How Much Did the Astros Really Benefit from Sign-Stealing?
With the offseason moving at it’s now customarily glacial pace, the story that’s dominated the baseball headlines for the past week has been the Astros sign-stealing scandal. Since the first story was published by Ken Rosenthal and Evan Drellich at The Athletic last Tuesday, we’ve seen bits of evidence confirming the Astros strategy: a crude system of live monitors and a trash can to relay the incoming pitch type to the batter. On Friday, Rob Arthur of Baseball Prospectus provided audio evidence from the TV broadcasts, on which the whacking of the trash can can be identified and analyzed. Rosenthal and Drellich followed up their post with another revelation that the Astros were exploring different ways to electronically steal signs. And then there’s the video evidence pulled from the 2017 Astros World Series documentary showing a computer — sometimes a monitor, sometimes a laptop — in the tunnel leading to the dugout with a trash can nearby.
MLB is still conducting its own investigation, but the evidence that’s been dug up publicly is pretty damning. Sign-stealing has always been part of the game, but the Astros crossed the line when they began using electronic means to relay information in real-time. And this isn’t the first time they’ve been accused of baseball skullduggery of some sort. There’s little doubt that some form of punishment will be handed down by the commissioner’s office once MLB wraps up its investigation. The only question is how harsh will the penalties be; will it be a slap on the wrist, or will the hammer come down hard to deter other teams who are likely exploring other ways to use technology to steal signs.
Gamesmanship and various forms of cheating are as much a part of the fabric of baseball as the unwritten rulebook, all in an effort to gain an upper hand against your opponent. But how much of a benefit does sign-stealing give to a batter? Knowing what type of pitch is incoming gives the batter a distinct advantage — more information is far better than just guessing — but they still need to translate that information into action, whether its a swing or a take. Since we have plenty of data to analyze, can we measure the effect of sign-stealing on the outcome of a pitch, play, or game?
In 2016, the Astros’ home strikeout rate was 24.5%, the third-worst in baseball. The next year — the year they supposedly implemented their sign-stealing system — it plummeted to 16.7%, the best in baseball. While it may look related, it’s probably more coincidental. Their strikeout rate away from home also dropped by four and a half points and they’ve managed to keep their overall strikeout rate below 20% over the last three years. Besides, sign-stealing should have far broader effects than simply reducing a team’s strikeout rate. Knowing what type of pitch is coming should also help contact rates and, perhaps, produce more high-quality contact.
Digging into the Astros plate discipline stats helps us get a little more granular. Here’s a comparison of some key metrics at the team level in Minute Maid Park.
| Year | O-Swing% | Z-Contact% | SwStr% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 28.60% | 79.15% | 13.20% |
| 2017 | 27.80% | 85.85% | 9.50% |
| Change | -0.80% | 6.70% | -3.70% |
The Astros improved in all three of these plate discipline metrics from 2016 to 2017. They chased pitches out of the zone less often, they made contact on pitches in the zone more frequently, and swung and missed less often. Then again, Houston posted better marks in each of these three metrics on the road than at home in 2017.
The Astros roster had some pretty significant turnover between these two years. Could the difference in talent level explain their huge improvements in plate discipline? Five of the nine batters who accumulated the most plate appearances in 2016 carried over to the next season: George Springer, José Altuve, Carlos Correa, Marwin Gonzalez, and Evan Gattis. If we limit our data query to those five batters, we see similar results.
| Year | O-Swing% | Z-Contact% | SwStr% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 27.91% | 81.91% | 11.50% |
| 2017 | 27.45% | 86.51% | 9.41% |
| Change | -0.46% | 4.59% | -2.09% |
These five batters improved their plate discipline across the board. And when we compare their plate discipline on the road in 2017, they posted a better chase rate and swinging strike rate away from home. Only their zone contact rate was better at home in 2017 (86.5% at home, 85.7% on the road).
