FanGraphs Baseball

On Opt-Outs and Risk Mitigation

On Tuesday, David Price signed the largest contract for a pitcher in baseball history, getting $217 million over seven years to join the Red Sox. But the value of his deal isn’t just the $217 million dollars he’s now guaranteed; he also obtained an opt-out which gives him the right to hit the free agent market again in three years, if he believes he’ll be able to get a raise at that point. If he pitches well over the next few seasons and opt-outs, he may very well be able to replace the final $127 million of this deal with another $175 to $200 million commitment, pushing the total he’d collect between the two contracts close to $300 million.

Yesterday, Eno Sarris looked at the opt-out from a few different angles, estimating that it added something like $10 to $15 million in value to Price’s deal. Clearly, the opt-out is a perk to the player, as it allows them to reset their salaries if they play well and the market inflates, but doesn’t give the team the same option if they struggle or get injured. The team assumes the full risk of the guaranteed money, but does not get the same potential return if the investment goes well, as the opt-out reduces the upside for the team.

But could an opt-out clause also reduce a team’s risk? Over the last few days, both on Twitter and in (and after) my chat yesterday, a significant number of people have argued that including the opt-out increases the odds that the Red Sox avoid the riskiest years of this deal, and that the opt-out could help the team if they’re willing to let him leave after he opts out. After all, at that point, they’d have signed the best pitcher on the market for $90 million over three years, which is obviously a pretty great outcome for the team.

This assertion often conflates correlation and causation, though. While it’s true that getting three years of Price at $90 million without carrying the longer-term risk is a good outcome for the Red Sox, Price only opts out in situations where his market value is greater than the remaining $127 million left on his contract. In other words, at that point, the Red Sox wouldn’t be able to replace Price’s expected future performance by spending $127 million; they’d either have to pay more to keep him in Boston, or pay a lesser player (or players) that amount in order to fill the hole that the opt-out created. The opt-out occurs at a point when the original contract has turned out well for the Red Sox, but the opt-out is not the cause of the contract turning out well, and it does not improve the team’s situation at the point the opt-out is exercised.

From a purely accounting standpoint, the only way including an opt-out can be a positive for the team is if the player takes a larger discount in guaranteed money than the value of the opt-out is expected to provide. For instance, if Price would have demanded $250 million without the opt-out, then signing him for $217 million and including an opt-out is very likely a better decision for the Red Sox, since the math suggests the value of the opt-out is less than $33 million. For a team, whether to include an opt-out should mostly be a calculation based on the difference in guaranteed money the player is willing to leave on the table in order to have the opt-out included.

But while I’ll disagree with the sentiment that including the opt-out without getting a financial offset can ever be a net positive for a team, I do think a few interesting counterpoints were raised about the difference in expected long-term outcomes for a team when an opt-out is included. In particular, this comment from Josh yesterday explained a somewhat different perspective pretty well.

Certainly, if Price opts out, it’s because there’s a market for his services that may or may not include the Red Sox. In theory, if he had positive value, the Red Sox could trade him to one of those other teams interested in picking up the back end of his deal, no doubt.

The problem is that the market doesn’t work that perfectly. There are relatively few teams that can absorb a $32M pitcher and it’s possible that they are undesirable trade partners (division rivals, poor relationship between front offices, etc). If there is a trade partner, there’s no guarantee that the available return is greater than the value of a qualifying offer. There’s also a chance teams would be less than excited to acquire an asset at full price that’s only being dealt because of the risk he’s about to decline. If he opted out, it’s likely more teams would get involved at a sub-32M AAV in exchange for years. Perhaps he’d take 6/150 rather than 4/128.

I tend to think along the same lines as Dave on this — that the opt out is obviously player friendly — but the argument that there is no conceivable benefit to the team is a little too black and white for me. They definitely won’t be able to acquire a package of players from an interested trade partner this way(versus “might have been able, otherwise) but I’m sure the Red Sox would get over the grief of being out from under pricy decline years and their newfound payroll flexibility and draft pick quickly enough.

In the scenario where Price opts out, it is a given that there’s a market for his services that would result in a larger payday awaiting him in some other city. I’m not particularly convinced by the annual average value argument, as if a team was willing to pay him 6/$150M, they’d likely be willing to trade for Price at 4/$127M and then sign him to an extension that pushed some of the present money back into the new years of the deal; Price doesn’t have to be a free agent for an acquiring team to re-work his contract, after all, and plenty of trades are made contingent upon a player agreeing to a contract with their new team as part of the deal.

