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Heath Bell and Carlos Pena were each claimed on waivers earlier this week, though it appears that neither player will be moving.

The Giants claimed Bell, most likely to bolster their bullpen given the injuries to Brian Wilson and Sergio Romo. The waiver claim could have also been submitted to block the Diamondbacks from acquiring Bell. The Yankees claimed Pena, even though Mark Teixeira plays virtually every inning at first base and Jorge Posada has performed well against righties this season with a .359 wOBA.

But given the Yankees place in the standings and the lack of need for the Red Sox, the claim on Pena probably wasn’t used as a blocking mechanism.

Both players should have been dealt back at the trade deadline, when teams could unilaterally work with one another. Both Bell and Pena might not represent massive improvements to anyone with only a month remaining in the season, but they could have impacted the playoff picture if traded in mid-July, when more teams were seemingly in the race. Let’s take a look at both situations.

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The San Francisco Giants have been in a a funk lately, turning a half-game lead in the division on August 9 to a three and a half game deficit in a mere seven days. Their pitching hasn’t been bad, but at some point the sheer lack of offense was bound to catch up with them. On Monday, Scott Miller of CBS Sports tweeted that no team had made the playoffs averaging fewer than four runs scored per game since the 1988 Dodgers.

At the time, the Giants were averaging 3.43 runs per contest. While they were looking up at the Diamondbacks in the standings and not technically in the playoffs, Miller’s point remained valid. If they climb back atop the division, the Giants could conceivably become one of the lowest scoring teams in history to make the playoffs if their offensive struggles persist. But would they be the lowest scoring team to make the playoffs?

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The San Francisco Giants have been quite active so far in the off-season. They made a very early splash when signing Jeremy Affeldt to pitch out of their bullpen and added some reinforcement today, inking Bobby Howry to a deal. Brian Sabean has also been reportedly pursuing Edgar Renteria, a deal that could come to fruition very soon. Additionally, Sabes has been linked to Jorge Cantu, he of the 29 home runs for the Marlins in 2008. With the potential for a very new-looking Giants offense in 2009, I decided to compare their starting lineup from 2008 to what it may look like for the season opener.

First, if any Giants fans out there read this and would like me to factor in partial seasons for some players who received playing time due to an injury to a starter, let me know. Also, if you have reason to believe that they will feature a different starting first baseman in 2009, I will make the correction. For the 2008 lineup, I took those with the most starts; therefore, certain players with a small sample of playing time were not included.

2008 Giants        RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina     +35.0   +3.50
Rich Aurilia       +3.0   +0.30
Emmanuel Burriss  +22.4   +2.24
Jose Castillo      +4.0   +0.40
Omar Vizquel      +23.2   +2.32
Fred Lewis        +25.3   +2.53
Aaron Rowand      +10.0   +1.00
Randy Winn        +38.5   +3.85
John Bowker        -4.4   -0.44

Put together, these ten players combined for +157 runs above replacement, or +15.7 wins. Now, how does this stack up with the potential lineup in 2009 if they ink Renteria and Cantu?

2009 Giants         RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina      +31.2   +3.12
John Bowker         +5.0   +0.50
Emmanuel Burriss   +15.5   +1.55
Jorge Cantu        +15.0   +1.50
Edgar Renteria     +23.5   +2.35
Fred Lewis         +21.8   +2.18
Aaron Rowand       +19.5   +1.95
Randy Winn         +31.0   +3.10
Pablo Sandoval (3B)+33.0   +3.30
Pablo Sandoval (1B)+16.0   +1.60

Now, the above projections are based upon Bengie Molina sustaining about a half-win above average defense and slightly improving his offense to league average for a catcher; on Aaron Rowand improving offensively; and on Renteria bouncing back on both offense and defense. These projected wins amount to 16.3 above replacement, a half-win greater than a year ago. Therefore, adding Renteria and Cantu, and giving a full year’s worth of playing time to Burriss and Bowker will add just a half-win above what they accomplished last year.

Pablo Sandoval needs to be added to the mix. His weighted projection calls for a .362 wOBA in 419 PA in 2009. Assuming he is -5 runs defensively, since we don’t know much about his defensive prowess other than it is about average or below average at 1B, we’re looking at +11 runs on offense, -5 on defense, we’ll say -10 as a positional adjustment since he could split between 1B/3B, and +20 for replacement. The total of +16 runs, or +1.6 wins. This would bring the potential 2009 Giants offense to 17.9 wins above replacement, close to three wins better than this past season.

