Dave Roberts Shouldn’t Have Taken Brandon Morrow’s Phone Call
A SOUTHWEST FLIGHT HIGH ABOVE THE MIDDLE WEST — While waiting to board my return flight to Cleveland from Houston on Monday morning, I scrolled through the news on my phone, reading about the madness I’d witnessed at Minute Maid Park the night before. In the process, I came across something of interest, a comment made by Brandon Morrow following Game 5.
The Dodger reliever was candid and contrite in the wake of his club’s Game 5 loss. In the clubhouse afterwards, speaking to Yahoo! and other reporters, Morrow shouldered the blame, as some standup athletes will do. While elaborating on the reasons for his guilt, he produced a comment worthy of greater examination.
“We had a plan,” Morrow said. “And we’re very plan-oriented and try to stick to that. I made them deviate away.”
See, Morrow wasn’t supposed to be available Sunday night. Dodgers manager David Roberts had said before the game that he wouldn’t be available, having pitched in every game of the series following his emergence as one of Roberts’ most trusted relievers.
But as Morrow watched Clayton Kershaw stumble, as he watched a four-run lead evaporate, as he watched the first member of the Dodgers relief corps, Kenta Maeda, depart the right-center field bullpen and fail against one of the game’s all-time great offenses — while throwing a ball that might be juiced and slippery — Morrow picked up the bullpen phone and placed a call.
“He called down and said that he felt good,” Roberts told reporters after the game. “He was throwing today, he felt good. And he called in the middle of the game, and he said, ‘Hey, if we take the lead, I want the ball, my body feels good.’ So in the seventh inning, you can’t turn him down.”
Well, you could.
Roberts, that is, could. He holds that authority.
Roberts is a smart man and has done an excellent job with the Dodgers this season. Dave Cameron wrote in defense of Roberts — and rightfully so, I believe — when Roberts permitted an otherwise effective Rich Hill to go only twice through the order in Game 2. Roberts demonstrated a willingness to make an unconventional, perhaps unpopular, decision then.
Managerial decisions in this type of charged environment can become complicated, and Minute Maid Park was electric: rock-concert loud in one of the wildest World Series games of all time. There’s a reason the Astros wanted the roof closed. When Jose Altuve launched his three-run homer, the ballpark become so unhinged, so loud, I looked over at SBNation’s Grant Brisbee, who was a couple seats down from me in the auxiliary press row (yes, FanGraphs is in the auxiliary press class), and we were both laughing maniacally at the absurdity and insanity of it all. I didn’t have a rooting interest, necessarily — unless you consider chaos to be a rooting interest — but I enjoyed it nevertheless. I have no doubt that it’s difficult for managers to avoid the influence of their emotions under such circumstances. For writers, it was more difficult to write about Game 5 than a wild game in, say, May.
Still, I wrote about how I thought A.J. Hinch went away from the plan in Game 4. And we know for certain Roberts went away from the plan a game later.
As I wrote in the referenced piece, it was way back in May, in the Progressive Field visiting dugout, when I asked Hinch about decision-making, about how he tried to avoid becoming a prisoner to the moment, how he protected himself from the fear of being second-guessed when making an unconventional choice in real time.
Hinch said he tries to make most decisions at “2 p.m.” — that is, in advance of a typical night game. He tries to think through all the potential matchups and scenarios then so that his judgment and decision-making is not clouded by the moment, by emotion. The Dodgers are similarly plan oriented.
I thought Hinch managed exceptionally well in Game 7 of the ALCS and in Game 3 of the World Series. But in letting Morton face the lineup for a third time in Game 4, even Hinch seemed to deviate from the plan.
And now we have Roberts and Morrow on record saying that they did, indeed, depart from their own blueprint. Perhaps there ought to be something like a sealed order that a manager writes to himself before the game, places in a capsule, and then opens after his starter has gone through the lineup twice. Then he could follow the plan from there as closely as reality will allow.
