Freddie Freeman Joins the Los Angeles Galacticos

Freddie Freeman went out on top in 2021, riding in a parade through Atlanta as the unquestioned leader of a franchise he’d taken to World Series glory. He’s coming into 2022 on top, but in a different way. This time, he’s headed to Los Angeles as the newest member of a team he beat in the playoffs last year. But more importantly, he’s doing it with $162 million:
BREAKING: Freddie Freeman has agreed to terms with the Dodgers on a six-year, $162 million deal according to @JeffPassan and me.
— Kiley McDaniel (@kileymcd) March 17, 2022
With this signing, the Dodgers are taking another crack at what they briefly built midway through last season: an offense with an All-Star at every position, the kind of team that doesn’t just have depth but also enviable breadth. Cody Bellinger? He’ll likely bat eighth. Will Smith? He’ll be the most overqualified six hole hitter in the game.
It feels like too much. It feels like overkill. But that’s because we’ve all become accustomed to a style of team-building focused on risk mitigation. Have the best team in baseball? Recent orthodoxy would tell you to consolidate your gains and focus on signing one of your stars to an extension, or fortify your minor league system to help develop the next crop of stars. It’s a popular method because it works; no less a team than the Dodgers showed the benefits of this strategy as they built a powerhouse throughout the middle of the last decade.
For the past several years, though, the Dodgers have been doing something different, supplementing their home-grown talent by adding stars in free agency and trade, creating essentially two cores: one of Dodgers who came up in the system, and another of talented superstars acquired from elsewhere.
Mookie Betts jump-started the process, and while he was acquired in trade, the reason he was available was that he and the Red Sox couldn’t come to an agreement on an extension. Before last season, they signed Trevor Bauer to a three-year deal that went sour more or less immediately when he was placed on administrative leave as part of an investigation into allegations of sexual assault. That didn’t stop them – they traded for Max Scherzer and Trea Turner at the deadline. Now, they’re adding Freeman to that mix.
The Dodgers might not consistently spend this much, but for the past two years, they’ve stopped treating the Competitive Balance Tax as a binding ceiling, a decision that makes plenty of sense given their gargantuan local TV revenues. Their final payroll came in at $277 million last year. It’ll likely be in a similar range this year – $272 million as of today, though there are still players to be signed and a possible Bauer suspension to consider. That’s before counting non-payroll expenses, which will push their tax number higher.
While it might seem like too much on the surface, like spending money for the sake of spending it, there’s a clear method to their thinking. The Dodgers are trying to build a team for all seasons, and Freeman and Betts make a lot of sense as long-term pillars of that goal. The current Dodgers will run out one of the best lineups in baseball history, but that will likely only last a year. Justin Turner has this season and a team option for next year left on his contract, and at 37 he’s getting close to the end of the road. Max Muncy has two years left on his extension. Bellinger will be a free agent after 2023. Trea Turner could leave after this year.
Could the Dodgers re-sign every one of those players? They could, but I don’t think it’s likely. They have prospects coming up who will inevitably replace some of those names, and while they’ll surely make a push to keep Trea Turner on the team, it’s hardly a given that he’ll stay. If you take a longer perspective, Freeman is a nice luxury this year — and then a key cog if the team loses players elsewhere in the next two.
With Freeman in the fold, they’ll be insulated somewhat from any future departures. Oh, they probably would have been fine anyway – they’re quite good at generating the aforementioned home-grown talent, and already had Betts, Smith, and Chris Taylor on long-term deals. But you know what sounds better than Betts, Smith, and Taylor? Betts, Smith, Taylor, and Freeman.
If there’s one player who should feel left out in the cold by this move, it’s Gavin Lux. The former top prospect never really found a role in 2021; the Turner/Scherzer trade limited his opportunities at second base, and he played more games as an injury fill-in at shortstop than anywhere else. With Seager gone and a DH added, this was the year that at-bats were supposed to flow like wine. With Freeman and Muncy occupying first and DH, though, Lux’s role is shrinking. Is he a utility infielder? A platoon left fielder or second baseman who plays against righties? We’ll see what the team does with him, but he could be a potential casualty of building for tomorrow today.
Most likely, they’ll find a place to shoehorn Lux in and give him another chance to hit at the big league level. There will be spots opening up in LA’s lineup soon – AJ Pollock’s contract is up after next year, Justin Turner can’t play third base forever, and who knows what will happen to Bellinger going forward. There will be starts and at-bats available for Lux, with or without Freeman anchoring first base for the foreseeable future.
