Go Rate, and the Pursuit of Whatever’s Beyond Perfection

If you enjoyed last week’s Buntpalooza, you’re going to love this, because I’m making up new stats again.
Let’s start with Rickey Henderson. You probably know that in 1982, Rickey set a still-unchallenged single-season record of 130 stolen bases. Which is a lot. Of course it’s a lot; this was the highest-volume season by the best basestealer who ever lived. I just referred to him as “Rickey,” because he was so great he can go by his first name on first reference, like “LeBron” or “Tiger” or “Weird Al.”
Nevertheless, I worry that we don’t appreciate how extremely a lot 130 stolen bases is in one season. One way to look at it is in distance; 172 stolen base attempts (Rickey also got caught a league-high 42 times that year), at 90 feet each, constitutes almost three miles of ground covered. The man ran the best part of a 5K in stolen base attempts alone.
In 1982, Rickey registered 656 plate appearances and 143 hits, including 10 home runs and four triples. Let’s take those away, because you can’t steal a base after hitting a home run, and while you can theoretically steal a base after hitting a triple, come on, this isn’t the 1890s and you’re not Sliding Billy Hamilton. That leaves Rickey with 130 stolen bases on 129 hits that could’ve given him a chance to steal a base.
Baseball Reference is kind enough to count how many times a player reaches base in a given season. This is instructive for Rickey, because while he hit just .267 in his record-setting campaign, he led the majors in walks with 116, giving him an OBP of .398. We’re not just looking at hits, in short. B-Ref has Rickey with 274 times on base, including errors, in 1982. Subtract the 14 home runs and triples and you’re left with 260 of what I’ll call stolen base opportunities. That means Rickey was on base 260 times and attempted to steal almost two-thirds of the time: 66.1%, to be exact. From here on, I’ll be referring to this ratio as “Go Rate,” because I could not in good conscience devote any more time to thinking of a funny backronym like PECOTA or CORSI.
The weakness in go rate, which I’ll address up front, is that it doesn’t account for a number of scenarios in which a batter-runner could be in position to steal, or exclude scenarios in which he’s blocked. For instance, times on base doesn’t include instances of a batter reaching on a fielder’s choice with the base in front of him empty. Nor does it debit instances of the batter reaching, only to find the base in front of him occupied. For Rickey, that wasn’t always a problem, as Tony Phillips and Davey Lopes spent plenty of time at the bottom of Oakland’s lineup in 1982, thus inviting a double steal. But ordinarily, you don’t run if the base ahead already has someone standing on it.
If, for some reason, you remember my May article about Esteury Ruiz’s unusual on-base ability and unusually aggressive baserunning, you’ll recall that I went through his plate appearances one-by-one and weeded those cases out. For a few weeks’ worth of one player’s season, that’s feasible. But for the 379 position players who’d appeared in 50 or more games through this weekend, that’s a tall order. Generalities will have to do for now.
What makes the Rickey Henderson season so ridiculous is the combination of aggressiveness and volume of on-base opportunities; the man played 149 games, almost always hit leadoff, and was among the best on-base guys in the league. But two players this season are beating Rickey’s 1982 go rate, albeit in more limited opportunities:
| Name | Go Rate | SB% | SB Opp | SB | CS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Andrew Velazquez | .727 | 81.3 | 22 | 13 | 3 |
| Dairon Blanco | .697 | 78.3 | 33 | 18 | 5 |
| Esteury Ruiz | .519 | 85.3 | 131 | 58 | 10 |
| Jorge Mateo | .416 | 87.5 | 77 | 28 | 4 |
| Elly De La Cruz | .351 | 78.8 | 94 | 26 | 7 |
| Willi Castro | .340 | 86.1 | 106 | 31 | 5 |
| Bobby Witt Jr. | .327 | 80.4 | 156 | 41 | 10 |
| Jake McCarthy | .326 | 89.7 | 89 | 26 | 3 |
| Ronald Acuña Jr. | .315 | 84.2 | 241 | 64 | 12 |
| José Caballero | .315 | 89.3 | 89 | 25 | 3 |
Minimum 50 Games
Through 9/10
Between this and his appearance atop the bunt leaderboard, Velazquez has to be the most John McGraw player in the league right now. Sixteen stolen base attempts out of 22 opportunities is a ridiculous number. If there weren’t a pitch clock in place, a pitcher could just hold the ball and wait for Velasquez to get bored and take off for second.
