Five Takeaways from the Non-Tender Deadline
Wednesday was the deadline for teams to offer contracts to their arbitration-eligible players, and the expectation going into the night was that plenty of players would be added to the free-agent pool. As Eric Longenhagen noted, non-tenders have been on the rise over the last few years, and 2019 gave us the busiest deadline in recent memory, as we saw players coming off injuries, quality second basemen, and sluggers with other deficiencies all get cut — 53 in total.
This year was even busier, as close to 60 players lost their roster spots. With the moves now official, here are a handful of takeaways from the deadline and what they mean for the coming winter. (For a full list of non-tenders, Roster Resource has you covered.)
Pre-Tenders Were a Big Deal for Small Deals
Sometimes the threat of a non-tender is enough to strike a favorable deal with players. There were a huge number of one-year deals agreed to, including some fairly recognizable names. Matt Olson, Eduardo Rodriguez, José Berríos, Byron Buxton, Hunter Dozier, Jorge Soler, Johan Camargo, Jesús Aguilar, Omar Narváez, Steven Matz, and Alex Dickerson all agreed to one-year deals, likely below what they would have received in arbitration.
The fear of becoming a free agent in a pandemic winter likely played a big part in that. While free agency is generally a good thing, more players in the pool means more minor league deals and fewer major league guarantees for players on the fringes of the roster. By signing now and receiving a guaranteed deal, players also head into spring training without the risk of being cut and making considerably less money.
The Biggest Names Stayed Put
Ahead of the deadline, both Eric and our readers made their predictions on which players might get the axe, with some relatively big names potentially on the chopping block. But among the stars who might have been non-tendered, not much happened. Gary Sánchez received a contract from the Yankees, as Kris Bryant did from the Cubs. Tommy Pham looks like he’ll return to San Diego for another season. These weren’t exactly surprises, but after a shortened season and with teams scaling back payroll, big changes were still a reasonable possibility — if not via a non-tender, then as a potential trade. Some of these players — Bryant in particular — will resurface in trade rumors down the road, but for now, they’re staying put.
Sluggers Get Non-Tendered
The biggest name jettisoned was Kyle Schwarber, whose tenure in Chicago comes to an end after six seasons. The former postseason and World Series hero was still productive just a year ago, but his 2020 was a mess, as he struck out too much, hit way too many groundballs, and put up a 90 wRC+, though he was closer to average against right-handers. Though he’ll be just 28 years old next season and looks to be a big bounce-back candidate if he can find a nice platoon, the Cubs decided his $8 million salary would be better spent elsewhere. Given that they also jettisoned Albert Almora Jr., their outfield should look a little different in 2021.
Schwarber and Almora aren’t alone among hitters looking for a new home. Eddie Rosario and Hunter Renfroe were put on waivers and went unclaimed. Maikel Franco was not offered a deal by Royals. Adam Duvall, Danny Santana, Nomar Mazara, José Martínez, and Travis Shaw will all hit free agency, too. One of the more interesting players to be let go is David Dahl, who struggled in Colorado and battled injuries but was once a top prospect.
There wasn’t a crowded crop of corner outfielder-types on the market, with Marcell Ozuna in the top tier and Joc Pederson occupying the step below. But the likes of Rosario, Renfroe, Duvall, Dahl and Mazara will join the Robbie Grossman/Adam Eaton/Yasiel Puig tier that suddenly has a lot more available players.
Add a Few More Available Relievers
The veteran relief group was already pretty deep, and it got deeper on Wednesday. Archie Bradley was good last year and in 2019, and he might be the second-best reliever now on the market. The rest of the relievers now available don’t have Bradley’s upside, but Hansel Robles, Keynan Middleton, Ryne Stanek, Matt Wisler, A.J. Cole, Alex Claudio, John Brebbia, Chasen Shreve, Jonathan Holder, and Justin Anderson are all capable arms for bullpens in need. In the semi-intriguing starter/maybe reliever category, Trevor Williams, Tyler Anderson, and Carlos Rodón weren’t tendered contracts, either.
This Was As Bad As it Was Expected to Be
While the non-tender deadline is generally more of a minor date in the offseason calendar, it was a much bigger deal this season. With a greater number of players expected to become available, teams have, for the most part, opted to wait on signing free agents to see who got let go. With the pool of available players now larger, we will see if teams choose to wait out the available options to get even more favorable terms in free agency. We also saw a large number of arbitration-eligible players agree to deals before the deadline to avoid the possibility of being non-tendered. The uncertainty surrounding how arbitration will play out after a shortened season also likely played a role in the increase of these deals.
The starting pitching market in free agency appears to be moving rather quickly, and the Mets’ signing of Trevor May could get the reliever market moving too. But the non-tender deadline was a snap back to the reality of the long, cold winter players face ahead.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
By signing now and receiving a guaranteed deal, players also head into spring training without the risk of being cut and making considerably less money.
Yes in general, but note that Matz’s deal is not guaranteed (or, is reportedly <$1M guaranteed against $5.2M if he makes it past March 17) which made it a no-brainer for the Mets to invite him to spring training and evaluate.
Guillermo Heredia’s contract is like that too. I was confused at first as to why the Mets would “guarentee” him $1 million but it made a lot more sense when I found out that’s only if he makes the OD roster out of Spring Training.
