JAWS and the 2025 Hall of Fame Ballot: Billy Wagner

RVR Photos-USA TODAY Sports

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2025 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2016 election at SI.com, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

Billy Wagner was the ultimate underdog. Undersized and from both a broken home and an impoverished rural background, he channeled his frustrations into throwing incredibly hard — with his left hand, despite being a natural righty, for he broke his right arm twice as a child. Scouts overlooked him because he wasn’t anywhere close to six feet tall, but they couldn’t disregard his dominance over collegiate hitters using a mid-90s fastball. The Astros made him a first-round pick, and once he was converted to a relief role, his velocity went even higher.

Thanks to outstanding lower-body strength, coordination, and extraordinary range of motion, the 5-foot-10 Wagner was able to reach 100 mph with consistency — 159 times in 2003, according to The Bill James Handbook. Using a hard slider learned from teammate Brad Lidge, he kept blowing the ball by hitters into his late 30s to such an extent that he owns the record for the highest strikeout rate of any pitcher with at least 900 innings. He was still dominant when he walked away from the game following the 2010 season, fresh off posting a career-best ERA.

Lacking the longevity of Mariano Rivera or Trevor Hoffman, Wagner never set any saves records or even led his league once, and his innings total is well below those of every enshrined reliever. While Hoffman’s status as the former all-time saves leader helped him get elected in 2018, Wagner — who created similar value in his career — has faced major hurdles to getting recognized. But thanks to his extraordinary rate stats, he now stands at the doorstep of Cooperstown. Over the past five election cycles, his share of the vote has more than quadrupled, from 16.7% in 2019 to 73.8% in ’24, to the point that he missed election last year by just five votes. He’s now in his final year on the writers’ ballot and, thankfully, much closer to the 75% mark than the handful of recent candidates whose elections went down to their last at-bat, so to speak, namely Tim Raines (2017), Edgar Martinez (2019), Larry Walker (2020), and Gary Sheffield (short of the mark last year, alas).

2025 BBWAA Candidate: Billy Wagner
Pitcher WAR WPA WPA/LI R-JAWS IP SV ERA ERA+
Billy Wagner 27.7 29.1 17.9 24.9 903 422 2.31 187
Avg HOF RP 39.1 30.1 20.0 29.7
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference

William Edward Wagner was born in Marion, Virginia, on July 25, 1971, into circumstances — as documented in a September 20, 1999 Sports Illustrated profile by Michael Bamberger — that were hardly idyllic. Father William “Hotsey” Wagner, an all-county pitcher, married his 16-year-old bride, Yvonne Hall, on the day he graduated high school. Billy was born 13 months after they wed; two weeks later, Hotsey left for Saigon, where he spent nine months monitoring the urinalyses of U.S. soldiers about to return home from the Vietnam War. His marriage collapsed after he returned home in 1976. Billy and his younger sister bounced around in the care of his divorced (and remarried, and re-divorced) parents and both sets of grandparents. Poverty was a constant, food stamps an embarrassment; “[a] few crackers with peanut butter and a glass of water” was a typical breakfast.

While playing football at age seven, Wagner broke his right (throwing) arm when a friend fell on it; six weeks later, just after the cast was removed, he broke it again. During this time, he learned to throw left-handed, turning his baseball glove inside out and channeling his anger at his instability and grim surroundings into throwing a ball at the side of his maternal grandparents’ house, doing it so hard that pieces of aluminum siding fell off. Finally, just before he turned 15, he went to live with Jack and Sally Lamie, his uncle and aunt, in Tannersville, 19 miles away. By that point, Billy had fallen a year behind in school due to his unstable home situation, but once coaches and administrators at Tazewell High School (the closest high school, an hour away) agreed that his throwing was a danger to his middle-school peers, they “socially promoted” him into high school.

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Though he grew to just 5-foot-5 and 135 pounds in high school, Wagner starred as both a center fielder and pitcher whose fastball could reach 86 mph. As a senior in 1990, he hit .451, stole 23 bases, and struck out 116 in 46 innings with a 1.52 ERA. Scouts were put off by his size, so he followed cousin Jeff Lamie to Ferrum College, a Division III school, with the intention of playing football — until the coach saw him throw a baseball. At Ferrum, Wagner grew to 5-foot-9, gained 40 pounds, and boosted his velocity to 93 mph. As a sophomore in 1992, he allowed nine hits in 51 innings and set an NCAA record with 19.1 strikeouts per nine. While dominating the collegiate Cape Cod League, he struck out the side in the league’s All-Star game without allowing a foul ball. The Astros chose him with the 12th pick in the 1993 draft.

By now 5-foot-10 and 170 pounds, Wagner began his professional career as a starter, battling control issues but whiffing more than a batter per inning at every stop and making Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospects list in 1994 (78th), ’95 (17th), and ’96 (14th). In 1995, he posted a 2.89 ERA in hitter-friendly Double- and Triple-A environments, with 9.7 strikeouts per nine in 146.1 innings. All the more impressive was that his performance came amid tragedy, as his wife’s father — who had emerged as a father figure in Wagner’s life — and stepmother were brutally murdered in May, just days after Wagner had been added to the Astros’ 40-man roster in anticipation of a late-season call-up.

Wagner made his major league debut on September 13, 1995 in Shea Stadium; mustering a fastball near 100 mph, he retired the Mets’ Rico Brogna on a fly ball before being lifted for a pinch-hitter by Astros manager Terry Collins. After 12 starts for Triple-A Tucson in 1996, the fire-balling Wagner, 24, joined the Astros’ bullpen in early June and supplanted the injured Todd Jones as the team’s closer after the All-Star break. He converted nine saves in 13 chances, finishing the year with a 2.44 ERA and 11.7 strikeouts per nine (but also 5.2 walks) in 51.2 innings. The Astros carried a two-and-a-half game division lead into September, but a 4–16 tailspin to start the month lost them the division and ultimately cost Collins his job.

Under new manager Larry Dierker and powered by the “Killer B’s” — Jeff Bagwell and Craig Biggio — the Astros made the playoffs in each of the next three seasons, with Wagner emerging as one of the game’s most dominant closers. He saved 23 games with a 2.85 ERA and 14.4 strikeouts per nine in 1997, setting a record for a pitcher with at least 50 innings. Despite missing more than three weeks in 1998 after taking a Kelly Stinnett line drive off his head, he topped that strikeout rate in each of the next two seasons and trimmed both his walk rate and ERA. In 1999, he whiffed 14.9 per nine and walked 2.8 en route to a 1.57 ERA with 39 saves in 74.2 innings. Not only did Wagner make his first All-Star team, but he also tied teammate Jose Lima for fourth in a particularly Houston-heavy Cy Young vote; ex-Astro Randy Johnson won, and Mike Hampton finished second. Wagner’s 3.8 WAR led all National League relievers and nearly topped the 3.9 he had accumulated in the previous three seasons.

It was that September when Bamberger caught up with “the Astros’ smaller-than-life closer” who “would tip the scales at his listed weight of 180 pounds only after a third helping of grits,” exploring his difficult past in an attempt to find out, “Where does he get his heat?”

He throws fastball after fastball, one four-seamer after another, all in the A to A-plus range. The movement on his pitches is wicked. Batters speak of heaters that start at their heads and finish at the knees, on the outside corner of the plate. On Wagner you can guess fastball. (He throws only occasional sliders and changeups.) What you can’t do is hit it.