(And because Velazquez only had 94 plate appearances when I made this chart, I went back and counted manually every time he reached base with the bag in front of him unoccupied: Eight walks, seven singles, three fielder’s choices, two doubles, and a strikeout/wild pitch, for 21 total opportunities. So the stolen base opportunities column might not be accurate down to the last decimal, but it’ll get us in the proverbial ballpark.)
What I love about Velazquez on this list is the fact that he isn’t even a particularly good basestealer or even a runner. He’s perfectly fine in both cases — 77th percentile sprint speed and a 13-for-16 success rate that’s just a tick over the league average — but little about Velazquez’s game suggests that he should be running the bases like Vince Coleman after three Red Bulls.
Blanco, the next player up, makes a little more sense; he’s got 100th percentile speed, which is the good stuff. That’s some Bobby Witt Jr., Corbin Carroll, Elly De La Cruz action. Of course this guy should be running all over the place even if 18-for-23 (and 19-for-24 for his career) isn’t a standout steal rate. Blanco’s position here brings back memories of the absurd team speed the mid-2010s Royals had; Lorenzo Cain was the third-fastest outfielder on the playoff roster. Or the 1980 Royals, who had Frank White and Amos Otis, and also Willie Wilson, who stole as many bases as White and Otis put together.
At the other terminus of the Johnny Damon Highway comes the first high-volume outlier: Ruiz, who’s attempted 68 steals out of 131 opportunities, which is an absurd go rate of .519. As we get out of the top four, the gaps on the leaderboard start to calm down, and it becomes clear that a go rate in the neighborhood of .300 signifies an aggressive basestealer. Just as in Kansas City, there’s something in the water in Oakland’s outfield: not just Henderson, but Rajai Davis and Coco Crisp. Even Starling Marte went 25-for-27 on stolen base attempts in the 56 games he spent in green.
Not to beat the same dead horse about Ruiz, but I’m so happy he’s doing this. The A’s are on their way out of town; the team might lose 110 games. Ruiz was the big shiny offseason acquisition in a three-way trade that delivered All-Stars to multiple National League contenders; Ruiz, at this point, is kind of a poor man’s Marquis Grissom? A destitute man’s Starling Marte, perhaps.
Life is like Ozzie Albies hitting right-handed: It is short, and it is brutal. There are two ways you can go with that information. You could give up and phone it in, knowing none of it matters. Or you could decide that, because none of it matters, you might as well get your giggles in while you can. Why shouldn’t Ruiz run a go rate over .500 in high volume? What’s the worst that can happen? He gets caught? The A’s lose? Please.
In that spirit, let’s find the players who are committed to running no matter the results. These are the six players who are at least a full run below average in BsR and have a below-average SB%, and yet are in the top 100 in go rate:
| Name | BsR | Rank | Go Rate | Rank | SB% | Rank | SB | SBatt | SB Opp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Isiah Kiner-Falefa | -1.2 | 260 | .177 | 47 | 70.6 | 230 | 12 | 17 | 96 |
| Manuel Margot | -2.0 | 292 | .134 | 79 | 72.7 | 223 | 8 | 11 | 82 |
| George Springer | -1.4 | 269 | .129 | 86 | 79.2 | 177 | 19 | 24 | 186 |
| J.T. Realmuto | -1.9 | 289 | .127 | 87 | 76.5 | 192 | 13 | 17 | 134 |
| Ke’Bryan Hayes | -1.1 | 252 | .126 | 88 | 60.0 | 260 | 9 | 15 | 119 |
| Henry Davis | -1.4 | 268 | .117 | 98 | 42.9 | 300 | 3 | 7 | 60 |
Minimum 50 Games
Through 9/10
Realmuto’s a weird case, because last year he almost set the record for most stolen bases in a season without being caught. (Jon Berti, last season’s major league stolen base leader, very nearly made this list as well.) Chase Utley holds the record over a full season with 23; Realmuto was 21-for-21 last year when he got thrown out on his final stolen base attempt of the regular season in the Phillies’ 160th game of the year. Trea Turner is currently 26-for-26 in 2023; we’ll get to him in a minute. Conversely, Ke’Bryan Hayes and Henry Davis are having a horrendous time on the basepaths. It’s like all the stolen base luck in Pennsylvania rolled east.