This is Guillermo Heredia’s last go-round with a major league contract either way. The main reason he got a contract is that he still has an option year left, so you can bring him up when your center fielder goes on the DL and send him back down when he’s done. (Unless you believe that this year will be his big breakout, in which case I guess we’ll agree to disagree)
Let’s hope the Mets go after Archie Bradley, who is (for me) the biggest surprise outside of Dahl. (What do the Rockies have to lose by signing Dahl for one more year at that low of a cost?!) Gsellman starts the season in the minors to ride the shuttle as needed; Diaz/Bradley/May is a heck of a back-end regardless of what Lugo’s role is.
If you are a rebuilding team with a hole in center field, Dahl is the kind of guy you’d want to go after. Lots of service time left, and generally played decently when healthy (last year was pretty bad, admittedly). You know who fits that description perfectly? The Colorado Rockies. (The Giants are a decent fit too, and he would have made more sense for the Royals than Michael Taylor).
While I agree he would make more sense than Taylor, I do think Taylor could be a potential breakout candidate. His statcast data is decent. He seems to hit the ball hard, plays good defense, and runs fast. I guess that is more for fantasy however, as his real life value is unlikely to ever be that high.
Feels like a great Red Sox fit as well.
It’s more bc he’s the only real CFer on the roster and one of just 3 OFers.
I disagree with the last point, and I think it is because of the first point. There were a lot of pre-tender deals. Chad Pinder, Tony Kemp, Jesus Aguilar, Erik Gonzalez, Steven Matz…these were the sorts of bubble guys who would have very likely been tendered in a normal year, but they saw they were at risk and took a deal. Others, like Knebel, got traded (this, FWIW, I think is a really good deal for the Dodgers, although it probably depends on whether anything goes back).
And the result of that is that I’m pretty sure there are only 10 players who might have been tendered in a normal offseason who weren’t this year. The only players who fit that description, really, were David Dahl, Kyle Schwarber, Duvall, Archie Bradley, Brian Goodwin, Maikel Franco, and Carlos Rodon. I’m not sure any of them would have been locks in a normal year anyway, because a lot of them are pretty expensive. And only David Dahl is legitimately surprising to me in this offseason.
A lot of these other guys, like Rosario, Renfroe, Danny Santana, Jose Martinez, Mazara…these guys would have been non-tendered in any normal year too. They were too expensive.
10 players is a lot though! A ~20% increase in non-tenders is huge. I think that the fact we were all expecting roughly this to happen, and feared worse, has cushioned the blow somewhat, but I don’t think there’s really any getting around the fact that this offseason is shaping up to be just as bad for the players as we thought (outside of whatever the Mets do, and maybe 1 or 2 other teams like the Blue Jays that actually seem inclined to improve their teams this offseason).
But that’s 10 players who _might_ have gotten a tender, and I could only list 7 (I just said 10 in case I forgot someone). It could only have been 3. That’s the upper limit.
Actually there were only 3 more non tenders than last year. I found that surprising given the uncertainty arbitration presents this year with the short ’20 season and how numbers will be evaluated. MLBTR’s arb projections (which are usually fairly good) had tiered numbers given that uncertainty. The pre-tender deals were all over the map as compared to their projections, but often fell between their high and low projections. So it hasn’t been the bloodbath many were predicting yet.
But the rule of thumb typically is that those who sign early do better so I guess we’ll see. And the results of any actual hearings should be pretty interesting.
Realistically it appears to me non tenders were more about creating roster space for FA signs. Only 20 of the 56 guys had fWAR over .5 WAR total across both ’19 and ’20.
Brewers fan here. If Knebel gets a little more life on his fastball which he was trending toward at the end of last year after missing time to TJ surgery, it will be a great move by the Dodgers. His knuckle curve is virtually unhittable and when he’s at 97-98 mph with his fastball, he’s an absolute shutdown closer and fun to watch. Good dude too.
I think you’re missing quite a few of the cheaper and/or less notable guys. For example, John Brebbia would’ve been tendered a contract in a normal offseason.
Then there’s the case of Knebel, who would’ve likely been tendered a contract and not traded, as well as all those guys who wouldn’t have needed to agree to cheaper deals in order to avoid a non-tender.
The non-tender Armageddon did not happen and the pre-tender deals look pretty good along with the handful of free agent signings so far. Not seeing the huge financial distress signals that everyone was expecting. Maybe the vaccine has convinced clubs to bite the bullet
If anything, I expect very short tenor free agent deals with two years being the sweet spot. Anyone getting 3+ years should consider themselves lucky.
Teams are learning that if you put 200-300 players on the open market each year it holds down prices. Short term deals guarantee that situation to continue.
Players need to get a floor built into the CBA in the next negotiation. If every team needed to spend $100 million per year, it would create conditions for these middle market guys to get longer term deals.
Look closer at the Resource page and add the waivers and declined options to the non-tenders.
Not only are the total numbers large, there are names that shock.
Guys got cut or moved that still have options and could have keen retained under a split contract.
It’s not the end of the world but it is going to be a cold market after the deep pocket teams are done cherry picking. Don’t assume a normal year because the Mets, Yanks, LA, and a couple other teams go fishing.