Freeman should fit in well in the Dodgers lineup, but that would probably be the case on any team he joined. Over the past five years, he’s been the best first baseman in the game, and while he’s 32 now, his most recent season hardly showed signs of a slowdown. Long-term deals always involve planning for player decline, but there’s a secret benefit to signing someone like Freeman: there’s plenty of room for him to decline and still be useful.
How does that look when phrased in the form of a median projection? Like an All-Star with a gentle decline:
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | .293 | .381 | .530 | 566 | 103 | 166 | 31 | 2 | 33 | 101 | 76 | 6 | 143 | 3 | 4.7 |
| 2023 | .288 | .375 | .515 | 542 | 95 | 156 | 32 | 2 | 29 | 93 | 71 | 6 | 137 | 2 | 4.0 |
| 2024 | .283 | .368 | .491 | 515 | 86 | 146 | 28 | 2 | 25 | 83 | 64 | 5 | 129 | 2 | 3.3 |
| 2025 | .280 | .360 | .475 | 486 | 78 | 136 | 25 | 2 | 22 | 75 | 57 | 5 | 123 | 2 | 2.6 |
| 2026 | .274 | .348 | .449 | 457 | 68 | 125 | 22 | 2 | 18 | 65 | 48 | 4 | 113 | 1 | 1.7 |
| 2027 | .266 | .335 | .416 | 425 | 59 | 113 | 18 | 2 | 14 | 55 | 40 | 3 | 101 | 0 | 0.8 |
Because I think this deal has a lot to do with building for the present and future at the same time, I also had Dan Szymborski run a custom projection: a percentile-based distribution of outcomes for Freeman’s 2025 season. That’s not something ZiPS was designed for, but after a little tinkering, Dan produced an answer to my strange question. It doesn’t take a baseball analyst to tell you that Freeman will be good this year, but looking at the later years of his contract for variance helps explain how he might fit on the team over time:
| Percentile | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SB | OPS+ | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 90% | .324 | .416 | .602 | 472 | 87 | 153 | 33 | 4 | 30 | 96 | 71 | 11 | 170 | 5.9 |
| 80% | .305 | .393 | .556 | 478 | 84 | 146 | 30 | 3 | 28 | 89 | 65 | 8 | 152 | 4.6 |
| 70% | .295 | .380 | .518 | 481 | 82 | 142 | 28 | 2 | 25 | 83 | 62 | 7 | 139 | 3.8 |
| 60% | .287 | .369 | .498 | 484 | 81 | 139 | 26 | 2 | 24 | 79 | 59 | 5 | 131 | 3.1 |
| 50% | .280 | .360 | .475 | 486 | 78 | 136 | 25 | 2 | 22 | 75 | 57 | 5 | 123 | 2.6 |
| 40% | .273 | .351 | .457 | 488 | 76 | 133 | 23 | 2 | 21 | 71 | 55 | 4 | 116 | 2.1 |
| 30% | .265 | .342 | .429 | 490 | 74 | 130 | 21 | 1 | 19 | 67 | 53 | 3 | 107 | 1.4 |
| 20% | .258 | .333 | .415 | 492 | 73 | 127 | 21 | 1 | 18 | 65 | 51 | 2 | 100 | 1.1 |
| 10% | .244 | .315 | .375 | 496 | 69 | 121 | 18 | 1 | 15 | 58 | 47 | 1 | 85 | 0.0 |
Will the 2025 Dodgers hate having a league-average first baseman? They’d probably be okay with it, and that’s if Freeman ages somewhat poorly. A 30th-percentile outcome would still produce an above-average batting line. Long-term deals are supposed to be risky – that’s one of the big knocks on them – but with a universal DH and a high talent-level starting point, I don’t think Freeman’s deal carries a particularly high degree of risk. The worst-case scenario is probably injury-related, but he’s been quite durable and plays a position that minimizes wear and tear. Not only that, but he and Muncy can alternate at first and DH as necessary. That’s not to say there’s no risk – there’s always risk – but I don’t view it as being particularly high.
From Freeman’s standpoint, the Dodgers must have seemed like a compelling destination. Sure, he likely preferred Atlanta – he said as much during last season’s playoff run. But he and the Braves didn’t come to an agreement, and the Dodgers’ pitch is straightforward. “Come play for the best team in baseball,” they surely said. “Come play where you grew up.” (Freeman is a native of Orange County.) “Six years? Not a problem. We’ll be good every one of those years.” In addition to being the best team to make an offer, the Dodgers apparently offered the most money, though state taxes make an exact comparison difficult.