But I think Josh raises a point about the potential frictional costs of making a deal that are worth considering. In the scenario where Price has positive value in three years, he’s clearly pitched well to that point, and teams are often reluctant to trade star players who are performing at a high level, even if you could argue that there are signs that point to it being a rational decision in order to do so. The opt-out could force a rational decision upon the Red Sox where irrationality would prevail otherwise. While a team owning a positive-value contract without an opt-out always has the option of essentially forcing an a similar outcome if they so choose — MLB has the waiver system, and any player claimed on waivers could always be given away at any point, so a team is never really stuck with a long-term contract that has positive value relative to the market rate — often contracts at this valuation come with no-trade clauses, which complicates the ease of making a trade, even if a team decided they wanted to do so.

There are frictional costs to trying to trade highly paid star players, and regularly, teams end up hanging onto expensive aging players beyond their sell-by date because of the perception backlash that comes with trading a face-of-the-franchise type of talent. So, perhaps the theoretical upside of the potential trade value is overstated, if a team isn’t willing to act on that trade value. And the point about the qualifying offer is completely correct; even though a team doesn’t get to trade a player who opted out, in the current form, they are compensated with an asset valued at roughly $10 million in exchange for the player leaving for another organization.

We don’t know that the qualifying offer system will survive the next round of CBA negotiations, so a team signing a player to a deal with an opt-out this winter shouldn’t count on the fact that they will get draft pick compensation if the player outs out, but it is a potential benefit that could be realized by a team that has a star player opt-out in the future. The draft pick isn’t going to wholly compensate a team for the entirety of a player’s positive trade value in most cases, but we shouldn’t also assume that a team who has a player opt-out gets nothing in return; it’s the marginal gap between the potential crop of prospects and the draft pick that matters.

But beyond that, the increased likelihood of the team’s ability to walk away from an extension versus choosing to trade the final years of a deal also have to be factored in. And when we look at how irregularly teams choose to trade these types of players, it’s a fair point to suggest that the opt-out may force them into a good decision more frequently.

Overall, the opt-out is still always going to be a player-friendly perk, and one that benefits the player more than it benefits the team. But given the frictional costs involved with actualizing the trade value of a star player versus receiving compensation if the player forces the team into walking away from the risk of the longer-term commitment, the marginal cost of an opt-out to a team may be diminished somewhat. And if a team can get a player to leave $15 or $20 million in guaranteed money on the table — especially by taking a lower annual salary up front, and pushing more of their compensation to the end of the deal, after the opt-out decision has to be made — in order to obtain the opt-out, then it can be a perfectly rational decision to include one in a contract.


Eno Sarris Baseball Chat — 12/3/15

10:59
Eno Sarris: Good morning. First time on this thing. Be here shortly!

11:02
Eno Sarris:

12:02
bad parent: wanted to name my kid eno… made a typo and now we’re stuck with an emo kid

12:02
Eno Sarris: I have a friend who let his three year old name his new brother. His brother Elmo raps and skates now, which probably happened because of his name.

12:02
Hooha: What is your Christmas beer of choice?

12:03
Eno Sarris: Goose Island Juliette or Halia. Love the sour sisters.

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Drew Pomeranz on His Knuckle Curve

On the day of baseball’s non-tender trade deadline, the San Diego Padres traded first baseman Yonder Alonso and lefty reliever Marc Rzepczynski to Oakland in exchange for left-hander Drew Pomeranz and minor-leaguer Jose Torres. For those interested, Craig Edwards examined the trade in a general way earlier this morning. The point of this post is to look more closely at one part of the trade: Drew Pomeranz.

If Pomeranz is just a good reliever, then the deal amounts mostly to this: three years of control for a good reliever in exchange for two years of a first baseman who can be league average two-thirds of the time. Maybe, to make a trade like that even, you’d have to add a piece or two to get Alonso, but that’s when the deal makes the most sense for the Athletics.

The deal makes better sense for the Padres if Pomeranz is a starter. And it looks like the team is considering him a starting pitcher for the time being.

The question of whether or not Pomeranz can be a good starting pitcher for the Padres hinges on three things, most likely: his health, his changeup, and his curveball. Earlier this season, I talked to the pitcher about all three.

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A’s Trade Drew Pomeranz to Padres for Yonder Alonso

With the non-tender deadline approaching on Wednesday, deals for arbitration-eligible players were going to be much more likely than the big free-agent contract we saw the Boston Red Sox hand David Price on Tuesday. Teams, especially small-market teams like the San Diego Padres and Oakland Athletics, have a tendency to move around players whose production on the field is becoming less valuable relative to the increasing expense (due to arbitration) of employing those players. The A’s and Padres completed a four-player deal on Wednesday. Not surprisingly, three of the four players were arbitration-eligible. The Padres will receive starter-turned-reliever Drew Pomeranz and minor-leaguer Jose Torres while the A’s will receive first baseman Yonder Alonso and lefty reliever Marc Rzepczynski.

