Ned Yost Left Edinson Volquez in Too Long

The manager of the Royals was his typical Yostian self heading into Game Five of the American League Championship Series. He went into the game with a 3-1 lead, needing just one victory out of four games to advance to a second straight World Series. He joked about the possibility of “watching 35 drunk guys try to get through customs” if the Royals clinched in Toronto. He put Alcides Escobar in leadoff spot so Escobar could work his magic. He sent 32-year-old Edinson Volquez to the mound against the Toronto Blue Jays to try and clinch the American League crown, and for a time he got nearly the best performance he could ask for from the right-hander.

Volquez, pitching for his fifth team in five years, had his best season in half a dozen years after the Royals signed him to a two-year, $20 million contract with an option for a third season. From 2009 to 2014, Volquez pitched nearly 800 innings, putting up a mediocre 4.46 ERA (121 ERA-) and 4.35 FIP (114 FIP-) and amassing just four wins above replacement in six seasons. He put up a good 3.04 ERA in 2014, aided by a low .263 BABIP and a very good Pittsburgh Pirates defense as his 4.15 FIP indicated not much had changed. Despite high velocity, Volquez struck out players at a below average rate, although he had dropped his walk rate in recent seasons. He pitched well in two postseason games entering yesterday, with 13 strikeouts and just 3 runs conceded in 11.2 innings over two starts, but spread out eight walks and was the clear third option behind Yordano Ventura and Johnny Cueto.

Volquez started yesterday’s game with surprising velocity. He exceeded 98 mph on his sinker in the first inning, a speed he topped only one time in the last three seasons, back in May 2014, per Brooks Baseball. Volquez appeared to be cruising through five innings, giving up just three hits, including a solo home run to Chris Colabello, but there were a few warning signs. Volquez’s velocity was not leading to strikeouts nor did it generate very many swings and misses. He had just two strikeouts, and generated just five swings and misses on 88 pitches (5.7%). When hitters swung at Volquez’s offerings they tended to make contact, as the five swings and misses do not look any better when compared to the 41 swings (12.2%), per Brooks Baseball.

Adding to the lack of strikeouts, Volquez appeared to lose velocity as the game went on. The graph below from Brooks Baseball shows the velocity of Volquez’s pitches for Volquez’s first five innings.

Volquezmph

The groupings above each represent an inning and there is a pretty clear trend downward. He didn’t reach 98 mph after the second inning, and by the fifth inning he couldn’t get higher than 96 mph, a two mph hour drop from the beginning of the game. The fifth inning went well results-wise. He struck out Dioner Navarro for one of his two strikeouts on the day, and he gave up only a soft infield single to Kevin Pillar. But in addition to the drop in velocity, Volquez appeared to be losing his grip on the strike zone. The graph below shows where Volquez pitched in the fifth inning.

Volquez5

Of the 16 pitches made in the fifth inning, only seven were in the strike zone. Volquez got out of the inning without any problem, and through five innings, he had given up just the one run off the second-inning home run. It was at this point, that Ned Yost went a little off his recent track record in the playoffs.

After sweeping the Los Angeles Angels in the American League Division Series in 2014, the Royals sent out James Shields to pitch Game 1 of the American League Championship Series. With a 5-1 lead heading to the bottom of the fifth, Shields began pitching to the top of the Orioles lineup for the third time of the game. Shields got out of the inning, but three runs had scored and Baltimore was in striking distance. Shields was removed from the game, beginning a streak of eight games where the Royals pitcher was relieved before making it through the fifth inning. Yost limited exposure to his pitchers and relied on his great bullpen to reach the brink of a championship. The chart below shows the innings pitched by starters in the postseason last year along with the number of batters the pitcher faced after the first two times through the order (denoted by TTO), the game situation when the starter exited and the number of runs given up the third time through the order (a plus-sign represents runners left on base by the pitcher that eventually scored).

Ned Yost’s Early Hook in 2014 Playoffs
Game Pitcher IP TTO Batters Game Status Runs TTO
ALCS 1 James Shields 5.0 8 U1 3
ALCS 2 Yordano Ventura 5.2 7 Tie 1
ALCS 3 Jeremy Guthrie 5.0 2 Tie 0
ALCS 4 Jason Vargas 5.1 1 D1 0
WS 1 James Shields 3.0+ 0 D3 0
WS 2 Yordano Ventura 5.1 5 Tie 0
WS 3 Jeremy Guthrie 5.0 0 U2 0
WS 4 Jason Vargas 4.0 2 U2 0+
WS 5 James Shields 6.0 9 D2 0
WS 6 Yordano Ventura 7.0 10 U9 0
WS 7 Jeremy Guthrie 3.1 0 Tie 0+
AVERAGE 4.52 4

Yost trusted Shields, but other than letting Ventura work in a blowout, he removed pitchers at the first sign of trouble. Given the number of runners that scored late in pitcher appearances, Yost’s formula yielded positive results. This season, Yost has not been as aggressive. Repeating the same chart above for this season reveals the following.