…It is true that Wagner has superb mechanics, which is amazing when you consider that he is a natural right-hander … It is also true that he drives off the rubber as well as any pitcher since Tom Seaver; his legs are thick and heavy for a man of his otherwise ordinary physique. It is true that he has a remarkable ability to throw first-pitch strikes. But those facts alone do not begin to answer the question.

In February 1999, Wagner had signed a three-year, $10.1 million extension, covering his arbitration years. For as strong as his 1999 was, his 2000 was a near-total loss: Wagner struggled with his control in 27.2 innings before admitting he had been throwing in pain and undergoing season-ending surgery to repair a torn flexor tendon and remove scar tissue. With their bullpen a garbage fire, the Astros sank to 72–90, but both Wagner and the team rebounded in 2001. He made his second All-Star team, saved 39 games, whiffed 11.3 per nine, and finished with 2.4 WAR; the Astros won 93 games and their fourth NL Central title in five years. Alas, they were again ousted in the first round by the Braves, the team that had also done so in 1997 and ’99.

By both WAR and ERA, Wagner’s performance continued to improve in 2002 and ’03. In the latter season — his third All-Star campaign — he set career highs with 86 innings and 44 saves en route to a 1.78 ERA, 11.0 strikeouts per nine, and 3.4 WAR, the last of which edged John Smoltz for the lead among NL relievers. On June 11, 2003, Wagner helped to make baseball history when he closed out a combined no-hitter of six pitchers against the Yankees in the Bronx — the first time New York had been no-hit since 1958. Two pitches into the second inning, starter Roy Oswalt had to depart due to a groin injury; relievers Pete Munro, Kirk Saarloos, Lidge, and Octavio Dotel carried the baton to Wagner, who struck out Jorge Posada and Bubba Trammell, then covered first base on Hideki Matsui’s game-ending groundout.

After missing the playoffs in 2002, the Astros battled with the Cubs for the NL Central title in ’03, but a 3–6 record over the final nine games cost them a one-and-a-half game lead. While Wagner took one of those losses, it was only the second time over his final 36 appearances that he allowed a run. After the season, he criticized owner Drayton McLane for the team’s failure to increase payroll to augment their rotation. “It’s going to be a tape job,” he said after the team’s final game, looking to next season. “It’s not like we’re going out there and getting any marquee pitchers.”

Wagner would be proven quite wrong, but he had punched his own ticket out of town. Owed $8 million for 2004 with a $9 million option for ’05, he was traded to Philadelphia on November 3 for a trio of pitchers (Ezequiel Astacio, Taylor Buchholz, and Brandon Duckworth) who combined to deliver -3.5 WAR as Astros. Their sorry production was more than offset by Houston’s marquee free-agent pitchers: Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte. Though the latter was limited to 15 starts in 2004 due to elbow surgery, the former won his seventh Cy Young award. The revamped Astros, who also added Carlos Beltrán for the 2004 stretch run, reached the NLCS that season and the World Series in 2005. “I just wish he’d done this when we were a game out last season,” said Wagner of McLane’s spending.

Though he joined a team that was beginning to assemble the roster that would dominate the NL East from 2007 to ’11, Wagner’s two years in Philadelphia were less than fulfilling. Groin and rotator cuff strains cost him two and a half months in 2004, limiting him to 48.1 innings. He rebounded with another All-Star season in 2005 (1.51 ERA, 38 saves, 2.7 WAR), but his mouth continued to make bigger headlines. Amid a 4–12 July skid, he criticized the team’s intensity, saying that the Phillies quit when they fell behind and that “we ain’t got a chance to get there right now,” in reference to the postseason. While the Phillies finished with 88 wins under new manager Charlie Manuel, they fell one game short of the Wild Card and two short of the division title. Wagner spent the last third of the season in silence after receiving no support in a players-only meeting, then blasted his ex-teammates from afar after departing. Years later, he lamented, “I learned a lot about criticism and how not to be a leader when I was traded … I began to turn into someone I didn’t want to be.”

A free agent for the first time, the 34-year-old Wagner landed a four-year, $43 million deal with the Mets and sparked an inter-borough controversy: His entry song, Metallica’s “Enter Sandman,” was already in use by the Yankees’ Rivera, though Wagner’s 1996 adoption predated Rivera by three years. The song got a workout in Queens: Wagner saved 40 of the Mets’ 97 wins as they claimed their first NL East title in 20 years. Accompanied by a typically low 2.24 ERA, his save total ranked second in the league, the highest he would ever finish, and his 11.7 strikeouts per nine was his highest mark since 1999. He notched the first three saves of his postseason career as the Mets downed the Dodgers and won the NLCS opener against the Cardinals, but he took the loss in Game 2 by allowing three ninth-inning runs, then gave up two runs protecting a 4–0 ninth-inning lead in Game 6. In Game 7, manager Willie Randolph left setup man Aaron Heilman in for his second inning of work in the ninth inning of a tie game; Wagner could only watch as he served up a decisive two-run homer to Yadier Molina.

That was as close as Wagner ever got to a World Series. Though he pitched very well for most of 2007, saving 26 of his first 27 chances with a 1.28 ERA, he posted a 6.91 ERA from August 21 onward, a span of 14 appearances. That Mets team gained infamy for blowing a seven-game lead with 17 games to go, losing out on a playoff spot on the season’s final day, but Wagner’s only blown save in that span came in a New York win. The team wound up outside the playoff picture on the final day in 2008 as well, in part because Wagner’s August 2 forearm strain led to Tommy John surgery.

When the Mets signed Francisco Rodríguez to a three-year, $37 million deal that winter, the writing was on the wall for the rehabbing Wagner. After making two late August appearances for the team, he waived his no-trade clause and was dealt to the Red Sox, who in turn promised not to pick up his $8 million option for 2010, granting him complete freedom in choosing where to pitch the following season. He was strong in 15 appearances for Boston, striking out 22 in just 13.2 innings for a team that won the Wild Card but was swept out of the first round by the Angels.

In December 2009, Wagner signed a one-year, $7 million deal with Atlanta, and at 38, he pitched as well as ever, posting a career-low 1.43 ERA and striking out 13.5 per nine (his highest rate since 1999) in 69.1 innings en route to 2.5 WAR for yet another Wild Card team that made a first-round exit. That season included two milestones as well. On June 25 against the Tigers, he struck out the side on 10 pitches and became the fifth pitcher to reach 400 saves in his career. On August 27, he struck out Giancarlo Stanton (then known as Mike) for his 1,170th career strikeout, surpassing Jesse Orosco for the record among left-handed relievers:

Despite triggering a vesting option for 2011, Wagner followed through with a decision announced in May to retire at season’s end to spend more time with his family. No pitcher has ever walked away from his career following a season of at least 50 innings with a lower ERA or a higher strikeout rate.

Wagner holds some other distinctions as well. Among pitchers with at least 900 innings, his strikeout rate, whether expressed as 11.92 per nine or as 33.2% of all batters faced, is the best in history. In the past two seasons, Kenley Jansen (12.66 per nine, 35.4%) and Craig Kimbrel (14.06 per nine, 38.8%) have claimed that distinction at the 800-inning level, which was the cutoff I had used for pre-2024 versions of this article. Of the pitchers who have reached 900 innings, Blake Snell (11.23 per nine), Chris Sale (11.09), and Robbie Ray (11.07) are the next-closest on a per-nine-innings basis, and Jacob deGrom (31.0%) is next on a percentage basis, followed by Sale (30.6%) and Snell (30.2%). With higher rates in fewer innings, Kimbrel and Aroldis Chapman (14.76 K/9 and 40.0% in 760 innings) might supplant Wagner at the 900-inning level, but neither is guaranteed to last that long; the former was designated for assignment in mid-September by the playoff-bound Orioles, and the latter has steered his career to the brink on more than one occasion.