I guess I’m just not seeing this with the non-tenders; we saw it more with the options. The movement behind non-tendering for useful but slightly overvalued players has been building for a couple of offseasons already. And for the options, while there are some shocking names if you haven’t paid attention for a few years, but Corey Kluber and Carlos Santana and Chris Archer were not getting their options picked up at those rates (Archer probably not at all). The Rays declined an Morton’s option and despite being geographically limited, the guy signed a contract worth the same amount with another team. There are a few guys where they probably would have been retained in earlier years, like Kolten Wong, Brad Hand, Kyle Schwarber, and Archie Bradley, so that’s where I think you see the action. Maybe Mitch Moreland and Darren O’Day. But the only name I am legitimately surprised by is David Dahl.
My expectations aren’t about the name guys not getting picked up…eventually…
It’s about the deals they’ll get. The “discounts” it’ll cost them.
I expect to see a lot of short deals. Incentive laden deals. Or even conditional deals. And all way lower than what a lot of folks think of as “cheap”.
And the driving force isn’t just the uncertainty over the conditions in 21, but the coming negotiations. The owners have been at this for years now, looking to reset salaries for the middle class. The owners are using the rules of the CBA to squeeze the union. I’m guessing they want to do away with arbitration.
It won’t be pretty.
I don’t expect a full ’22 season, maybe none.
I would like to see arbitration go away as well, but with that needs to be the amount of time that teams have “control” over a player. The amount of time a player is forced to be with one organization, even if they don’t want to be with them, needs to change.
No, the 6-7 years of team control is an absolute necessity to maintain competitive balance in order to allow the smaller markets to occasionally compete by building cheap homegrown stars through their farm systems! If you think teams like the Dodgers and Yankees have it good now, that’s nothing compared to how badly they’ll destroy the competition if they drop the number of years of team control.
One thing it would do would force teams hand away from high school players. Let them grow and improve in college, that would save 3-4 years of minor league growth time. Get them out of college and then you can have them on your big league squad sooner, would be less need for so many levels of minor league ball as well.
So far it looks like the royals, blue jays and Braves are spending. I think you have a conclusion built already not supported by any facts.
“Players need to get a floor built into the CBA in the next negotiation. If every team needed to spend $100 million per year, it would create conditions for these middle market guys to get longer term deals.”
This is a popular (populist?) take, but from an economic perspective it’s a bad one. Forcing entities into any type of salary “floors” usually has all sorts of unintended consequences.
In this specific case, a simple consideration of the second order effects of forcing teams to spend X amount of dollars would likely lead to even more of a “stars and scrubs” type approach, where teams would spend extra dollars on Mike Trout and cut salary in other places (say, among the massive group of defensively challenged 2 WAR outfielders).
Think of it as a minimum wage analogy. If you force me, the employer, to pay all employees $10/hour, I simply won’t hire employees that bring a marginal benefit less than $10. Or I will hire them, and then be forced to raise prices. Or if you force me to spent X amount on labor each day/month/year, I’ll simply pay my best workers more since they are generally 2-3x more productive anyway (or in white collar knowledge-based jobs, potentially 20-30x productive) and then let the others go.
The obvious answer from the economically illiterate is then to also install a salary cap on the players, which again, will lead to more unintended consequences. You would see a bunch of teams clustered around the salary floor, with a large number of “max” contracts like you see in the NBA where the players aren’t getting paid their actual value. So then a rule would be put in place where the organization that drafted the player could offer a higher contract…which would basically then lead to, just like the NBA, groups of star players banding together to form “super teams”, since a small market team that offered a “super max” contract to a homegrown player would then be financially crippled.
Eventually you start having so many financial diktats forced on entities that they then start offering black/gray market benefits outside the salary cap.
With a salary floor, I do worry about unintended consequences. Like more teams taking on bad/dead contracts to reach an arbitrary floor number in exchange for prospects. I’m not 100% sure that imposing a floor automatically means that guys like Eddie Rosario will get $10 million a season.
That’s still better than not spending the money at all.
Is there any defense whatsoever of Hoyer’s Schwarber non-tender decision? In what world is ~$8 million for a player projected at 2.4 WAR in 2021 not an incredible bargain?
Are we sure it was hoyer’s call and not an ownership edict?
yeah totally fair point, my ire should really be directed at the rickets family. don’t worry, i have plenty of rage toward them as well.
regardless I just haven’t seen enough coverage of how terrible this choice was from a baseball perspective. all the analysis so far has been retrospectives of Schwarbs’ 2016 WS heroics. even removing sentiment though, it’s just a really bad baseball move to let a player with ≥ ~10-12 million in surplus value leave
We need to rethink the concept of surplus value, especially where there is a large pool of similar (commoditized?) profile players. Is there a more commoditized profile right now than 2-win, 115 wRC+, limited baserunning and defensive-value corner OF/DH types? Do we really think teams will play for surplus value the same way when there are a whole bunch of similar-profile players available as compared to surplus value at a more scarce profile/position?
I continue to believe that surplus value is not linear but is part linear, part plateaued, and part logarithmic – at various points on the graph – and is also based on the relative pool of available players at that position, with similar profiles, and that teams always evaluate it against the current crop of available players as compared to what resources are *expected* to be available at any point in the near future…
There will always be more Kyle Schwarbers and Eddie Rosarios to sign than other types of profile… their supply is high while their demand is not, given the relative probability that a minimum salary player can provide that 2-win, 115 wRC+ (which is a higher likelihood than the probability that the minimum salary player / prospect will actually become the next Mike Trout or Mookie Betts)…
It all comes back to supply and demand, and simple looks at surplus value don’t actually provide you with that.