Then there’s Springer, who at 19-for-24 is a rounding error below league average but is actually having one of the best basestealing years of his career. The biggest difference in Springer’s game since moving to Toronto three years ago is that he’s actually a decent percentage basestealer now; in seven seasons with the Astros he was 48-for-79, which is mystifyingly bad for a player as fast as Springer was in his youth. With the Blue Jays, he’s now 37-for-45, which is positively respectable. But as Leo Morgenstern wrote last week, speed isn’t everything when it comes to baserunning.
As you might expect, the top of the go rate leaderboard features lots of players who know what they’re doing. These players are in the top 100 in go rate, with a SB% of 90 or better and a BsR of 4.0 or better:
| Name | BsR | Rank | Go Rate | Rank | SB% | Rank | SB | SBatt | SB Opp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CJ Abrams | 8.9 | 3 | .314 | 11 | 93.2 | 83 | 41 | 44 | 140 |
| Corbin Carroll | 12.1 | 1 | .297 | 13 | 90.4 | 91 | 47 | 52 | 175 |
| Taylor Walls | 5.7 | 10 | .264 | 19 | 95.7 | 78 | 22 | 23 | 87 |
| Josh Lowe | 5.7 | 9 | .250 | 21 | 90.3 | 92 | 28 | 31 | 124 |
| Jarren Duran | 5.4 | 14 | .224 | 24 | 92.3 | 90 | 24 | 26 | 116 |
| Bryson Stott | 4.8 | 21 | .166 | 53 | 93.3 | 82 | 28 | 30 | 181 |
| Francisco Lindor | 5.7 | 11 | .162 | 58 | 92.9 | 84 | 26 | 28 | 173 |
| Trea Turner | 5.9 | 8 | .150 | 67 | 100.0 | 1 | 26 | 26 | 173 |
| Christian Yelich | 7.1 | 5 | .149 | 68 | 90.0 | 93 | 27 | 30 | 202 |
Minimum 50 Games
Through 9/10
These are the best baserunners, and the best high-volume basestealers, in the sport. And you know what? A few of them could stand to be a little more aggressive on the basepaths. Turner in particular. Obviously what he’s doing is impressive, potentially even record-setting. Utley is the most efficient basestealer of all time, and being more perfect than him is no small feat. More than that, Turner is in a lineup with a lot of guys who can drive you in from any base, so maybe he should be a little more conservative than someone like Ruiz.
But the number I keep coming back to with Turner is from 2012, his freshman year at NC State. That season, Turner stole 57 bases in 61 attempts in 63 games. Even Rickey Henderson would be impressed by that level of get-up-and-go.
The thing about 26-for-26, or even 30-for-30 if Turner gets there, is that I doubt Turner has chosen to run in the only favorable situations that presented themselves. At the risk of drawing a fraught comparison between division rivals, consider Acuña:
| Name | BsR | Go Rate | SB% | SB | SBatt | SB Opp | OBP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trea Turner | 5.9 | .150 | 100.0 | 26 | 26 | 173 | .319 |
| Ronald Acuña Jr. | 5.5 | .315 | 84.2 | 64 | 76 | 241 | .417 |
Here we have two of the best high-volume basestealers in the league. And because Phillies fans all learned the same lesson from Ted Lasso last month and turned Turner into Jimmie Foxx, both Acuña and Turner are both in the midst of special power-speed combo seasons as well.
Maybe this is an unfair question to ask, because it’s impossible to separate Acuña’s baserunning from his MVP-worthy campaign at the plate, but I’ll ask anyway: Which of these seasons are you going to remember five or 10 years from now?