At a broad level, it’s hard to make any conclusive statements about the possible effects of the Astros sign-stealing. Travis Sawchik came to a similar conclusion in an article posted at FiveThirtyEight yesterday. But what these plate discipline metrics fail to capture is the true impact on a per-pitch level. The additional information provided by the thumping trash can definitely helps a batter make a decision about whether or not to swing. Would it result in higher quality contact and better takes on borderline pitches?
You’re probably already familiar with RE24 — the run expectancy based on the 24 base-out states. As part of his work on Baseball Savant, Tom Tango recently introduced RE288; that is, the run expectancy based on the base-out state and the plate count state. That gives us an easy way to calculate run values for any pitch thrown and then aggregate those run values to begin to analyze how a team, say, benefited from specific knowledge about the pitch being thrown. Knowing what is coming on the first pitch of an at-bat isn’t nearly as important as knowing what pitch is coming in a 3-2 count with runners on base.
I pulled pitch data from Baseball Savant for 2016 and 2017 and calculated run values for swings and takes against the three major pitch types: fastball, breaking ball, and offspeed. At a team level, here’s what we see:
| Year | Fastball | Breaking | Offspeed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swing Runs | |||
| 2016 | -83.52 | -61.36 | -15.12 |
| 2017 | -44.15 | -24.81 | -17.2 |
| Change | 39.37 | 36.55 | -2.08 |
| Take Runs | |||
| 2016 | 79.96 | 30.01 | 23.66 |
| 2017 | 75.23 | 43.46 | 21.25 |
| Change | -4.73 | 13.45 | -2.41 |
In 2017, the Astros massively improved their performance against both fastballs and breaking balls when playing at home, particularly when they swung at those pitch types. They also got better at watching breaking balls pass by. Their performance against offspeed pitches didn’t really budge, but I don’t think that tells us anything. Knowing whether a pitch is a fastball or a breaking ball is far more important because of the way those types of pitches move. If a fastball is signaled, the batter can gear up for heat and make sure they put a good swing on a relatively straight pitch. If a breaking ball is signaled, they can focus on the movement of the pitch to remove the deception it would otherwise create. If an offspeed pitch is signaled, the batter still has to recognize the speed of the pitch, battling their eyes and instincts that tell them a pitch that looks like a fastball was thrown.
I also calculated run values for swings and takes on pitches in and out of the zone. When paired with the plate discipline metrics above, their improvement in one single area comes into focus.
| Year | In Zone | Out of Zone |
|---|---|---|
| Swing Runs | ||
| 2016 | -53.8 | -77.82 |
| 2017 | 20.8 | -75.08 |
| Change | 74.6 | 2.74 |
| Take Runs | ||
| 2016 | -114.56 | 214.33 |
| 2017 | -107.37 | 214.99 |
| Change | 7.19 | 0.66 |
The Astros improved by nearly 75 runs when swinging at pitches in the zone in their home ballpark. We’d expect to see a big swing in run values given the Astros’ improved zone contact rate discussed above. The other three facets above also show improvements too.
What do these run values look like when we compare their 2017 home performance to their away performance?
| Year | Fastball | Breaking | Offspeed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swing Runs | |||
| 2017 – Home | -44.15 | -24.81 | -17.2 |
| 2017 – Away | 16.08 | -7.36 | -11.97 |
| Difference | -60.23 | -17.45 | -5.23 |
| Take Runs | |||
| 2017 – Home | 75.23 | 43.46 | 21.25 |
| 2017 – Away | 84.97 | 25.4 | 22.1 |
| Difference | -9.74 | 18.06 | -0.85 |
| Year | In Zone | Out of Zone |
|---|---|---|
| Swing Runs | ||
| 2017 – Home | 20.8 | -75.08 |
| 2017 – Away | 79.99 | -96.45 |
| Difference | -59.19 | 21.37 |
| Take Runs | ||
| 2017 – Home | -107.37 | 214.99 |
| 2017 – Away | -83.63 | 229.33 |
| Difference | -23.74 | -14.34 |
Well that certainly clouds our data. In almost every respect, the Astros performed better on the road than at home in 2017. The only aspects where they saw better results at home were when taking breaking balls and taking pitches out of the zone. They were around 20 runs better at home than on the road when they spit on a breaking ball or if the pitch was out of the zone. Considering all the data we’ve seen so far, that might be the one area where the Astros truly benefited from their sign-stealing system, and it earned them maybe a couple of extra wins in 2017.