Roberts didn’t abide by his own orders, though. The result? A four-run outing from Morrow, including two home run — even after Morrow hadn’t allowed a single homer all season. Morrow didn’t retire a single batter on Sunday. He pitched like he was tired. His recorded an average fastball velocity of 95.1 mph after posting a 98.1 mark in Game 1 and 96.4 in Game 3.
Sure, Morrow didn’t know he was throwing an exploding baseball, but it was a mistake to throw Springer a pitch center-in. Morrow didn’t want to know where the ball landed, instead looking dejectedly toward the first base. Perhaps, in that moment, we see Morrow realizing his error. Second thoughts are ever wiser.
“It’s a credit to him to be used like he has been and want the baseball,” Roberts said.
Remember, kids, discretion is the better part of valor. Bravery can be misguided.
From the Yahoo! piece by Mike Oz cited above:
In five minutes of talking with reporters, [Morrow] called himself “selfish” no fewer than three times.
“Probably a selfish move on my part … ” he said at one point
“It was a little bit selfish … ” he said at another.
Again, pitchers often look great until they do not. This was true of Morton in Game 4 up until the third time through, true of Morrow through the series until Sunday. Preventative measures can be hard to sell but they matter.
Morrow took the blame but this decision ultimately is that of the manager. It’s the manager’s call. The manager has to be strong enough to resist even the most impassioned pleas from a player. I’m sure that’s not easy. Protections ought to be in place, like a scripted series of plays in football. Roberts shouldn’t have listened to Morrow. Maybe Roberts shouldn’t have even taken the phone call. Roberts should have stuck to his plan. And, yes, maybe Plan A wouldn’t have worked either, but at least Plan A was created in a more sober state.
Minute Maid Park was not sober.
The power of a moment, the power of persuasion, won the day. The Astros won the night.
A Cleveland native, FanGraphs writer Travis Sawchik is the author of the New York Times bestselling book, Big Data Baseball. He also contributes to The Athletic Cleveland, and has written for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, among other outlets. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Sawchik.
Also hurts them for tonight. Sure he only threw 6 pitches, but having to warm up an extra time and throwing them will surely make him a little more tired. I can’t see them wanting to pitch him both today and tomorrow if they make it there, so basically up to them to choose which one they want him pitching.
and what’s bad is the game they would likely need him more(tonight) he’s going to be compromised some. Tomorrow they’ll have not just Kershaw available, but also Wood.
I do think it’s going to be a much more favorable pitchers situation these next 2 days. Weather a good 25-30 degrees cooler than games 1 and 2.
As a [fan, manager, teammate, coach, etc.], you want your guy to say “give me the ball.” It shows he has the mental edge to handle the situation. However, that edge can blind him of his fatigue or ineffectiveness. Why else are there coaches and managers paid? To make these decisions for the players.
Thought-provoking article, but are you serious when you suggest that Hinch perhaps should not have answered the call?
Edit: Roberts, not Hinch.
Sorry, guys, I’m not seeing the evidence that Roberts is a smart man. Just look through the posts and comments here in the Series. A big proportion of them are about questionable decisions Roberts has been making. Some people are defending some of his decisions (I myself have defended some of his decisions) but they are a minority, and some of his decisions aren’t being defended by anyone. He’s doing one questionable or bizarre thing after another, in fact it’s getting hard to keep track of all of them. He’s got a great team but that doesn’t make him smart.
Second guessing is really easy. It doesn’t make us smart either. There is nothing easier than writing a script after the game is over, or pointing out where things went wrong. In an alternate universe some of those moves could have gone right – then we would be singing his praises. How different would this conversation be if Chris Taylor scored easily on that Corey Seager double in the 8th? I don’t think anyone would be complaining about anything.
I think that Roberts has made really good personnel decisions. I don’t think many managers would have put Joc on the roster, which has worked out really well.
So I guess you really didn’t like this article, right?
