Ned Yost Left Edinson Volquez in Too Long
The manager of the Royals was his typical Yostian self heading into Game Five of the American League Championship Series. He went into the game with a 3-1 lead, needing just one victory out of four games to advance to a second straight World Series. He joked about the possibility of “watching 35 drunk guys try to get through customs” if the Royals clinched in Toronto. He put Alcides Escobar in leadoff spot so Escobar could work his magic. He sent 32-year-old Edinson Volquez to the mound against the Toronto Blue Jays to try and clinch the American League crown, and for a time he got nearly the best performance he could ask for from the right-hander.
Volquez, pitching for his fifth team in five years, had his best season in half a dozen years after the Royals signed him to a two-year, $20 million contract with an option for a third season. From 2009 to 2014, Volquez pitched nearly 800 innings, putting up a mediocre 4.46 ERA (121 ERA-) and 4.35 FIP (114 FIP-) and amassing just four wins above replacement in six seasons. He put up a good 3.04 ERA in 2014, aided by a low .263 BABIP and a very good Pittsburgh Pirates defense as his 4.15 FIP indicated not much had changed. Despite high velocity, Volquez struck out players at a below average rate, although he had dropped his walk rate in recent seasons. He pitched well in two postseason games entering yesterday, with 13 strikeouts and just 3 runs conceded in 11.2 innings over two starts, but spread out eight walks and was the clear third option behind Yordano Ventura and Johnny Cueto.
Volquez started yesterday’s game with surprising velocity. He exceeded 98 mph on his sinker in the first inning, a speed he topped only one time in the last three seasons, back in May 2014, per Brooks Baseball. Volquez appeared to be cruising through five innings, giving up just three hits, including a solo home run to Chris Colabello, but there were a few warning signs. Volquez’s velocity was not leading to strikeouts nor did it generate very many swings and misses. He had just two strikeouts, and generated just five swings and misses on 88 pitches (5.7%). When hitters swung at Volquez’s offerings they tended to make contact, as the five swings and misses do not look any better when compared to the 41 swings (12.2%), per Brooks Baseball.
Adding to the lack of strikeouts, Volquez appeared to lose velocity as the game went on. The graph below from Brooks Baseball shows the velocity of Volquez’s pitches for Volquez’s first five innings.
The groupings above each represent an inning and there is a pretty clear trend downward. He didn’t reach 98 mph after the second inning, and by the fifth inning he couldn’t get higher than 96 mph, a two mph hour drop from the beginning of the game. The fifth inning went well results-wise. He struck out Dioner Navarro for one of his two strikeouts on the day, and he gave up only a soft infield single to Kevin Pillar. But in addition to the drop in velocity, Volquez appeared to be losing his grip on the strike zone. The graph below shows where Volquez pitched in the fifth inning.
Of the 16 pitches made in the fifth inning, only seven were in the strike zone. Volquez got out of the inning without any problem, and through five innings, he had given up just the one run off the second-inning home run. It was at this point, that Ned Yost went a little off his recent track record in the playoffs.
After sweeping the Los Angeles Angels in the American League Division Series in 2014, the Royals sent out James Shields to pitch Game 1 of the American League Championship Series. With a 5-1 lead heading to the bottom of the fifth, Shields began pitching to the top of the Orioles lineup for the third time of the game. Shields got out of the inning, but three runs had scored and Baltimore was in striking distance. Shields was removed from the game, beginning a streak of eight games where the Royals pitcher was relieved before making it through the fifth inning. Yost limited exposure to his pitchers and relied on his great bullpen to reach the brink of a championship. The chart below shows the innings pitched by starters in the postseason last year along with the number of batters the pitcher faced after the first two times through the order (denoted by TTO), the game situation when the starter exited and the number of runs given up the third time through the order (a plus-sign represents runners left on base by the pitcher that eventually scored).
| Game | Pitcher | IP | TTO Batters | Game Status | Runs TTO |
| ALCS 1 | James Shields | 5.0 | 8 | U1 | 3 |
| ALCS 2 | Yordano Ventura | 5.2 | 7 | Tie | 1 |
| ALCS 3 | Jeremy Guthrie | 5.0 | 2 | Tie | 0 |
| ALCS 4 | Jason Vargas | 5.1 | 1 | D1 | 0 |
| WS 1 | James Shields | 3.0+ | 0 | D3 | 0 |
| WS 2 | Yordano Ventura | 5.1 | 5 | Tie | 0 |
| WS 3 | Jeremy Guthrie | 5.0 | 0 | U2 | 0 |
| WS 4 | Jason Vargas | 4.0 | 2 | U2 | 0+ |
| WS 5 | James Shields | 6.0 | 9 | D2 | 0 |
| WS 6 | Yordano Ventura | 7.0 | 10 | U9 | 0 |
| WS 7 | Jeremy Guthrie | 3.1 | 0 | Tie | 0+ |
| AVERAGE | 4.52 | 4 |
Yost trusted Shields, but other than letting Ventura work in a blowout, he removed pitchers at the first sign of trouble. Given the number of runners that scored late in pitcher appearances, Yost’s formula yielded positive results. This season, Yost has not been as aggressive. Repeating the same chart above for this season reveals the following.