It’s telling to me that I find the strategic implications of this signing to be its most compelling aspect. There’s no point in asking what the Dodgers see in Freeman – it’s obvious. Do you like middle-of-the-order lefties who rarely strike out, walk a ton, and hit for both power and average? Do you like it when they post a wRC+ higher than 130 for nine straight seasons? Do you like Statcast pages that are just a sea of red?

Even ignoring the measurables, Freeman is a satisfying player to watch. When people assert that line drive rate is skill and not just luck, Freeman is who they point to. He squares up everything – he has a career 27.5% line drive rate, comically higher than the league average. He hits everything hard, and never pops up. He doesn’t strike out very often – he doesn’t even swing and miss very often these days. He chases fewer pitches out of the zone than average despite being one of the most aggressive hitters in the game when opponents are foolish enough to venture into the strike zone.
The market for first basemen isn’t what it once was, and the market for players over 30 is a veritable ghost town compared to 20 years ago. It’s hard to imagine another first baseman signing a deal like this anytime soon now that Matt Olson is locked up long-term. You have to be a unicorn to get a six-year deal as a 32-year-old first baseman, and Freddie Freeman is a unicorn.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Lux will get plenty of at bats. Dodgers move players all over the diamond regularly. Injuries will happen, and 162 games is a long season.
I expect that there will be a rotation through the DH spot.
One other reason to build in re bats: they had three critical at bats in a half inning featuring in the play-offs last year featuring Stephen Souza, and Albert Pujols. (Mookie was the third.)
To be fair, the Albert Pujols situation was their own fault.
How was the Souza situation not their fault? Pujols showed up a lot more in the postseason because Muncy went down in game 162.
Its more the opposite. Souza only played because Muncy was hurt. Pujols was getting regular use against LHP at which he was quite useful all season for the Dodgers, though it also got him some PA vs RHP in Muncy’s absence that was not ideal
Just came here to say I like the new team name. It feels true. It wasn’t too long ago that it was the Yankees who gave that very impression.
Look at those big ol dentures lol
He paid a lot for those fake teeth …..but he can afford it.
Depth of stars team building model. This is how a big market franchise should operate.
This is just as boring as when the Yankees did it. Of course they outbid everyone else on a 32 year old first baseman. Why wouldn’t they?
On an ideological level, I don’t like the luxury tax, but at a practical level I shudder to think what the Dodgers would do without it.
Another way of putting it–I don’t think Ben has this one right. The story isn’t that Freeman might provide firepower in in 2023, 2024, or 2025, although he probably will at the beginning and has a decent chance of doing it later too. The story is that if he hits the median or does worse, the Dodgers aren’t concerned about the consequences.
If Freeman hits the median, the contract will pay off for the Dodgers. They will have paid roughly market rate for his services.
ZiPS projects median Freeman to be worth 17.1 WAR over 6 years. Ben Clemens calculated $/WAR, 2+ Projected WAR Players to be $8.5 M/WAR for 2022, down from the high of $9.5 M/WAR in 2020. Effectively, the Dodgers are paying $162 M, divide it by 17.1, and you have the Dodgers paying $9.47 M/WAR for Freddie Freeman. Higher than the average for the year so far, but Kris Bryant’s contract hadn’t been signed yet.
Effectively, the Dodgers are paying $27 M/year, which projects to be 11% of the Dodger payroll this year. Even if Freeman is worth nothing in year 6 of the contract, they can in all likelihood afford the hit, since the payroll tax ceiling will rise. It’s not that the Dodgers aren’t concerned about the consequences; they are. The consequences are just within their margin for error.
Agree on the ideological vs practical feelings about the CBT.
The Dodgers or Mets are going to have a 40 man payroll about 5 times as big as the Pirates. Their 26 man opening day payroll might be 6 or 7 times as big. Now, that’s nobody’s fault but Bob Nuttings, but no other North American league allows that to happen. And it isn’t just the Pirates. There could be four or five teams under the NHL salary floor of $60M when games start in a few weeks.
Pirates, Guardians, and A’s are all possibilities–the A’s at $60M but Manaea is definitely a goner and probably Montas too.