At the 900-inning level, Wagner’s .187 opponent batting average is the lowest in history, 17 points better than the next 20th- or 21st-century pitcher, Nolan Ryan, though if we lower the bar to 800 innings, Kimbrel (.169) and Jansen (.183) sneak past him. Again using the 900-inning cutoff, Rivera is the only post-1920 pitcher with a lower ERA (2.21) or higher ERA+ (205) than Wagner’s 2.31 and 187. His 2.73 FIP is the third-lowest in that span, behind only deGrom (2.59) and Sandy Koufax (2.69). Meanwhile, his 0.998 WHIP is the third-lowest all-time behind dead-ball era hurler Addie Joss (0.968) and deGrom (0.994). Wagner’s total of 422 saves, meanwhile, ranks eighth on the all-time list behind Rivera (652), Hoffman (601), Lee Smith (478), Jansen (447), Kimbrel (440), Rodriguez (437), and John Franco (424); the two active pitchers in that group surpassed him this past season.

Is that a Hall of Fame career? As I’ve laid out in connection to the recent cases of Smith and Rivera, with such a limited number of relievers in the Hall — the aforementioned pair, both elected in 2019, brought the total to eight — it’s difficult to say, particularly given the role’s evolution over the past half-century. Hoyt Wilhelm, Rollie Fingers, and Goose Gossage were all multi-inning firemen who racked up higher innings totals than the enshrined relievers who followed in their wake. Bruce Sutter worked multiple innings as well, though generally only when his team had a lead narrow enough to produce a save opportunity. Dennis Eckersley, who spent the first half of his career as a starter, became the model for the one-inning closer we know today. Even excluding his 3,285.2 innings, the other seven relievers elected averaged 1,496 innings, whereas Wagner threw only 903, well below even Hoffman’s 1,089.1 and Sutter’s 1,042. Where the majority of the saves of Wilhelm, Fingers, Gossage, and Sutter were longer than an inning, as were 27% of Eckersley’s, only 9% of Wagner’s were.

While one can certainly make the case that, based on rate stats, Wagner was more dominant than any of them, his shortfall of innings presents a problem when translating to a value measure such as WAR. That said, he was so much more dominant than Hoffman that the two are tied at 23.7 JAWS, with Hoffman’s slight edge in career WAR (28.0–27.7) offset by Wagner’s slight edge in peak (19.8–19.4). Either way, both are significantly below the standards at the position even if I exclude Eckersley. The other seven elected relievers averaged 35.8 career WAR, 23.6 peak WAR, and 30.1 JAWS. One can’t really justify Wagner’s inclusion in Cooperstown on the basis of those metrics alone.

That doesn’t mean it’s game over, though. As anyone who has been following me since I introduced the metric that became JAWS for the 2004 ballot knows — at a point when Sutter was still two years away from election, and Gossage four years away — I’ve never been entirely satisfied with the way it handles relievers. Over the years, I’ve employed various hybrid metrics in an effort to find a balance between something descriptive (what does this say about who’s in the Hall?) and something prescriptive (what is this telling us about who should be in?). Upon bringing my Hall analyses to FanGraphs for the 2019 ballot, I began using one such hybrid measure in evaluating Wagner, and with the help of the good folks at Baseball Reference, R-JAWS (Reliever JAWS) was formalized in time for the 2022 election cycle, meaning that their computers now do the math instead of mine.

While the version of WAR used in JAWS features an adjustment for leverage — the quantitatively greater impact on winning and losing that a reliever has at the end of the ballgame than a starter does earlier — to help account for the degree of difficulty, it’s not the only way to measure reliever value. Win Probability Added (WPA) is a context-sensitive measure that accounts for the incremental increase (or decrease) in the chances of winning produced in each plate appearance given the inning, score, and base-out situation. For a reliever, single-season WPA scales similarly to single-season WAR, which is to say that it’s rare that one is worth more than three wins in a single year, by either measure. WPA can be additionally adjusted using a pitcher’s average leverage index (aLI) for a stat variably called situational wins or context-neutral wins (referred to as WPA/LI).

Long story short, both of these are now in the sauce. R-JAWS is the average of a reliever’s WAR (including his time as a starter and as a hitter) as well as his WPA and his WPA/LI. Including those last two stats helps to elevate pitchers for what they did as relievers rather than as starters, which is what we’re after, because Hall voters generally aren’t geared toward recognizing swingmen or setup relievers. Not only can you can find R-JAWS on the aforementioned Baseball Reference Relief Pitcher JAWS Leaders page, but it’s also now the default method for sorting (you can still sort by WAR, WAR7, and JAWS as well).

Wagner, who’s tied for 19th in old-school JAWS, ranks a respectable seventh in WPA among relievers at 29.1 and an even better fifth in WPA/LI at 17.9. That puts him right in the mix with the other enshrined relievers in R-JAWS:

Top Relievers by R-JAWS
Rk Player WAR WPA WPA/LI R-JAWS
1 Mariano Rivera+ 56.3 56.6 33.6 48.8
2 Dennis Eckersley+ 62.1 30.8 25.8 39.6
3 Hoyt Wilhelm+ 46.8 30.4 26.3 34.3
4 Rich Gossage+ 41.1 32.5 14.8 29.5
5 Trevor Hoffman+ 28.0 34.2 19.3 27.1
6 Billy Wagner 27.7 29.1 17.9 24.9
7 Joe Nathan 26.7 30.6 15.8 24.4
8 Firpo Marberry 30.6 25.5 16.8 24.3
9 Tom Gordon 35.0 21.3 14.5 23.6
10 Kenley Jansen 21.9 29.0 17.3 22.7
11 Jonathan Papelbon 23.3 28.3 13.4 21.7
12 Ellis Kinder 28.9 23.8 11.7 21.5
13 Francisco Rodríguez 24.2 24.4 14.7 21.1
14 Lee Smith+ 28.9 21.3 12.7 21.0
15 Stu Miller 27.0 20.5 13.5 20.7
16 David Robertson 21.7 23.9 14.5 20.0
17 Craig Kimbrel 22.3 22.6 13.9 19.6
18 Tom Henke 22.9 21.3 13.9 19.4
19 Dan Quisenberry 24.6 20.7 12.5 19.3
20 Rollie Fingers+ 25.6 16.2 15.1 19.0
21 Tug McGraw 21.8 21.5 13.1 18.8
22 Bobby Shantz 34.6 10.4 10.1 18.4
23 Aroldis Chapman 20.8 21.3 13.1 18.4
24 John Hiller 30.4 14.6 9.4 18.1
25 Bruce Sutter+ 24.1 18.2 11.9 18.1
Hall avg w/Eckersley 39.1 30.0 19.9 29.7
Hall avg w/o Eckersley 35.8 29.9 19.1 28.3
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference
R-JAWS is the average of WAR, WPA, and WPA/LI.
+ = Hall of Famer

Prior to the election of Rivera, Wagner was just 0.1 below the Hall average excluding Eckersley, and while his standing relative to that average has slipped, he’s the top reliever outside the Hall in that combined measure. I think that’s worth a lot in this context.

Those leverage-based measures provide a much stronger basis for voting for Wagner than JAWS. That goes doubly when taken alongside his other accomplishments and overlooking his unsightly 10.03 ERA in 11.2 postseason innings for teams that were generally in the midst of being steamrolled.