However, if we substitute Cantu for Sandoval at 3B, and remove Bowker for Ishikawa/Phelps in a platoon, things look much better. Sandoval would improve to +3.3 wins, and the Phelps/Ishikawa platoon would be worth +1.2 wins. This would result in +18.8 wins above replacement for the 2009 Giants offense, higher than if they get Cantu, and go with Sandoval/Bowker at 1B. Therefore, it would seem like the best bet for SF would involve signing Renteria, going with the Ishikawa/Phelps platoon at first base, and letting Pablo be the everyday third baseman.

For the most part, the clutchiest plays of 2008 came in the form of walkoff home runs, and why not? These are usually the most dramatic plays, and WPA is appropriately defined by Dave Studeman as “the story stat.” Thus far, we have seen Jason Michaels, Josh Hamilton, Nate McLouth, and Nick Swisher go deep to compile the seventh through tenth biggest offensive plays of the year, but spot number six belongs to Eugenio Velez of the Giants. Velez, the rookie second baseman with plenty of speed, broke the home run mold in his huge play. The graph for the game, which took place on September 10, is below. Notice how you can barely even see his name register:

Actually, this graph makes the big spike appear like it belongs to Chris Young, not Velez, since Eugenio’s play is hidden in the upper portion. The game saw a matchup of Brad Hennessey and Dan Haren, which remained scoreless through two innings. In the third, Stephen Drew smacked a solo home run to give the Snakes a 1-0 lead. In the bottom portion of the same inning, Velez hit a two-run double to give his Giants the 2-1 lead. Foreshadowing?

The score would remain 2-1 until the ninth inning, when things really went haywire. The Diamondbacks began the frame with a 16.1% probability of winning the game. Brian Wilson, the Giants closer, entered the game and began by issuing a free pass to Chris Snyder. Alexander Romero came in to pinch-run, and Augie Ojeda sacrificed him into scoring position. Tony Clark followed with a walk, before Jeff Salazar relieved him on baserunning duties. Stephen Drew then flew out, meaning the Diamondbacks had runners on first and second with two outs. Their win probability was a mere 14% at this point.

Chris Young delivered a two-run triple, blowing the save for Wilson, and putting the Snakes ahead 3-2. Adam Dunn flew out to end the frame, but the damage was done. DBacks closer Brandon Lyon then entered, hoping to avoid the same fate as Wilson. The Giants had just a 19.8% shot of winning the game at this juncture. Following a Pablo Sandoval groundout, Bengie Molina singled. He, of course, was pinch-run for. Travis Ishikawa then grounded out, advancing the runner to second. Lyon walked Aaron Rowand to literally set up the exact same scenario that Wilson found himself in during the top half of the inning.

Velez stepped in and, after taking two strikes to go behind in the count 0-2, hit a two-run triple of his own, winning the game for the Giants in the process. With just a 17% probability of winning as his plate appearance began, the sixth biggest play of the season saw an expectancy swing of 83%, just barely ahead of the 82.9% in the seventh play. This was definitely a wild game, as not only did both closers blow saves in the ninth inning, they did so by giving up two-run triples!

Yesterday, we talked about the possibility that Albert Pujols is in the midst of his best season, but that his performance has gone largely unnoticed due to our general expectation that he will be, well, awesome. In the discussion thread, one of the topics mentioned involved how we, as fans, are desensitized to Pujols’ 1.100+ OPS primarily due to the absolutely ridiculous seasons of Barry Bonds from 2001-04. With that in mind, I’d like to remind those that have forgotten exactly what the much-maligned Bonds did in this four-year span.

First, just a general look at some of his numbers:

Year    GP     2B     HR     BB     K      BA/OBP/SLG      OPS
2001    153    32     73    177    93    .328/.515/.863   1.379
2002    143    31     46    198    47    .370/.582/.799   1.381
2003    130    22     45    148    58    .341/.529/.749   1.278
2004    147    27     45    232    41    .362/.609/.812   1.422

His slash line in this entire span was .349/.559/.809, which resulted in an OPS of 1.368, a good 300 points ahead of second-place Todd Helton. Each component of that slash line led the major leagues in this span as well. Bonds posted an OPS+ of 256 in these four years, way ahead of Albert Pujols’s 167.