There are so many factors at play, it’s nearly impossible to isolate the effects the Astros’ sign-stealing had on their performance. The fact that they continued to use this scheme throughout the year tells me they found some benefit, even if it’s hard to determine exactly what it was from the data. In the end, the Astros improved across the board in 2017, leading to their first World Series in franchise history. That championship was fueled by new talent, player development, and possibly cheating. It’s likely some combination of the three, and the data is murky enough to leave it at that for now.
Jake Mailhot is a contributor to FanGraphs. A long-suffering Mariners fan, he also writes about them for Lookout Landing. Follow him on BlueSky @jakemailhot.
A lot of people bring up the BB/K stat, which is fair, but what’s interesting to it for me is that Brantley, Altuve and Gurriel have all never struck out over 90 times a season, and Bregman has historically been an above-average OBP bat. It’s not to say they’d be the same, but it’s an interesting thought to me with walks/strikeout measurements since this is a squad somewhat known for good batting eyes.
Gurriel came up in the astros as did bregman…..they have good batting eyes because they know whats coming.
You can check Gurriel’s stats outside of the MLB. Gurriel has never struck out over 65 times in a season whether it was the MLB, CNS or NPB. Similarly, Bregman has had high OBp and walk rates in every level of ball he’s played in.
I’m glad to see fangraphs diving in to this.
A couple thoughts
1. We don’t really know they weren’t sign-stealing on the road so I’m not sure home-road splits are the best way to review this
2. There has been some reporting that only a subset of players participated. I would look at those we know are in the videos and look at just their performance like gattis, Beltran, Bergman etc
3. From the reporting I have read the process may started late in 2017. Is there a month by month review that can be done along the same lines ? Maybe the data becomes clearer in August and sept ?
It may also take some time to learn how to use signs and not everyone may be good at it.
But this puts a whole new shadow over “The Astros rarely chase sliders.” Well, we have a new explanation for that.
1. We don’t. But the method described so far, for stealing catcher signs, would be much more difficult to implement away as they wouldn’t have the camera already set up.
2. Without knowing who actually participated you cannot pick and choose which players to investigate just based on they played better, some participants may have played worse.
3. A month by month split would be interesting but we are then decreasing the sample size and the issue who who they played in the months comes into effect as that would impact expected performance.
We know a subset of who participated by viewing the videos
thats a great starting piont. When the investigation is done and all players are interviewed. They will know exactly who it was that used it.
I do agree that we don’t know when exactly the sign stealing started nor do we know when.
But man, can you imagine if they had a stealthy way steal signs on the road at the same time they were crudely the shit out of a trashcan for the whole world to hear?
they do…many inside spilling guts saying they were using bandages that vibrated sensors in them according to many in media.
That doesn’t explain how they would get the sign put down by the catcher in real time. They had CF camera setup in Houston, but wouldn’t have that setup at other ball parks.
The vibrating bandage part is still significant. It could explain how this might have continued even after regular season 2017, or in games where we can’t easily hear the banging. But it doesn’t suggest to me that they were using it in other ball parks.
exactly…lots of smoke about using vibrated bandages from inside mlb execs coming out. AStros used those in 18 and 19 on the road and at home.
Where is this being reported
https://www.reddit.com/r/baseball/comments/dm7jov/game_thread_world_series_game_2_nationals_1/f4yk70c/
well before it was actually announced. according to jomboy the astros have already figured out who the whistleblower was due to their obscure posting history on reddit and using that reddit account on company equipment
Joel Sherman of ny post is reporting that’s what he’s hearing coming from sources inside investigation linked to Ex Astros execs.
Phenomenal work, Jake.
It’s pretty wild to say “well, these things improved greatly at the same time as we definitely know they were cheating, but it’s probably a coincidence”. Really?