^^^^This is what I wanted to say. But he wrote it a lot better than I ever could. Somebody sign this guy.
This is also why discussing value-per-win of hitters vs. pitchers is tough. Everyone always needs relievers, and about 20 teams need a starter at any given time. But if you’re a position player, you’re participating in a much smaller market. Some years there are more teams that need a starting-caliber second basemen or left fielder than there are available, and most years there is not (and to a lesser extent, this is true at every position). Supply and demand plays out very differently for most position players.
This year the market is not only relatively small but also budget limited.
Guys like Schwarber, Duvall, Rosario, Dahl, even Almora would be a fit in Cleveland, Miami, Texas and a couple other teams. Not everywhere or even 20 teams.
They still might find jobs but not at tbe salaries they might have been expecting after a normal 2020.
Some might even end up on make-good contracts, like Heredia.
And some of those might not make it out of training camp, whenever that happens; spring, mid-summer, late summer…
The issue with the term surplus value is that we have been told 1 WAR = $8M or whatever the figure is. That simply hasn’t been the case, 1 WAR players don’t make $8M because teams know a $500K rookie or quad A player can come up and give them most or all that production at a much lower cost. (Even if you factor in the minimum salaries to bring the $/WAR figure down, 1 WAR players still make less than even that).
Brock Holt put up over 1 WAR in back to back seasons (in partial play time even) before signing with Milwaukee for a whopping $2.5M. Jose Iglesias alternated between 1 and 2 WAR seasons for several years before hitting the free agent market and getting paid….you guessed it, $2.5M on back to back contracts.
There is also much greater value in having a high concentration of WAR in a single player versus spreading it out across 2-3 players because it leaves room for more potential total WAR from your entire roster. Which, combined with the scarcity of elite players, is why $/WAR goes up as a player’s WAR goes up.
Take two teams with equal WAR, contracts aside. Team A has a roster of 2-4 WAR players, Team B has a few 5+ WAR guys and a bunch of 0-2 WAR players.
It’s much more costly and difficult for Team A to improve at any given position because 5+ WAR players are hard to find and those players are much more expensive to acquire.
Team B will have a much easier time swapping out their 1 WAR players for 3 WAR players because 3 WAR players are much less scarce and as a result, cost relatively less per WAR than 5 WAR players.
Exactly – it’s not linear. The first win in projected WAR is not worth anywhere near as much as the 4th, 5th, 6th or above. The value of that first win is probably <$3M unless you're a catcher. The value of that second win is probably <$5M unless you're in a high-demand position (and definitely <$5M if you're a corner OF with a limited baserunning / defensive profile.)
But then the value of the 3rd and 4th win not only increases, but also increases the volume of potential suitors, which creates a bidding war for those players who can provide those projected wins…
And that's the point. Surplus value isn't linear.
I’ve been saying this forever. It’s irritating how widespread the misconception that every player is “worth” ~$8M for each point of WAR above 0 has become. If that were true, we’d have mediocre players getting $16M AAVs in free agency, above average semi-star types getting $24M-32M AAVs, and legit superstars like Machado and Rendon getting $45M-$60M AAVs. It’s just so obviously not that simple
Someone please correct me if I’m wrong…but I think this comes from a confusion between “cost” and “value”. The $8M/WAR (or whatever it is in a given year) is a cost. It is, essentially, adding up the league wide FA contract outlays in an offseason, and dividing that by the (expected) WAR of the cohort.
It is a VERY rough average, and is in no way a worthwhile metric to compare against any single player’s contract to determine if it’s a good deal or not. In fact, doing that exposes not the worthiness of the deal, but rather the points where value and cost are not the same thing.
I hear you that of course supply and demand matter in determining contracts. What’s needed is a notion of *relative* WAR that more aggressively adjusts for position and player “type.”
A natural quantitative solution is to adjust the replacement player (“outside option”) flexibly based on the pool of available talent. The number/quality of “similar players” could be computed in a straightforward way using the techniques already used to get player comps.
But contract crowdsourcing pages at the beginning of the offseason still emphasize WAR. I still think it’s a reasonable benchmark. Do you disagree that (before he was non-tendered) a one-year $8 million contract would be on the low end of the conventional wisdom on FG for Schwarber’s valuation?
Yes, and it’s not just relative WAR (though that is clearly important). Valuing a “win” at $8M is a simple tool that incorporates a couple of fallacies beyond the fact that WAR is not linear.
First, the demand for WAR is not infinite. Each team is looking to improve, now or in the future, from its own baseline. Not every team values current wins the same, though (presumably) all teams value future wins the same when committing long-term dollars. But in a given year, there is a finite demand for WAR beyond fungible parts and depth.
Second, the supply of WAR will always, always be far greater than the demand, although perhaps not at a position-by-position basis.
Third, the “value” of a win is not the same as the “cost” of a win. In an economy, things sometimes cost more than they are actually worth in the long term (especially when your demand is abnormally high and supply is abnormally low but will ultimately even back out), and things sometimes clost less than they are actually worth.