At the outset of his candidacy, it was clear that Wagner faced an uphill battle to get to Cooperstown. Overshadowed by Hoffman when the two debuted in 2016 and lost in a sea of qualified candidates at other positions as well — 11 exceeded the JAWS standard that year — he received just 10.5% of the vote. At the time, that was a lower debut percentage than any player elected by the writers since they returned to annual balloting in 1966, but Scott Rolen, who received just 10.2% in 2018 yet was elected five years later, has since set a new standard for what’s possible.

Wagner more or less ran in place over his next two cycles, but on the 2019 ballot, as traffic began to thin out a bit, he climbed to 16.7%, then posted annual gains of 15.0%, 14.7%, 4.6%, 17.1%, and 5.7% over the last five cycles. Per The Athletic’s Jayson Stark, that 17.1% jump was the largest for any reliever, surpassing the 15.5% increase by Fingers in 1992.

Heading into the 2024 election cycle, those gains looked as though they might put Wagner over the top — but might not. As I noted last year, among post-1966 candidates who received between 65% and 70% and still had eligibility remaining, 14 of 31 were elected the next year, and 21 of 31 within two years. Wagner received 78.3% of the votes from ballots published before the election announcement, but just 55.1% on unpublished ballots, and barely missed the mark.

The good news is that history is still on his side. Of the last 24 times a candidate received at least 70% but less than 75% and still had eligibility remaining, that candidate was elected the next year 21 times, with the exceptions being Jim Bunning (twice) and Curt Schilling. The former was done in once by a barrage of blank ballots and once by a crowd of stronger candidates, while the latter found increasingly intricate and offensive ways to sabotage his own candidacy as he approached 75%. Particularly given the urgency created by this being the final year of his candidacy, I don’t anticipate Wagner falling short.

Here’s the recent history of how candidates who received at least 50% in their ninth year of eligibility fared in their 10th and final year:

Recent 10th-Year BBWAA Candidates
Player 9th Yr % 10th Yr % Gain
Billy Wagner 2024 73.8% 2025 TBD TBD
Curt Schilling 2021 71.1% 2022 58.6% -12.4%
Edgar Martinez 2018 70.4% 2019 85.4% 15.0%
Tim Raines 2016 69.8% 2017 86.0% 16.2%
Barry Bonds 2021 61.8% 2022 66.0% 4.1%
Roger Clemens 2021 61.6% 2022 65.2% 3.6%
Gary Sheffield 2023 55.0% 2024 63.9% 8.9%
Larry Walker 2019 54.6% 2020 76.6% 22.0%

While seeing that only three of the previous seven were elected in year 10 might be unsettling, by that point it was clear that Bonds and Clemens weren’t going to reach 75% due to their links to performance-enhancing drugs, and Schilling was taking the first scorched earth electoral campaign in Hall of Fame history to its deserved conclusion. Three of the other four gained entry, adding an average of 15.5%, and it’s worth remembering that Sheffield was held back to some degree by his BALCO connection.

Add to that the fact that Wagner is already closer to 75% than any of these recent predecessors, and I think we’ll be hearing his name called on January 21.

Because of the crowded field of candidates in his early years of eligibility, I didn’t include Wagner on my virtual ballot until 2019, then added him to my actual ballot in ’21, and he’s been there ever since. While JAWS guides my process, I’ve remained particularly open-minded regarding its handling of relievers over the years, seeking alternative ways to evaluate them, and Wagner’s dominance in so many categories is difficult to ignore, as is his underdog story. He’s no Rivera, but he’s hardly out of place in a group that includes Hoffman, Smith, Fingers, and Sutter. With Jansen, Chapman, and Kimbrel all struggling at points in their mid-30s to the point that only one of the three spent all of 2024 as a full-time closer, we can appreciate how hard it is to maintain the level of performance that Wagner did, right up to the end of his career. Maybe 15 years from now we’ll be talking about Emmanuel Clase in this context, but Wagner stands as the best reliever outside the Hall. To these eyes, that’s worth a vote.





Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.

78 Comments
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AlbyMember since 2025
1 year ago

Fun fact: Only six of the pitchers in the Hall of Fame are credited with 0 saves.

mfuellingMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Alby

Whoa, had to look into this and I think it’s only five because Maddux had one in the ’98 postseason.

Thank you though, this is definitely a fun fact.

Veeck as in BeckMember since 2024
1 year ago
Reply to  Alby

I will spend the rest of the day guessing which six (now five) and look it up later.

As the save was a relatively recent statistical invention I assume we have to be back-crediting saves in the exercise.

Lanidrac
1 year ago

We back-credit other stats like RBIs, so why not?

g4Member since 2020
1 year ago

While I’m not convinced Wagner deserves entry, I’m flabbergasted by that swan song 2010 season. Coming as it did 1 year removed from TJ, there’s no reason to think he wouldn’t have replicated the unfailingly stellar rate stats he produced throughout his 30s for 2 or 3 more seasons. (Short of blowing out his arm again, though it’s a safe bet that guys who recover well from a TJ get at least a few years out of the new ligament before re-tearing, John Means excepted.] Give Wagner 150-200 more innings at his career-average rates and he’d have my vote.

That means — and it feels odd to phrase it this way — that Wagner chose extra time with his family over securing HoF induction (and all its corresponding benefits). A fascinating proposition to say the least.

Barney Coolio
1 year ago
Reply to  g4

Yeah,I feel that way about Wagner, Jim Edmonds, and Kenny Lofton. They retired after good final seasons when they had easily attainable milestones to reach.

They chose to prioritize other things, which is their right. But I cannot get too worked up about their HOF cases.

Man, I wish that after 2011, Johnny Damon had prioritized getting maximum playing time in order to reach 3000 hits. He needed 138.5 hits at age 38 and 39 to reach 3000. I am sure KC would have loved to have him back for those two years. But no…

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  g4

There’s also Buster Posey, except he’ll probably get in within the first few years of his candidacy, anyway.

Shirtless George Brett
1 year ago

Anyone else find it weird that relievers are the only players that are judged by a totally different standard?

Like, if someone made the argument that a platoon RF should be in the hall of fame because he was really good in the limited innings he played, people would call you crazy. They would say no one not good enough to be a starting RF should be anywhere near the HoF. But thats exactly what we with do with pitchers.

Just a weird thought I have always had.

Last edited 1 year ago by Shirtless George Brett
The Kudzu KidMember since 2016
1 year ago

My son compares it to backup goalies in the NHL making the hockey hall of fame, and I can’t shake that comparison. There was also a comment on Fangraphs a while back saying that if only Kevin Brown had been a little worse as a starter, he likely would have sailed into the Hall as a dominant reliever.

Of course, this is yelling at clouds, since it’s established that relievers get in and that’s that. Wagner would get my hypothetical vote.

Ivan_GrushenkoMember since 2016
1 year ago
Reply to  The Kudzu Kid

Kevin Brown is easily good enough as he is.

sadtromboneMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  The Kudzu Kid

It’s probably more like a late game defensive replacement in basketball.

Last edited 1 year ago by sadtrombone
DannyMember since 2016
1 year ago

It *is* weird.

The John Smoltz Effect – where a late career transition to the bullpen was considered a resurgence and somehow more valuable than 100 strong but injury-plagued innings – vexes me to this day. I mean, of course a Hall of Fame caliber starter was dynamite one inning at a time! Why the hell should that ever have been considered greatness, rather than expected?

Shirtless George Brett
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

Yeah man. I have always been baffled at how Smoltz’s time in the bullpen didnt obliterate the idea that there is something special about relievers and they are more than just guys not good enough to be starters. After seeing how he performed, the logical conclusion should have been exactly what you said; of course a Hall of Fame caliber starter was dynamite one inning at a time!

