Figuring Out Jackie Bradley Jr.’s Brewers Fit
Earlier this week, when I examined the potential landing spots for center fielder Jackie Bradley Jr., the Brewers stuck out as a team that didn’t appear to have a glaring need, particularly with center fielder Lorenzo Cain returning to the roster after opting out early in 2020. Yet FanSided’s Robert Murray, who previously covered the Brewers for The Athletic, had recently reported that the team was in the mix for them, and a week and a half later, they landed him via a two-year, $24 million deal that includes an opt-out after this season. The question is, how’s this going to work?
To these eyes, the bigger surprise than the Brewers adding to their stockpile of outfielders is that Bradley landed a multiyear deal in March, and at a healthy AAV at that. Aside from Bryce Harper‘s 13-year, $330-million megadeal, which was announced on March 2, 2019, in my research for the Bradley piece I was unable to find another multiyear position player deal that was completed in March during the past decade, with Manny Ramirez’s two-year, $45 million return to the Dodgers in 2009 the last one that came to mind. It’s just not a month for lasting commitments.
Given that slim history, plus Dan Szymborski’s less-than-glowing ZiPS projection for Bradley — WARs of 1.6 and 1.3 in the first two seasons over about 1,000 total plate appearances, a serviceable return if accompanied by a solid platoon partner — I figured it might be a stretch for him to approach the three-year, $27 million deal from the ZiPS contract model, to say nothing of the reports that he was seeking a contract of at least four years. Bradley (and agent Scott Boras) didn’t get the years, and his total guarantee is less than that of the model but not by much; with his opt out after the first season, he’s exchanged that for a good amount of control.
Brewers president of baseball operations David Stearns, who’s been on the job since October 2015 (initially as general manager) has a history of overstuffing the roster and letting manager Craig Counsell figure out the playing time, and it’s helped the team to three straight postseason appearances for the first time in franchise history. On back-to-back days in late January 2018, Stearns traded for Christian Yelich and signed Cain to a five-year deal, that despite corner outfielders Ryan Braun and Domingo Santana — not to mention first baseman/outfielder Eric Thames — coming off solid seasons; Santana had bashed 30 homers in his age-24 campaign. In late July 2018, he dealt for Mike Moustakas while third baseman Travis Shaw was in the midst of a 32-homer season; Shaw took up playing second base seamlessly and the team came within one win of a trip to the World Series.
Stearns then re-signed Moustakas via free agency in late February 2019, and he played mainly second base until Shaw’s injuries and offensive struggles forced him out of the lineup and Keston Hiura arrived, whereupon the Moose returned to third base; the team claimed a Wild Card spot (though they lost the game). Last year, he signed Avisaíl García to add to his Yelich-Cain-Braun collection of outfielders. The last-minute introduction of the universal designated hitter put the Brewers in a seemingly strong position until Cain’s opt-out created a hole that García and Ben Gamel could only do so much to fill. The Brewers did make the playoffs despite just a 29-31 record, but were quickly dispatched by the Dodgers in the Wild Card Series.
So not only did Stearns history suggest something like the Bradley signing was possible, but the Brewers’ recent but unsuccessful pursuit of Justin Turner (who returned to the Dodgers in mid-February) showed that he still had money to spend. And spend it he has.
As to how the Brewers could piece this together, it’s worth noting that both Cain, who turns 35 on April 13, and Bradley, who turns 31 on April 19, both have some experience in right field. During Cain’s run with the Royals, and particularly in 2014 and ’16, he often started in center and moved to right in the late innings while Jarrod Dyson took over center. For his career, he’s played 157 games in right but started just 91; in 977 total innings there in his career (but none since 2016), he’s 16 runs above average according to DRS, 13.4 according to UZR. Bradley has played 64 games in right, with 43 starts and a total of 437 innings, mostly from 2013-15, when he was still finding his footing in the majors; he’s got 4 DRS and 3.0 UZR in the spot.