We all know the walks are just mind-boggling, as are the intentional free passes, but Bonds did not strike out much in his actual qualifying at-bats either. It was literally frightening to face him from 2001-04 and teams counteracted this fright by just conceding an open base (or even letting him go to first when the base was occupied) and hoping to retire the subsequent batters.

His WPA/LI counts in these years: 13.04, 11.96, 8.92, 10.87. Yes, they led the league each year, by quite the large margin as well. The closest year came in 2003, when Albert Pujols still finished over 1.5 wins lesser than Bonds.

Looking at these years from an all-time perspective, his OPS numbers in each season ranks amongst the top eight of all time, with his 2004 season ranking first. The 2002 season ranks third, 2001 ranks fourth, and 2003 ranks eighth. Babe Ruth occupies spots #2, 5, and 6, with Ted Williams claiming seventh place. Now, you might be inclined to think that Ruth’s OPS+ would be much higher given that the offense “back in the day” wasn’t as good as it is now, but you would be wrong.

In actuality, Bonds’ OPS+ in 2002, 2004, and 2001 rank #1, 2, and 3 on the all-time list, with his 2003 season coming in at #9. In my estimation, this is hands down the greatest four-season stretch of offense in the history of the sport.

I’ll close by reiterating something RJ Anderson at Beyond the Box Score showed not too long ago. The WARP3 (Wins Above Replacement Player) of the average Hall of Fame hitter is 118.2. The WARP3 of Barry Bonds is 236.4. Barry Bonds makes the average Hall of Fame hitter look like a replacement player.

Nobody honestly expected the San Francisco Giants to compete for anything significant this year. Their prized offseason acquisition was Aaron Rowand, a guy coming off of a career year in a hitter’s park; they still owed Barry Zito mega-bucks; and the outlook beyond this year did not look too bright, either. They are a bad team, but what gets lost in the shuffle too often when discussing like-performing teams is that not all of the players are bad. The Giants, as a team, may struggle, but some of their individual parts are solid or all-star caliber.

One of these players, whom Giants fans seem to be sold on as a building block, is Fred Lewis. Now, no matter what this silly article at Baseball Evolution thinks, Fred is nowhere (and I mean nowhere!) near the level of Barry Bonds… but he still looks pretty good.

In 117 games this year he has put up a .285/.355/.454 slash line with 23 doubles, 10 triples, and 9 home runs. His speed and numbers remind me of Curtis Granderson, just without the home runs that would boost the three components of his slash line. Chances are, most fans have never heard of Lewis, and while he may not sustain his current performance—a .372 BABIP—his OPS is currently higher than both Ryan Howard and Mark Reynolds, two guys with stronger reputations.

With regards to his .372 BABIP, I’m not saying Lewis cannot sustain a high number, but .372 is borderline ridiculous. It has been speculated (but never tested… hmm… maybe I’ll check that soon) that speedier players can/will post higher BABIPs because they will beat out grounders when others would not. Perhaps Lewis falls into this category, but my money would be put in the regression department in that metric’s cubby.

He does strike out his fair share of time but he has not been in the big leagues for very long and patience seems to be one of those virtues that grows with experience. His 27.1% strikeout rate is in the same vicinity as Adam Dunn and Dan Uggla, for those curious. He is also right around the halfway point in walk percentage, amongst qualifying senior circuit members.

All told, he has a 1.01 WPA/LI, and has been playing solid defense. Via the + – system, Lewis is a +8 leftfielder, which is tied for second in the big leagues. Carl Crawford, at +20, is far and away the leader. For those interested, Johnny Damon, Matt Holliday, and Garret Anderson are also +8 in leftfield this year. Dave pointed out that the Giants may be shipping Randy Winn out of town after this season, as he is a very attractive commodity from the perspective of other teams, but Fred Lewis looks like a very decent chip with which to build.

Last year, Matt Cain posted one of the best 7-16 seasons of all time, clearly producing numbers above the level expected from a record like that. He would give up two or less runs and and lose or fail to record a decision more often than win, which speaks volumes to the offense “supporting” him. This year, he got off to a similar start, losing games in which he pitched poorly, but not winning the games he deserved to win. With a month and a half left he has already surpassed last year’s total with eight wins, but his record still is not indicative of what the rest of his numbers suggest.