But it somehow was seen as almost the exact opposite.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago

All the anti-Wagner people citing Smoltz *really* need to take a look at his FanGraphs page – he put up 3 ace-caliber seasons after moving back to the rotation!

Like, the fact that an elite, zero doubt HoF was nearly as good as Wagner and Mariano after switching to the pen for a few years, then went back to being an elite, zero-doubt HoF starter isn’t nearly the gotcha y’all seem to think it is, haha.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

That’s not the argument. The argument is that proponents of relievers as outperforming WAR often suggest they possess a trait that allows them to be especially great in closer or relief situations that other pitchers lack, and Smoltz being able to immediately switch from SP to RP contradicts that idea (let alone the many much worse SP’s who have become dominant relievers).

Smoltz’ value clearly wasn’t maximized in the bullpen which is why he was moved back to the rotation and went on to produce much more value, as many other teams have tried to do with their good bullpen arms (Kopech, Whitlock, etc) because their value isn’t maximized in the pen. Wagner and Rivera had skills that made them a disproportionately good relievers to starters, but that was less valuable than just being a good starter and that they lacked the ability to perform as a good starter compromised their value in their careers.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Proponents of relievers outperforming WAR (like the analytically advanced teams who pay a lot more for relievers than their WAR indicates…and Tom Tango’s “Pitcher Run Value” metric) don’t need to talk about any sort of special sauce when they can just point at the vast difference between how WAR measures reliever value and teams do:

fWAR thinks that a pitcher who comes in with the bases loaded, allows a double, then gets a popup and a strikeout has provided more value than a pitcher who came in and got a double play.

rWAR thinks those pitchers performed identically.

To say the least, most teams disagree.

Lanidrac
1 year ago

This is very true.

However, rWAR for pitchers has just as many of its own problems, such as not accounting for team defense beyond just errors, wild pitches, and passed balls.

Unfortunately, both major versions of WAR suck at evaluating pitchers as they stand.

Last edited 1 year ago by Lanidrac
Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Smoltz was still more of an exception that the rule. Yes, there are quite a few more exceptions than usual, but that still doesn’t change how a transition to the bullpen is also very difficult for probably an even larger percentage of decent or better starting pitchers.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

Of course, not only did John Smoltz go back to being a HoF caliber starter after his stint in the pen…but he was pretty firmly worse than Wagner and Mariano during that stint.

Ivan_GrushenkoMember since 2016
1 year ago

I’d rather see Hamels, Saberhagen, Cone, Stieb, Santana, Pettitte, Babe Adams. Heck I’d rather see Hudson and Buehrle than a reliever. But I’m speaking to the wind.

marchandman34Member since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Ivan_Grushenko

Preaching to this choir!

Wagner wouldn’t be a heinous pick, but I’d much rather take the deserving starting pitchers first. Felix is on his first ballot 🙂 too.

ScottyBMember since 2017
1 year ago

1000000% agreed. Because of this, my standard for relievers would be unbelievably high, and Wagner doesn’t come close to the cut.

(The analogy I often think of is pinch-hitters like manny Mota or Rusty Staub – unquestionably the best at what they did, and in high leverage, but they had sooooooo many fewer at bats)

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  ScottyB

I mean, it’s not even about “leverage.”

The fundamental question is whether a reliever who enters with the bases loaded and one out and gets a double play performed better than a reliever who allows a single and a sac fly, then gets a strikeout.

rWAR says they’re exactly the same.

fWAR says the latter performance was more valuable.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

Obviously these statistics are intended to reflect value over a larger sample size than a single game. You can play these games with anything (ie a batter who’s 1-4 with a single who gets an RBI’s same as batter who’s 1-4 with triple who gets an RBI). You can load as many bases as you want, relievers don’t prevent nearly as many runs as starters.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

I mean…take it up with Tom Tango, mate.

I just happen to agree that a starter who leaves the bases loaded should get neither credit nor a penalty for what the reliever does and that a reliever should receive credit for stranding inherited runners and a measure of blame for letting them score.

Do you know the fun thing? We measure this!

So I’m able to base my HoF opinions on how effectively a pitcher prevented opposing teams from scoring over their careers, within the context of the game situations.

And you’re able to ignore all of that in favor of a model that claims the only possible explanation for a pitcher not being as effective from the stretch is random variation!

Aren’t stats fun?

Lanidrac
1 year ago

The blame for inherited runners scoring should really be shared between them. There’s just no easy way to divvy it up.

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Only on a counting basis. On a rate basis, they surpass starting pitchers on average, even with neither ERA, FIP, nor WHIP accounting for strand rates.

Overall, it’s two different skill sets.

Last edited 1 year ago by Lanidrac
Shirtless George Brett
1 year ago

I mean, rWAR and fWAR use different baselines for pitcher WAR. fWAR uses FIP and rWAR use RA/9. So of course they are going to value things differently. This isnt new.

But no version of WAR is meant to be used over a single inning so I’m honestly not even sure what point you are trying to make here other than a very disingenuous one.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago

“The point I’m trying to make here” is that no version of WAR is designed to measure what relievers contribute.

To be clear, that’s not a critique of WAR as a concept:

It’s a critique of your fundamental lack of intellectual curiosity, given the availability of models that do measure relievers’ performance against MLB teams’ conception of their value.

Last edited 1 year ago by Cool Lester Smooth
Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  ScottyB

The difference is that they wouldn’t be merely pinch-hitters in the first place if they were good enough to be starters. The same is not necessarily true for relief pitchers.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago

You could ask all of the heavily analytics driven teams who spend significantly more $/WAR on relievers than they do starters…but you can find the answer by sorting the career leaderboards by RE24.

Mariano’s between Max Scherzer and Roy Halladay…and ahead of John Smoltz.

Wagner’s ahead of guys like Lester and Chuck Finley (and WELL ahead of King Felix), despite only pitching 13 full seasons.

Despite what the WAR models say, a pitcher entering mid-inning and getting out of a bases loaded, one-out jam is insanely valuable.

3cardmontyMember since 2025
1 year ago

This is legit wild and I’m struggling to wrap my head around it. WPA I could see favoring relievers but why should RE24? Especially closers who normally come in with no outs and the bases empty?

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  3cardmonty

It’s because the ultra elite relief aces like Rivera and Wagner weren’t “come in with the bases empty in the 9th” types like Kimbrel and Jansen…and because even folks like Kimbrel and Jansen (neither of whom have passed Joe Nathan in RE24) routinely come in mid-9th when a middle-reliever makes a 5 run game “interesting.”

(Plus, RE24/Pitcher Run Value doesn’t differentiate between pitchers who leave the game with the bases loaded based on the performance of the next man up).

Shirtless George Brett
1 year ago

It’s because the ultra elite relief aces like Rivera and Wagner weren’t “come in with the bases empty in the 9th” types 

I mean, this is just objectively not true. From 2002-2010 (the splits tool only goes back to 2002) Wagner appeared in 537 games. 518 of those games, so NINETY SIX PERCENT, he came in with 0 outs and 0 runners on base. 457 of those appearances were in the 9th.

only 177 of those 518 appearances were high leverage. that’s 34%. So two thirds of his career he was coming in at the start of an inning in a med to low leverage situation and the vast majority of the time it was the 9th inning

For his entire career Billy Wagner dealt with 60 inherited runners. That’s less than 4 per year for his career.

You are painting a picture of Wagner’s career that is just not reality.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago

OH EM GEE!

Your point about leverage comprehensively rebuts my comment that opens by saying that leverage is irrelevant to the conversation!!!