From a baserunning perspective only, Turner is the one on pace to set a record, and he’s been a slightly better runner overall. But Acuña is doing something spectacular; he called his shot for 50-50, and while he won’t get there, 40-70 is in play and that’s not a bad consolation prize.
There’s something alluring about how in-your-face Acuña’s season is. (You’ll notice this chart is slightly out of date. That’s because Acuña tried to steal twice while I was writing this article.) He’s forcing the action more than all but a handful of baserunners. I think there’s an artistry to Turner’s (so far) perfect basestealing season, and nobody with half a brain would accuse him of being a boring player. But I want a player with his obvious gifts to be as aggressive as possible.
Stolen bases are more common this season than they’ve been in any year since 1997. Some of that has to do with the rule changes, which I supported in large part because they might lead to precisely this outcome. But it’s also because players like Ruiz and Acuña have decided to run like hell. That’s what I want from this sport: Aggressiveness, risk-taking, forcing the issue. Whether it’s smart or safe or not.
In 1982, Henderson not only stole more bases than anyone before or since, he also became the only player since the stat was recorded to be caught stealing 40 or more times in a season. Among players with 100 or more career attempts, Utley is no. 1 in SB%. Turner is fourth. Henderson is 51st. Only one of them is the consensus best basestealer of all time.
Efficiency is great. Perfection is even better. But sometimes perfection leaves you wanting more.
Michael is a writer at FanGraphs. Previously, he was a staff writer at The Ringer and D1Baseball, and his work has appeared at Grantland, Baseball Prospectus, The Atlantic, ESPN.com, and various ill-remembered Phillies blogs. Follow him on Twitter, if you must, @MichaelBaumann.
I love this article, but as I’m not getting any streaming services, I’m not sure what lesson to take from last month’s Ted Lasso.
No one can tell you or Apple will sue them for IP violations which appear in the fine text every time you click “accept.”
Baseball Reference already tracks “Stolen Base Opportunities”, which it defines as “a runner on first or second with the next base open”
Yep, and Terrence Gore was the first guy I looked up. 52 SB in 95 opps, 54.7% go rate. Rickey at 172/225 = 76.4% go rate in 1982 and 32.1% for his career!
Should also include if the score differential is greater than 4 runs
The last sentence of this piece is perfect (and, ironically, does *not* leave the reader wanting). Slow clap.
*Short, and brutally awesome.
One fine point on Velazquez is that six of his stolen bases came as a pinch runner.
Was getting ready to post about his pinch running too! But didn’t know it was 6. And they seemed against closer types with long windups.
Also, I’m wondering if Adalberto Mondesi has the highest go rate in Royals’ history, even with all the prototypical Royals you mentioned here.
This is sort of like the argument that prime Joey Votto should have swung more with runners on. Having a near .500 OBP is cool, but people tend to remember big HR & RBI totals more.
As the 90’s taught us… “Chicks [and everyone else] dig the long ball [and SB].”
I wonder how many slides Rickey did in his 172 SB attempts in 1982. If we assume 3.5 slides per attempt, that leads to 602 slides. That is a lot of wear on the body.
Rickey got me thinking, how many times in MLB history have they thrown out the back runner on a double steal negating the guys steal of third? It has to have happened.
Why would he average 3.5 slides per attempt? Surely it’s got to be a number slightly over 1 per attempt, accounting for slides on foul balls (which can’t add too much–they don’t happen on every attempt, and usually the runner can hear the call and abandons the attempt before sliding).
The best I recall, it wasn’t uncommon for pitchers to throw over several times whenever Rickey was in base. The guy was a walking disruption. I am not sure if 3.5 was correct, but I would definitely expect a sum greater than two.
Ah, I was thrown by “slide.” I would call those “dives.” I do think they are probably a little less hard on the body than using your legs or arms to suddenly decelerate from a full sprint, but still, point taken.
To be honest, I am not 100% sure that is what the author meant, but I was offering what I thought was a logical interpretation.