Ned Yost’s Patience in 2015 Playoffs
Game Pitcher IP TTO Batters Game Status Runs 3rd Time
ALDS 1 Yordano Ventura 2.0 0 D3 0
ALDS 2 Johnny Cueto 6.0 9 D2 0
ALDS 3 Edinson Volquez 5.2 6 D2 1
ALDS 4 Yordano Ventura 5.0 5 D1 1
ALDS 5 Johnny Cueto 8.0 8 U5 0
ALCS 1 Edinson Volquez 6.0 6 U3 0
ALCS 2 Yordano Ventura 5.1 7 D3 2
ALCS 3 Johnny Cueto 2.0+ 0 D4 0
ALCS 4 Chris Young 4.2 1 U3 0
ALCS 5 Edinson Volquez 5.0+ 4 D2 1+
AVERAGE 4.97 4.6

Despite two outings of just two innings (the first due to a rain delay), the higher average indicates Yost has given his pitchers a bit more leeway, and it has not entirely paid off. Due to the incredible late-inning efforts by the Royals offense, Yost’s reluctance to aggressively deploy his bullpen the same way he did in 2014 had not hurt him until yesterday. When Volquez went out for the sixth inning, he had thrown just 64 pitches and the team was down just one run. Switching the pitcher out was not demanded by typical measurements, but in the postseason, Yost’s quick hook had previously been rewarded.

The loss of velocity and lack of control continued in the sixth inning for Volquez. He walked Ben Revere. With the heart of the lineup coming up, no move was made. He then hit Josh Donaldson, but no move was made. While the ensuing walk to Jose Bautista was somewhat controversial, Volquez did not have great command and hitters fouled off the pitches in the zone. A coaching visit to the mound resulted in no move to the bullpen. Not until Volquez walked in a run was a move made. When the inning started, the Royals’ win expectancy was 25.7%. Volquez left with the bases loaded and a two-run deficit. The win expectancy had dropped to 6.9% even before Yost called on the bullpen. Kelvin Herrera struck out the side, but a double to Troy Tulowitzki broke the game open and turned the game from a pitcher’s duel into an easy Toronto win as the Royals’ win expectancy declined all the way to 3.0% — although the damage was done before Tulowitzki stepped to the plate. While most managers might not have taken Volquez out in that situation, Yost managed his team into the World Series by going to his bullpen early in games. The Royals still have a 3-2 lead and are headed back home, but they missed a chance to keep the game in reach and try to close out the series without having to play another game.





Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.

34 Comments
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dan
8 years ago

So he should have brought in the reliever sooner, but the reliever let the game get out of hand, so…

Concerned Reader John
8 years ago
Reply to  dan

The thinking is that if Herrera goes in earlier, the bases are less likely to be loaded, Revere isn’t walked home, and the double doesn’t score three more runs.

Mark
8 years ago
Reply to  dan

You’re mistaking process and result. Volquez shouldn’t have been allowed to face the middle of the Jays lineup when he was clearly struggling. I was at the game telling my buddy there was no way Yost lets Volquez face Donaldson/JB/EE again if anybody is on base because you could tell he wasn’t going to get them out another time. You’re playing with fire on that one, especially with KC having an off day tomorrow (and longer if they win the game) so you could be aggressive with the bullpen.

Had they gone to Herrera earlier, like for JB/EE (or even Donaldson), there’s a better chance of Herrera shutting down the Jays. Instead, Volquez couldn’t get the middle of the order out, which put Herrera in a nearly impossible situation. Bases loaded, nobody out and Cola/Tulo/Navarro up.

It was poor planning by Yost. With a strong bullpen and an off day and the middle of the lineup up and a struggling Volquez, it wasn’t the time to gamble on Volquez. You have a talented, rested bullpen, and you choose not to use it. Yost and the Royals deserved to lose the game for making a poor decision at the worst possible time.

As a Jays fan at the game I couldn’t have been happier. The Volquez chants were clearly messing with him, he was losing his command, and there’s no excuse for not going to the bullpen there. You have an elite strength, and you choose not to use it. Embarrassing display of managing there.

Walter
8 years ago
Reply to  dan

There is a good chance Tulo doesn’t even come to the plate if Yost goes to Herrera after Donaldson get plunked. And really, Herrera should have been in there to pitch to JD anyways.

TBJESE
8 years ago
Reply to  dan

Incorrect. Volquez let the game get out of hand by allowing 4 straight baserunners with recording an out. Herrera then allowed a double and struck out 3 consecutive batters.

Even if you confused process with results, the results still show that the earlier you get to Herrera, the better.