Nearly as compelling as the “fun facts” that wholly exclude the first half of Wagner’s career!

Like I’ve said elsewhere:

It’s not my fault that anyone capable of sorting a leaderboard can see that Wagner suppressed significantly more runs, in aggregate across 900 innings than King Felix did in 2700.

It’s Tom Tango’s…and it’s also his fault that we have those numbers over a far longer sample than FG’s sortable splits, which lets intellectually curious folks learn that Lee Smith, Felix, and Joe Nathan are a coin flip in terms of run prevention against expectation; and that all three lag well behind guys like Jon Lester and Billy Wagner.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

Teams don’t pay relievers substantially more by WAR. Edwin Diaz got $100mil/5yrs heading into age 29 heading off 3.0, 2.1, .9 in 2020, 0 (big xFIP/FIP difference), 3.5 WAR seasons with clean inury history.

Taijuan Walker got $72mil/4yrs heading into age 30 coming off 2.7, 1.5, .6 in 2020, injured 2019 & 2018 seasons.

Even top SP’s in their late 30’s like Verlander (a year off TJ), Scherzer, and Wheeler are getting $120mil/3yrs. Degrom got $185mil/5yrs off 2 injury riddled years in his mid 30s.

Are there any top relievers who are getting anywhere close to $40mil/yr, even when they’re much younger? No, they’re getting paid in line with 2-3 WAR SP’s, which is what their WAR’s indicate.

No reliever is even getting paid in line with guys like Nola and Rodon in their 30’s. These relievers are not HoF quality players and aren’t getting paid in line with HoF quality players.

Unless you’d seriously mean to tell me that you’d value a 2-3 WAR closer like Wagner on par with even someone like Greinke, a borderline HoF? Higher than Cliff Lee or Cole Hamels? Be willing to pay them the same or more and trade the same or more for them?

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Ayyyyy, another appeal to the authority of WAR that fails (refuses) to address anything brought up within the comment to which it replies!

It’s important to remember that taking fWAR seriously requires believing think that there’s no difference between pitching from the windup and the stretch.

This isn’t ambiguous:

FanGraphs literally measures how much worse pitchers are from the stretch separately from how they perform on BIP in general, while explaining the aspects of pitcher performance they exclude from fWAR.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

Your comment was about how teams value relievers more on a $/WAR basis and I brought up an example that directly addressed that argument. You argued multiple times that teams valued relievers above starters well beyond what WAR would indicate and haven’t provided any evidence to that.

Now you’re talking about how pitchers perform worse in the stretch and that isn’t captured by WAR but others have already pointed out that guys like Wagner overwhelmingly weren’t brought in with bases loaded, but rather in clean 9th innings. So that point isn’t relevant to Wagner.

It’s also not true that WAR doesn’t account for this stuff.

bWAR and fWAR factor in leverage, which includes inherited runners.

https://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained_pitch.shtml

https://library.fangraphs.com/war/calculating-war-pitchers/

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

You can say that again!!!!

Thatguy47
1 year ago

Your comment was about how teams value relievers more on a $/WAR basis and I brought up an example that directly addressed that argument. You argued multiple times that teams valued relievers above starters well beyond what WAR would indicate and haven’t provided any evidence to that.

Now you’re talking about how pitchers perform worse in the stretch and that isn’t captured by WAR but others have already pointed out that guys like Wagner overwhelmingly weren’t brought in with bases loaded, but rather in clean 9th innings. So that point isn’t relevant to Wagner.

It’s also not true that WAR doesn’t account for this stuff.

bWAR and fWAR factor in leverage, which includes inherited runners.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Leaving aside the self-parodying cherry-pick of the Walker contract…I do appreciate your acknowledgment that you don’t know how bWAR or fWAR work.

Last edited 1 year ago by Cool Lester Smooth
Thatguy47
1 year ago

Could you provide a single example of a reliever contract that’s wildly out of line with what WAR would suggest?

Some other examples:

Josh Hader: $95mil/5yrs heading into age 30 season off 1.7, .8, 2.6, .3 in 2020, 2.3, 2.6 WAR seasons.

Taillon: $68mil/4yrs heading into age 31 season off 2.4, 1.9, .8 in 2020, 3.9, 3.2 WAR seasons.

ERod: $80mil/4yrs into age 31 off 3.0, 3.9, 3.7, 2.1 WAR seasons.

Chris Bassitt: $63mil/3yrs into age 34 off 2.8, 3.3, 1.3 in 2020, 2.1, .6 WAR seasons.

What do you think about Chris Bassitt’s HoF candidacy? Because according to MLB teams he’s as valuable in his mid-30s as Hader and Edwin Diaz are in their primes.

According to you Wagner’s more valuable than Cliff Lee, who’s at least analogous to late 30’s Wheeler, Verlander, Scherzer for his career. I’m confused, where are all the relievers getting anywhere near $40mil/yr contracts?

How don’t I understand how WAR or sabermetrics works? Can you actually explain an argument rather than condescending to people?

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Using those numbers you provided and prorating for 2020…

RP Hader: $7.78M/WAR
SP Taillon: $6.27M/WAR
RP Rodriguez: $6.30M/WAR
SP Bassitt: $8.53M/WAR

Out of these four examples you cherry-picked, only one of them actually supports your argument that relievers don’t get paid more per WAR. Seriously, you’re just embarrassing yourself at this point.

Thatguy47
1 year ago
Reply to  Lanidrac

I’m embarrassing myself? You can’t even follow my argument. Even at $1.5mil more per WAR you don’t get anywhere close to 25 WAR reliever being as good as 60 WAR starters.

And how am I cherrypicking these guys I just pulled up all the midtier SP’s from the last couple offseasons? Can you find a single example of a RP who contradicts this argument?

Last edited 1 year ago by Thatguy47
Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

I would love for you to explain why you think that inherited runner outcomes should be excluded from any consideration of reliever value…and why WAR models should value starters who load the bases loaded differently based on their relievers’ performance.

Make a positive argument – Wagner smokes Lee in terms of aggregate value added, in fewer than half the innings, in the only available model that ascribes any value to a reliever stranding runners.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

What stat are you referring to? Can you post a link to it? Also, could you address anything I said?

a) Do you agree that MLB teams don’t pay relievers anywhere in line with what this stat suggests, and pay them very similarly to WAR values? Earlier you said they didn’t.

b) Can you see in the link that WAR does incorporate inherited runners, by way of including leverage? If not, how so?

Also what exactly is the argument for inherited runners? Before you said it was because pitching out of the stretch was more difficult, but the leverage factor accounts for this and besides that stretch vs windup isn’t that big of a difference, and as others have said Wagner barely pitched with inherited runners on. Is this the only factor you’re arguing for?

In terms of value by stranding runners, like I said I need to see the stat but a lot of times that gets into WPA territory where the same pitcher gets more value depending on the situation even though they’re the same quality of player and their ability to perform in certain situation’t already captured by War & stuff. Wagner was actually less clutch than average per WPA. So I need to see if that’s the only difference in how this stat’s calculated.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Ah, so we ARE on the same page that you lack the fundamental knowledge of sabermetrics (not to mention the “Ctrl-F” function on your browser) to have a remotely informed conversation on whether the current WAR frameworks align with how teams assess reliever value!

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Before your next reply, I hope you google a pair of terms:

“Run Expectancy” and “Base-Out States.”

I don’t want to get my hopes too high…but your research might even help you discover a relationship between those two concepts!

Last edited 1 year ago by Cool Lester Smooth
PC1970Member since 2024
1 year ago

Up above it was posted that Wagner only had 60 inherited runners for his ENTIRE career.