As far as “dives” go, or head first slides, repeated ones still batter and bruise your body. You still get scrapes, and the potential damage to your hands is increased. The ground is still hard, even if covered with a layer of sand. Not to mention the times the ball ticks off the firstbaseman’s mitt and plunks you.
That Rickey was able to avoid serious injuries during his record breaking season is an incredible feat in its own right in my opinion.
Yeah, when I wrote “slides” I meant dives/slides.
Having to dive into first base 3 times, only to be thrown out trying to steal second base would make most people a little shy about stealing. Or make them scream for vengeance and can’t wait to steal again.
This was a really terrific article. One of my favourites that I’ve read on the site this season. Great work, Michael!
Glad to see IKF there. With the Yankees seemingly managing five hits or less per game, the chances of in two or more hits in the same inning is slim. So even though he’s not particularly good, maybe they need any break they can get.
Why does BsR account for DPs? I don’t really get it. DPs seem like more of a hitting metric that penalizes you for hitting grounders with a runner on first. Yeah there is some element of speed to avoid a DP but if you are hitting grounders at 100+ mph even Acuna’s speed means nothing.
Yes this argument is a direct result of the tweet by Jeff Passan that said Freddie was just as good as Acuna at baserunning according to BsR. This sounded ridiculous to me, but it did prompt me to investigate what goes into calculating BsR.
Most balls hit 100mph, even on the ground, stand a better chance of becoming hits than balls hit slower than 100mph. 100mph double play opportunities are rarer than double play opportunities on 80mph ground balls because the fielders don’t get to them. That’s hitting value.
But sometimes someone does get to the ball. And depending on exactly where in the infield that 100mph ball goes, there are still plenty of double play opportunities that Acuña turns into a fielder’s choice but Eric Hosmer turns into a double play. That’s baserunning value.
So given that you’ve already benefited from hitting it 100mph, it seems fair that if you hit it 100mph straight at somebody so often that it leads to a notable number of extra double plays, there needs to be some way to account for that against you. This is unlikely; it’s more likely that hitting bouncers fielded on the baselines will turn into double plays. But it can happen. And it doesn’t really show up anywhere else. It happens to be in baserunning rather than hitting, but it doesn’t seem wrong exactly because of the overall effect of EV.
The overall effect of including wGDP may be that BsR rewards players who are fast and hit it softly more than players who are fast and hit it hard. But this is a relatively small difference that is dwarfed by WAR-contributing batting runs. Acuña may benefit from wGDP less than, say, Jarrod Dyson with the same number of at bats would have benefited from it. But the reason Dyson never got the same number of at bats is that he’s a much worse hitter, and the overall value of the hitting is higher than the value of this little bit of extra BsR.
I agree that you should detract from the total WAR value of a player who has a higher wGDP, but I still think it is more of a hitting metric than a base running metric.
A more accurate base running metric might account for exit velocity if it was actually trying to put a value on how fast someone gets to first out of the box. wGDP doesn’t do that though. So how does it accurately reflect how someone’s base running skills are reducing or increasing the percentage of DPs they hit into? It doesn’t. It doesn’t separate the hitting from the base running at all.
It could be that Acuna’s hard grounders and soft grounders are a total wash. I don’t know. My argument comes from people detracting from Acuna’s SB total by referencing BsR. So I use him as an example but I still think my argument about wGDP is valid.
The basic idea is that staying out of double plays with men on base is helpful. If you ground into a double play, that means one of two things:
1. A ground ball was hit hard at a fielder who was able to turn two.
2. A ground ball was hit slowly that was fielded, and the batter-runner was unable to beat out the throw.
In general, slower runners who hit ground balls will have more double plays. That said, some guys have more opportunities to hit into GDP, so BsR uses wGDP.
From the wGDP page:
Weighted Grounded into Double Play Runs (wGDP) is the number of runs above or below average a player has accumulated based on their ability to stay out of double plays. wGDP is based on how many double play opportunities a player arrives in and then how often they hit into a double play when those situations come up. wGDP gives players credit for not hitting into double plays no matter how they avoid them. If they run well out of the box, great. If they don’t hit grounders with men on first, that’s cool too.
