on Friday at a whopping 119.5 mph. It went out on a line, ricocheting off the side of the batter’s eye, which you can see in this frame:
Friday, Marlins outfielder Kemp Alderman hit a homer that left Salt River Fields in a real hurry, at 119.5 mph. pic.twitter.com/HBvj2F0oud
Like Durbin, Alderman missed time in 2024 with a broken hand. It’s good to see Alderman hitting with elite peak power coming off of this particular injury, but I’d advise everyone to pump the breaks on his overall prospectdom at this time. He loads his hands so deep, high, and late that I worry he’ll struggle against better velocity as he climbs the minors. Though Alderman’s regular-season strikeout rates don’t raise alarm, I don’t think 30-ish games at each A-ball level is a meaningful sample, especially for a draft pick out of an SEC school. It’s fine to be hopeful that I’m wrong or that Alderman will make necessary adjustments once better stuff starts beating him, and he clearly has the power to clear the offensive bar at a corner outfield spot. But even though he’s raking out here, he does not have an opinion-altering look. I know Marlins fans have gone through this a lot lately, where they have a minor leaguer with elite power but an insufficient hit tool to profile (Peyton Burdick, Griffin Conine, Jerar Encarnacion), and I worry Alderman is another of this ilk.
Alert Ben Lindbergh, we have a knuckler. The 25-year-old Kirby was an undrafted free agent out of UConn in 2023 and spent most of 2024 in Fort Myers either on the Complex or FSL roster. His knuckleball needs to be more consistent for him to be considered a prospect at all, but for now it’s a lot of fun to watch a guy whose primary pitch is his knuckler.
The Arizona Fall League has a knuckleballer this year, Twins righty Devin Kirby. pic.twitter.com/Z6c7ik6vH4
These players have had their scouting reports added to the Fall League tab on The Board. Head over there to check out their tool grades and scouting reports.
Ken Blaze-Imagn Images and Jayne Kamin-Oncea-Imagn Images
Beyond offering the rare clash between number one seeds, this year’s World Series matchup between the Los Angeles Dodgers and the New York Yankees is steeped in baseball history and — as anyone who’s read me over the past two and a half decades knows — is of great personal resonance. The last time the two teams met in the Fall Classic, in 1981, I was an 11-year-old baseball nut hoping his favorite team could avenge its back-to-back World Series losses from ’77 and ’78. I could never have imagined that I’d get to cover their next October matchup. For most of the country, this pairing’s biggest selling point beyond the top-seed aspect and the involvement of the sport’s two most storied franchises is the presence of the game’s two biggest stars. Both the Dodgers’ Shohei Ohtani and the Yankees’ Aaron Judge are coming off historic seasons that will likely net them MVP awards, though things haven’t come quite so easily for either of them in the postseason.
We won’t officially know until November whether Judge and Ohtani both won the awards, but even working from the assumption that they will, this is hardly the first time that two likely MVPs have squared off in the World Series. In fact, it’s happened 25 times since 1931, with four such pairings from among the 11 times the Yankees and Dodgers have met. That said, it’s just the second such meeting since the start of the Wild Card era (1995 onward) and the sixth since the start of the Division era (1969 onward). MVP choices may be driven less by team success these days, but even when they are, the expanded playoff field makes getting to the World Series much harder:
Sunday night’s NLCS Game 6 offered quite a contrast in its starting pitcher matchup. With a chance to push the series to a decisive Game 7, the Mets started Sean Manaea, a 32-year-old lefty who made a full complement of 32 starts during the regular season, set a career high for innings pitched (181 2/3), and had already made three strong postseason starts, allowing five runs across 17 innings. On the other side, with an opportunity to close out the series and claim their fourth pennant in eight seasons, the Dodgers tabbed Michael Kopech, a 28-year-old righty who started 27 games last year but hadn’t done so once this year, instead pitching out of the bullpen 67 times in the regular season and four more in the playoffs. The unorthodox choice owed to the Dodgers’ injury-wracked rotation. Los Angeles has barely been able to muster three workable starters for October, let alone four, and so manager Dave Roberts has resorted to sprinkling in bullpen games, with mixed results.
The ballgame turned out to be a mismatch, but not in the way you might have imagined. Kopech struggled with his control, throwing just 12 strikes out of his 25 pitches, walking two, and allowing one hit and one run. If he set a tone for the rest of the Dodgers staff, it was that this was going to be a grind, the outcome hinging on their ability to navigate out of traffic — which they did, stranding 13 runners while yielding “only” five runs. Meanwhile Manaea, who had limited the Dodgers to two hits and two earned runs over five innings in NLCS Game 2, lasted just two-plus innings and was battered for six hits while walking two. He was charged with five runs, four of which came off the bat of Tommy Edman in the form of a two-run double in the first inning and a two-run homer in the third.