He was NOT coming as a “fireman”, like Gossage & Fingers did & like Sutter did in his1st 2-3 years. (or Tekulve, Quisenbery, etC)

Not sure anyone is saying stranding inherited runners isn’t valuable, but, since Wagner only faced 4-5 per year, it shouldn’t be used as a reason to vote him into the HOF.

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Your argument lost immediate credibility by using examples that include 2020 without prorating their WARs that year.

Meanwhile, even when you prorate 2020, Diaz still got paid $8.23M per WAR averaged over those past three seasons, which is indeed higher than almost all starting pitchers get. They aren’t getting $40M/year, BECAUSE they don’t generate as much WAR per year as starters do, but we’re talking about outperforming starter salaries on a rate basis here.

Some of your starter examples are also special cases. Verlander and Scherzer are future Hall of Famers who were recently still in excellent form despite being in their late 30’s, while DeGrom is still young and great enough to be an easy Cy Young contender if he can just stay healthy all year long.

Last edited 1 year ago by Lanidrac
sadtromboneMember since 2020
1 year ago

I have always been of the mind that relievers don’t pitch enough for the Hall of Fame. My three person reliever Hall of Fame is Eckersley (who had a Hall of Very Good career as a starter first), Gossage, and Rivera. And IIRC they pitched a huge amount in addition to having great rate stats.

There just has to be some minimum peak / career WAR for a Hall of Famer. Most of these guys are not even close.

marchandman34Member since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Totally agree, I just can’t flip my brain to see a 4th reliever being valuable enough to make the HOF.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Do you think that including Goose’s first two seasons (-0.3 fWAR, -2.8 RA9WAR) would help him close the aggregate RE24 gap between he and Wagner?

Billy obviously put up that slightly higher RE24 in literally half the innings pitched, but I recognize respect for longevity.

PC1970Member since 2024
1 year ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

I think I’d add Wilhelm, but, that sounds right to me. Even Finger, I think is more of “right place/right time” guy, not a true HOF pitcher.

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

The requirements need to be different for players who are just as dominant of players but simply can’t play as many innings due to the inherent mechanics of their role. It’s the same reason we lower expectations for catcher playing time.

PhilMember since 2016
1 year ago

I do dislike this argument that because most relivers are failed starting pitchers, they shouldn’t be in the HoF. Most position players are failed catchers, shortstops or centre fielders – is anyone going to argue that when Bryce Harper is eligible for the HoF that he shouldn’t be elected because he’s a failed catcher, and then a failed right fielder?

We’ve just had the LA Dodgers, who had 60% of innings pitched in the playoffs (if you include the opener as a reliver, which seems fair) pitched by relievers, win the World Series. Relief pitchers, as a collective, are really important. To use the comparison that the Kudzu Kid’s kid made, I assume the MLB equivalent of the backup goalie in the NHL is the back up catcher. Austin Barnes got into one game for the Dodgers in the playoffs – and didn’t bat, while their worst relievers pitched multiple times. (And you absolutely can make this argument in reverse – the Yankees rostered Stroman, and didn’t use him either as a starter or in relief)

Now, I do agree that it should be very very hard for a relief pitcher to make it into the Hall – their body of work just so limited.

I do like the thought experiment of how go would a platoon RF have to be to make the hall – or a pinch hitter, who gets 162 PA a season for 13 years. (But you would imagine that if those guys were that great, they would be given a full time role very quickly – for a reliver, the multi inning reliever doesn’t really exist anymore, and the workload jump from a 1 inning or 4 out guy to a starter is a big jump, though we have seen examples of guys making it work)

While teams value relief pitching in the aggregate, they don’t tend to value individual relievers. Individual relievers are very volatile – how surprised would you be if, for example, Evan Phillips put up a 5+ ERA and FIP next season, and was DFA’d by the Dodgers after 30 innings? The guys who are dominant relievers over a long period of time are very rare – and perhaps that should be part of their HoF argument.

Lanidrac
1 year ago
Reply to  Phil

The think is, that thinking is based on an flawed argument that hasn’t been true for over a half century in the first place. While there are still some failed starters who then make a career out of being a relief pitcher, these days most All-Star relievers are NOT failed starters.

Starters and relievers these days have two similar but separate skill sets.

Last edited 1 year ago by Lanidrac
Lanidrac
1 year ago

If platoon players were good enough for the Hall, they wouldn’t be platoon players in the first place.

The same is not true for relief pitchers, who possess a different set of skills from starters, at least they have for at least the past half century. While quite a few pitchers like Eckersly and Smoltz can be good or even great in both roles, they are still more of the exceptions than the rule.

Plus, there are a number of decent starters who may wind up temporarily in the bullpen and no longer be as good as they were in the rotation. Sometimes, a failed reliever can even become a good starter.

Last edited 1 year ago by Lanidrac
Veeck as in BeckMember since 2024
1 year ago

I’m not enamored with Wagner but given how close he is it would be a shame to not make it in on vote #10. Also the rags-to-riches story, and stepping away early while still in his prime, those are in his favor. Not enamored…but still cheering for him.

As an aside, some random reliver metrics below. I’d love to see Mike Marshall get some HOF consideration someday 🙂 And if someone argued Rich Gossage was the greatest reliever in baseball history I wouldn’t laugh at them.

Career Innings Pitcher per Relief Appearance (ignores all innings in a game started, and NOT an exhaustive top-20-or-whatever list, there are many names skipped):
McDaniel 1.89
Wilhelm 1.84
Marshall 1.80
Stu Miller 1.79
Fingers 1.66
McGraw 1.66
Gossage 1.61
Sutter 1.58
Garber 1.58
Lyle 1.55
Face 1.48
Tekulve 1.37
Gordon 1.23
Smith 1.23
Eckersley 1.14
Rivera 1.12
*** Wagner 1.06 ***
Hoffman 1.05
Nathan 1.00

Career Goose Eggs:
1 Gossage 677
2 Fingers 663
3 Wilhelm 641
4 Rivera 614
5 Franco 589
6 Smith 589
7 Hoffman 580
8 Sutter 557
9 McGraw 521
10 Reardon 520
11 Lyle 520
12 Tekulve 517
13 McDaniel 507
14 Marshall 489
15 Garber 468
16 Perranoski 444
17 K-Rod 433
18 Todd Jones 425
*** 19 Wagner 421 ***
20 Orosco 416

Best Single Season Reliever WPA:
1 Willie Hernandez 8.65
2 John Hiller 8.39
3 Doug Corbett 7.81
4 Stu Miller 7.3
5 Quisenberry 7.01
6 Gossage 6.98
7 Percival 6.59
8 Gagne 6.57
9 Aurelio Lopez 6.57
10 McGraw 6.52
11 Foulke 6.4
12 Britton 6.39
13 Treinen 6.33
14 Hoffman 6.26
15 Dick Radatz 6.23
16 Jose Mesa 6.14
17 Ray Narleski 6.11
18 J.J. Putz 5.95
*** 19 Billy Wagner 5.89 ***
20 Gossage 5.87

Lastly, Peak Reliever WPA (i.e. WPA7):
1 Gossage 33.1
2 Rivera 30.9
3 McGraw 28.8
4 Nathan 28.5
5 Hoffman 27.5
*** 6 Wagner 25.2 ***
7 Papelbon 25.0
8 Quisenberry 24.7
9 Stu Miller 23.4
10 Kimbrel 23.3

DannyMember since 2016
1 year ago

“He’s no Rivera, but he’s hardly out of place in a group that includes Hoffman, Smith, Fingers, and Sutter.”