| Game | Pitcher | IP | TTO Batters | Game Status | Runs 3rd Time |
| ALDS 1 | Yordano Ventura | 2.0 | 0 | D3 | 0 |
| ALDS 2 | Johnny Cueto | 6.0 | 9 | D2 | 0 |
| ALDS 3 | Edinson Volquez | 5.2 | 6 | D2 | 1 |
| ALDS 4 | Yordano Ventura | 5.0 | 5 | D1 | 1 |
| ALDS 5 | Johnny Cueto | 8.0 | 8 | U5 | 0 |
| ALCS 1 | Edinson Volquez | 6.0 | 6 | U3 | 0 |
| ALCS 2 | Yordano Ventura | 5.1 | 7 | D3 | 2 |
| ALCS 3 | Johnny Cueto | 2.0+ | 0 | D4 | 0 |
| ALCS 4 | Chris Young | 4.2 | 1 | U3 | 0 |
| ALCS 5 | Edinson Volquez | 5.0+ | 4 | D2 | 1+ |
| AVERAGE | 4.97 | 4.6 |
Despite two outings of just two innings (the first due to a rain delay), the higher average indicates Yost has given his pitchers a bit more leeway, and it has not entirely paid off. Due to the incredible late-inning efforts by the Royals offense, Yost’s reluctance to aggressively deploy his bullpen the same way he did in 2014 had not hurt him until yesterday. When Volquez went out for the sixth inning, he had thrown just 64 pitches and the team was down just one run. Switching the pitcher out was not demanded by typical measurements, but in the postseason, Yost’s quick hook had previously been rewarded.
The loss of velocity and lack of control continued in the sixth inning for Volquez. He walked Ben Revere. With the heart of the lineup coming up, no move was made. He then hit Josh Donaldson, but no move was made. While the ensuing walk to Jose Bautista was somewhat controversial, Volquez did not have great command and hitters fouled off the pitches in the zone. A coaching visit to the mound resulted in no move to the bullpen. Not until Volquez walked in a run was a move made. When the inning started, the Royals’ win expectancy was 25.7%. Volquez left with the bases loaded and a two-run deficit. The win expectancy had dropped to 6.9% even before Yost called on the bullpen. Kelvin Herrera struck out the side, but a double to Troy Tulowitzki broke the game open and turned the game from a pitcher’s duel into an easy Toronto win as the Royals’ win expectancy declined all the way to 3.0% — although the damage was done before Tulowitzki stepped to the plate. While most managers might not have taken Volquez out in that situation, Yost managed his team into the World Series by going to his bullpen early in games. The Royals still have a 3-2 lead and are headed back home, but they missed a chance to keep the game in reach and try to close out the series without having to play another game.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
So he should have brought in the reliever sooner, but the reliever let the game get out of hand, so…
The thinking is that if Herrera goes in earlier, the bases are less likely to be loaded, Revere isn’t walked home, and the double doesn’t score three more runs.
You’re mistaking process and result. Volquez shouldn’t have been allowed to face the middle of the Jays lineup when he was clearly struggling. I was at the game telling my buddy there was no way Yost lets Volquez face Donaldson/JB/EE again if anybody is on base because you could tell he wasn’t going to get them out another time. You’re playing with fire on that one, especially with KC having an off day tomorrow (and longer if they win the game) so you could be aggressive with the bullpen.
Had they gone to Herrera earlier, like for JB/EE (or even Donaldson), there’s a better chance of Herrera shutting down the Jays. Instead, Volquez couldn’t get the middle of the order out, which put Herrera in a nearly impossible situation. Bases loaded, nobody out and Cola/Tulo/Navarro up.
It was poor planning by Yost. With a strong bullpen and an off day and the middle of the lineup up and a struggling Volquez, it wasn’t the time to gamble on Volquez. You have a talented, rested bullpen, and you choose not to use it. Yost and the Royals deserved to lose the game for making a poor decision at the worst possible time.
As a Jays fan at the game I couldn’t have been happier. The Volquez chants were clearly messing with him, he was losing his command, and there’s no excuse for not going to the bullpen there. You have an elite strength, and you choose not to use it. Embarrassing display of managing there.
There is a good chance Tulo doesn’t even come to the plate if Yost goes to Herrera after Donaldson get plunked. And really, Herrera should have been in there to pitch to JD anyways.
Incorrect. Volquez let the game get out of hand by allowing 4 straight baserunners with recording an out. Herrera then allowed a double and struck out 3 consecutive batters.
Even if you confused process with results, the results still show that the earlier you get to Herrera, the better.
Anecdotally, as a Jays fan watching the game, I was quite happy to see Volquez stay in for Encarnacion. You could “feel” that they were getting to him.
How where the Jays getting to him? Volquez did not give up a hit that inning. He also had a pitch in a location that is typically called a strike on fastballs get called a ball. That pitch would have struck out Bautista if called correctly – if the location is a strike on a fastball it should be a strike on a non-fastball.