And, finally, and this one is an opinion rather than a fact, decisions are made based on probability models, and the probability of securing certain performance at a certain cost. And by year 4-5, a team generally knows what it has in a player, especially in this age of analytics where you would largely suspect that changes in approach could have been ironed out by this point. Therefore, what WAR pricing models need to price is in the probability or “certainty” that a player will produce a certain value as compared to the probability or “certainty” of a minimum-salary player being able to produce that same value.
So – to your Kyle Schwarber question… yes, I disagree that $8M would be on the low-end of the scale for Schwarber. (You asked about conventional wisdom, but I can’t speak to conventional wisdom. And conventional wisdom is often very, very wrong because conventional wisdom is often retrospective in modeling rather than current, in many disciplines.)
I think $8M is on the HIGH end of the scale, for all the reasons mentioned. I think a team can be relatively certain that Kyle Schwarber will be a 2-win, 115-120wRC+, middling running and average defending corner outfielder, with some range of probability above and below that line. I suspect there is a value for the “certainty” of that performance compared to a prospect who may or may not produce that value at a minimum salary. I don’t know what the market value is for the certainty/probability, but it’s clearly not 14x the league minimum, or $8M, given the supply of corner OF types who can provide that value (as well as the supply of other types who could learn to play corner OF as well as Kyle Schwarber has learned to player corner OF).
Anecdotally, it seems the same is true with relievers. There is generally high variability in their performance. The relivers who get multi-year contracts at a large multiple of the league minimum are guys who teams are relatively certain can repeat their performance (including weighting injury risk). Otherwise, relievers are a fungible part – constant demand, but a very high supply.
On the other hand, a catcher who could be a relatively certain 2-win, 115-120wRC+, average defender might very well be worth 14x the league minimum or more, given the short supply of catchers and the extreme variability in their performance.
Sorry – one last thing, as a bit of a tangent. This is why the Drew Smyly signing baffled me so much. If Drew Smyly can repeat, over 100-120 innings or more, what he did in 2020, then his $11M contract makes sense. But I am highly curious as to what the Braves see that gives them any meaningful degree of certainty that he can repeat/sustain that performance over those innings. Charlie Morton at 1/$15 makes a lot more sense because I would expect a much higher probability of certainty in the outcome.
Yea I also thought $11M was high especially given the low 2020 inning count (26) that we’re evaluating here, but:
-He bumped his 4 seam velo from ~91 MPH the prior three years up to ~94 MPH
-Increased his curveball usage
-Dropped his change up
-Bumped his zone %
All this led to a large spike in whiff rate and a jump in GB rate (with a corresponding reduction in FBs) which are all good things. I’d still be wary though given his barrel rate also jumped.
I tend to look at SP valuations separate from hitters. Solid SPs are a more scarce resource who serve the second purpose of bullpen arm in the playoffs. I also think some of it is that teams feel like they have more control over pitcher performance because it’s easier to change someone’s pitch mix than a hitter’s swing or plate discipline.
Rick Porcello made $10M last year on a one year deal. Granted we’re coming off a pandemic season with a ton of lost revenue so this $11M feels like a lot more than Porcello’s $10M last year, but Rick Porcello didn’t have similar positive indicators that Smyly had in his small sample either.
Agreed 100% with everything you wrote… but I think an interesting question that is ripe for study is how long it takes batters/teams to adjust their scouting reports and approaches when a pitcher changes his pitch usage or his approach. Drew Smyly succeeded not only because he ditched his changeup and upped his curveball usage, but also in part because that was a change to his pitching profile that teams were not aware of until it was evident. In a full 162-game season, I wonder if some of those effects level off a little bit once teams change their scouting report as the data becomes more evident. He only threw 7 games and 26 innings, so we don’t know – but it would be really, really interesting if someone took the data and did a study of how long and to what effect the league catches up with pitch-usage, pitch-mix, etc. changes as opposed to improving a pitch considerably.
I would guess seventy percent of the reason why Theo Epstein left is because he didn’t want to have decisions like this.
I’d think Theo was looking at what was coming.
Schwarber is just the beginning of a big shift for the Cubs. Going into ’21 right now they are short in the rotation, the pen, and the OF, and 3 cornerstones of their current stretch (plus Kimbrell on an option) are FA’s after ’21. Do they go for a “last hurrah” in ’20? The owner is crying the blues about finances – how do they fill the holes with limited majors ready prospect capital?
Sure they marketed Schwarber aggressively for a trade – that nobody bit may say something about his perceived value, though the tender deadline likely hurt that effort.
Likewise, I find it unlikely Bryant is back with them at the projected salary. I don’t think they’ll have a problem finding a taker for him, but with a guy like Huascar Ynoa coming back as the return I don’t think Theo wanted any part of that.
With the owner crying poor, and not looking like a particularly viable contender with the current group, and a bunch of expiring contracts, everyone knows what comes next. The only players who are locks to return are Happ, Bote, Hoerner, Alzolay, Caratini, Heyward, and Kimbrel (and the last two only because their contracts make them untradeable). Several others are likely to return, even Bryant, but there is a non-zero chance that Caratini is catching close to every day, some stopgap is playing 1B and LF, and the rotation includes 3 or 4 of Alec Mills, Cory Abbott, Keegan Thompson, Colin Rea, and Justin Steele.