And, well, therein lies the problem.

While I appreciate the analysis and I do think that Wagner is better than those guys, it’s (1) not by much, and (2) it’s not a particularly impressive list, in my view. At least half of that list are clear mistakes by your analysis.

Relief pitching is so inherently fickle and volatile that the margins of greatness are necessarily much smaller than at any other position. I am simply not comfortable saying that Wagner is appreciably better than legions of rough competitors: Nathan, Jansen, Kimbrel, Gordon, etc., and without confidence in the distinctions, Wagner would become permission to induct most of these guys rather than a bright line keeping them out.

Relievers are just different. I don’t want to oppose all of them on the basis that they are just failed starters, but I cannot ignore that reality either. I think we need to establish the presumption that close cases at this position should not be inducted.

…for that reason, I’m out.

Ivan_GrushenkoMember since 2016
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

You can add Papelbon and the great Darren O’Day

g4Member since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

Excellent pull quote Danny. I had the same gut reaction about comparisons to Sutter and Smith, in particular. I like Fingers and Hoffman more, but they too at best squeaked over the proverbial line.

Wagner’s best argument is that he was more effective than all of them. But the lack of longevity drops him right back alongside these warm bodies.

Thatguy47
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

No offense to the writers here who are some of the best in the business but there’s clearly more of a nostalgia that’s motivating the reliever HoF candidacies than a strong logic. There’s just not a compelling argument that these guys are anywhere near good enough to warrant election but baseball writers and fans nonetheless twist and turn to find ways to make it work even though it doesn’t.

Fact is relievers are getting into the HoF in part because a lot of these guys grew up seeing people like Wagner with insanely low ERAs, misperceived how valuable a very low ERA was over a very small amount of innings and idolized them as iconic players due in part to the perception of them coming into close games and being lockdown guys, and now are struggling to reconcile that perspective with the reality than none of these guys were all that valuable over their careers.

That’s my impression anyway. When I was younger I was also confident that Wagner, Robb Nen, John Wetteland, Eric Gagne, Papelbon, and others were alltime greats and deserving HoFers (at some point or another in each’s career), but I was wrong. Not sure all these writers have come to that same realization.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Statcast says that Emmanuel Clase provided more pitching run value than Corbin Burnes this year, in 120 fewer innings.

Because, unlike FG and BRef’s models, Statcast thinks that stranding runners is an important part of reliever performance, and should be measured.

I agree with Statcast.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

It’s very reasonable that a .61 ERA in 74.1 IP could be considered better than a 2.92 ERA in 194.1 IP. If the disparity in ERA between Wagner and HoF pitchers was that vast he would likely be a deserving candidate even with as few innings as he has. But it isn’t.

I’m not familiar with Statcast’s model or even what you’re referring to (xERA?), but the fact is MLB teams pay pitchers pretty consistent to their WAR whether they’re relievers or starters. None of this stuff gets you to territory where more than a couple of relievers are as valuable over their careers over HoF and many nonHoF starters.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Statcast also has Luke Weaver ahead of Garrett Crochet, this year.

The core concept of Pitcher Run Value is that if a pitcher leaves an inning with the bases loaded and one out, they pitched poorly in that inning, whether the reliever gets a GIDP or allows a bases clearing double.

It also thinks that a reliever who allows a bases clearing double before ending the inning pitched poorly, and that a reliever who gets a GIDP was extraordinarily valuable.

Every method of WAR disagrees with these principles.

Thatguy47
1 year ago

No it doesn’t disagree, it just smooths over this stuff. I’m having trouble finding the stat you’re referencing, but I would imagine that if it’s a stat that’s at all rational then someone like Luke Weaver had a fluke year in terms of getting GIDP’s and avoiding big hits with inherited runners and over the longrun would vastly underperform Crochet.

Because there’s no team that’s valuing Luke Weaver over Crochet, so if that’s the actual result of the stat and not a fluke then it’s a bunk stat.

Also Luke Weaver was at 84 IP this year vs Crochet 146IP, so that’s no really reflective of Wagner 900IP vs Hamels/Felix/whoever 2500+IP regardless.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Thatguy47

Dude.

If you think a model intentionally choosing to exclude every single datum regarding inherited runners in its framework of valuing relievers is “smoothing over that stuff,” rather than *disagreeing* with the concept that relievers can provide value via their performance with inherited runners…you’re almost certainly not equipped to make this a useful conversation.

Last edited 1 year ago by Cool Lester Smooth
Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

Leaving aside the fact that Billy Wagner wasn’t a failed starter…he was appreciably better at stopping other teams from scoring runs than all of those guys – in the latter group, Nathan’s the only one close to Smith.

PC1970Member since 2024
1 year ago
Reply to  Danny

& K-rod & Papelbon..just opens the doors to many similar pitchers.

I’m not sure I wouldn’t vote for Tekulve, Quisenbery, Mike Marshall, Hiller, Franco, Lyle etc over him. Those guys pitched multiple innings in a true fireman role, way more volume of innings in tougher situations, not just coming in at the start of the 9th.

That said, IMO, none of them are HOF’ers.

drewsylvaniaMember since 2019
1 year ago

Put him in.

riffkeyMember since 2024
1 year ago

I think two things can be true at the same time – elite or near-elite relievers aren’t as valuable as elite, near-elite and very good starters AND there can be a place for them in the Hall of Fame. The demand for and cost of elite relievers, along with what their teammates say, reveals that they have plenty of value. We also can’t quantify the psychological boost of their consistency. In fact, the verifiable inconsistency of most relievers increases the value of elite consistent ones, in my mind.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
1 year ago
Reply to  riffkey

I agree that a lot of the opposition to Wagner has come within the context that Kimbrel and Jansen would inevitably surpass him.

…and I feel like the anti-Wagner crew hasn’t managed to adjust to how goddamn clear it is that Kimbrel and Jansen are closer to Papelbon than Joe Nathan.

Tanned Tom
1 year ago

No. Hall should be Wilhelm, Fingers, Gossage and Rivera. Not enough innings of work, and brutal post season performance.

LMOTFOTEMember since 2017
1 year ago
Reply to  Tanned Tom

I’m basically with you but I’d swap Eckersly for Fingers. Once you let in Fingers and Sutter the door opens for another dozen guys who are close to them. For me the bottom guy to get in would be Hoffman.

PC1970Member since 2024
1 year ago
Reply to  Tanned Tom

Good point on his playoff record.

To me, that is the final straw on his candidacy. In the true biggest games of his career, Wagner was terrible. Maybe bad luck, maybe bad pitching, who knows for sure, but, the result is what matters.

He’s borderline, at best, but, IMO that pushes him to the “no” vote.

ballparknerd40Member since 2024
1 year ago

One of the best pieces of baseball writing I’ve read was Joe Sheehan’s newsletter on Trevor Hoffman’s HOF candidacy. Sheehan compared Hoffman’s career with fellow Padre Andy Benes. It put all the thoughts I had about closers who lacked postseason success into focus. As a Mets fan who witnessed Wagner’s collapse during the 2006 postseason there’s no way I will ever think of him as a Hall of Famer. All the analysis is great; for me Hall of Fame shouldn’t be something you need to drill down on every number to decide. Guys like Hoffman and Wagner were good players who compiled an arbitrary stat that could have been accomplished by the Andy Benes’s of the world.

ballparknerd40Member since 2024
1 year ago

I am going to have to spend time telling the grand kids why guys like Schilling, Bonds, Belle and Alex Rodriguez aren’t in the Hall of Fame but lesser players like Wagner, Baines and Hoffman are.