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Yesterday, lead prospect analyst Dan Farnsworth published his excellently in-depth prospect list for the Kansas City Royals. In this companion piece, I look at that same Kansas City farm system through the lens of my recently refined KATOH projection system. The Royals have the 20th-best farm system according to KATOH.

There’s way more to prospect evaluation than just the stats, so if you haven’t already, I highly recommend you read Dan’s piece in addition to this one. KATOH has no idea how hard a pitcher throws, how good a hitter’s bat speed is, or what a player’s makeup is like. So it’s liable to miss big on players whose tools don’t line up with their performances. However, when paired with more scouting-based analyses, KATOH’s objectivity can be useful in identifying talented players who might be overlooked by the industry consensus or highly-touted prospects who might be over-hyped.

Below, I’ve grouped prospects into three groups: those who are forecast for two or more wins through their first six major-league seasons, those who receive a projection between 1.0 and 2.0 WAR though their first six seasons, and then any residual players who received Future Value (FV) grades of 45 or higher from Dan. Note that I generated forecasts only for players who accrued at least 200 plate appearances or batters faced last season. Also note that the projections for players over a relatively small sample are less reliable, especially when those samples came in the low minors.

1. Cheslor Cuthbert, 3B (Profile)

KATOH Projection: 4.1 WAR
Dan’s Grade: 40+ FV

Cuthbert hit .277/.339/.429 as a 22-year-old in Triple-A last year, which earned him a late-season cameo with Kansas City. Cuthbert likely won’t be a star, but he makes a lot of contact, plays a semi-premium defensive position and is young enough that he still has time to improve. Statistically, he looks like a future everyday player, and those don’t grow on trees.

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In their most recent round of roster cuts, the Kansas City Royals optioned outfielder Terrance Gore to High-A Wilmington. Gore was one of seven players the Royals cut this week, and one of hundreds who have been cut from their respective teams this spring. However, Gore differs from most of these guys in that he was a player of some significance the last time meaningful baseball was played: In last year’s World Series. Gore became something of a household name last October, when he served as the Royals designated pinch-runner during their in their unlikely run to the World Series. The speedy 23-year-old appeared in six playoff games for the Royals — and stole three bases — without recording a single plate appearance or inning on defense.

Gore’s blazing speed made him an exciting player to watch last October, and as far as pinch-runners go, he’s about as good as they come. But unfortunately for Gore, pinch-runners can only provide so much value, even if they represent a very important run. Back in 2012, Sam Miller of Baseball Prospectus reasoned that Billy Hamilton would be worth just one-tenth of a win over one month of games while serving as a pinch-runner.

Of course, Hamilton has since turned into a nice little player, racking up a respectable 3.7 fWAR last season. However, Gore’s nowhere near the hitter that Hamilton is. By no means is Hamilton a good hitter, but he can hit at least a little bit — He put up a 79 wRC+ in 2014. Gore on the other hand, put up a 57 wRC+ … in A-ball.

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Bruce Chen recently told Tyler Kepner that, health permitting, he could see himself having a very lengthy career similar to Jamie Moyer’s. The man still loves everything about baseball and is fully aware of what defines his success.

Chen reasoned that, like Moyer, his success hinges on knowing how to pitch rather than velocity and pure stuff. Part of that knowledge calls for a hefty utilization of his offspeed pitches. Another part involves throwing his pitches from different arm angles at any given time, a lesson learned from Royals pitching coach Bob McClure. At 34 years old, Chen embodies the term ‘crafty lefty’ and embraces the classification. While Chen isn’t exactly putting the league on notice, he understands his limitations and has become quite the cost-effective starting pitcher.

While he’ll never achieve the potential many saw in his days as a prospect, Chen could certainly be a serviceable major league arm for years to come. But is he the next Jamie Moyer? Can he really keep batters off balance for another decade and a half?

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The Royals officially released Kyle Davies earlier this week following poor performances in parts of five seasons. Acquired from the Braves in exchange for half of Octavio Dotel’s 2007 season, Davies seemed like a solid return. He threw hard, complemented the heater with a decent yet underwhelming curve, and was not yet eligible for arbitration. In other words, he was exactly the type of project the Royals were looking for. While the trade itself was good for the team at the time, Davies has arguably been the worst regular starter in baseball over the last five seasons. His presence on the Royals roster this season, as well as his career numbers, invites discussion regarding tendering contracts, building rosters and large gaps between ERA and estimators.