I didn’t particularly dislike it. For the most part, I thought it was interesting. The title and the last paragraph are misguided, but the bulk of the content was good.
> Second guessing is really easy. It doesn’t make us smart either. There is nothing easier than writing a script after the game is over, or pointing out where things went wrong.
I don’t understand this. Whether work or school, having people go over past successes and failures is perfectly normal. If there’s no second guessing there’s no way to improve and learn from failures of yourself or others.
Second guessing is not easy. It’s hard. Because it attempts to invoke an alternate reality which we can’t ever try out except in our own head (unless there are time travelers reading this).
The more legitimate question here is whether Travis Sawchik, with his knowledge of the facts and understanding of baseball, is a person who is capable of reviewing a particular event of game 5. Cause if the Dodgers are as capable of a team as we think they are, you know they are certainly second guessing this particular decision.
100% disagree. Second guessing is really, really, really easy. Its subjective as well and anyone can do it. You don’t even need to know what you are talking about… Even morons can second guess things that they don’t know anything about. I am not trying to imply that anyone here is a moron, but the act of second-guessing is in fact easy – and it doesn’t make you smart.
It’s important to examine what happened after the fact, but the human brain is so full of biases that we nearly always evaluate prior events based on results, not process. Results are bad because of so many reasons.
This is why we do sabermetrics — the natural hindsight/survivorship biases blinded humans to what actually helps baseball teams win games. If you evaluate a pitchers start based on how many runs he gave up, you’re doing it wrong (and most situations end up evaluated on results).
Evaluate process, not results. Results are misleading.
Every comment questioning Roberts’s in-game tactics seems to get downvoted all to hell but I agree, anyhow. Considering the talent he has to draw on, he’s made a surprising number of head-scratching moves, particularly and especially concerning pitcher fatigue.
It’s in some sense odd because when it comes to comments here on particular decisions he’s made, they’re overwhelming negative. In the many discussions here in the last few days of the many questionable decisions which he has been making, very few people are actually defending particular decisions of his (I’ve defended one out of the many of his decisions which are being questioned here, but I was clearly outvoted on that one). But if anyone draws the obvious conclusion and says ‘he isn’t managing well’, people are aghast. My comment above is -12 so far, but no one is trying to actually defend him.
Nobody is defending him because your comment had nothing substantive or objective to respond to.
It is official – Roberts in now a genius!
“The manager has to be strong enough to resist even the most impassioned pleas from a player.” Reminds me of Terry Collins giving in to Matt Harvey in 2015 Game 5.
A manager’s role is to bridge the gap between strategy and reality. The best laid plans can quickly fall apart. A manager certainly should not blindly stick to a script. Communication is a very important job of a manager. A manager’s ability to adapt to the actual situations is exactly what differentiates great ones from bad ones. If your guys hit and your SP goes 7 strong innings… well that’s not really coaching. They get paid to make judgment calls and work with the players.
How a guy feels is more important than any plan. I don’t see how this amounts to anything. Stubbornly sticking to some arbitrary plan would be a greater offense IMO. You have to trust your players and he did.
The “plans” are what we sit around second guessing. The “plans” are why RP throw too often as opposed to when it actually makes sense. A few years ago, Madison Bumgarner closed out game 7 – I am sure that wasn’t part of the “plan”, but he felt good.
Actually it was more or less part of the plan, not necessarily 5 innings in game 7 but at least 3 or 4. He only threw 26 innings in September and had 4 days’ rest for every start in the playoffs. From the first game of the World Series anyone who thought about it realized that this was what Bochy was aiming for if the Series went 7 games. I sure did.
I remember watching the game (also a Giants fan) and thinking there was no way that MadBum would finish off that game. No more than LAD has plans of Kershaw playing the hero in game 7 tomorrow. In any case, you said it yourself, it wasn’t the plan to have him throw the majority of the game. I don’t think there should be any plans, just ideas in a World Series -there should be ideas and contingencies along with the ability to adapt when the game goes to hell. The players are the ones who win and lose the games – discussing strategy is what fans do before and after the game. Once the first pitch is thrown all of that goes out the window. I don’t particularly disagree with you on this point, but plans… I only have so much interest in analyzing those.