As far as their center field work goes, here’s the table I previously made for Bradley, showing the recent erosion of his defense from excellent to merely above average:
| Year | Innings | DRS | UZR | OAA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 1375.2 | 14 | 8.2 | 9 |
| 2017 | 1204.1 | 15 | 3.7 | 15 |
| 2018 | 1137.1 | -1 | 7.4 | 9 |
| 2019 | 1247.0 | -2 | -1.2 | 6 |
| 2020 | 471.0 | 5 | 1.8 | 7 |
Still, the man has a flair for the spectacular. Here’s a top five from a mid-2018 article at The Athletic by Chad Jennings, less relevant than his more recent work (a reel of which I included in my previous Bradley piece) but plenty entertaining:
According to the metrics, Cain has generally outdone Bradley, with a gap that had widened in 2018-19, but he had no meaningful data from his 44 defensive innings last year:
| Year | Innings | DRS | UZR | OAA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1173.1 | 16 | 10.1 | n/a |
| 2016 | 614.2 | 9 | 4.8 | 7 |
| 2017 | 1275.0 | 4 | 3.3 | 21 |
| 2018 | 1180.0 | 18 | 8.7 | 22 |
| 2019 | 1177.1 | 22 | 7.0 | 16 |
Counsell didn’t equivocate at the introductory press conference, telling reporters, “Lorenzo is our center fielder,” and adding, “We don’t have any fourth outfielder. We’re going to have a lot of starting outfielders and we’re going to have to figure out how that works. That’s kind of how I’m viewing it. But there is playing time, absolutely.”
Given the mix of players — the lefty-swinging Yelich and Bradley, and the righty-swinging Cain and García — the most basic building block for playing time would appear to be a García/Bradley platoon, particularly given their splits:
| Split | Cain PA | Cain wRC+ | García PA | García wRC+ | Bradley PA | Bradley wRC+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Career vs RHP | 3109 | 99 | 2342 | 95 | 2318 | 97 |
| Recent* vs RHP | 1419 | 102 | 785 | 93 | 931 | 103 |
| Career vs LHP | 1207 | 126 | 892 | 119 | 963 | 84 |
| Recent* vs LHP | 490 | 126 | 337 | 116 | 388 | 75 |
Though he hit for a 143 wRC+ in all of 69 PA against lefties in 2020, Bradley has generally been less effective against them in recent years than at the outset of his career. I noted in my previous piece that Bradley’s strong offensive showing (.283/.364/.450, 120 wRC+) in 2020 wasn’t supported by his Statcast quality-of-contact numbers. That’s true to an even greater degree when one drills down into the splits:
| Split | wOBA | xwOBA | Dif | wOBAcon | xwOBAcon | Dif |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| vs. LHP | .387 | .311 | .076 | .438 | .322 | .116 |
| vs. RHP | .336 | .302 | .034 | .399 | .349 | .050 |
This table imbues the splits with more importance than they deserve, as we’re talking about 45 batted balls events versus lefties from a partial season, but my point is simply that nobody should expect Bradley to rake against lefties as he did last year. Theres a whole lot more evidence that upholds the wisdom of sitting him against most lefties.
As for the 29-year-old García, the first year of his two years-plus-option, $20 million deal did not go so well. After batting .282/.332/.464 (112 wRC+) with 20 homers for the Rays in 2019, he sank to .238/.333/.326 (82 wRC+) with two homers last year, his fourth out of the past six with a wRC+ of 92 or lower and a WAR of 0.7 or lower; besides 2019, his other good season was ’17 with the White Sox, when he hit for a 138 wRC+ and produced 4.2 of his 6.8 career WAR. He’s a free swinger who chases about 40% of pitches outside the zone, annually has outstanding maximum exit velocities (last year was the first where he didn’t top 115 mph at least once) but hits the ball on the ground too often to consistently do damage. Last year, he produced a groundball/fly ball ratio of 1.7, and set career lows with an 87.4 mph average exit velo (26th percentile) and a 3.8% barrel rate (15th percentile); his .321 xwOBA was his lowest mark since 2016.
García has always carried the burden of being compared to then-Tigers teammate Miguel Cabrera at too young an age due to his size, Venezuelan background, and apparent power. Listed at 6-foot-4, 250 pounds, he reported to camp having lost 36 pounds over the winter due to a healthy diet, putting him at or near the top of the mythical Best Shape of His Life leaderboards. Even before losing the weight, he brought speed (78th percentile, via Statcast) and athleticism to the table, and he’s improved defensively since his younger days, though he was overexposed in center field (-5 DRS in 348.1 innings) last year. While he’s 10 runs below average by that measure for his career in right field, he was 12 below in 1,425 innings alone in 2014-15, and is five above average in 3,040 innings since then.