The video evidence clearly shows some pitchers and catchers realised something was going on. Any stats on what happened after batteries changed their signs?
Be better, Fangraphs. “wellll we can’t prove it made them better they really got better idk” really better not be the Fangraphs line (but I’ll wait until we get a full commentary piece later this week, hopefully).
Frankly, this type of analysis should be no consideration at all in MLB’s investigation.
These results do nothing but make the Astros look stupid.
It’s the same thing as the GOP’s defense of Trump: “Well, he tried to bribe a Ukrainian official with aid, but it didn’t work so he’s innocent of a crime.”
Just because the Astros weren’t all that successful doesn’t mean they weren’t breaking the rules.
Take away Altuve’s MVP.
after the investigation is finished, and if it comes out that he participated in the cheating. Absoultley he should be stripped of it, and banned for life from the game.
The per pitch analysis is really interesting, thanks Jake!
On the plate discipline improvement from 2016-2017, here is the Jeff Sullivan article from prior to the 2017 season about how the Astros were projected for the largest improvement in K% since 1950 (mentioned on Effectively Wild the other day): https://blogs.fangraphs.com/the-astros-have-a-completely-new-look/
So you’re saying Jeff Sullivan was in on this from the beginning?!
Just when you think you can’t hate the Astros any more than you already do…
Kinda gives that MLB commercial “Let the kids play” and the cockiness of Carlos Correa a whole new spin doesn’t it?
The results really don’t matter. The Astros thought it was effective enough that they needed to do it, and they did it… attempting to gain advantage by breaking the rules does not require actually gaining an advantage.
Couldn’t agree more with this. Of course on an analytical-based baseball site, we need to review and analyze what results occurred from the supposed cheating.
But from a punishment side, the results shouldn’t matter, the amount of effort they took to cheat should.
This. And I’m all for articles like this. Likely the best deterrent for stuff like this is proof it doesn’t work.
these analysis above is extremely flawed as stated by many people in the comments.
On punishment, I think results should have some part in the punishment side. There should be base punishment for fact that they cheated, and then additional punishment based on how much the cheating helped them.
That the famously analytic Astros thought it was effective enough to risk the penalties that MLB is now considering seems to me like pretty strong evidence that it was in fact effective.
It’s a little bit like the steroid thing.The people who actually had skin in the game were willing to risk huge penalties, including lifetime banishment, to reap the advantages of steroids, but then Bill James and people like that come along and say no, they really don’t help. I know whose opinion I would trust on how much that stuff works.
Great article. Check out Jake Marisnick’s splits in 2017.
BABIP/wRC+
Home .371/173
Away .270/69
Interesting that he’s one of the few who gained a significant advantage.
I was looking the other day at the change in K% between 16 and 17 as evidence of stealing signs since I’ve seen a lot of people point to that. What’s interesting is Marisnick’s K% drastically increases between those two years, while others fall, which would seem to suggest he’s one a the few that didn’t gain any advantage.
Looking only at Ks is too narrow. Look at entire body of work. Example – Home barrels went from 3% in 2016 to 19% (14 th best in MLB) in 2017 back to 3% in 2018)
Jake Marisnick also is a bench player who doesn’t start games very often, so for him to have a bloated BABIP would be expected
We shouldn’t just assume the Astros didn’t also steal signs on the road. There have been accusations of electronic bandages being used, which definitely could be utilized on the road. Even if their cheating only won them one extra game, say a playoff game in which two series went 7 games, they need to be eviscerated by Manfred. I think we also need to look at the Astros hitters in a different light. Would Altuve won MVP if they weren’t stealing signs? The Astros have shown a remarkable ability to hit for power while avoiding strikeouts. It will be fun to analyze the numbers again next year assuming the Astros receive a fair punishment and actually play fair baseball.
Over this three year span, the Astros walked 2% more at home than they did on the road, and they struck out 2% less. The averages for baseball are roughly 6% and 3.5%. So the Astros had smaller home/road plate discipline splits than the rest of the league. We’d expect the reverse.