Well then you weren’t paying much attention. Bumgarner was really shaky in the 5th but after that he was blowing them away. I would say the plan was to leave him out there as long as he was pitching well, and it seemed fairly safe to assume that that would be at least close to finishing the game. But there would have been no problem bringing in Casilla/Romo/Lopez (Affeldt pitched before Bumgarner) because they were all rested and had all pitched brilliantly (Wong’s homer off Romo was the only run any of them had given up in the postseason).
Do you really just want to argue? Because I don’t. I did not keep a journal of my feeling during that game, but I know that most people were shocked that he had enough left to close out that game. My point is and still was that plans go out the window when the game starts. Let’s be friends. I like you name and the team that you root for.
Only if you believe that players feel for their body is connected with good performance. In this situation, at least, there was no connection.
I know how much some folks railed against Smoltz’s commentary in game 2 regarding the quick Hill hook, but boy has he been proven right. The Dodgers pen is tired and overworked, they’re finally cracking this series, and Roberts is not good at assessing that.
I wonder if the Honeycutt rumors have anything to do with this perception, he’s old school, he’s a guy who would listen to his pitcher and send him out against better judgement.
What rumors are there about Honeycutt?
My impression was that Smoltz’s reasoning was based more on Hill having pitched well so why pull him? as opposed to the exhaustion factor.
Here’s my question on Smoltz then. Did he heavily criticize using Maeda (42 pitches) and Morrow both when down multiple runs in Game 3? Did he heavily criticize using Jensen to pitch the 9th up 5 runs in Game 4? Because those are both considerably worse bullpen use decisions in deciding how to deploy relievers without overusing them than pulling Hill after two times through the order when trailing by 1 run.
You know what is kind of funny about this whole conversation at this point? Roberts yanked Hill in a similar spot in game 6 and it all worked out perfectly! Was he right? Is he an idiot? Calling it after then game is easy. Simply calling to leave the starter in is easy too. I am just pointing out that there are no right answers. There are no proofs. There is only discussion and it needs to be for the purpose of fun. I hate the “I am smarter than …” and “… needs to be fired” stuff. Baseball is fun, and talking baseball is supposed to be fun too.
Chaos is a perfectly acceptable rooting interest.
I’m an entropy fan.
“Minute Maid Park was not sober.” This is perhaps the best way to sum up that game. We are lucky to be watching this series unfold like this. To Game 6!
Honestly, I didn’t even know the bullpen phone worked both ways before now.
How would the bullpen coach communicate to the manager is someone is warming up and something just isn’t right?
I guess I figured they just jumped up and down and waved their arms frantically until he called back
Shades of Matt Harvey, 2015 WS Game 5…
For me, bringing Morrow out for game 5 was the worst decision by Roberts during the whole postseason.
McCarthy or Fields is probably better than tired Morrow.
Furthermore, even if it did work out, Morrow would be too tired for game 6 anyways.
There was no way Roberts could use Morrow for the remaining three games.
What he should have done is have a relatively better rested Morrow for game 6 and game 7.
Instead, Roberts chose crazy fatigued game 5 Morrow and might need to go to another crazy fatigued game 6 Morrow.
It was terrible but there’s a lot of competition for Roberts’ worst move:
(1) Having Jansen try to get a 6-out save in game 2 even though he’s never pitched 2 innings after pitching the day before in his career (result: Jansen blew the save).
(2) Having Jansen pitch the 9th inning in game 4 even though the Dodgers had a 5-run lead, thereby bringing about a situation in game 5 where Jansen was again in the position of having to pitch multiple innings with no rest (result: Jansen lost the game).