Since debuting in 2005, Davies has thrown 768 innings with below average peripherals, poor controllable skill marks and abysmal run prevention rates. He has a career 6.4 K/9 and 4.3 BB/9, and a 39 percent groundball rate. He doesn’t miss many bats, exhibits poor control and struggles to keep the ball on the ground. The anti-Halladay, if you will. He stranded runners at a meager 67 percent clip, which hurt mightily given his 1.62 WHIP and .318 batting average on balls in play. Plenty got on and plenty came around to score, translating to a 5.59 ERA. Though his xFIP and SIERA were a bit kinder — they are identical at 4.91 — they didn’t exactly vouch for his performance.

Since 2007, the year he was traded to the Royals, there are 83 pitchers to throw 600+ innings. Davies has the sixth lowest WAR (5.6), the worst ERA (5.40), third worst SIERA (4.87), fifth highest BABIP (.313), second worst WHIP (1.58) and second worst strand rate (66.8 percent). No matter how one slices it, Davies has been the, or one of the, worst starting pitchers in baseball.  Read the rest of this entry »

Stop me if you’ve heard this one before: Jeff Francoeur is off to a great start and appears ready to reach his full potential.

It’s now May 9th, and Francoeur is hitting .302/.345/.581. He leads the league in total bases with 10 doubles, a triple and eight home runs. He adds value in the field and on the basepaths. His .279 ISO ranks fifth in the American League, and he ranks fifth from an overall production standpoint with 1.7 wins above replacement. His sharp uptick in productivity is surprising, especially since there is at least one real sign that the improvements might stick.

One of the most interesting aspects of his overall line is how he isn’t walking any more frequently than in years past. The improvement is entirely attributable to a power surge. His batting average on balls in play is by no means otherworldly at .310. His line drive rate is a fairly unimpressive 16%, and nearly 50% of his balls in play are on the ground. Add in that his strikeout rate is a touch higher than it was last year, and it becomes easy to wonder how he is displaying so much power.

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As has been written before, Royals outfielder David DeJesus is the sort of player who tends to fly under the radar because he does no one thing exceptionally well, but he does a number of things at an average or above-average level. He’s been about a 3 WAR player most of his career, and has accumulated almost that much value already in 2010. DeJesus probably isn’t an average center fielder any more, but runs saved in left or right field count, too. Despite having only average-ish power and being a terrible basestealer, DeJesus has a .344 career wOBA (.290/.361/.429). At 30, DeJesus is having a career year in 2010 offensively, with a .379 wOBA (.329/.397/.466). That probably is not his true talent level, but ZiPS’ rest-of-season projection is bullish nonetheless: .299/.369/.444 (.358 wOBA). One good test to see if a sports journalist has a clue is whether he or she says “David DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” By my calculations, those people think that a fourth outfielder is someone whose true talent level over a full season is (conservatively, based on current projections) about 3 WAR. Draw your own conclusions.

Given DeJesus’ subtle combination of skills, it is ironic that the poorly-constructed-but-“official” Elias Rankings might somehow catch on to his value. According to the latest “reverse engineered” Elias Rankings at MLB Trade Rumors, if free agency started today, DeJesus would be Type A, meaning that if the Royals were to offer him arbitration and he turned it down then signed with another team, the Royals would get the signing team’s first round pick in the 2011 draft as well as supplemental pick.

This is particularly interesting because DeJesus is one of the Royals’ best trading chips due both to his value on the field and his team-friendly contract: $4.6 million for all of 2010 with a $6 milllion club option for 2011 (with a $500,000 buyout). Assuming DeJesus is only owed about two million dollars over the rest of the season and (using the conservative 3 WAR full season estimate) is projected to be worth about 1.5 wins at four million dollars per win, that’s four million dollars of surplus value this season. Assuming the team is smart and picks up the option, a half-win decline to 2.5 WAR for 2011 and inflation to about $4.5 million per win, that’s another five million dollars of surplus. Nine million dollars surplus could fetch something like good (if non-elite) prospect and perhaps some filler, and again, that’s based on a conservative estimate of DeJesus’ value.

But if DeJesus ends up a Type A free agent, that potentially adds an interesting wrinkle. In a Kansas City Star article from last month discussing DeJesus, several possible courses of action are mentioned, including trading DeJesus, picking up the 2011 option and keeping him, picking up the 2011 option and trading him in the offseason, and declining the option and then offering him arbitration in hopes he would turn it down and sign with another team, thus netting the Royals draft compensation. This last possibility is what interests me here.

