Archive for baserunning

With just 27 of them per team in any game, outs are a rather precious commodity. It’s important not to give them away, as letting them go often decreases the chance of scoring. Even so, there are some situations in which outs are given away and it’s regarded as advantageous. For example, a pitcher, who is likely quite bad at hitting, is often called to sacrifice bunt, moving a runner over as opposed to the more likely outcome of merely recording an unproductive out by means of strikeout, pop up, ground ball, etc.

There are other so-called “productive outs,” like moving a runner from second to third with a ground ball to the right side or hitting a sacrifice fly, but those situations are more likely to be a happy accident than intentional — i.e. a player was attempting to record a productive hit, but made an out that happened to provide an ancillary benefit. Finally, there’s still another form another potential productive out, in which a base-runner gives himself up so that another runner has a a better chance to score. Let’s explore whether that move is productive or beneficial.

While you’ve likely seen this type of play before, let’s go through a brief example. Earlier this season, Jhonny Peralta stepped to the plate with one out and runners on first and third. Brandon Moss, the runner at third, doesn’t possess great speed and has produced a negative base-running figure over the course his career. Yadier Molina, the runner on first, is a Molina. Peralta hit a fly ball to shallow center field. Coco Crisp, the center fielder, doesn’t have a very strong arm, but given how shallow the play was and Moss’ lack of blazing speed at third base, there was a reasonable chance to throw Moss out at the plate if the latter ran. Moss did run, the throw was slightly off line, and it was cut off by Yonder Alonso, who threw to second base. Max Muncy then chased after Molina, who was running back towards first, caught up to him for the out, but not before Moss was safely at home.

The embedded video below shows the play in full.

So did Molina make the smart play by giving himself up? It’s difficult to know for certain. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the throw likely would not have gotten Moss at the plate, rendering Molina’s sacrifice unnecessary. However, that’s not information Molina had at the time he decided to run. If you listen to the clip above with sound, you can hear broadcaster Ricky Horton say, “I don’t know” as the play began to materialize, questioning aloud whether Moss should run. The play itself did not do much to increase the Cardinals’ chances of winning, moving them from 81.5% win expectancy to 83.3% in the game. Of course, those numbers come before and after the play, and the decision we are discussing occurred in the middle of the play after an out was made.

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If you’re a more or less normal, sensitive American male like myself, you were shocked and/or awed by the revelation — courtesy of R.J. Frigging Anderson’s article of last week in re Jay Bruce — that Baseball-Reference is currently in the business of keeping a stat called XBT%, or Extra Base Taken Percentage. What this stat tells all of us normal, sensitive American male-types is the — and I quote — “percentage of times the runner advanced more than one base on a single or more than two bases on a double, when possible.” In other words, the stat seeks to represent the frequency with which a player takes an extra base. Also, in other words: it’s awesome.

And not only that, but B-R also records Stolen Base Opportunities (SBOs) — i.e. “the plate appearances through which a runner was on first or second with the next base open.” I feel no shame in not having formerly realized this — I mean, I’m a pretty important guy with a lot on my figurative plate — but I give thanks and praise now for having discovered it when I did.

In any case, here’s why I bring up all this junk: if one were in the business of attempting to adjudge the aesthetic pleasure provided by certain players, then one would very likely be curious about the baserunning skills of those players. As I, Carson Cistulli, am such a “one,” then it follows logically that I would be interested in such a thing.

Though baserunning is, admittedly, a rather minor part of a player’s overall contribution, it’s also a contribution which is rather easy to isolate. In what follows, I’ve attempted to do just that.

So, what makes an interesting baserunner? Well, I’m sure we could have all sorts of fist fights about that (and might soon at the FanGraphs Live Event). In this case, however, I allowed my enthusiasm to guide me unapologetically.

Much like with pitcher NERD, I utilized z-scores (i.e. standard deviations from the mean) to arrive at baserunning NERD (rNERD). In this case, I used a sample of players who’ve recorded at least 100 plate appearances. For each player, I found the sum of three different z-scores: XBT%, SBO% (that is, stolen base attempts as a percentage of opportunities), and stolen base success rate (SB%).

From there, all I did was cap the lowest possible SB% z-score at -1.1 (to mirror the highest z-score) and then add a constant (in this case, 4.91) to put all the scores on a 0-10 scale.

Using this method, here are the Top 25 baserunners (from a sample of 350 qualified players):

I like this list, because there are very few surprises. I mean, Michael Bourn, B.J. Upton, Rajai Davis: we know those are fast guys. The pleasure from such an exercise, however, frequently comes from the players who surprise us. In this case, Kyle Blanks has to be that guy. Surprisingly, Blanks is among the league leaders in taking the extra base. Why that is exactly — maybe batting ahead of lefties, or something? — is unclear, but it makes for something to think about when Blanks makes his retun to the field in August sometime.

As for the 25 laggards, here they are:

I don’t know that there are too many surprises here. Mostly, it’s a list of first basemen and catchers, which is probably to be expected. The presence of Mitch Maier might be of some concern to Royal fans — although, truth be told, they have enough on their plates. Nick Swisher, like Maier, has been seen roaming centerfield more recently than not. He’s never been a speed demon, but it’s surprising to see him on this list.

If you’re interested in seeing the full spreadsheet of 350 baserunners, it’s available just by clicking here.