He has a 3.57 ERA supported by a 3.48 FIP. Though he walks hitters to the tune of 3.62 per nine innings, he is pretty hard to hit, which is currently resulting in a 1.28 WHIP. On top of that, he rarely gives up home runs, as evidenced by his 5.7% HR/FB that is very similar to his numbers in this metric over his entire career. For the record, league average is around eleven percent.

This year, he has given up two earned runs or less in 13 starts, and gone just 6-1 in that span. Though better than his results in 2007, that means there are six no-decisions that could have or should have been wins. Though I ultimately don’t care about the W-L record, most of the country does, and Cain’s reputation is likely hurt outside of San Francisco or NL West teams because of this. He has seemingly perfected the art form of pitching well enough to win while losing or not getting any decision.

His 1.62 WPA/LI and 1.54 REW are solid for this year, but nowhere near the top of the leaderboards. He has been the perfect compliment to Tim Lincecum and a great number two pitcher. For those curious, his WPA/LI is one win lower than Lincecum and his REW is about two wins lower. Still, the tag team nicknamed “LinceCain” is one reason Giants fans should feel happy about something from this season.

Cain is a very good pitcher… not a league best righty by any means, but with some better run support, his reputation would be much stronger amongst baseball fans. He could conceivably receive, and deservedly so, a huge contract when it is free agency time despite a potential W-L record 20 games below .500.

Following my post last week about Carl Pavano‘s contract a lively discussion ensued in which it was argued that Barry Zito’s was much worse. The reasoning for this being that Pavano’s absence didn’t necessarily hurt the Yankees whereas Zito would actually be hurting the Giants with his poor pitching each start. Yes, it bordered on the absurd to offer him a 7-yr/126 million dollar deal following the 2006 season, but, in looking at his numbers I found that his 2006 seasonal line and current numbers in 2008 shared a similarity.

In 2006 he produced a 4.89 FIP; so far this year he is at 4.98. In 2006, however, his ERA ended up 3.83, a number much lower than the current 5.80. Essentially, both of these seasons resulted in very similar metrics of controllable skills yet one involved an ERA a full point lower and the other is featuring an ERA almost an entire point higher. What’s the difference?

For starters, he has allowed a ton of baserunners this year, posting a 1.80 WHIP following his poor performance last night. He always walked plenty of hitters but this year his walk rate is higher and his BABIP, which hasn’t ever been higher than .300 in his career, is currently .332. On top of that, his strand rate isf 65.2%, meaning that he is allowing baserunners at an insanely alarming clip and allowing them to score at a rate well below the average. In 2006, his strand rate was well above average at 78.5%.

In 2006 he walked 4.03 batters per nine innings while fanning 6.15 per nine. This year, the strikeout rate is similar, coming in at 5.88 K/9, but the BB/9 has risen to 5.63. Despite the vast increase in walks, his home run rate is down, which has allowed the FIPs in each of these seasons to be within .09 of one another. Using the in-season Marcel projector, Zito is expected to produce this over the remaining two months:

2008 Remainder Marcel: 12 GS, 60 IP, 64 H, 30 BB, 44 K, 1.57 WHIP, 4.55 FIP

Compare then his overall line with this projection to his 2006 season:

2008: 33 GS, 169.0 IP, 192 H, 98 BB, 115 K, 1.72 WHIP, 4.82 FIP
2006: 34 GS, 221.0 IP, 211 H, 99 BB, 151 K, 1.40 WHIP, 4.89 FIP

Dan Szymborski, creator of the ZiPS projection system, was kind enough to send me his in-season projector this weekend and so what happens when we plug Zito into that?

2008 Remainder ZiPS: 12 GS, 68 IP, 67 H, 34 BB, 49 K, 1.54 WHIP, 4.55 FIP

Substitute ZiPS for Marcel in the 2006 vs. 2008 comparison to get the following:

2008: 33 GS, 176.2 IP, 195 H, 102 BB, 120 K, 1.70 WHIP, 4.82 FIP
2006: 34 GS, 221.0 IP, 211 H, 99 BB, 151 K, 1.40 WHIP, 4.89 FIP

And, in comparing the two projections for Zito over the remainder we see virtually the same results: He is not as bad as his numbers thus far would suggest but he isn’t necessarily good either:

Marcel: 12 GS, 60 IP, 64 H, 30 BB, 44 K, 1.57 WHIP, 4.55 FIP
ZiPS: 12 GS, 68 IP, 67 H, 34 BB, 49 K, 1.52 WHIP, 4.55 FIP

It seems that Zito was not as good as some of his 2006 numbers would suggest nor is he as bad as some of his 2008 numbers suggest. He’s not a very effective pitcher anymore but he is a very expensive and handsomely paid one. If we didn’t know his name and just heard about a pitcher with his numbers coupled with an 84-85 mph fastball and a lack of control, I would tend to think we would all question how he is a major league pitcher. We may not be at that point completely yet with Zito, but that corner may be turned quite soon.

Anyone familiar with my work, be it here or elsewhere, can tell you that there is no pitcher I have covered more in my time as an analyst than Matt Cain. The Giants righty has been a favorite of mine since entering the big leagues in 2005 and I have always felt somewhat sorry for the guy. See, Cain generally pitches quite well though it fails to matter due to the poor quality of the Giants team he plays for. Quite simply, they do not score runs for the guy.

In his young career, Cain has a 3.87 ERA, 3.90 FIP, 1.26 WHIP, right around league average 72.0% LOB rate, K/BB above 2, opposing BA of .229, and BABIP of .276. Despite these very solid numbers his career record is a measly 26-35.

Last year, Cain allowed a maximum of two earned runs in 18 of his 32 starts, yet managed to go 5-7 with 6 no-decisions in those games. The bullpen blew five of his potential wins as well, giving him one of the, if not the, best 7-16 seasons in history. This year has been slightly better in that department: In 11 of 17 starts he has allowed a maximum of three earned runs and gone 4-1 in those games. Still, six no-decisions in games of that quality is a bit high.

In 2005, of all starting pitchers with at least 40 innings pitched, his 2.53 RS/9 (run support per nine innings) was the lowest in both the NL and MLB. In 2006 it evened out a bit, to the tune of 5.10 RS/9, right around the middle of the pack. Last year, his 3.51 RS/9 was again the worst in the NL and MLB. And this year, his 4.10 RS/9 ranks the 11th lowest in the NL. All told, over the last three calendary years, Cain has received 4.10 runs of support per nine innings pitched, the lowest of anyone.

Second place in that span? Why, Ian Snell of the Pirates… at 4.56 RS/9. Cain has received just about a half-run per nine innings less of support than his closest “competitor.” The average run support for pitchers qualifying for inclusion was 5.01, meaning Cain is supported almost a full run less per nine innings than the average starting pitcher in this span. And, with the Giants seemingly having no idea what they are doing from an offensive standpoint, there is very little to suggest something like this could drastically change. By the time Cain can hit the free agent market he could be a heavily coveted pitcher with a career W-L to date around 20-30 games under .500.

Aaron Rowand, by all accounts, had a career year last season with the Phillies. In 161 games he boasted a slash line of .309/.374/.515, complete with 27 HR, 89 RBI, and 45 doubles. Playing in the bandbox known as Citizens Bank Park caused many, myself included, to speculate his performance would drop off the radar when he signed a 5-yr/60 mil deal with the Giants. Going from a career year in a notorious hitter’s park to an equally notorious pitcher’s park would make intuitive bells ring with regards to a regression of sorts.

His numbers at home have not been anywhere near those on the road this year—.777 OPS vs. 1.084 OPS—but those road numbers have been stellar enough to result in an overall slash line of .328/.396/.527.

Rowand has seen his BB%, BABIP, and HR/FB increase each year from 2006 until now, but one number is going in the opposite direction, which is quite puzzling: His percentage of contact has steadily decreased. Not necessarily surprising, this has caused an increase in K%.

His overall statistics have improved from 2006 to today but he is putting his bat on the ball less often; 73.46% of the time as compared to 80.78% in 2006.

2006: 80.78% Contact, .297 BABIP
2007: 78.29% Contact, .348 BABIP
2008: 73.46% Contact, .389 BABIP

This could point towards Rowand fouling the ball off less often; perhaps instead of making noticeably less contact he is either swinging and missing or putting it into play much more often than the past. He might not sustain this level of performance all year long but it is definitely counterintuitive to say that a guy making less contact will increase his production… but I guess that’s why they* call him Aaron “Counterintuitive” Rowand.

*-nobody calls him that.