FanGraphs Baseball

Baseball may have seemed to have solved the catcher concussion problem when it instituted new rules governing the play at the plate in 2014. Despite some hiccups, eliminating the play at the plate seems to eliminate the main source of player on player in-game violence — and the other, the play at second base, is currently under scrutiny. Despite the odd pitch to the head and outfielder into the wall, that should make baseball one of the safest sports for a young brain. The numbers, especially for catchers, provide hope.

But there is still one repetitive play that causes concussions regularly for catchers — and there might be a fix to that problem, too. A fix that seems to come with even fewer ramifications for the game.

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Over the weekend, Pirates ace Gerrit Cole expressed some unhappiness with the organization based on his 2016 salary.

On Saturday, Cole grudgingly signed a deal for $541,000 in base salary. That’s the same amount he made last year — $531,000 in base pay play a $10,000 bonus for making the All-Star team.

According to Cole, the team’s initial offer last week was for $538,000 – which was less than his total pay last year. The team refused to go higher than $541,000.

“They even threatened a salary reduction to the league minimum if I did not agree,” Cole said.

As a pre-arb player, Cole’s salary is dictated to him by management, and per the rules of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, he has no recourse but to accept whatever they offer. If he chose not to sign for the $541,000 they offered him, they had the power to unilaterally renew his contract at whatever price they wanted, even down to that $507,500 league-minimum number. Until a player reaches arbitration eligibility, they have no negotiating power whatsoever, so even elite players like Cole make something close to the league minimum.

MLB’s pay scale is intentionally designed to restrict the earnings of young players, with the resultant savings being passed on to veterans who are free to negotiate their wages in free agency. As with many unions, length of service is a larger factor than performance in determining wages, with younger players subsidizing the wages of older workers. Cole understands this system, and his grief doesn’t appear to be with the wage scale itself, as much as the Pirates’ implementation of their system of pre-arb raises.

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Early this morning, the full 2016 ZiPS projections went live on the site. This is probably news to many of you. Surprise! Happy ZiPS day. You can now export the full ZiPS spreadsheet from that link, find individual projections on the player pages, and view our live-updating playoff odds, which are powered by a 50/50 blend of ZiPS and Steamer. This is good news for everyone, including us, the authors, because now we have more information with which to work.

And so here’s a post that I did last year, and one which I was waiting for the full ZiPS rollout to do again: previewing the year’s team defenses. It’s been a few years running now that we’ve marveled over speedy outfielders in blue jerseys zooming about the spacious Kauffman Stadium outfield, and now those speedy outfielders in blue jerseys are all World Series champions. People are thinking and talking about defense more than ever, and you don’t think and talk about defense without thinking and talking about the Kansas City Royals. Defense: it’s so hot right now. Defense.

The methodology here is simple. ZiPS considers past defensive performance and mixes in some scouting report information to give an overall “defensive runs above or below average” projection. Steamer does the same, except rather than searching for keywords from real scouting reports, it regresses towards the data from the Fans Scouting Report project compiled by Tangotiger every year. The final number is an average of these two figures, and can be found in the “Fld” section of the depth charts and player pages. It isn’t exactly Ultimate Zone Rating or Defensive Runs Saved, but it’s the same idea, and the same scale.

Let’s look ahead toward the year in defense.

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The Best

1. Kansas City Royals

This is one of my new favorite fun facts: the Royals outfield defense, just the outfield, is projected for 31 runs saved, which is higher than any other entire team in baseball. And with Alex Rios out of the mix in right field and Jarrod Dyson and Paulo Orlando stepping in full-time, Kansas City’s outfield defense should somehow be even better than it’s been in the past.

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Flashback to February of 2006. Lindsay Lohan has never been to jail, Steve Irwin’s alive and well, and we still have three years of Bieber-free living to look forward to. More importantly, though, Baseball America has just put out its annual top 100 prospect list.

Now that a decade’s passed, and we know how each of these players turned out, let’s look back at some of these players’ prospect years. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned — statistically or otherwise — from their case studies that might be useful in evaluating today’s prospects. Keep in mind that these players are all just anecdotes. They represent merely a few data points among thousands, and therefore shouldn’t be used to draw any sweeping conclusions. But still: real-world examples are always fun, and names and faces are a great way to bring macro-level trends to life.

Below each name, you’ll see three WAR figures. The first is that player’s historical KATOH forecast — that is, what KATOH would have projected given the relevant prospect’s minor-league numbers. The second was calculated using the formula derived by Jeff Zimmerman in this year’s Hardball Times Annual applied to each player’s 2006 BA ranking. The third is that player’s actual (positive) WAR total throughout the period of time forecasted by KATOH. (So for players 22 and younger, that’s thru age-28. For players 23 and over, it’s the first six years.)

Essentially, you have KATOH’s projection, BA’s projection, and what actually happened. I tried to glean some sort of lesson from each of these case studies, even if the lesson wasn’t particularly ground-breaking.