Other than Zack Greinke’s historic season, the 2009 Royals had little go right. Billy Butler was one non-Greinke bright spot. After a disappointing 2008, Butler raked in 2009, hitting .301/.362/.492 (.369 wOBA). He even became the everyday first baseman despite questions about his defense, beating out celebrated glove-man Mike Jacobs.

The Royals’ other “Savior,” Alex Gordon, has not quite (ahem) lived up to expectations. Hailed as “the next George Brett” upon being drafted in 2005, Gordon started at the hot corner on Opening Day 2007 and received a standing ovation. Things went downhill from there, as Gordon ended 2007 with a .317 wOBA. In 2008, he posted a merely decent .344 wOBA. Gordon got seriously injured to start 2009 , struggled upon returning, got demoted, and finally limped to a .321 wOBA (although 189 PA tells us next to nothing). The current attitude of many is understandable: Butler is The Man, and Gordon is a question mark at best.

Butler is clearly superior to Gordon as a hitter, and his minor league performances always indicated a higher offensive upside. But it is curious that so many smart people following the Royals have so readily hailed Butler’s 2009 as an awesome breakthrough while saying “meh” to Gordon’s decent 2008. Why is this curious? Because despite the glaring offensive disparity, we live in the Age of WAR. Let’s compare each player’s best season so far: Butler’s 2009 vs. Gordon’s 2008.

Butler’s 2009 value was excellent offensively at 21 runs above average. It was less impressive defensively. Despite looking better than expected, Butler posted a -6.7 UZR at first base (with a -12.6 overall positional adjustment). Butler’s overall WAR for 2009: an above-average 2.4.

Gordon’s 2008 value was more evenly distributed. +7.7 runs hitting, but only -3.0 UZR. However, the latter was accumulated while playing the much-more-valuable 3B. Altogether Gordon had a 2.6 WAR in 2008. It is obvious why many were down on Gordon’s 2008 relative to the Butler’s awesome 2009. Wait, what? Gordon was actually slightly more valuable in 2008 than Butler was in 2009?

Not really. After all, FanGraph WAR doesn’t currently include baserunning (other than SB/CS, which are included in wOBA/wRAA). Looking at the non-SB elements of baserunning using Baseball Prospectus’s EqBRR, as Erik did, we find that Butler was one of the worst baserunners in baseball in 2009 at about five runs below average, putting his WAR at about 1.9. In 2008, Gordon was about +3, which puts his WAR at about 2.9. So Gordon’s 2008 wasn’t “slightly” more valuable than Butler’s 2009, it was significantly more valuable. In fact, once baserunning is fully taken into account, Butler’s 1.9 WAR 2009 isn’t even quite as good as Gordon’s 2.1 WAR from his “disastrous” 2007.

My point is not about the relative value of Butler and Gordon going forward. Batting generally improves the most in the early 20s (whereas fielding and baserunning are relatively static), and Butler is two years younger than Gordon. There are legitimate questions about Gordon’s future given his performance and health. My intent is neither to run down Butler nor celebrate Gordon. One might respond that “Gordon’s value was primarily due to defense, position and baserunning!” But that is exactly the point — those things matter. Despite living in the Age of WAR, informed observers sometimes still focus on only one aspect of a player’s performance. And that can lead to a gap between a perception of one value disparity and the reality of the opposite.

Our expectation is that anyone who reads this site on a regular basis has been given a strong education in the ways of WAR. But there’s a missing facet that you should not forget when putting together a player’s total value of what he does on the diamond, and that is baserunning. Sky Kalkman has visited this subject a time or two, and since he’s ridden off into the sunset for the time being, and I’m recently riding back into the picture, I’ll just pick up where he left off and give you an update on 2009 non-stolen bases baserunning.

Baseball Prospectus has a remarkable metric measuring baserunning. Here at FanGraphs we already include stolen bases/caught stealing in a player’s wOBA, but any educated baseball fan knows that there is more to baserunning than just steals. There is the art of taking extra bases on ground balls, fly balls, hits while not getting caught doing it. God-given speed has its place, but it takes brains and instincts on knowing when to be the aggressor and when not to.

The numbers presented are EQBRR – EQSBR (total baserunning runs minus stolen base runs.)

First let’s take a look at the best baserunning teams of 2009.

Team        Runs
Rockies       14
Marlins       12
Cardinals     10
Angels         8
Athletics      8
Rays           8
Giants         7
Twins          6
Blue Jays      6
Diamdonbacks   3
Tigers         3
Dodgers        2
Astros         1
Mariners       1
Red Sox        0
Indians        0
Brewers        0
Padres         0
Reds          -1
Phillies      -1
Mets          -2
Nationals     -3
White Sox     -4
Cubs          -5
Yankees       -6
Rangers       -6
Royals        -7
Braves       -10
Pirates      -13
Orioles      -15

The Rockies, Marlins and Cardinals all helped themselves to the tune of a full win thanks to their heady base-running. That’s a feather in their caps. The Cardinals and Marlins do not steal a lot of bases, but they know when to be aggressive on the basepaths and wreak havoc on opposing teams. How the Cardinals can put up a full win of baserunning with Yadier Molina on their team is a feat within itself.

The Braves, Buccos and O’s on the other hand put together quite a comedy show on the basepaths.

The major take away here is that for the best and worst teams, the difference was just a +/- a win (roughly).

Next up, we’ll look at the individual leaders and laggards.