The motivations for both clubs are fairly transparent. Last season, the Padres attempted an experiment that involved putting Wil Myers in center field and putting Matt Kemp and Justin Upton alongside him. The experiment did not go well. Myers, who had been a right fielder, was ill-equipped to handle center field. Placing the poor defense of Matt Kemp next to him did not help matters. The Padres have apparently seen the error of their ways and will not attempt a similar alignment next season. Myers recently said he would prefer to play first base, and this trade will allow him to do so and leave the Padres open to pursuing a new center fielder while they spend a few years waiting for Manuel Margot.

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Job Posting: Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim Baseball Systems Developer

Position: Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim Baseball Systems Developer

Location: Anaheim

Description:

The Los Angeles Angels are hiring an experienced software developer to build and maintain an aggregated player information and tracking system to help in the decision making process of the Baseball Operations Department.

Responsibilities:

  • Drawing from multiple data sources, design and manage a single player information and tracking system.
  • Manage receipt, storage, merging, and formatting of multiple data sources (flat files, APIs, database pulls, etc.) Identify, diagnose and resolve data quality issues.
  • Develop web-based front-ends to display data at multiple levels of detail.
  • Implement and optimize advanced algorithms for player projection from software prototypes.
  • Continually work with baseball operations staff to identify features and areas of improvement within the player information system to facilitate a user-friendly research tool.
  • Integrate new information sources and multimedia displays into player information and tracking system.
  • Communicate results to appropriate staff members through presentations, written reports, and tools.
  • Other duties as identified by the Director of Quantitative Analysis.

Qualifications:

  • Experience with software development, including requirements definition, design, development, testing, implementation, and iterative improvement.
  • Expert level knowledge of SQL and database optimization techniques.
  • Proficiency with front-end web development technologies (including HTML5, CSS, JavaScript and JavaScript frameworks) Strong understanding of desktop, laptop and mobile UI/UX design concepts and demonstrated ability to apply responsive design techniques. Particularly focused on representing large data sets in easy to consume user interfaces.
  • Experience designing ETL (extract, transform, load) processes to integrate multiple data sources, formats, and media into a single application.
  • Management of multi-tiered deployment environment (development, staging, production).
  • Working familiarity with advanced statistical concepts, particularly those relevant to sabermetric player projection techniques that include experience implementing statistical calculations, derivations, and graphical representations into software applications (experience with Python and Matlab a plus).
  • Bachelor’s degree (B. A.) in Computer Science, Information Systems, or related field from four-year college or university; and five years related experience and/or training; or equivalent combination of education and experience.

Compensation:
This position is compensated.

To Apply:
Please apply here.


Job Posting: Tampa Bay Rays Baseball Research & Development Intern

Position: Tampa Bay Rays Baseball Research & Development Intern

Location: St. Petersburg, Fla.

Description:

We are seeking interns with a passion for winning through mathematics, data analysis, and computation. The internship positions will be with the team’s Baseball Research and Development group in the Baseball Operations department. Start and end dates are flexible, and we will consider applicants who are available for only the summer of 2016. Please note that these positions have the potential to lead to a full-time employment offer, but such an offer is not guaranteed.

Responsibilities:

  • Statistical modeling and quantitative analysis of a variety of data sources, for the purpose of player evaluation, strategic decision-making, decision analysis, etc.
  • Collecting public and private data for additional analysis.
  • Ad hoc queries and quantitative research in support of general Baseball Operations tasks.
  • Various game-day duties, as necessary.

Qualifications:

  • A strong foundation in mathematics, statistics, computer science and/or engineering.
  • Some experience with computer programming.
  • Familiarity with a statistical software package such as R.
  • Familiarity with SQL.
  • Familiarity with Python or MATLAB.
  • Familiarity with the online baseball research community.

In addition to working closely with the broader Research and Development team, we desire candidates who will challenge the status quo and explore new research opportunities. Previous interns have developed ideas that have changed the way the organization approaches important challenges.

Compensation:
This position is compensated.

To Apply:
To apply, please send an email to researchresume@raysbaseball.com with the subject “2016 R&D Internship” and include a resume, an unofficial transcript (if you were enrolled in a college degree program within the last three years) and answers to the following questions:

  1. What dates are you available for the internship?
  2. What computer programming experience do you have?
  3. What is a project that you believe would add substantial value to a baseball team? Please describe the project and provide an overview of how you would complete it.