The Dodgers weren’t expecting Kopech to go any deeper, leaving Roberts to follow a script that allowed him to utilize his remaining relievers to best effect (such as it was). The Mets harbored hopes that Manaea could at least pitch into the middle innings so that manager Carlos Mendoza could avoid deploying some of their lesser relievers, but the starter faltered so early that they didn’t have that luxury. As it was, the fifth run charged to Manaea scored when Phil Maton, already carrying an 8.44 ERA this October, was summoned with no outs in the third and didn’t escape before serving up a two-run homer to Will Smith. Faced with a 6-1 deficit, the Mets refused to go quietly, but went down just the same in a 10-5 loss that included 14 pitchers combining to allow 22 hits and 12 walks. It was excruciating viewing, and with a pennant on the line, one couldn’t help but wish instead for starters battling deep into the game. Alas, this was hardly atypical October baseball. Read the rest of this entry »
Hunter Gaddis didn’t want to throw Juan Soto a fastball. With two on and two out in the top of the 10th inning, Gaddis started the fearsome slugger with three sliders in a row: one for a ball, one for a called strike, and one for a foul ball. Behind in the count now, Soto fouled off two changeups and then another slider. This was supposed to work. Opponents batted .135 against the two pitches this season. They whiffed 30% of the time. Gaddis had clipped the edges of the zone with the nastiest stuff he could muster — some of the nastiest stuff in the game — and Soto simply refused to be beaten. Six soft pitches in a row, and Soto was hanging back and spoiling them at the last possible moment. Surely Gaddis could get away with one fastball, right? Right?
Asked after the game about his mindset during the at-bat, Soto said, “I was just saying to myself, ‘You’re all over that guy.’” Gaddis finally threw a fastball. Soto was all over it.
The four-seamer left Gaddis’ hand at 95.2 mph. It left Soto’s bat at 109.7. Soto didn’t leave the batter’s box at all. He watched as the high, arcing blast traveled 402 feet into the Cleveland night and center fielder Lane Thomas, head craned upward, drifted slowly back to the warning track. By the time Thomas had run out of real estate and the ball had landed safely in the standing room section just past the wall, Soto still hadn’t reached first base.
The blast gave the Yankees a 5-2 lead in Game 5 of the American League Championship Series and propelled them to their first World Series since 2009. The 15-year hiatus matches the gap between New York’s 1981 and 1996 appearances, the franchise’s longest stretch away from the Series since it first reached it in 1921. Asked what was going through his mind when Soto hit the go-ahead home run, general manager Brian Cashman said, “I was thanking God.”
New York’s 4-1 series victory belies a tight and thrilling series that featured multiple extra-inning games, riveting reversals, likely heroes, and extremely unlikely goats. For the third straight game, the Yankees and Guardians were tied during the ninth inning. For the second straight game, the Yankees scored the winning runs off Cleveland’s untouchable high-leverage relievers. The vaunted Guardians bullpen, asked to pitch 28 innings over five games, actually ran a slightly better ERA than New York’s relievers, but Cleveland simply needed more from them. As has so often been the case, the Guardians always looked to be a couple solid bats short.
With Tanner Bibee starting on three days’ rest, the Yankees threatened from the very beginning. Gleyber Torres started the game with a single through the right side, then Soto ripped a low liner into the right field gap and all the way to the wall. Third base coach Luis Rojas waved Torres around third, but a perfect relay from Jhonkensy Noel and Andrés Giménez nabbed him just inches before he was able to slide his left hand across the plate. Giménez’s 94-mph laser was on the money, without a hop.
It took an incredible relay to foil the gutsy send, but two batters into the game, it was still a questionable decision. Instead of second and third with no outs, the Yankees had Soto on second with one out. Bibee hit both Aaron Judge and Jazz Chisholm Jr. to load the bases, but managed to escape the inning unscathed. Just when it looked like the Yankees might run away with things and get to the overtaxed Cleveland bullpen early, Bibee settled down. He retired the next 10 Yankees in order and faced the minimum over the next four innings, consistently inducing chases on changeups and breaking pitches below the zone.
During the first inning, Carlos Rodón looked every bit as sharp as he had in Game 1, striking out two and retiring the side in order. He started the second inning with a strikeout as well, but the Naylor family slowed his roll. Josh Naylor tapped a grounder off the end of the bat to the abandoned left side of the infield, and the charging Chisholm had no shot at catching him at first base. Rodón struck out Noel to notch the second out, then Bo Naylor worked what would’ve been the at-bat of the game if not for what happened later. He pulled the 10th pitch he saw down the right field line for a line drive double. As Alex Speier noted, it was the first time a lefty had hit an extra-base hit off Rodón since July 28. More importantly, with a full count and two outs, Josh Naylor was running on the pitch, allowing him to score easily. Rodón still looked excellent, but after two Naylor hits and zero hard-hit balls, Cleveland led, 1-0.