Per roster resource, the O’s are at $64M, the Marlins are at $71M, and the Rays are at $86M. Of those, the only one that might go down are the Rays, and they’ve got a ways to go to get below $60M.
I do think the people who insisted that the Guardians were definitely going to spend this time probably need to wonder about why they were wrong about this one. Their salary is higher than it was last year, by $1M, but that’s mostly due to the rise in minimum salaries. It’s possible they’ll top $60M if they sign one of Pham / Soler to play right field, plus maybe a pitcher or two.
Depends on your source. Spotrac and Cots have some of those teams substantially lower.
But whatever the source, the main point stands. No other North American league allows one team to spend half what another does and MLB allows them to spend MUCH less than that.
this all reminds me of how Bowie Kuhn nix’d the sale/quasi-trades of Vida Blue first to the Yankees then later to the Redd. Charlie Finley also tried to sell, my memory is a vague blender so forgive if I don’t remember it exactly, Joe Rudi & Catfish Hunter to the BoSox.
The logic was it would deplete the A’s into bottom tier team while moving top tier teams with all the cash. Basically the competitive balance. How times have changed and the game has evolved from those mid-70s league politics.
I’m life long Dodger fan but I can’t say I really like this. It will be fun to watch for sure, still it would be more fun with more spending balance. Of course those so-called small market teams should be doing more to compete. Do hoping things evolve again so playing 162 games to take 12/14 teams to post season is entertaining.
“Small market teams should be doing more to compete” – what do you want them to do, create a bigger market?
This move by the Dodgers is a microcosm of what keeps small market teams from competing.
I don’t know, maybe the small market teams should spend their revenue sharing money and compete like the Brewers, Reds, and Royals have done in this past decade. Those are the smallest markets in MLB, and they rank 16th, 20th, and 22nd in payroll this year. The Brewers have been in playoffs the past four years. In 2015, the Royals were 16th in MLB in payroll and won the World Series.
Nothing is keeping the small market teams from competing. They’re doing just fine, when they want to compete.
You can probably drop the Reds from this list, but, the main point is absolutely correct. & really you should add St. Louis to it. That’s a small market team that is successful.
THAT is the way you build a franchise. Smart management, competitive for going on 30 years now (last time below .500 2 straight years? 1994-95 Last 90 loss season? 1990). & guess what?? They’ve built a solid following with good attendance & good TV ratings, because they put out a good product. & that allows them to spend $$ above their weight.
What a novel idea.
PS- I’m not a Cardinal fan, but, as a fan of baseball, I can’t help but admire how they operate.
RaiderJoe?
“The Dodgers or Mets are going to have a 40 man payroll about 5 times as big as the Pirates. Their 26 man opening day payroll might be 6 or 7 times as big.”
Of course, I fault the Pirates for that (and their miserly brethren) more for that than I do the Dodgers or Mets…
Weirdly, your comment feels like a backhand swipe at player salaries, though I know from your other posts that it isn’t intended as such.
There are plenty of teams that could have made a competitive bid. They chose not to, just like they chose not to compete with the Yankees payrolls in the early/mid-2000’s.
In all honesty, I wish the Dodgers or the Mets would just decide to completely corner the free agent market for a few years in a row as a giant middle finger to every other team. Maybe the shame of being seen as poor relatives would convince the miserly to start spending real dollars to be competitive as opposed to pro forma “competitive”.
I think the one counterpoint to this general idea is that some other teams do occasionally spend big on free agents but do so extremely unwisely. This might be what’s just happened with Kris Bryant and the Rockies, for more money than Freeman’s deal right?
The FG coverage on it listed some other poorly made big dollar contracts.
So while I agree with the overall sentiment — it’s not entertaining to see teams not try at all — I think the other great problem is that some front offices and ownerships just don’t have a clue. I think a big part of it is the mess of CBA rules that keep most players off market til after their primes (it’s so much easier to come up with a good large contract for a youngish talent in their prime than someone who is in decline).
And finally, yes, let the high rollers spend big and hopefully shame the others into spending more. Either way, pay the players
It’s primarily a revenue sharing problem. Most North American sports leagues don’t have this problem because TV revenues are centralized. TV revenues in MLB are very decentralized, so splitting them is misery, and you’ve got some teams with 5x-10x times the resources of the others. And at this point, with teams owning their own networks, it’s going to be hard to do more. Especially since the players union has decided, quite incorrectly, that revenue sharing is keeping teams from spending rather than giving them the resources to do so.