Let’s be real, it looks likely that the Cubs are right at the beginning of another rebuild and won’t be a World Series contender until 2024 at the earliest.
Personally, I’d try to extend or resign Baez and Contraras and let Bryant and Rizzo walk after next season (after extending QOs), and then focus mostly on rebuilding the pitching staff both short and long term. It might lead to a couple of down years in ’22-’23, but it would probably be a quicker turnaround than starting a full rebuild or trying to keep the window open longer than is reasonable followed by a huge crash.
8 mil for someone who just hit under the mendoza line, too much.
This may not be the best website for you 😉
In about 5 years of playing time (6 minus his injuries and the shortened 2020 season), Schwarber compiled 5.1 Bwar 9.4 Fwar. Pretty replaceable.
– And, as should have been pointed out in the Abreu HOF article, on average walks are about 2/3 as good as a single, meaning extremely low BA guys are less valuable even if they have halfway reasonable OB%
While it’s true that batting average does have some value, also keep in mind that the 2020 season was a small sample size for everyone.
I know, common sense isn’t so common around here it seems.
Sadly people here seem to often care more about expected outcomes and the skill sets that go with them, than with actual results. Results matter in baseball, in life. Expected outcomes and good intentions only get you so far if you don’t actually produce.
Everyone cares about expected outcomes. The only question is what you think will predict it going forward. For example, if you thought a high career batting average predicted outcomes, then you’d advocate for your team to bring Magglio Ordonez out of retirement. Or, if you thought a high batting average in 2020 predicted outcomes, then your team should be all-in on Jake Marisnick as your everyday CF. Both of these would be madness, and if you can articulate why, you can get a glimpse of how past performance is not always a good predictor.
Caring about expected outcomes is fine. But its not more important than actual results. The example with Schwarber is that he had an extremely low batting average this past “season.” The reality is that he has never been a good batting average player, and he just showed that his floor can be a lot worse than what it has been. Even if he was unlucky and advanced analytics were to say that he should expect to out perform those numbers in 2021, the extreme low floor is there.
Personally I’m not trying to predict any outcomes, there are too many variables that are potentially unknown to do that. I care more about possible outcomes and the floor and ceilings for players. It isn’t about what should have happened, its about what did.
You clearly believe it is possible to predict a distribution of expected outcomes. You cannot possibly only care about “actual performance.” If Trevor Bauer had Tommy John surgery tomorrow, would you sign him to a big contract? He did really, really well in 2020.
You are bringing a medical variable. Medical variables always change things to some extent. Not sure your point in doing so other than trying to utilize an extreme example. I don’t see anywhere that I stated I “only care about actual performance.” My issue is with those who care more about the expected outcomes than the actual outcomes.
I don’t take a lot of stock in what anyone did for the 2020 season. That season in and of itself was an outlier. High strike out and low BA players I’m not a fan of and wouldn’t give them high dollar contracts.
Not only do I care a lot more about “expected” outcome than “actual” outcomes, I only care about expected outcomes. And I suspect you do too. Hanser Alberto had a tiny strikeout rate and a great batting average in 2019. Would you support your team giving him a massive contract? He “actually” had a .305 batting average. How about Jose Martinez? He’s available, and his batting average for 2017-2019 is .295.
No matter what criteria you put out to say you only care about “actual” performance, I can find you an example where you would be really against the idea of signing a guy with actual performance to a big contract. And you can keep changing the criteria, but this could go on infinitely, because you’re not articulating what you’re doing: Mentally adjusting whether you think that the performance will repeat in 2021. And that is the definition of expected outcomes.
Why you would or would not give someone a contract at all or how big of one has a lot that goes into it. It is not just about one number to give someone a big contract.
When I’m mentioning expected outcomes, I’m referring to the analytics stats that say what “should have” happened in various at bats for pitchers or hitters previously. Not about what is expected in the future so much. When we are looking back and saying what we expected to happen in various situations, it doesn’t really matter that much, what matters is what did happen.
ehh, luck is a real thing. Looking at what should have happened and comparing that to the players larger sample size (i.e. previous years) can highlight how a particular outcome was just plain luck, be it good or bad. Works for players and works for teams (W/L% in one run games being a great example).
Nothing wrong with having some lucky. At any given time I’d rather be lucky than good. That saying has been around for a while for a reason.
One of my favorites was someone back in 2012 arguing on this site that they would rather have Matt Harrison over Felix Hernandez because Harrison gets wins and that is what is is all about, not these stats that don’t matter.
Guys with lots of home runs, relatively low OBPs, and low defensive value regularly get non-tendered. This is also why, even if Hunter Renfroe had a good year, he probably would have gotten non-tendered, and why Duvall got non-tendered despite having his best year in a while. Normally I wouldn’t say that would be enough, but Schwarber is coming off of a bad year due to repeatedly hitting the ball into the ground, there’s an argument that the value of his arm no longer outweighs his mobility problems in the field, there doesn’t seem to be much opportunity for him to improve beyond his career norms at the plate, and the Cubs owner has been crying poor for a while now. I’m also pretty confident that if they couldn’t find a taker for him in a trade that he’s not going to sign for $8M right away anyway, and that while another team might have tendered him it’s not a given.