The Guardians added an insurance run in the fifth inning, when Gimenéz shot a one-out double down the third base line and Steven Kwan singled him home two batters later. David Fry reached out and broke his bat on a changeup, lifting a popup into shallow left center. Judge, Alex Verdugo, and Anthony Volpe converged on the perfectly placed ball, which went in and out of the diving Judge’s glove. Verdugo tried to hurdle Judge, but somehow he didn’t actually leave the ground and was lucky not to injure the prostrate behemoth. Kwan, who had to wait and make sure the ball wasn’t caught, advanced to third, while Fry reached second with a double. Rodón’s reward for obliterating Fry’s bat on a ball that Statcast gave a 90% catch probability was a trip to the showers. He allowed five hits and two runs over 4 2/3 innings, striking out six and walking one. Four of the five hits came off the bats of Cleveland’s left-handed hitters. Rodón wouldn’t be in line for the loss for very long.
Bibee came out to pitch the top of the sixth, which also meant facing the top of the New York lineup for the third time. At the very least, we have to acknowledge that manager Stephen Vogt didn’t have an easy decision in front of him. The Guardians used nine total pitchers in Games 3 and 4 on Thursday and Friday, seven in each game. Five of them appeared in both games, including the team’s big four of Cade Smith, Tim Herrin, Emmanuel Clase, and Gaddis. The options were to leave in the cruising Bibee, to bring in an excellent but possibly gassed reliever for the third straight game, or to bring in a fresher but worse reliever. Vogt chose door number one, and while the call was defensible, well, we talk about the third time through the order penalty for a reason.
Torres reached out and yanked a soft liner over the third baseman for a single, and Soto ripped a more convincing single right back through the box. With runners on first and second, Judge sent a ball right to short for an easy 6-4-3 double play. That prompted a visit from the training staff, which seemed to be a fairly transparent ploy to buy Cade Smith some extra time to warm up, except Smith didn’t come in.
With Giancarlo Stanton at the plate, Bibee looked appropriately scared; he had no intention of attacking Stanton in the zone, even after he got the red-hot slugger to chase his first two pitches, a slider away and a changeup low. Bibee stuck with that approach and tried to tempt the hulking hitter with three soft pitches off the plate, but all three of them missed the zone by too much, and Stanton laid off. For the 3-2 pitch, Naylor set the target a solid 18 inches outside, but Bibee missed in a far worse spot, spinning a slider right over the middle and slightly down. Stanton did what Stanton does, shooting an absolute missile into the left field stands. The line drive left the bat at 117.5 mph and had a projected distance of 446 feet.
If you’re keeping score at home, on Bibee’s third time through the Yankees lineup, he faced four batters and allowed three hard-hit balls, two runs, and one lead. The game was knotted at two.
Vogt brought in Smith, who struck out Chisholm to end the inning. With the seal broken, the score tied, and his season in the balance, Vogt unleashed the rest of the big four. Despite pitching for the third day in a row, the quartet was effective. Smith got the first out of the seventh inning, then allowed a single, and Herrin finished the inning and pitched a perfect eighth. Clase worked a scoreless ninth, and Gaddis worked the fateful 10th. After Volpe lined out weakly to short to lead off the inning, Gaddis walked Austin Wells, then induced a groundball to second base from Verdugo. It was hit a bit too softly to get the double play, but in an attempt to get both outs anyway, Brayan Rocchio rushed through his part of the turn and botched the play altogether. Giménez’s feed clanked off the top of Rocchio’s glove, then bounced harmlessly to the turf. Everyone was safe.
Gaddis struck out Torres, bringing Soto to the plate. “He’s gonna do it,” said Chisholm after the game. “That’s the only thing going through my mind: He’s gonna do it.” None of the three runs Soto drove in was earned.
In the visitor’s dugout, Aaron Boone had the luxury of managing with the knowledge that his back wasn’t against the wall, and it allowed him to choose door number three. Fourteen relievers threw at least 10 relief innings for the Yankees this season. Among those 14, not one of Mark Leiter Jr., Tim Hill, or Jake Cousins – the first four out of the bullpen on Saturday – ranked higher than seventh in terms of leverage index when entering the game. The three combined for 3 1/3 scoreless innings, walking four Guardians but allowing just one hit. Boone finally called on Luke Weaver to pitch the ninth and 10th innings, and the slight star allowed just one hit before ending Cleveland’s season on a lazy fly ball that landed in the glove of – who else? – Juan Soto.