I’m not one of your downvoters, for what it’s worth, and it’s a valid point that you make, but when teams go year after year after year without spending any of that money and crying poor…well, I have a hard time feeling sorry for billionaires that can’t keep up with billionaires. When guys like Veeck still owned teams, I might say otherwise, but ownership doesn’t work like that anymore. If they can’t keep up, they should be made to give up ownership to those who can.
He has valid points, although I get uncomfortable when some fans (not necessarily the OP’s whose views I don’t really know) immediately want to embrace an NFL-style approach in MLB. I don’t know how many times I’ve seen fans use the false equivalancy that a hard cap/full revenue sharing is why the NFL is more popular than MLB because it has more parity. It has payroll parity; it doesn’t necessarily have competitive parity.
A counter-intuitive view is the NFL, MLB and NBA are three different sports and have different approaches to salary caps based on their revenue and development models. The NBA’s salary cap is more leaky than MLB’s, but they seem to be thriving and growing, in some ways because they have a leaky salary cap. Maybe each has figured out a model that works for their different sports. The NFL really is a national sport that plays 16 regular season games and has a showpiece event to crown it’s champion. National TV contracts work for them. MLB can’t compete with that. I love baseball more than any other sport, but even I will watch NFL Sunday football with teams all over the country.
As I noted below, the Dodgers let their own home-grown star leave and sign elsewhere for $325MM. They replaced his lefty bat with Freeman at half the total cost. That’s not buying everybody. That’s redirecting resources. It was a smart move. The Braves absolutely could have kept Freeman. The chose not to. The Boston Red Sox traded away their generational home-grown player in Mookie Betts because of the CBT. The Yankees payroll in 2021 was basically the same as it was 15 years earlier, meaning it’s vastly less as they pocket their skyrocketing revenue. The “Yankees tax”, as the CBT was originally known, has worked as it was designed to, at least with teams like the Yankees and Red Sox. They’ll spend, go over, then retreat. It has served as a breaking mechanism.
Increased revenue sharing most likely means Nutting and Castellini will simply be pocketing additional revenue from the other markets.
NBA ratings and attendance are down 50%. The NBA is in deep cack for reasons that aren’t entirely apparent to me.
“NBA attendance is down 50%” is unequivocally, categorically false. Attendance peaked at an average of 17,884 per game in 2016-17 and is averaging 16,744 per game this year as of right this moment. Down, to be sure, but down by just 6.3% – nowhere near 50%. Were you looking at the pandemic year or some such?
Also, TV ratings are also off of their peak in 2015-16 but are up slightly in 2021-22 compared to last year – down quite a bit from peak but not by 50%. *NBA Finals* ratings cratered in the pandemic-ravaged 2020 season but bumped up a bit in 2021. Still down enormously compared to their peak (over 50% in fact) in 1998, MJ’s last of six finals appearances.
The issue is that people conflate the problem of the Pirates / Marlins / A’s / Guardians with that of the Brewers / Twins / Royals / Rockies. There are plenty of teams that would run payrolls close to $200M if they could. And so would a lot of mid-market teams, like the Mariners and Cardinals (although the Cardinals’ market is both small and medium sized depending on how you look at it).
I think people use revenue sharing woes as a pretext to cover for the fact that a lot of these teams are just VERY VERY poorly managed in every aspect. We’d be better off with a league of 30 Liberty Media owned teams than what we have now, and people don’t like that thought
I mean, friend, the issue isnt that revenue sharing is keeping teams from spending, but rather that we’re seeing demonstrations that it doesn’t do anything at all, as teams can just pocket the money. They also wouldn’t spend with revenue sharing. The issue is that many owners would rather maximize profitability than the quality of their teams on the field, to the extent of spending less on salary than their revenue sharing payment in the first place.
That’s the issue MLBPA has targetted, and it’s spot on correct. The issue is that profitability and on-field success are decoupled, and until they are more closely related, there’s nothing that will make those teams invest in players. You can have NFL style centralized revenue sharing of all TV revenues, and the Marlins and the like will *still not spend money* until you either force them to with a floor, or in some way tie their team profitability to their on-field performance. Until you do that, increasing revenue sharing just makes their current behavior *even more profitable*.
Excellent analysis
Lux could be the centerpiece of a trade for a trade for somebody like Montas.
This is a team that was giving key at bats to Albert Pujols at the end of last season and in the postseason. They’re far from invincible and it seems like they recognized the need to give themselves a boost.