For example, Luis Arraez has 17 GDP, good for 20th in MLB. However, his wGDP is -1.1, meaning he grounds into double plays more than average. Julio Rodriguez has 13 GDP, tied for 39th, but he has 0.3 wGDP, meaning he’s avoided more double plays than average.
Ronald Acuña Jr. hits into more double plays than average because he hits the ball hard more often than not, and unfortunately, right at fielders. His UBR is just slightly above average, because he doesn’t go first to third, he steals second and third. His steals a lot of bases and has been caught stealing the most.
Left-handed batters in general don’t hit into as many double plays, because if they pull a ground ball, it is to the second baseman, and it’s a lot closer from the left-handed batters box to first than the right-handed batters box. So wGDP generally favors LHH, and if you look at the leaderboards, the top is mostly LHH.
Is Freddie Freeman as valuable as Ronald Acuña Jr. at baserunning? No. But Freeman is sneaky valuable on the bases. He doesn’t ground into double plays, he takes the extra base, and he’s 30th in MLB among qualified batters in steals.
Thanks for the explanation. I did skip over all of that even though I do understand that it is wGDP and what that means. I still don’t get how it is a base running metric and not a hitting metric though. Like I say in my reply above I think it would more accurately reflect someones speed out of the box to first if it accounted for exit velocity or even if the player is left handed, like you said. It doesn’t though so unless I’m missing something and grounders tend to be a wash, which they might, then I still think it has more to do with hitting.
GDP hasn’t been a part of hitting metrics, partly because for hitting metrics, you either make an out or you don’t. We only care about what happens at the plate. Most hitting metrics over the years haven’t included GDP for that very reason.
Hitting and base running are both offensive metrics, so if we don’t include GDP in hitting metrics like wOBA, it will be in base running metrics.
I do think that wGDP does penalize batters who hit behind bad runners.
Judging quality or value of base running solely by BsR is the faulty argument.
Freeman also isn’t making any outs on the bases. He’s got 29 extra bases taken vs 22 for Acuña. He’s got 1 pickoff vs 7 for Acuña. He’s got 1 out made while baserunning vs 8 for Acuña. He’s not adding as much, but he’s subtracting a lot less.
Noting here that I get in the original question about wGDP these guys were just examples, not the central point. But I think it speaks to the other part of this: Acuña’s wGDP is probably flukishly high because he’s hit the ball hard right at guys more than would be expected, it’s certainly higher than it has been previously in his career. But it’s not the only thing dinging his BsR. And as examples these two are interesting: Freeman’s ability to make the right read as a baserunner, at least this season, has been better than Acuña’s. And when you set that next to the steals it ends up working out about equally.
Now what’s also interesting is the last two years are by some distance the best BsR run of Freeman’s career. Is it random? Did he just figure it out? Or is it something about the Dodgers’ baserunning philosophy/coaching vs Atlanta’s?
It’s not random. His BsR has increased from 2021-2023 because Freddie has been hitting second in the order more, and he had better baserunners in front of him on the Dodgers.
In 2021, when hitting second, Freddie had Ronald hitting in front of him, and Jorge Soler a few times. When hitting third, a mixture of Soler, Joc Pederson, Ozzie Albies, Dansby Swanson, and a few others were in front of him.
In 2022, Freddie had Mookie Betts or Trea Turner or both hitting in front of him. Both are great baserunners.
In 2023, Freddie had Mookie Betts in front of him for most games, with James Outman and David Peralta a handful of times.
Since 2021, Freddie’s:
UZR has decreased, 2.7 to 2.0 to 1.1.
wGDP has increased from 0.9 to 2.8 to 1.3.
wSB has increased from -0.3 to 0.6 to 1.8.
It’s hard to see this as being driven by much other than different runners in front of him, or maybe something the Dodgers are doing to avoid ground ball double plays. Because the Dodgers do avoid double plays more than other teams.
From 2021-2023, as a team, the Braves BsR is 19.3.
UBR is 16.6, wGDP is 0.9, wSB is 1.8.
From 2021-2023, as a team, the Dodgers BsR is 34.9.
UBR is 7.0, wGDP is 22.4, wSB is 5.5.