FanGraphs Baseball

Like many of this site’s readers, the author of this post has occasionally entertained a fantasy in which he’s tasked — as the general manager of a major-league club — with constructing a championship roster. As with many fantasies, this one is burdened by awful, dumb reality: apart from an impressive combination of talent and experience, the position of general manager also requires one to work “all the time” or at least “nearly all the time.” For those among us who have already allocated a portion of the day to assuming the fetal position and weeping gently, that sort of obligation is untenable. As assorted industry contacts have confirmed for me, employment in a front office allows almost zero time for reflection on the horror of merely existing.

Still, this doesn’t prevent one from contemplating how one would conduct the affairs of a club were he given the opportunity. This post is designed to do that, briefly.

This post is also built on a reasonable assumption — namely that, among the general manager’s most important duties (and the scouting director’s and team president’s) is the acquisition of amateur talent. With few exceptions, organizations exercise great control over players whom they procure by means either of the draft or international free agency. In addition to owning the rights to such players for years in the minors, clubs are then entitled to six or seven years of player control in the majors. One can (and maybe should) debate the merits of the system; however, that debate lies outside the scope of this very modest report. What’s relevant here is the fact that it exists.

Even if a club doesn’t have space for a talented player on its 25-man roster, this doesn’t render that player’s value moot. The Detroit Tigers, for example, have maintained a strong major-league club for much of the last decade in part by exchanging young, cost-controlled prospects for more expensive, more proven major leaguers. While the Tigers have frequently placed among the bottom third of farm-rankings lists, this isn’t to say that the organization hasn’t reaped the benefits of its amateur scouting department. Rather, they’ve attempted to leverage those benefits in a different way — by exchanging future for present value.

What’s the best place to find such players, though? That’s the question a GM et al. must answer — and the more accurate the answer, the better situated a club to win.

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Yesterday, I utilized my KATOH projection system to rank the 30 farm systems. By my math, the Milwaukee Brewers are the top dog. And it isn’t particularly close. Here’s a graphical representation of each team’s cumulative projected WAR according to KATOH.

The Brewers farm system outpaces everyone else’s by a fairly wide margin by this metric. That’s interesting in and of itself. But the path David Stearns and company have taken to put their farm system in this position is perhaps even more interesting.

For one, they’ve acquired a large chunk of their minor league talent in the very recent past. Orlando Arcia, their consensus top prospect, has been around for a few years; but many of the others are very new additions. In fact, KATOH’s #2 through #8 prospects all joined the organization within the past seven months. That’s Ramon Flores, Jacob Nottingham, Brett Phillips, Josh Hader, Isan Diaz, Zach Davies and Javier Betancourt. Domingo Santana would fall in that group as well were he still prospect eligible. They’ve also added Rymer Liriano, Keon Broxton, Garin Cecchini, Jonathan Villar, Adrian Houser, Bubby Derby (who I’m still not convinced is a real person) over that same period. Not to mention lower-tier prospects Freddy Peralta, Trey Supak, Colin Walsh, Zack Jones, Carlos Herrera, Daniel Missaki and Manny Pina.

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The Brewers continued the rebuilding process on Friday dealing power-hitting outfielder Khris Davis to the Athletics in exchange for prospects. Here’s what my fancy computer math thinks of the prospects who are now property of the Milwaukee Brewers.

Jacob Nottingham, C, 6.8 WAR (Profile)

Nottingham was a former sixth-round pick who broke out in a big way in A-Ball last year. After an underwhelming two years in a Rookie Ball, he slashed .309/.364/.493 in 122 games between the Houston and Oakland organizations. He had a wee bit of trouble making contact as evidenced by his 20% strikeout rate. But he made up for it by hitting for loads of power.

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Today, we’re excited to introduce FanGraphs Membership. What is FanGraphs Membership? Quite simply, it is a voluntary way for you to help support all the baseball content we produce each and every day. If you’ve been looking for an opportunity to help contribute to the long-term growth of the site, this is your chance to do just that, and partner with us to help continue to provide data and content that helps us all understand the game of baseball a little bit better.

FanGraphs Membership is not a paywall; we are not creating a separate section of the site that will only be available to members. In fact, we’re actually taking the content that was previously available to FanGraphs+ subscribers and making it available to everyone. We want every person who visits the site to feel that they are getting the most out of their experience, and believe that, with a broad base of support from the fantastic community here, we can continue to provide that information without restricting access to anyone.