He didn’t give up a hit but let three base runners on and walked in a run with the fourth…
Patience Bob, they got to him through patience. And that pitch is only called a strike half the time, and even less so for breaking pitches that drop further out of the zone. Go read Jeff Sullivan’s excellent article regarding this and you’ll see. Pretty much the definition of a pitch in the gray zone that could go either way. So you can’t really get to butt hurt over it.
Pitch could have gone either way. I think thats just a really hard pitch the call. A fastball isn’t dropping several inches after it crosses the plate. The ump doesn’t get to watch the slow mo side replay to see exactly where it was when it crossed the plate. It was well low when caught and that influences the call.
I don’t think there’s nearly enough evidence for you to say that pitch wasn’t called correctly with such certainty.
It was a borderline pitch. It literally could have gone either way and one team would be upset. Even if you include fastballs, that pitch is a called strike less than half the time, so it’s pretty strange to say that it should have been a called strike.
“He also had a pitch in a location that is typically called a strike on fastballs get called a ball.”
First, pitches in that location generally get called a strike 47% of the time. That’s not typical.
Second, that pitch was not a fastball. Non-fastballs in that location get called a strike 29% of the time. Definitely not typically called a strike. If anything, it is typically called a ball.
It was a great pitch. The trouble was that he threw it to a guy who has a great feel for the strike zone and who correctly judged that it would not be called a strike.
The pitch was the definition of borderline, not “typically called a strike”. 47% call on fastballs, 29% on curveballs. Good pitch by Volquez, great take by Jose.
The pitch is called a strike 47% of the time overall (fastballs + non-fastballs). Since it is only called a strike 29% of the time on non-fastballs, the percentage of strikes called on a fastball in that location must be higher than 47%, much higher, so that the mean ends up at 47%. I am just saying that it appears to me that a pitch in that location is a strike based on the majority of umps calling it a strike on a fastball. But on non-fastballs it should be a strike too because the location should matter, not type of pitch. I understand the difficulty of making a call a non-fastball, but it appears most umps are calling the non-fastballs in that location erroneously.
Not a results based comment, it just appeared as though they weren’t chasing balls and weren’t missing the strikes. At bats were getting longer, swings were more aggressive and confident. Early on in the game that didn’t appear to be the case.
That is my kind of comment. You always need to trust your gut!
I trust mine!
Tulo’s double (the play that got the game out of hand) was more on Cain than Herrera. Cain came in at first on the play. Had Cain made the correct jump on the ball he would most likely have caught Tulo’s ball. Only second time this season that Cain came in on a ball over his head where he still didn’t end up making the catch.
Huh? That ball was the textbook definition of a gapper. Hit hard, deep, not too much air under it, to a midpoint between the outfielders.
I think you’re confusing Tulo’s double with Pillar’s double that scored Tulo later.
Are you thinking of Pillar’s double in the 8th?
Tulo’s double was in the gap, no Royal was anywhere near where it landed: http://mediadownloads.mlb.com/mlbam/2015/10/21/mlbtv_kcator_525058983_1200K.mp4
I can’t find video of Pillar’s double, but it was just over Cain’s glove.
Your confusing plays again Bob.
As noted below, I admit my mistake/confusion.
It seemed like Volquez just stopped pitching and was just throwing as hard as he could. The ump didn’t give him a few calls and he just tried to throw it harder.
Your patience chart has NLCS instead of AL.
My bad. You guys are right. I was thinking of Pillar’s double in the 8th. Tulo got a nice hit off of Herrera. Pillar’s double was the one that Cain makes 98 or 99 times out of 100.
ALCS Game #2: John Gibbons Left David Price in Too Long
Sure, he had a 1-hitter to that point, but that TTO is a killer!
Difference is that the royals have a deep and strong bullpen.
Price wasn’t going to get pulled because you essentially can only trust Osuna, and to a lesser degree Lowe, Sanchez only vs RHP.
If cecil was available you maybe think to bring him in when Price got in trouble
Have you seen Lowe and Hendriks’ ERA and peripherals this season? They were both top 30 relievers in terms of WAR.
For me they were an obvious upgrade over Price at that point of the game against RH batters. Problem is that every 2nd batter that came up that inning was a lefty.
Still I think you have to go to the bullpen after Hosmer singled.
In the end, I don’t think Gibbons’ decision to stick with Price was nearly as egregious as Yosts’ because of the Blue Jays’ lack of LH options as well as having one of the best SPs on the mound
Very true, though perhaps weight the Gibbons decision by the lack of elite relievers able to get LH hitters out (Cecil out and Loup underperforming/family issues) and the fact that Price is a past and potential 2015 Cy Young winner.
That being said I think Gibbons will likely bring him out earlier if given the same situation in Game 6.
I was shocked but not surprised when Yost left Volquez in as long as he did. It made no sense given the fact that there was a day off coming up and Herrera and Davis haven’t exactly been overworked, but in the playoffs I’ve had the feeling that Yost just doesn’t have the killer instinct he had last year, he’s kind of letting things happen.
I really don’t think he did.
You speak of the 7/16 zone rate on pitches in the 5th as if it were low, but this converts to just under 44%. Volquez’s career strike rate on pitches is about 46%. This is hardly evidence for a lack of control, especially given the number of pitches just outside the zone.