1. Delmon Young, OF (Profile)

KATOH: 13.9 WAR
BA: 20.3 WAR
Actual: 3.6 WAR

Just like everyone else, KATOH was all in in Delmon. It was kind of hard not to be. Young hit .322/.388/.538 as an 18-year-old in A-Ball, and then slashed .315/.354/.527 between Double-A and Triple-A. And he stole bases, too. He had it all, or at least it looked like he did.

His one flaw was his plate discipline. Both his strikeout and walk numbers left a little to be desired, but dwelling on those numbers feels like nitpicking. His 7% walk rate was certainly acceptable, and his 19% strikeout rate wasn’t terribly concerning (even considering that 19% then might be equivalent to 22% now). When a player is so good at everything else, you can let things like that slide. You kind of have to, or else you’d be down on nearly every prospect.

As you know, Delmon never panned out. The plate discipline was the biggest culprit — although his weight problems certainly didn’t help, either. As of this writing, Young is a 30-year-old who’s been without a team for the better part of the last year. He was a replacement-level player or worse for most of the last decade.

Lesson
I guess the takeaway is to be wary of hitters who have great tools and minor-league numbers, but also possess an unrefined approach at the plate. Although, I’d be lying if I said I could have seen this coming. The strikeout rate was a warning sign, but the truth is that 19-year-old Delmon Young gave us little warning that we were in for a decade of replacement-level play. More often than not, players as talented as Young make the necessary adjustments. Sometimes they don’t.

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I don’t know how often Ian Desmond thinks about the nine-figure extension offer he turned down. He probably doesn’t think about it as often as people who write about Ian Desmond think about it. Desmond, after all, has to live his own life, and he still has to worry about the present and the future. Not to mention, he’s already earned some tens of millions of dollars, so it’s not like one tough decision has caused Desmond to go bankrupt. He’s doing fine, all things considered. He had the chance at a big payday, he didn’t take it, so he’s collected fewer millions — but still millions, and he could, in theory, go on to earn that whole sum anyway. Just has to prove himself on the baseball field. It’s the thing he’s best at.

In a way, it’s not fair to hold the decision against Desmond. He was justified in making his call, and now it’s in the past and no longer relevant. We have the advantage of knowing more now than we could’ve known back then, and of course what happened in 2015 made Desmond look a lot worse. His decision was a fine decision. But. But. There’s no way around the visual of all this. Desmond bet on himself as a soon-to-be free agent. He signed for one year and $8 million after spring training had already started. And he signed to play a position he hasn’t played.

Ian Desmond is doing fine. Ian Desmond is a major-league-caliber baseball player. It’s just been a hell of a drop. If it weren’t for Josh Hamilton, he might still not have a job.

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Ben and Sam preview the Padres’ season with MLB.com Cut 4 writer Michael Clair, and Jeff talks to MLB.com Padres beat writer Corey Brock (at 23:31).

At the end of this past week, prospect analyst Jesse Burkhart published a post at FanGraphs enumerating the virtues of draft-eligible Louisville outfielder Corey Ray. Less than an hour after that, the present author published a collection of regressed statistical leaderboards for select college conferences — atop one of which appeared draft-eligible Louisville outfielder Corey Ray, for his performance among ACC batters during the first week of the collegiate season.

For both reasons, the author observed with some interest this weekend’s series between Louisville and Ole Miss, played at the latter’s home park. While the Cardinals lost two of three games there, Ray played well, striking out just once over 14 plate appearances and recording an extra-base hit in all three contests.

The last of those extra-base hits was a home run — which is to say, basically the best kind of extra-base hit there is. With a view both to (a) celebrating that home run and also (b) attempting to reach the very narrowest possible demographic of this site’s wide readership, what the author has done is not only to capture the video footage of Corey Ray’s homer, but also to render it into slow motion and set it to an excerpt from Also Sprach Zarathustra by dead German composer Richard Strauss.

The results of this unnecessary moment in the history of film appear below.

It has been said that everyone remembers their first. With that in mind, I recently asked a trio of general managers/presidents of baseball operations about the initial trades they made as big-league decision makers. One of the responses began with a refutation of a report.

“Deadspin actually wrote an article about what was supposedly my first transaction,” said White Sox GM Rick Hahn. “That was trading Kenny Williams, Jr. to the Colorado Rockies (in November 2012). However, I didn’t actually do that trade. It was announced a couple of days after I became GM, but Kenny had already put that in place with Dan O’Dowd. It was a good story — it looked like an old-time mob move to settle things with Kenny’s family — but in reality it was all Kenny.

Hahn couldn’t recall his first trade — records show it was Brandon Kloess to San Diego for Blake Tekotte — but he remembers his first transaction and his first major deal. Right after being hired he re-signed Jake Peavy, and the following summer he sent Peavy to Boston in three-team swap that netted Avisail Garcia, Frankie Montas and JB Wendelken. Read the rest of this entry »

Here are the results of the nine polls. You will see a link to each Instagraph, the results, along with my commentary.