Sure, this isn’t perfect either, but it’s a good double-check for the more granular analysis provided in the article. The author did a good job, but I’m surprised that information like this wasn’t included.
not a good job. extremely flawed. according to many in media it is now known cheating was being done on the road as well through electronic bandages and not all players participated.
Would it also not stand to reason that with the additional information garnered from knowingly avoiding offspeed pitches at home they would do better on the road as well?
Ballplayers already do well with pitch sequencing, and seeing pitchers multiple times. I would think that information, added to concrete experience of how pitches look out of specific pitchers’ hands, would bolster their zone awareness and ability to attack good pitches.
What better experience is there than seeing and taking MLB offspeed pitches that you can surmise are out of the zone as they leave the hand?
Baseball is such a mental game, the Astros should start banging on garbage cans and whistling at random just to mess with the opposing battery.
I’m not sure “make it look like we’re cheating” is the best move at this juncture.
If you’re going to compare home vs road numbers, please put them in the same table. Why are the home numbers presents in a tabular format and then the road ones are included below in a sentence?
Once I figured it out how, I cheated all the time in Candyland. But I didn’t always win (because I was an incompetent child). Not benefiting from cheating doesn’t negate the cheating.
It is like the Sacramento Kings executive who stole millions but says he intended on paying it back
I think this is great, but perhaps the best indicator will be what did the Astros do at home without runners on base (or at least without a runner on second)? When teams went to the complex signs for a runner at second, the “cheating” camera most likely wasn’t useful. But at home, without runners on base, did the Astros put up ridiculous (ie, cheating) stats?
Good question
Fair question. This goes significantly deeper than just K% and BB%.
FG waits over a week to publish any mention regarding the biggest off-season story in years, then produces the most inferior piece on the entire topic? What/which professional relationship are you trying to protect, Jake?
Negating actual video/audio evidence of cheating with quotes like “while it may look related, it’s probably more coincidental” reads like FG wholly disregards any facet of this story, but doesn’t want to appear completely disingenuous to its readers.
All of the research put into writing this article was wasted time. Be better than this.
I think you missed the point of the article. It isn’t “did they cheat”? It’s “was the cheating effective”? I for one am interested in it.
I’m more wondering why its been a full day and there’s been nothing on the Chris Martin re-signing. What’s their agenda here?!?!
One aspect I didn’t see mentioned regarding a comparison between 2016 and 2017 is the difference in the baseballs (2017 shattered the HR record – which was then shattered this year). I wouldn’t think it would have much impact on home/road splits, but a look at how the other teams performed between the two years might be worthwhile. That said, I agree with the other posts that cheating should be dealt with appropriately regardless of whether or not it was proven to be effective.
Ah, the Fangraphs moratorium on mentioning the sign stealing scandal has finally been lifted I guess? I was puzzled why it had been well over a week and still no article that mentioned the subject.
Do we really need to discuss whether sign stealing helps? We’ve known that pitch deception is important for a very long time. It is the whole basis behind effective breaking balls. Stealing signs is basically throwing pitch deception out the window.
We know that pitchers go through a lot of trouble to throw every pitch the same, and why do this if it didn’t make a substantial difference. I’m sure a pitcher’s curveball or changeup could be thrown better if they didn’t have to make it look like a fastball delivery. In fact I’m pretty sure the real reason those pitchers are effective is because they’re disguised to look like a fastball through delivery.
We know that pitchers get hammered sometimes when they tip pitches, and fixing those tips helps performance.
I think it’s too difficult to measure through data, when we don’t know which batters were stealing signs, and when.
Examining the overall season stats is only relevant if we think they cheated on every single AB and pitch. Based on videos I’ve seen, it seems more likely they were at least somewhat selective and employed the cheating system more often in close games and late innings.
If they were selective about when they cheated, the impact in the win column could be far more significant than the impact it had on season-long statistics. What we really need here is more analysis of the banging sounds themselves: the frequency the banging is used, whether the ABs involved were higher leverage, and so on.
You are of course 100% correct, Bruno. Selectivity is key.