You Can Watch a Dominican Game in Extra Innings Right Now

Game

The image presented here is a screencap of Jimmy Paredes from roughly five minutes ago, shortly before he recorded the last out of regulation during this evening’s Dominican Winter League game between Gigantes del Cibao and Leones del Escogido.

Here are some players from Gigantes who’ve recorded plate appearances: Maikel Franco and Carlos Peguero and Wilson Betemit. Here’s a single one from Leones to do the same thing: Patrick Kivlehan, just identified as the player-to-be-named in the Leonys Martin trade.

Here’s the count on Hanser Alberto just before the author published this inconsequential notice: 1-2.

Here, finally, is a link to watch the game in technicolor video.


Nori Aoki Takes His Act to Seattle

When you read descriptions of Nori Aoki, you’ll often read about how he’s entertaining before you read about how he’s talented. Even his numbers are entertaining, if you’re into that sort of thing — in four years, he’s batted .285, .286, .287, and .288. He’s an unusual player to watch, which makes him an interesting player to watch, and though he’s not the greatest player to watch, you could say he puts smiles on faces. Ultimately that’s the real purpose of all of this.

Aoki was having a solid year with the Giants before he wound up with a leg fracture and, later, a concussion. Aoki’s agent says he’s fine now, which is a very agent-y thing to say, but the Giants still declined Aoki’s very much affordable 2016 option. So into free agency he went, and out of free agency he’s going, to Seattle, for a one-year contract with an option. I don’t yet know what it’s worth, but I assume the money is modest, by free-agency standards. Aoki didn’t sign for much a year ago, and it’s not like his 2015 did anything to change the profile.

Offensively, he’s clearly consistent. He’s not a power threat, but he’s a contact and on-base threat, with a career 107 wRC+. He’ll make some puzzling decisions on the bases, but he can move around just fine. His defensive reputation is for routes like this one:

…and those aren’t uncharacteristic. Aoki isn’t fluid out there, and he doesn’t score very well according to the Fan Scouting Report as a consequence, but as a corner guy, Aoki has rated just fine by DRS and UZR. He doesn’t seem to be a defensive liability, in other words. He’s not prime Ichiro or anything, but he can handle the outfield better than incumbent Nelson Cruz. As for any aging concerns, that’s the neat thing about one-year contracts.

For his career, Aoki’s averaged almost exactly 2 WAR per 600 plate appearances. It stands to reason he should be almost that good in the season ahead, if he’s really healthy. A little worse, probably, but fine enough as a stopgap. One of the things to know is that Aoki’s one of the very most difficult players in the majors to strike out. He’s also a lefty who, to this point, has owned a reverse platoon split at the plate. He’s a contact-oriented slap hitter, which allows him to be consistent, no matter who he’s facing. Righty, lefty, power, finesse, fly ball, groundball. Aoki doesn’t change.

Something I want to share: grounders. Aoki hits a bunch of them. And he sprays them around, more than almost any other player. Since 2002, 553 players have hit at least 500 groundballs. Here are the five lowest rates of pulled grounders over that span:

Gathright wins by a giant margin, but Aoki’s third-lowest, slapping grounders up the middle and the other way, toward the shortstop. Sticking with that, Aoki gets a quick start out of the box, and he runs a very high soft-hit rate on his grounders. So what follows shouldn’t be too surprising — here are the big-league leaders in infield hits, according to our leaderboard, since Aoki debuted in 2012:

Aoki’s also bunted a bunch. There is a power swing in there, a pull swing with lift, but so much of his game is soft contact, and it worked again last year before the injuries. It should work similarly going forward.

The one troubling thing is what the Giants did. Aoki seems like a modest bargain, here. Same thing looked to be the case last offseason. But the Giants had the chance to keep Aoki for next year for $5.5 million, and instead they paid a $0.7-million buyout, meaning they didn’t think Aoki was worth $4.8 million. This is the same team that liked him a year ago. Maybe it’s just a money thing; maybe they’d prefer to stay cheaper in the outfield, and put the most money possible toward rotation improvements. But alternatively, the Giants might not have a great opinion of what’s to come. And they’re the ones who’ve seen Aoki most recently, not the Mariners. It’s a consideration.

But Aoki says he’s okay, and I guess we believe him until we have reason not to. For the Mariners, maybe this is the end of any Marcell Ozuna pursuit, but they could still futz around with left field if they wanted. The more important thing to them was accumulating enough options to keep Cruz out of the outfield as much as possible. In that regard, this is a step forward, and it presumably came at a quite affordable price. Sometimes a bargain can just be a bargain.


Did Mike Ilitch Accidentally Suggest Possibility of Collusion?