Stanton, who took home ALCS MVP honors, had four hits in the series, all of them home runs. In Game 5, Soto went 3-for-5 with four hard-hit balls, including a double and the series-winning homer, and raised his OPS in the series from 1.159 to 1.373. When asked why he was so sure Soto would deliver, Chisholm said simply, “Because it’s Juan Soto. Pay my guy! Pay Juan Soto!” The World Series starts on Friday, Soto’s 26th birthday.
Managing in the playoffs is all about balancing immediate payoffs and long-term sustainability. Not ultra long-term, mind you, but managing a bullpen for a seven-game series is trickier than simply pressing the same buttons every day until you win or lose. ALCS Game 4 featured three momentous bullpen decisions. The managers chose differently; they both paid the price. In the end, the Yankees got the better of the Guardians in a 14-pitcher, three-and-a-half-hour, 14-run shootout. But a few early decisions absolutely shaped the way the game went, and so they take center stage here tonight.
No Rest for Cade Smith
Cade Smith was one of the best relievers in baseball this year. If he didn’t play on the same team as Emmanuel Clase, we’d call him a lockdown closer. Instead, he’s a dominant fireman, capable of coming in whenever Stephen Vogt needs him to ice the opposition. And Vogt has needed him a lot. He pitched in all five games of the ALDS. He got the first game of this series off, but then he faced the meat of the Yankees lineup in Game 2 and Game 3.
He’s been pitching nearly every day, which hurts. He’s facing the same batters over and over, which hurts. But what are you going to do, not use your best option against a team that has two MVP-level bats stacked together in an otherwise navigable lineup? Juan Soto had already homered and the Yankees were up 3-2 when the top of the order came up in the sixth inning. On came Smith, for the third time in four days. Read the rest of this entry »
NEW YORK — Though he wasn’t the offensive star of Game 3 of the National League Championship Series — he didn’t hit a moonshot into the second deck like Shohei Ohtani or Max Muncy — Will Smith did collect two hits in the Dodgers’ 8-0 victory over the Mets. They weren’t exactly scorchers, but one was of critical importance, as it drove in the game’s first run. Remarkably, Smith’s performance was just the second time this postseason that a catcher has collected multiple hits in a game, and for as much as Smith has struggled, his numbers still stand out relative to the competition. It’s been an exceptionally difficult October for the men wearing the tools of ignorance.
These days, those tools actually suggest anything but ignorance. Armed with more data than ever, and playing in a pressure-cooker atmosphere where a single pitch can turn a series, Smith and those of his peers who are still standing (or squatting) in October — namely the Yankees’ Austin Wells, the Mets’ Francisco Alvarez, and the Guardians’ tandem of Bo Naylor and Austin Hedges — might be required to navigate a short-working starter and half a dozen relievers through opposing lineups, controlling the tempo of the game when things threaten to spiral out of control, and shaking off untold aches and pains. Hitting? That’s part of the job, but this fall, these catchers’ offensive contributions have felt particularly secondary, not unlike those of pitchers swinging the bat in the days before the universal designated hitter.
The numbers certainly look like those bygone pitchers hacking away. Thus far, the catchers for the 12 postseason teams have collectively hit .169/.236/.255 (40 wRC+) with five homers and a 28.3% strikeout rate through 254 plate appearances. In other words, they’ve been outhit by Madison Bumgarner (.172/.232/.292, 44 wRC+ career). Read the rest of this entry »
Cleveland’s baseball club was known as the Blues when the American League was formed in 1901, but that’s far from what Guardians fans were singing following Thursday’s ALCS Game 3. Two days before A Tribe Called Quest and other musical luminaries are to be inducted into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, Progressive Field erupted in rapture as David Fry circled the bases in the bottom of the 10th inning to cap a stunning comeback and give the Guardians a 7-5 win.
More on that in a moment.
The first inning featured missed opportunities — both teams stranded a pair of runners — as well as a pitch clock violation on a chagrinned Juan Soto and a sliding catch by Guardians center fielder Lane Thomas. That those happenings barely qualify as footnotes says a lot about what would eventually transpire. Ditto a second inning that saw Alex Verdugo chop a ball over first baseman Josh Naylor’s head and leg out a sliding double on a play where second base umpire Jansen Visconti ruled that Brayan Rocchio had a foot blocking the bag (that was debatable). Anthony Volpe advanced to third on the hit, then scored on a Jose Trevino groundball single that made it 1-0 Yankees. Guardians starter Matthew Boyd proceeded to pick off Trevino, which helped to limit the damage. Read the rest of this entry »