With the introduction of FanGraphs Membership, all the content produced on FanGraphs will now be accessible for free, without logging in, or being a FanGraphs Member. If you are not a FanGraphs Member, we will occasionally ask if you’d like to join in supporting the site, but it will always be your decision to make. Think of FanGraphs Membership as something akin to the model used by NPR.

Now you may be asking yourself, why is FanGraphs doing this?

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Khris Davis has four career outfield assists. Have you ever been curious about how he got them? Of course you haven’t. You’re a grown person, with responsibilities. A person trying to answer the big questions, a person who reads books, a person wondering what a gravitational wave is. This has never really crossed your mind, but, now you’re here. Now you’re curious. This is obviously a setup and human nature will force you to see this all the way through. You’re not as in control of you as you think.

Davis is relevant right now because he was just traded. He debuted in 2013 and, since then, on a rate basis, he ranks fifth-worst among outfielders in the DRS version of the arm-value statistic. He ranks seventh-worst in the UZR version of the arm-value statistic. According to the Fan Scouting Report, he ranks fifth-worst in release. He ranks fourth-worst by arm strength, and he ranks eighth-worst by arm accuracy, and if you put all three components together, he ranks second-worst by arm overall. Khris Davis has a bad arm. It’s been that way for as long as you’ve known about him. We don’t get to say this kind of thing very often, but there might genuinely be some of you capable of out-throwing Khris Davis, who is a major-league baseball player.

And he’s a player with four assists. Bad arm, four assists. Which means he’s been involved in throwing people out. Time to walk through the assists, like we did with Ben Revere back whenever that was. For some reason, in this moment, it’s important to know what’s happened.

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Not long ago, we made available the results of the 2015 Fan Scouting Report. August already made use of them last week, and everything is right up there for your easy perusal. The measure obviously isn’t without its flaws, but no defensive measure is without its flaws, and as you’ve probably come to understand by how often I poll the FanGraphs community, I love to see what you people think about things. Even when the public might be wrong, there’s the opportunity to learn from its perception. The Fan Scouting Report is all about perceptions.

If you don’t know quite how it works, people submit ballots, evaluating player defense based on seven categories: instincts, first step, speed, hands, release, arm strength, and arm accuracy. Everything gets combined into an overall rating, and last year’s top rating was a four-way tie between Jackie Bradley Jr., Brandon Crawford, Jason Heyward, and Andrelton Simmons. According to the fans, those were the best defenders in the game, and each of them is recognized as being outstanding. This is one fun way to sort the leaderboards — see who the fans think was awesome, either overall, or within a particular category.

You can also do the opposite of that. Every leaderboard that has a top has a bottom.

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For those of you who are interested in learning a little bit about the history of FanGraphs and our operations, Barry Svrluga wrote a great piece in the Washington Post about how it all got started.

With pitchers and catchers reporting soon, we just about have all the major free-agent signings wrapped up. It looks like Yovani Gallardo is about to sign with the Orioles, and there are rumors that Dexter Fowler could soon join him now that Baltimore has apparently decided to give up their first-round draft pick. With so many good outfielders available this winter, as the music stops, the available chairs for Fowler seem less desirable than we might have thought at the end of last season. Fowler’s defensive numbers have been pretty bad over the last few seasons, but his UZR figure was close to average in his only year with the Chicago Cubs. Determining change in skill from small sample size can be difficult, but it does not seem likely Fowler greatly improved his defense last season.

Defensive statistics are much-maligned outside of the analytic community, and even among those who use advanced statistics, there’s a degree of doubt regarding their utility. Much of the criticism stems from a misunderstanding about how to use defensive statistics given the larger sample size necessary to draw meaningful conclusions. Looking at three seasons worth of UZR can seem like going too far into the past, leading to rationalizations about short-term spikes in defensive numbers.

Over the last four seasons, Fowler has put up a UZR numbers in center field of -13.6, -1.7, -21.8, and last year’s -1.9 mark. Taken on the whole, it would be reasonable to conclude that Fowler is a below-average center fielder. It might be easy to look at the last three years, point to two that are pretty close to average, and call the -21.8 an outlier. This isn’t advisable, however, as doing so completely ignores a full year of data and merely cherrypicks the good seasons. The graph below shows two lines: yearly UZR for Fowler over the past five seasons, and a three-year average of UZR over the past five seasons, which is more representative of Fowler’s defense.