Personally, I’m on the same page as you in thinking that the Cubs (and the league) is wrong on this front. I don’t think he’s going to keep hitting the ball directly into the ground. He still hits the ball very hard. They don’t have another great candidate for left field at the moment, and looking at OAA suggests his mobility has not declined at all in the last couple of years (it was never very good). But this move has been telegraphed for a while now. My guess is that his market picks up if/when there’s a universal DH, and that if he gets impatient the Cubs or another team could re-sign him at a slightly lower salary.
The universal DH is an absolute must for the MLBPA at this point.
The AL can have the DH, NL doesn’t need it. Let both sides of the coin be happy.
I wouldn’t put that anywhere near a “must”. 10 mashers taking jobs from 10 relievers is a net win for the players, but not on the level of, say, increases to the league minimum.
Why is the universal DH even “good” for the MLBPA, much less a “must”?
It will be good for players who would make good designated hitters. There will be more demand for their services. But it will be bad for the utility infielders and eighth relief pitchers who would otherwise be granted the 26th spot on the roster. Why would it be good for the Players’ Association as a whole?
DH is a starter, not a bench player, so they make more money.
It can be defended if the Cubs replace him with someone better, but that seems unlikely.
In a world where the Cubs don’t agree with Schwarber’s 2.4 WAR projection?
By bwar, Schwarber’s career high was at 2.1 war mostly because DRS rates Schwarber as bad while UZR rates him as good and statcast OOA agrees.
Even by UZR, he has been trending in the wrong direction.
2017-2020 Schwarber
UZR: +12.4, DRS: -10, OOA: -22
I think that if they could 100% guarantee he gets exactly 2.4 WAR they would still sign him. But as you showed, there is variance around that number. And like they pointed out above, the cost of war/replacement isn’t linear. Owners also don’t value players based on our valuation of WAR. This is why guys like Jeff Mathis have 3.4 career war, and keep getting contracts. It is also why corner outfielders who are likely to be worth around 2 WAR can’t get “WAR value” on their contract, because there are far more of them to go around. I sort of see it from the MLBs view here as well. A lot of the guys like Schwarber, Rosario, Renfroe, etc are known commodities. There are probably guys in the upper minors who could probably put up 90-120 wRC+ with average to below average defense in the corners for league minimum who could possibly breakout, so why not play them instead? Every once in a while you will miss out on a career year, like what Ozuna just did (albeit he had a higher floor and higher ceiling and it was a better free agent market) but the league is (unfortunately) probably making the right decision of their valuation of these players as a whole.
Presumably, he was offered in trade and no one said yes. He’s been a free agent now for 48 hours and no one signed him. You could be right but it’s looking less likely by the minute
Yes, Charlie. A world where there are 25+ other players just like Schwarber in the league that are also easily available.
A lot of under 30 year old players looking for a job.
I count 16 players who were first round picks. not sure if I got them all. That seems like a high percentage but I really have no idea what it would usually be.
Did you remember to count Kolten Wong, a former first round pick who had his normally reasonable option declined rather than being non-tendered?
I wonder if this is a sign that the Cubbies are in on Springer? That could be a very good defensive outfield. Probably a good sign for Sam Hilliard as well, particularly if there is a DH in the NL next year. I hope they give him full-time at bats.
Sure, if they want to spend all their available money on one offensive player while leaving their pitching staff in shambles. It would be like the Angels signing Rendon all over again.
A Joc/Schwarber platoon somewhere (ANA? TOR?), as unrealistic as the money would make it, would be a heckuva lot of fun to watch
Uhh they are both lefties. That would be a real bad platoon
oy, I had Schwarber in my head as a righty! Thanks for setting me straight!
I am still looking for a way to get a handle on just what the teams revenue is going to look like next season. The Phillies said they lost a paltry $140, 000,000 last year and it is looking more and more like 2021 is not going to played before packed houses. I would like to find a place to make a sizable wager on where the Buffalo Blue Jays play the majority of their games next year. How can teams make reasonably offers to any players without some firm knowledge of the situation in 2021? Taking a fairly negative overview of 2021, limited attendance or none at all, but with a full schedule and players getting their entire salary looks like Armageddon going into the CBA negotiations. I can read the headlines now, “Players dispute owners claims of huge losses”.
Well, it’s pretty clear that ownership collectively lost money last year, which we expected and it turned out that way. How that’s distributed is something we can’t know unless the owners literally open their books, and that’s not happening. And we definitely don’t know what’s going to happen next year. There’s a new national TV deal coming too, although even if the increase was split entirely among teams it comes out to about $5M extra per team. And it’s complicated because they clearly don’t think they’re going to be losing money forever; things will probably be back to normal in March 2022, unless a totally new pandemic starts.
As for 2021…generally speaking, we’re not likely to see vaccinations available to the general public until at least March; too many health care workers, vulnerable populations, and other high-priority groups (other essential workers, for example), and too many problems with the supply chain. There are definitely segments of the population that will resist getting vaccinated at first (which is not an issue in March and April with limited ability to vaccinate the public and less so once things scale up). And on top of that, we don’t know the right dosing for kids yet, so that’s about 50-60 million people who can’t be vaccinated even if their parents want them to be. This will be uneven.
It will be bad enough that very few governors are going to greenlight attendance at first. (most likely place is going to be Florida, where the two teams, if their 2019 attendance was combined, would only have been 19th in MLB). And on top of all that, even though some teams might be allowed to have some fans in the stadium, people aren’t going to be buying tickers in even close to the same numbers.