(3) Having his cleanup hitter bunt in the 7th innings of a game which was tied 7-7 in the 7th against a team whose relievers had a ERA of over 7 in the Series (see Dave C’s article about this yesterday (‘The Most Unbelievable Moment of the World Series So Far’)) (result: the runner on 2nd was thrown out at 3rd).
(4) Exhausting Maeda by having him throw 42 pitches when the Dodgers were behind by 4 runs in game 3 (result: Maeda dishes up the game-tying 3-run homer to the first batter he faces when he comes in with 2 outs in the 5th inning of game 5).
(5) Double-switching in game 2 resulting in taking Bellinger out of the game and replacing him with Culberson (actually in terms of sheer indefensibility this may have been the worst but the result was actually good as Culberson homered).
Most people would add pulling Hill after pitching 4 strong innings in game 3. I actually defended that decision at the time but I was definitely in the minority. I’m sure I’m missing some here, I’ve seen a lot of other criticisms of particular moves of Roberts but I don’t remember all of them.
(1) Jansen had four days of rest and then threw 14 pitches the day before. The home run came off of his 16th pitch. Jansen did not blow the save because he was tired. I prefer Jansen going through second inning to fresh Fields, Cingrani, or McCarthy. Eight times out of ten, Jansen does not blow the save.
(2) I did not like this either. But it was somewhat defensible since Jansen warmed up already. Remember Roberts used Stripling for 9th inning in NLCS game 3 with 5 run lead where Stripling gave up two consecutive hits and Jansen came out anyways. Also due to Darvish’s clunker, the only somewhat reliable bullpen that wasn’t used the day before was Jansen.
Similarly, I did not like taking Hill out early but it was somewhat defensible especially from maximizing the chance in the individual game.
(3) This was in my opinion the second worst Roberts’ decision so far. No argument here. Maybe from individual game’s perspective, this might be worse. From the series’ perspective, I dislike Morrow even more.
(4) Considering the weakness of the Astros bullpen, using Maeda was not a terrible move. Roberts did not and should not have gave the game up. At the end of the day, it was a two run game. Another way of looking at it is by running Maeda and keeping the game close, Astros were also forced to burn up Peacock, possibly their best reliever at this point.
(5) I don’t know if it was that bad. At that point, Fields and is pitching. You just want your pitchers to not bat and delay Culberson’s batting as much as possible and hope the game is over before.
(1) and (2) Jensen has been asked twice in his career to throw multiple innings after having pitched the day before, in games 2 and 5 of this World Series. Both times resulted in disaster. You may say this is sheer coincidence. This seems unlikely to me.
(4) Using Maeda at that point in the game, the 2nd inning, made no sense (some people were saying that using Maeda period made no sense, but I think that’s going too far). In any case he wasn’t going to pitch more than a few innings and Jansen was presumably getting the day off so the Dodgers’ second-level relievers were going to have to hold the fort for a few innings at some point, and it was better to do it sooner rather than later because if they bombed out and the game got out of hand then Maeda (and for that matter Morrow) wouldn’t have had to pitch at all, whereas if they bombed out after Maeda had pitched it would have been too late for that.
(5) Why not simply leave Cingrani in Fields’ place in the lineup and then pinch-hit for him when he came up in the 10th? In any case McCarthy replaced Cingrani in the 11th. The only possible advantage to doing it as Roberts’ did it was if he intended to have Cingrani pitch more than one inning, but he obviously didn’t.
Fangraphs is hot in this World Series. I really like how your are working off of the facts, in this article it is Morrow’s quotes, and building off of it.
So, in Game 6, Roberts does just about everything he’s getting ripped for, and it all works perfectly. Quick hook for Hill. Four more innings by his 3 trusted relievers. Chase Utley’s Corpse scored the winning run.
None of it proves anything either way, but it does show a firm resolve on his part.
I would argue that consistency is probably a good idea, which he was. Right and wrong ultimately gets decided by the players. Do you think there will be a blog about this subject today? Maybe there is – I haven’t checked yet.