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http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-4/
One team defense allows 8 runs, and the other a shutout. But both gave up 10 hits and 3 walks.

60% I don’t care about the timing. These defenses should count the same.
40% In the end, all that matters is runs allowed. The shutout defense should count for much better.

Commentary: This was the closest of the polls. Readers were nearly split as to whether to consider sequencing at the team-defense level or not. They prefer not to by a small margin. So given the choice between a metric based on hits, walks and outs like Baseball Prospectus, or one based on runs like Baseball Reference, readers lean toward the BPro model. I’ll get to Fangraphs in a bit.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-7/
Solo HR or a bases-clearing double?

62% I don’t care about the context. I want the HR to count for more than the double.
38% Even if I prefer context-neutral stats, that’s true only to a point. Bases-clearing double for the win.

Commentary: The change in run expectancy is two runs for the double that clears the loaded bases, and one run for the HR with no runners on. The readers felt that even that wasn’t enough context to prefer the double over the HR. Basically, they don’t want to reward the batter for being a position to leverage a situation that he didn’t have a hand in creating. Even though he exploited it almost perfectly.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-2/
It’s the bottom of the 9th of a tie game, bases loaded, and it’s a walk or a HR

66% Totally different. I want the HR to count for alot more than a BB
34% Same impact. I care about the preservation of wins.

Commentary: Once again, even in a scenario in which it’s do-or-die, HOW you do it matters to the reader, even if it doesn’t matter for the situation at hand.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-6/
Ace relievers enters 9th, allow 1 run, with 2- or 1-run lead:

66% Both Billy and Trevor did an equally poor job, regardless of their lead
34% Trevor was a net negative. Billy was at least neutral, perhaps even net positive

Commentary: This is similar to the above scenario, where a player is thrust into a situation not of his making. And by an almost 2:1 margin, the readers want to evaluate the performance without respect to the situation.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-5/
Ace reliever enters 9th with a 3 run lead, allows 2 to end the game.

77% Two runs in the 9th is an abysmal performance.
23% Two runs when given 3 runs to work with is barely passable, but still a net positive.

Commentary: There’s a limit to which Fangraphs readers will take context into account. Being given a three run lead is too much buffer to consider, and they don’t want to reward an 18.00 ERA in one inning as a net positive. But still, 23% did.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-9-and-last/
Who pitched the better game, Strasburg or Wainwright?

78% Strasburg. His K/BB performance is so overwhelming. Maybe he didn’t get fielding support.
22% Wainwright. He didn’t dominate the hitters, but he was more effective. In the end, the runs tell the story.

Commentary: This was a referendum on FIP (heart of the Fangraphs model) v ERA (heart of the BR.com model) or Component-based ERA (heart of the BPro model). Obviously, having this poll on Fangraphs will bias the results towards those readers. But I tried to make the choice as tough as possible. Indeed, I carefully selected the numbers so they would match my version of the Bill James Game Score model.
http://tangotiger.com/index.php/site/comments/game-scores-for-2015

The two pitchers were set to have a score of “81” in both cases (50 is average, and around 100 is perfect). The 9 extra strikeouts for Strasburg were in balance against the 3 fewer singles and 1 fewer run for Wainwright. My version of Game Score is pretty much an even balance of the three models. I was really hoping that the readers, not realizing what I was doing, would end up going 50/50. They didn’t.

Given the results of the two polls, where the FIP model is much more preferred to the other two, while the BPRo model is slightly preferred to BR.com, this is what it looks like the Fangraphs readers prefer:
60% Fangraphs (FIP)
25% Baseball Prospectus (Component ERA)
15% Baseball Reference (ERA, actually RA/9)

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/building-a-better-war-metric/
Comparing a bases loaded walk with a solo HR:

81% Totally different. I want the HR to count for alot more.
19% Same impact. I care about the preservation of runs.

Commentary: Once again, fans don’t care about the runs, and what the batter can leverage. They care about the events. If the batter didn’t create the situation, the fans don’t want to let them leverage it.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-8/
Runner on third, 1 out, and the result is a K or SF:

83% This situation is so different, so obvious, that the value gap between a K and SF is huge.
17% I’m sticking that everything is context-neutral: an out is an out.

Commentary: In this case, an out is not an out. One is an out that moves the runner over, and the other is an out that doesn’t. This would be as different as a double v single. Fans are clear that if the situation is the same, but the outcome is different, then they’ll reward the outcome.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-3/
Comparing the stranded leadoff triple to the one where he scores:

95% Same thing. A triple is a triple.
5% Totally different. One puts runs on the board, the other was useless.

Commentary: The fans are saying the sequencing of the play ends as soon as the next batter comes to the plate. The batter did his job, and he ended up at third. Whatever happens after that, they won’t hold the runner accountable, nor reward him (unless he actively did something himself).

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Thank you to everyone who participated in the voting with 8000 total votes, and for the 180 comments in the comments section. I’m not sure where I go from here yet, but I’ll think of something soon.