Using three years of data smooths Fowler’s numbers considerably. The inconsistency of the yearly numbers largely evaporates and places Fowler’s defense somewhere between six and 12 runs below average at center field over the past few years. That inconsistency carried over to his WAR numbers as well, as the graph below shows.

Instead of a 1.4 WAR season followed a 3.2 WAR season, we see a pair of 2.5 WAR seasons the last two years. Not surprising for the soon-to-be 30-year-old, ZiPS sees Fowler as a 2.4 WAR player heading into next season.

But what about the possibility that Fowler’s defensive improvements are real? It does happen. Jhonny Peralta made himself a much better shortstop later into his career — and improved positioning could have helped Fowler last season, as could getting out of the ballparks in Colorado and Houston. That narrative was getting pushed early last season and it does have some validity.

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‘Tis the season for prospect rankings. With little else going on in the baseball world, prospect writers typically spend the month of February releasing and discussing ordered lists of prospects and farm systems. Even within the past hour at this very site, our own Jeff Zimmerman published a farm-system ranking derived from the scouting grades produced by Baseball America.

This year, I showed up to the party a little early by putting out KATOH’s top 100 list last month. I still have more to give, however. And here I present you with KATOH’s organizational rankings.

My methodology for compiling this ranking was pretty straightforward: I simply aggregated all of the KATOH forecasts by team. Still, there a few caveats worth mentioning.

• To be considered in this exercise, a player must have recorded at least 200 plate appearances or batters faced in 2015. KATOH derives its forecasts from minor league stats, so it can’t really formulate an opinion on players who didn’t play much in 2015. As a result, many of the players who were drafted in 2015 are omitted.

• This exercise only considers players projected for at least 1.0 WAR over their first six years in the big leagues. Ideally, I’d consider all prospects, but that would involve verifying the teams for thousands of mostly nondescript minor leaguers. That obviously taken some time. This one-win threshold cuts pretty deep into a team’s farm system. The average team has 18 players above this cutoff, while none have fewer than 10. That feels like more than enough for these purposes.

• KATOH tends to favor hitters over pitchers, especially on the high end. So this analysis likely favors organizations with farm systems that are hitter-heavy over those that rely more on pitchers. This is likely because a pitcher’s stats capture a smaller portion of his future potential relative to hitters. Factors like velocity also very important when it comes to projecting pitchers.

• And as always, stats don’t tell the full story. This is the output from a flawed statistical model that fails to take into account many of the factors that go into evaluating a prospect. If an organization has a lot of raw, toolsy prospects, it’s likely to be underrated here.

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You smell that? It’s baseball’s prospect-list season. The fresh top-100 lists — populated by new names as well as old ones — seem to be popping up each day. With the individual rankings coming out, some organization rankings are becoming available, as well. I have always regarded the organizational rankings as subjective — and, as a result, not 100% useful. Utilizing the methodology I introduced in my article on prospect evaluation from this year’s Hardball Times Annual, however, it’s possible to calculate a total value for every team’s farm system and remove the biases of subjectivity. In what follows, I’ve used that same process to rank all 30 of baseball’s farm systems by the surplus WAR they should generate.

I provide a detailed explanation of my methodology in the Annual article. To summarize it briefly, however, what I’ve done is to identify WAR equivalencies for the scouting grades produced by Baseball America in their annual Prospect Handbook. The grade-to-WAR conversion appears as follows.

Prospect Grade to WAR Conversion

Prospect Grade	Total WAR	Surplus WAR
80	25.0	18.5
75	18.0	13.0
70	11.0	9.0
65	8.5	6.0
60	4.7	3.0
55	2.5	1.5
50	1.1	0.5
45	0.4	0.0

To create the overall totals for this post, I used each team’s top-30 rankings per the most recent edition of Baseball America’ Prospect Handbook. Also accounting for those trades which have occurred since the BA rankings were locked down, I counted the number of 50 or higher-graded prospects (i.e. the sort which provide surplus value) in each system. The results follows.
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