All of which is to say that García makes a thoroughly credible short half of a platoon with Bradley. Both will have larger footprints than that, because Cain’s age and penchant for injuries, particularly lower body ones, mean he’ll require maintenance. He’s topped 141 games just twice in parts of 11 seasons, and after missing 98 games in 2012 due to left groin and right hamstring strains, averaged only 134 games from 2013-19. He missed 26 games in 2013 due to an oblique strain, and 17 in 2014 due to another left groin strain. In 2016, he was limited to 103 games, first missing a month in the summer due to a Grade 1 left hamstring strain, and then all but one game in September due to a Grade 2 left wrist sprain. After playing in a career-high 155 games in 2017, he lost 13 games to another left groin strain in ’18, and while he played 148 games in ’19, he battled right thumb, left knee and left ankle injuries en route to an 83 wRC+, his worst showing since 2013. Staying healthy isn’t his forte.
As if the point about Cain needed further underscoring, he has reportedly been dealing with tightness in his right quad, and MLB.com’s Adam McCalvy added earlier this week that the Brewers would wait until next week before getting him into spring games. The team is “Letting him get his legs back under him after he elected not to play last year.”
Thus it stands to reason that building some off days into the schedule for Cain will be necessary. Given his platoon splits above, the preference would be to do so when righties are on the mound, letting Bradley do his thing in center while García is in right. García could also pick up playing time backing up Yelich, who’s coming off a comparatively dreadful season (.205/.356/.430, 113 wRC+, 0.7 WAR) after two MVP-level ones, both of which saw him miss handfuls of games due to back spasms, not to mention his season-ending fractured kneecap in 2019.
Bradley’s arrival probably spells bad news for outfielders Derek Fisher and Billy McKinney, a pair of former Top 100 prospects who are both out of options. Both are lefty swingers, and both have yet to fully establish that they can hit any kind of major league pitching with consistency; for what it’s worth, Fisher has actually hit lefties (110 wRC+ in 112 PA) while getting eaten alive by righties (68 wRC+ in 346 PA). Righty-swinging utilityman Daniel Robertson has a smattering of experience in left field for when the need for a fifth outfielder arises.
As with the free agent signing of fielding wizard Kolten Wong, which pushed Hiura to first base, the addition of Bradley will help bolster a defense that was 23rd in the majors in DRS (-14) and 22nd in Defensive Efficiency (.687), and an outfield that was 25th in DRS (-11) — particularly when coupled with the return of Cain. This team may not be the second coming of Harvey’s Wallbangers, but preventing runs is half the game, too.
Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.
Seems like another savvy move on the margins from the Brewers’ front office! Lots of question marks, but the Brewers seem to have sky-high potential. They’ll need good health (perhaps the biggest of the aforementioned question marks), and bounce-backs from Hader and Yelich to meet it, but I think the foundation of a real contender is here given the pitching depth and potentially impact bats, along with the concerted effort to improve their defense this offseason. Should be a fun year for them!
Interesting that there are so few multiyear signings in March. But the contract itself seems also to be for much less than Boras hoped for. Brewers are probably counting on an opt-out.
Well, the fit is that Jackie Bradley Jr is a lefty with some power in a stadium that disproportionately rewards left handed power. The Brewers, when they have succeeded in the recent past, have had a handful of lefties with some power. Losing Travis Shaw (first to whatever happened in 2019, and then to another team in 2020) was a much bigger blow than I think a lot of observers realized, and the team also lost Thames, Moustakas, and Grandal (IIRC he was better from the left than right side). None of those guys are offensive stars but they’re all above-average left handed batters whose offensive performance plays up in Miller Park (it’s always going to be Miller Park). I haven’t seen Bradley’s spray chart stuck in Miller Park but I bet it looks pretty good.
The other part of this is the Brewers’ defense in the Stearns / Counsell era has relied really heavily on defensive positioning at the expensive of defensive talent. Maybe this is just the games, I watched but one of the wild things about watching a Brewers game is that either a defender is in exactly the right spot to make the play or absolutely nobody has a chance. The metrics haven’t loved the Brewers’ defense but it doesn’t look that bad overall; when you watch them, it becomes apparent that they are getting by largely by positioning wizardry more than fundamentals. Last season, things really fell apart with Hiura at second and Shaw / Moustakas gone and Cain out. Having Wong at 2nd, Bradley in RF (and spelling Cain in center), and (probably) having Shaw back at third makes them much less dependent on positioning.
Finally, I should note that if you take the 2020 OAA numbers seriously then Bradley absolutely has likely not lost much range in CF. OAA is a cumulative stat, so running 7 OAA in center field in ~450-500 innings is very good and better than any other OAA he’s put up. I mean, Cain is probably still better out there but it’s a high-class problem to have two legitimate center fielders.