It is an intriging suggestion, but ultimately, it is something the Royals should not do for two reasons. First of all, Victor Wang’s research on Type A compensation (summarized here) values average Type A compensation at about six million dollars. Assuming the Royals could make a fair trade (there is little point in analyzing possible screw-jobs) now at the conservatively-projected above surplus of nine million, the draft pick compensation wouldn’t hold up. Indeed, it is not clear that the draft pick compensation would even be more valuable than picking up DeJesus’ option and trading him in the offseason.

The second reason the arbitration-offer route is a bad idea is that DeJesus would be very likely to accept it. DeJesus is a good player that could help a lot of teams, but he isn’t a top-level talent like Matt Holliday was or Carl Crawford will be. He’s more like Orlando Hudson — a good player, but not good enough that teams are willing to overlook the draft pick they would have to give up to sign him. In each of the last two offseasons, Hudson ended up signing deals below his market value because teams were conscious of giving up the draft pick. DeJesus and his agent have no doubt noticed this, and realize they are likely to get a larger award in arbitration than free agency. If the Royals offer arbitration and DeJesus accepts, they not only don’t get the draft picks, but they would end up paying more in the arbitration award than they would have if they had picked up the option. Moreover, this would further reduce the surplus value (and thus potential return) DeJesus would have on the 2011 trade market.

DeJesus’ Type A status may bring send images of draft picks floating through the heads of Royals fans and officials. But given the likely outcome of that decision combined with the team’s current state, Kansas City should be looking to trade DeJesus now, as his value will never be higher.

Gods of Baseball, why must you test me so?

Earlier tonight, before my wife and I went out for supper, I read reports that the Royals had signed Jason Kendall for four million dollars over two years. I shuddered and began thinking about how to explain this silliness to even the most obstinate Dayton Moore-defender. Halfway through the meal I made the foolish (in more ways than one) mistake of looking at my BlackBerry. Kendall had, in fact, signed with the Royals for two years and six million dollars, a contract that, like Ivan Rodriguez’s deal with the Nationals, is appropriate for about a 1 WAR player. I then realized that anyone would understand why this contract is ridiculous.

Let’s get the basics out of the way: The Royals aren’t going to be getting any “interest” from Kendall’s excellent 1999-2004, or decent 2005-2006. They’re getting the 2010/11 model. CHONE projects Kendall to hit a .247/.317/.315 in Kansas City, or 25 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is roughly the same: .240/.313/.316; -26/150.

The Royals aren’t just paying for Kendall’s “bat,” but for his allegedly tremendous defense. CHONE’s TotalZone system apparently didn’t get the memo, projecting Kendall at -2/150. Other sources are the the same ballpark: I had Kendall at -4.5 runs in 2009. Translating the 2009 Fans’ Scouting Report to runs, I got about -3.

Even with the positional adjustment for catchers, Kendall projects as a 0.5 WAR player per 150 games, and few catchers play 150 games. The Royals managed to acquire a guy who is barely better than a AAA journeyman, will be 36 in 2010, will likely be replacement level or below in 2011 if he isn’t already, and are paying him six million dollars over two years. This would be a bad contract no matter what the team’s situation.

For the Royals, it’s even worse. For one thing, the Royals are at the opposite end of the “value of a marginal win spectrum” from, say, the Rays. If Dayton Moore and Jack Zduriencik switched places today, the Royals probably wouldn’t be ready to contend until at least 2012. Why blow money on a rich man’s replacement player now?

Moreover, the Royals have better internal options. Yes, Kendall will achieve what few could in making Royals fans miss the magic of Miguel Olivo’s strike-zone judgment and pitch-blocking skills. He’s gone, but there’s also a personal (and admittedly irrational) favorite of mine: the soon-to-be-non-tendered John Buck, who (aside from many fans never forgiving him for being part of the Carlos Beltran “haul”) has defensive problems of his own. Since Dayton Moore came to town, he has played Michael Scott to Buck’s Toby Flenderson. While it wouldn’t be worth it for the Royals to pay Buck’s likely arbitration award, as Rany Jazayerli suggests, they at least could have seen if they could non-tender Buck then re-sign him for less than Kendall, as Buck looks to be a 1-1.5 WAR player according to CHONE (if teams are smart, he will get a fair bit of attention once he’s non-tendered).