The good news is that there’s a decent chance vaccination distribution and administration can scale up quickly. You could potentially have half the population vaccinated by the end of May and two-thirds by the all-star break (stretch goals, but possible), and it’s possible that enough trials will be done with kids so that they can be folded in at some point in there. So I think we’ll see fans in stadiums before the season is over. When that is…that’s the literal billion-dollar question.
“Well, it’s pretty clear that ownership collectively lost money last year, which we expected and it turned out that way. ”
I’m flashing back to the never-ending stream of articles on sites like this, which used very strong language to dispute this exact claim, or at least to minimize it.
No, the argument was whether ownership (and individual teams, but that’s more complicated) would collectively lose money on a per-game basis. That’s not the same thing at all.
In a hypothetical world, imagine you have $100M in costs for your business no matter what happens, and you gain $1M per day your business is open; if you can only be open 50 days, you lose money, but it’s still a good idea to be open those days because you lose less.
I don’t know why I’m even explaining this; you know this.
Do you want me to link to the article where Craig argued that the owners might not lose any money at all, and if they did it would be nowhere near $4bn collectively? In the comments to that one you said that this whole situation has given the *players* more leverage.
It’s pretty funny. You wanna revisit that one?
I thought not.
Your analogy is completely wrong. The business literally cannot sell things to paying customers at a rate that covers employee salaries, so every day it continues to pay its workers it loses more money.
I don’t know why I’m even explaining this; you know this.
Right, the argument was whether the business was selling things at a rate where it would not only cover salaries but make a profit. Everyone knew they were going to lose money, because of ongoing costs that didn’t have anything to do with labor. If someone did say the owners wouldn’t lose any money at all, they were quickly disabused of that notion once they dug into the numbers.
The owners said they would lose money on a per game basis; the player said the owners would gain money on a per-game basis. You took the owners at their word, citing homo economicus (the go-to answer for economic fallacies). I said, citing actual math, that the figures the owners were talking about literally did not add up.
This argument was only possible because the numbers were ambiguous at best. And we will be revisiting it because there aren’t going to be fans in the stadiums to start the season, so buckle up. We’ll be debating this again in February.
Sorry, but that is a complete mischaracterization of what was said repeatedly on this website, in the articles and (especially) in the comments. Here’s the conclusion to one of Craig’s articles (https://blogs.fangraphs.com/parsing-mlbs-claim-of-a-4-billion-loss/).:
“Ultimately, owners might lose money this season, but just how much is up for debate. If the teams play games, it certainly won’t be the $4 billion figure that is being floated. And even without a postseason, playing the games and paying players prorated salaries results in more incremental revenue per game for owners than skipping the season.”
So if “everyone knew they were going to lose money” why was Craig saying that they “might” lose money? How is Craig so sure that the owners wouldn’t lose $4bn in an 82-game season (the proposal he was discussing), given that we now know with relative certainty (based on statements made to shareholders, which would violate federal law if fabricated, and the Braves’ public books) that they lost about $3bn over a 60-game season? Presumably you can do algebra… the numbers are pretty close to what the owners said all along.
This argument makes zero sense, and never made any sense, unless you believe that the rapacious lying colluding owners were leaving hundreds of millions — if not billions — of dollars on the table (plus facing a grievance that could cost them billions more) for no reason at all by pushing for a shorter season. That is an internally inconsistent argument to make: either they aren’t greedy, or else they weren’t leaving money on the table. There are no other plausible conclusions.
We now know that they weren’t leaving money on the table: per Craig’s own recent analysis (which is once again skewed against the owners, as numerous commenters pointed out yet again), the Braves did not generate any profit during the regular season, despite being one of the most exciting and competitive teams in the league.
So Craig was wrong in the thing he was “certain” about. It’s not arguable: playing more games would not have increased revenues for the owners, which is
probablydefinitely why they didn’t want to do it. And that’s why no one is *currently* arguing that, either. Everyone just wants to pretend they didn’t say the things they said only a few months ago.“things will probably be back to normal in March 2022, unless a totally new pandemic starts”
That literally goes against what every pandemic headline seems to be saying….
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/health/back-to-normal-bias-wellness/index.html
If you want to make a wager on that, watch on Bovada, they may have bets like that available soon.
Counting releases, declined minors assignments, and declined options on top of non-tenders there are 190 who were cut loose. That averages to a bit over six per team. A quarter of the 25 man roster.
Yes, a lot would’ve been cut loose because of 40-man roster management. But it is on top of 130 free agents.
I don’t think a typical year ends with 330 players floating around, playing musical chairs.
Joe Buck has already claimed Schwarber off of waivers
Hopefully they left Rodon at a no kill shelter.
Based on this: https://twitter.com/Feinsand/status/1334320099759689728?s=20 it would seem that this wasn’t nearly as bad as many of the doomsday reporters said it’d be.
Hi. Can anyone explain why the Dodgers felt they needed to acquire and then tender Knebel when the Brewers had decided not to?
The most reasonable interpretations seem to be:
1) the Dodgers felt Knebel was so desirable that didn’t want to face competition from other teams in free agency
2) another team was prepared to acquire/tender
Do we know what their thought process might have been?
Unless that was a significant PTBNL, probably #1.