Wait, is Muncy not going to be the second baseman? Wasn’t that the whole reason he was recruiting Freeman? I can’t imagine he’ll be thrilled being a full time DH.
the Dodgers treat positions as fungible
We’ll see if his elbow allows him to be the full-time second baseman. I know he’s said it’s fine but it’s a long season, and one way to make sure he doesn’t break again while keeping his bat in the lineup is to plug him in at DH part of the time.
There’s no way that Muncy is the “full time” 2B. I expect per 10 games he will DH 4, play 1B once, and 2B 3-4 times.
DH will be split most with Justin Turner and Muncy with Pollock and Freeman next in line.
It will take a massive change in attitude and approach for Freeman to be ok with not playing 1B once every ten games. That’s not how the dude’s wired.
If shifting goes away, he’s no longer playable at second base. He might play some third when J. Turner DH’s.
Given that Atlanta’s offer was basically the same dollar amount over 1 fewer year I think it’s obvious Freddie didn’t want to stay in Atlanta, which he earned the right to do. The Braves will be better off with a 28 year old signed long term anyway. No losers here …..unless Freddie or Matt crater, which isn’t likely.
The report I see is that they offered $135m. That is not the same. You can’t just take the AAV and call it the same. Freeman wouldn’t be likely to recoup that extra $27 in his late 30s. It’s possible he ages like Nelson Cruz, but not likely. That year can’t just be hand waved away.
Heyman says 5/140, but pretty similar to 135.
To be fair, one extra year at the same rate is a boatload of money. If someone offered me a 15% more money to move across the country I would certainly consider it, even if I already had a lot of it.
I think the more interesting take on this is that by going to the Dodgers instead of taking the Braves’ offer, he’s giving up 10-5 rights.
I’m not sure the order of magnitude of star players’ earnings is comprehensible to the average FanGraphs commenter
At risk of being that guy, his net income is probably similar with either contract even with the extra year in LA. He’s going from playing 90ish games a year in states without an income tax (Atl, Miami, plus years with road trips to TB, Hou, Tex, and Sea) to 12ish. Paying 12.5% on an extra 80 games a year will eat into that 6th year salary in a hurry.
There is little evidence that athletes making tens or hundreds of millions of dollars care about state taxes any more than any number of other non-baseball factors. I feel like it is thrown out for some reason by writers because other writers have also said it. Players seem to care about the number. That is the contract amount. That shows them how the team values them. That seems to be overwhelmingly what they care about.
Maybe they do, maybe they don’t, but it’s an empirical fact that impacts net earnings. The more likely argument is that agents don’t care since they get a percentage of gross earnings which isn’t impacted by the location where the player signs.
When Shaq first signed with the Lakers he spoke specifically about the Magic’s offer being more money because of taxes. It’s certainly a consideration, even if they don’t talk about it.
But Shaq literally didn’t take the Magic’s offer. So I’m not sure how that shows anything.
Georgia has a state income tax, though its 5.75% top rate is way lower than California’s. That doesn’t change your basic point, just the size of the effect. Also, I’ve seen Twitter posts that a large portion of his salary will be deferred, significantly reducing the NPV.
I just saw that–apparently the net present value of the contract is…$140M. So that indicates to me that Freeman just overplayed his hand.
I have not seen any reports that the Braves came within $22 million of this deal in their total offer. Seeing a lot of people (especially at Braves fan sites) framing it this way, as if Freeman accepting this offer proves he wanted out. Occam’s Razor is he did want to stay, but he didn’t want it enough to forego more than $20 million in earnings.
Braves fan here (obviously), I see it as both parties doing the best with the circumstances they were given. The Braves, understandably, didn’t want to give a 32-year old six years, and went down a different avenue to address their need. Apparently the 6th year was important to Freddie, and the team from his hometown offered it to him, so why not take it? I will miss Freddie of course, but all of this makes perfect sense to me.
I was telling a friend earlier today that I’m at peace with this – winning a ring makes all of the other stuff look small. If we lost to the Dodgers in the NLCS, I’d probably be irate. Oh well, I’m human.
Correct, and especially after hearing his press conference today, where he revealed that the Braves FO had contacted him only twice after the end of the season, both times perfunctory check-ins, it’s starting to feel like Atlanta had this outcome in mind the entire time and pitched their offer to Freeman on the basis of what he would likely reject.