If you’re playing poker with a marked deck, the objective isn’t to win every single hand possible. The TWIN objective is to win the most money possible — and not get caught.
Exactly. Good analogy.
We know for a fact players cheated. Video documentation. Email from Kevin Goldstein directing scouts to video dugouts. Cameraman banned from last years dugout. Video of illegal electronics being in the tunnel by the dugout. Ex player confirming this happened. Ex executives confirming this happened….etc. All players being interviewed currently. It happend. No way around it.
This issue is this stats shown above are flawed for many reasons as stated by the Duke up above. Not all players used it. They did this on the road as well through vibrating sensors etc. This scandal of cheating is unprecedented, much bigger than shoeless joe, steroids, and pete rose scandals. The players should be banned for life that were caught red handed cheating as well as Hinch and Lunhow. They made a mockery of the game.
Basically the same thing as the Pitcher saying…”here comes a fastball, Here comes a curveball” HUGE HUGE advantage. Anyone that knowingly participated in cheating, whether its owner, gm, manager, player, or analytics dept should be banned for life and punished.
Everything the astros have done has permeated other orgs now since they got away with it for so long before being caught. Several managers in MLB came from the astros. Elias at the Orioles GM etc. Then you have other teams fell like they have to do it just to keep up and compete with them.
After the investigation is complete and we know exactly who cheated and was involved. The following punishments should happen:
1. All individual awards and team awards should be stripped from them since 2017.
2. Anyone with direct knowledge in executive office should be banned for life ie Lunhow, Taubman etc.
3. Any player that cheated should be banned for life.
4. Hit them on the back end as well….They should lose prospects and draft picks.
5. If the owner Mclain knew about it, then he should be forced to sale the team.
6. None of the players should be allowed ever in the HOF.
Basically if you knew about it and/or participated in it , you are punished. Including the owner. Their should also be an audit and investigation of emails in the organization as well. This cheating is disgusting. These people/players/execs etc should be shamed from ever stepping in another mlb venue again.
Agreed that it’s disgusting. Disagree that “all who knew about it” should be punished as though they initiated it.
Players are pawns in all this. Moreover, it would be nearly impossible to parse the guilty from innocent ones. The known guilty? Maybe a minor suspension.
The managerial/executive level needs to be hammered, however. Numerous draft picks, no international money for a few years. Lifetime bans for multiple individuals, definitely. Kevin Goldstein and/or whomever directed him. Hinch if he knew — and he must have, right?
Do to these guys what the NFL should have done to Belicheat years ago.
I like the idea of trying to figure out if the cheating worked, but I think unless we know exactly what pitches they cheated we are grasping at straws. Some players didn’t use it, some players only used it in certain counts, or big situations, etc, etc. Maybe some players did worse with it, and they bailed. Maybe they did it as a trial in the regular season to see if it worked, then didn’t want to use it until the playoffs for fear of getting caught. Maybe they suspected a team was on to them and kept it under wraps during part of the season. If you were doing it in 2017 and a member of your team was now on the other team and you were playing them would you use it at that time? Obviously not, because that team would know that you were cheating. I don’t think you can isolate whether or not it benefited them because I do not think anyone knows when they were using it.
First the Patriots and now the Astros. Do you think all major franchises invest heavily in researching the value of cheating? Or is it just random
The fact that their stats on the road are better than they are at home is a huge red flag to me, especially in these categories where we would expect them to be worse.
Studies have shown that home field advantage comes mostly from the influence of the crowd on officials making calls, and the home plate umpire is the official that has the most opportunities to be affected by that in a baseball game. The fact that they were better on the road feels like circumstantial evidence that they were up to something, unless the run values of different events for road teams are a lot higher than they are for home teams, which I wouldn’t expect to be the case.
The question now is what were they doing on the road? Because to be better on the road than you are at home in these categories, I think you have to be doing something.
Given today’s technology ,and the near unlimited budget to buy the same ,does anyone really believe that the Astros couldn’t have been stealing signs on the road as well?
Are there any known cases where the cheating signal was wrong? If so it might be very interesting to look at outcomes on those pitches…