On Monday, the Detroit Tigers held a press conference to introduce their newest acquisition, Jordan Zimmermann. As has become customary on these occasions, Tigers’ owner Mike Ilitch attended the media session and fielded questions from reporters. Most of the attention following the press conference centered on Ilitch’s comments that he doesn’t “care about the money,” and instead simply “want[s] the best players.”

Of potentially greater significance, however, was a related statement Ilitch made in response to a question about whether he’d be willing to allow the Tigers’ payroll to surpass the $189 million luxury tax threshold:

“I’m supposed to be a good boy and not go over it,” Ilitch said, “but if I think there are certain players that could help us a lot, I’ll go over it. Oops, I shouldn’t have said that.”

Admittedly, there is probably nothing to this statement. Ilitch was likely just speaking casually, acknowledging that while the team’s payroll would ideally stay below the $189 million level, he could be willing to eclipse that mark for the right player.

At the same time, however, Ilitch’s choice of words was rather odd. By stating that he’s “supposed to be a good boy” and not exceed the luxury tax threshold, Ilitch’s statement would seem to suggest that he is under some sort of external pressure not to allow the team’s payroll to cross the $189 million mark. Along these lines, Ilitch then appears to quickly realize that he may have spoken a bit too loosely, leading to his “Oops, I shouldn’t have said that” line.

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Twins Sign Byung-ho Park for Very Little

When the Twins won the rights to negotiate with Byung-ho Park, his signing wasn’t quite a foregone conclusion — we’ve seen these things go wrong before. But it seemed very likely the Twins and Park would eventually reach an agreement, and now we’re officially there, with Park having been introduced at a press conference.

To quickly review, the Pirates bid $5 million for Jung-ho Kang. Then they signed him to a four-year contract worth $11 million, with a maximum possible value of five years and $20 million.

The Twins bid $12.85 million for Byung-ho Park. Now they’ve signed him to a four-year contract worth $12 million, with a maximum possible value of five years and $23 million.

So, it’s clearly a very similar contract structure. For all intents and purposes, Park and Kang wound up with the same deal. Kang would’ve deserved a bit of a bonus for having middle-infield potential, but Kang was also the first of his player type to try to come over, so Park benefits some from Kang’s success. Yet, the contract isn’t where the real effect is observed.

Because of Kang, other Korean players will draw more attention. They’ll be more highly valued. And that shows up in the posting fee: the Twins had to bid a lot more than the Pirates did the first time around, because there was increased competition and they really wanted to bring Park into the fold. In bidding for Park initially, the Twins faced competition from the rest of the league. But because of the system, once the Twins were declared the winners and once Park’s Korean team accepted the bid, the Twins wound up with almost all the leverage. They were the only team that could negotiate, and all Park could do was threaten to go back and wait two years for free agency. Such a threat would’ve been almost empty.

Some have said the Twins took advantage of Park’s eagerness to try to play in the majors. Park himself says he’s content. Of course, Park wasn’t going to say anything else, and millions of dollars are millions of dollars. He’s getting a chance he might not have thought would be possible a few years ago. Like Kang, Park can make a difference for future Korean players, down the road. Park deserves more money, though. This isn’t what his market value would be. The Twins did take advantage, but not because they’re monsters — this is just how the system is, and no team would be willing to shower Park with money just because. This system doesn’t benefit the players. The Twins did what they had to, and no more. It’s something of a shame, and players should get more of the share in an ideal world, but now Park gets to be an everyday DH or first baseman at the highest level of baseball in the world, and he’ll have a whole country behind him. The point is, Park isn’t getting screwed.

The profile is what it was: Park can hit the crap out of the ball. His power is real, even if he won’t hit 50 homers a season in the majors, and he manages to pair some walks with his strikeouts. He’s said to be a decent first baseman. For the sake of quick comparison, the Orioles just picked up Mark Trumbo from the Mariners for basically nothing, and he figures to get about $9 million next year. The Astros might non-tender Chris Carter, who’s in line for a salary just under $6 million, but he should make around that much, wherever he goes. Trumbo, the last two years, has been a replacement-level player, by our WAR. Carter has a career mark of just over 2 WAR in just over 2,000 plate appearances. Given Park’s ability and upside, you can see he should get more. The posting fee, of course, is a big part of the Twins’ investment — it’s more than half of the investment — but Park sees none of that. Now I’m just repeating myself.

Byung-ho Park: interesting player, who might be a good player. The Twins will pay him very little, relatively speaking, through the rest of his career prime. Kang posted a 109 wRC+ in last year’s first half, and in the second half he jumped to 154. If Park adjusts anything like that, this is going to look fantastic. For, you know, the Twins.