Unfortunately the Dodgers roster is way too well-balanced to really fit the Galacticos comp, but the ages do fit. Not that I dislike LA or free-spending teams generally, but from an entertainment perspective, I hope Tatis becomes baseball’s Ronaldinho and San Diego makes the old/expensive stars look ordinary.
That would be amazing
I’m neither a Braves nor Dodger fan, but I still think it’s unfortunate that the Braves couldn’t match the Dodgers offer. It’s clear Freeman wanted a 6th year, and the Braves decided that an 8-year deal for Olson through his age-35 season is better than an 6-year deal for Freeman through his age-37 season. They were willing to trade four prospects to make it happen, and that is part of the cost here. It’s not simply 8/168 vs. 6/162, it’s 8/168 AND four prospects (two who are global top 100) vs. 6/162. I’m not convinced that Freeman’s age 37 season won’t be more productive than Olson’s age 35. Freeman has a stronger track record and is building a potential HOF resume here, I believe his swing will age better, plus he’s already shown he can maintain production post age-30. This was a business transaction on both sides. I have no doubt Freddie wanted to return to Atlanta, but I also have no doubt he was fine going to play back in his home state. He wanted that sixth year and the Braves business side seemed to cap it at five. Was that worth it when factoring in his value to the Braves, the clubhouse, marketing, making him the next Chipper Jones? If not all of that, what about simply for the fans? This feels more like an opportunity lost, or misplayed, perhaps on both sides.
Beyond that, I’ve seen a lot of people criticizing the Dodgers “buying” another player. Well, let’s not lose sight of the fact that they let Corey Seager leave, their own player, who signed for $325MM. They replaced his very potent lefty bat with Freddie Freeman at $162MM, or approximately half of Seager’s deal. Freeman is not a SS, but he’s also more durable.
This was simply a smart decision, both baseball wise and business wise, by the Dodgers.
The Dodgers style right now remind me of those late-90’s to 00’s Yankee teams. It was always assumed whoever the top bat and arm was would wind up in pinstripes somehow.
But yeah, this does feel like too much. What the hell do they even need Freeman for? To beat teams by a score of 9 to 3 instead of 7-3? I feel like something unexpected will happen and this deal will impact the Dodgers in a bad way. Kinda like when you reach too close to the sun, you get burned.
Post-Integration first basemen through age-31, min 4500 PA, within ten points of FF in wRC+, twenty points in ISO, ten BsR, and neg. def runs:
Eddie Murray: 18.8 fWAR after age 31
Orlando Cepeda: 6.9 fWAR after age 31
Freddie Freeman: TBD
Rafael Palmeiro: 30.1* fWAR after age 31
Will Clark: 13.0 fWAR after age 31
Tony Perez: 20.1 fWAR after age 31
Boog Powell: 5.9 fWAR after age 31
Kent Hrbek: 3.8 fWAR after age 31
So a mixed bag. Best case is Palmeiro, with all necessary caveats. Then Perez and Murray, who turned into very good but rarely/never great players for a long time. Will Clark in the middle, and he would be higher if he had kept playing. Cepeda, Powell, and Hrbek as worst case bust scenarios on the type of deal he’s looking for. Group ave fWAR 14.1, median 13.0. The Dodgers are paying $11.5-12.5 million per war in that case, and taking a huge loss. He’d need to perform past Perez to justify the money, and concentrate that value into half the years.
You can’t just cherrypick seven players and find the average result and say “voila, here’s the value for Freeman.” User hughduffy, in a comment way up near the top, did some figuring and made a solid case for a much more attractive outcome for the Dodgers based on ZiPS which finds them paying less than $10 million per WAR, or right around where the final average should land for 2022 free agency.
Hrbek & Powell were both big guys who’s weight ballooned in their early 30’s. Cepeda hurt his knee, I think?
I don’t see Freeman as a close comp to Hrbek/Powell at all. He does remind me of Palmeiro as a player, but, as you note, no way to comp that one with Raffy’s roid use.
Great read on a great player, thanks
Wow turns out $57mm of the $162mm is deferred, which is rough. The accelerated FA timeline created by the lockout probably had a lot to do with it but it’s still wild how completely unprepared Freddie’s camp was for the Braves to move on.
Also makes it an even better deal for the Dodgers; they’re only paying FF $15mm the last 3 years of the contract which dramatically reduces the sting of those decline years.
This is going to be one of the best free agent deals ever, like Scherzer with the Nats caliber. Wild that more teams weren’t going after Freeman, especially with the DH in the NL.