Overall, I don’t think it made a lot of sense that the Brewers were the high bidder on this–there were a handful of other teams that clearly needed him more–but I think this is a pretty savvy deal and there’s a real chance that Wong / Bradley / Shaw are going to surprise in Milwaukee this year. The Brewers aren’t “real” contenders or anything but in the NL Central anything goes and fans who like defense should get what they’re looking for.
Seems like signing Wong and Bradley means that they’ve soured on positioning reliance
I thought they would be a great fit for Andrelton Simmons because they really needed a guy with more range in the middle, but the upgrade from Hiura to Wong should do it too. If Shaw plays regularly (and he probably should) then that will reduce pressure on the 3rd base side too.
It’s not an ideal situation because Lindblom, Hader, and Peralta, while all very good at pitching, are also pretty extreme fly-ballers in a stadium that rewards left-handed power. But I think you could see some really good run prevention out of Milwaukee this season. They’re still miles behind the Dodgers, Padres, Mets, and Braves but they at least have a real shot now of winning the division (and in the playoffs, maybe they’re hot and make things interesting / respectable).
I like this for the Brewers, and by all accounts this seems like a temporary solution from Boras to Bradley. I’m sure both are pretty disappointed they did not get the 4-5 year deal they are seeking (although under normal circumstances, I think it’s hard to envision any team committing that much time to such a streaky hitter). Depth is never a bad thing, especially in a year where teams will be hammered by injuries. Might as well stockpile whatever you can. This may not be what Bradley was hoping for and as alluded to here, there isn’t a clear as day fit for Bradley here, but I think both parties will benefit before Bradley tests the market again next offseason.
I wonder if Boras/Bradley didn’t think he was a Tori Hunter type.
“I like this for the Brewers, and by all accounts this seems like a temporary solution from Boras to Bradley.”
JBJ is 31 and uses his wheels to generate value.
The future contracts won’t be getting longer.
I didn’t say it’d work. My point is more so that I assume Boras is telling Bradley to think of this as a one-year gig and to try again on an open market in 2022 where he will be the best available CF option. Maybe if he course corrects some things and has a 162-game season on par with his performance at the plate in 2020, he could do a bit better than he did. Maybe 3/45? If all things worked out. I wouldn’t bet on it, I’m just trying to think of how they may be approaching this. Overall I agree with your point.
Surprisingly, he’s not that fast. (And he under-performs his speed on the base paths.)
He does have quick-twitch reactions and about a 95% “best route” ability in the OF, though. Plus a strong and accurate arm.
No idea on how any of this would age, but I’d love to see number-crunching on these subjects.
Josh Lindblom and Freddy Peralta are both extreme flyball pitchers, Bradley fits great with both of them on the mound.
A lot of exposition to say that the Brewers overpaid for a platoon hitter, especially when 4th OFers have been getting signed elsewhere for pennies on the dollar.
Any chance the Brewers also have reservations that Cain might sit out again?
As much as I like JBJ as a depth piece, Stearns has never paid $$ even close to this for depth. Could he have gotten a close look at Cain after a year off and be worried that he’s due for a huge dropoff, and thus needs someone new to take the majority of starts in CF?
That last sentence is especially appropriate considering that Harvey’s Wallbangers lost the 1982 World Series to a Whiteyball-era Cardinals team that was built around run prevention (and speed).
The option on the second year isn’t going to help my argument here, but could this be an inside-out play by the Brewers?
JBJ isn’t going to hurt them this year at$12 million, but if Garcia has another disappointing year with the bat, and Lorenzo ages badly, then 2022 makes very good sense for this contract.
Either way, I will always have JBJ’s back. An all-round good guy.
Strange that the Mets didn’t go for the JBJ / Kolten Wong (or Ha-Seong Kim) combo instead of relying on Dom Smith to survive in LF and JD Davis to squeak by at 3B, particularly when they decided to spend 3.25m in 2021 for Pillar (with more going out in 2022) and 3.55m for Villar.
The money spent on Villar would knocked the price of Kim down to 4m in 2021, and the money spent on Pillar would have made Bradley’s effective cost under 9m. That’s in the context of the Mets three primary OFers missing a ton of time since each became a starter. They badly needed a 4th OFer who’s about as good as a starter, not a Pillar who’s on his way out of the league. Looks like they may have whiffed, too, on spending 2/20+m on Walker (Jose Quintana without the durability, with the Mets 4th starter bound to be a regular in their postseason rotation should they get there) when Odorizzi appears to have gone for very little more.
Alderson’s two belts and a pair of suspenders approach to this offseason was a poor one.