Buck is likely a dead issue at this point, but the Royals also have Brayan Pena, who was acquired off waivers in 2008 in one of Dayton Moore’s smarter moves (insert joke here). CHONE projects his bat at league average and his glove at -5 — a 2.7 WAR catcher. That is probably optimistic; but if Pena is a -5 hitter and a -10 defender, that’s still about a 1.5 WAR player — much better than Kendall. Even if Pena is a -10 hitter and -15 defender… you guessed it, that’s about the same as Jason Kendall projects for 2010, minus about $2.5 million in salary. Maybe the Royals will “get smart” and sit Kendall for Pena, but a rebuilding team that puts itself into the situation of paying a backup catcher three million dollars a year doesn’t bring the word “smart” to mind.

Buck and Pena aren’t the primary issue here. They are examples that emphasize both the overpayment and pointlessness of the Kendall acquisition, particularly on a team that will be lucky to win 75 games in 2010. It is tempting to turn this into a rant about Dayton Moore, but frankly, this probably won’t be my last chance to do so this off-season. Instead, let’s have some words from the man of the hour himself, Jason Kendall:

“There were other offers,” [Kendall] said, “but one thing about Dayton and the Royals is, they called me the first day I became a free agent. That’s something that kind of speaks for itself.”

Indeed.

Thanks in large part to a very entertaining season so far, choosing which game to highlight each week proves to be quite difficult. Once again, the slate of games on the docket this past week was comprised of some absolute gems, some thrillers, and another position player finding his way onto the mound. Though a few others could give our winner a run for its money, the top game last week saw the Angels and Royals square off on Saturday in the best pitching duel this season.

The Angels bested the Royals, 1-0, behind a strong Joe Saunders outing, beating up on Zack Greinke in the process. Seriously… his ERA entered at 0.40 and left at an uglier 0.51.

While complete games are rare these days, both Saunders and Greinke went the distance in this instant classic. Greinke has now completed four of his seven starts, not necessarily reminiscent of Warren Spahn or Robin Roberts, but still pretty incredible in the present context. Greinke has also been the deserving recipient of an ample supply of attention this season for his absolutely dominant efforts. After “losing” on Saturday, Greinke’s statline looks like this: 7 GS (4 CG/2 SHO), 53.0 IP, 34 H, 0 HR, 8 BB, 59 K, 0.51 ERA, 1.46 FIP.

His counterpart on Saturday has also been doing well albeit with much less attention. Last season, Saunders broke out with a solid campaign; however, he also became the consensus pick for the pitcher with a good 2008 season that will regress pretty significantly the next year. After all, sub-5.0 strikeout rates are generally not that appealing unless the pitcher induces groundballs with the greatest of ease and posts Maddux-esque walk rates. Saunders issued around 2.4 walks per nine last season but he did record grounders on 47% of his balls in play. His +2.8 wins pegged him as a good, but not-as-great-as-a-3.41-ERA-in-31-starts-suggests pitcher.

Following his shutout on Saturday, Saunders has a 2.66 ERA and 4.23 FIP in 47.1 innings of work. His strikeout rate remains unworthy of boasting, but the BB/9 has dropped a bit. At right around +1 win this season, Saunders is once again looking good. Despite a large disconnect in his ERA and FIP, perhaps portending that teams are going to figure him out sooner of later, the Royals looked hopeless on Saturday, much like other teams look when facing Greinke.

The lone run of the game occurred in the bottom of the third on some small ball courtesy of the Scioscia-bunch. Gary Matthews Jr led the inning off with a double. Erick Aybar sacrificed him over to third. Chone Figgins hit a sac fly to rightfield. No other runs would cross the plate though not for a lack of trying as several of the runners who did manage to reach base in this game found themselves in scoring position.

In the top of the fifth, Saunders walked Billy Butler and allowed a single to Alberto Callaspo to start the frame. Runners on first and second, nobody out, and Saunders escaped unharmed thanks to three straight outs at the expenses of Willie Bloomquist, Miguel Olivo and Mike Aviles.

In the bottom of the sixth, Aybar doubled and moved to third two batters later when Maicer Izturis grounded out. The power-sapped Bobby Abreu couldn’t drive him home, though, ending the inning with the 1-0 score in tact.

Erick Aybar made an errant throw on a Bloomquist-grounder to start the top of the eighth, allowing Willie to reach base. Miguel Olivo then singled, moving Bloomquist up to second. Aviles sacrificed both runners into scoring position, leaving Saunders with one out and runners at second and third. Coco Crisp then grounded into a fielder’s choice, with Olivo being retired at third base and Bloomquist moving up to take over that same spot. Now with runners on the corners and two outs, a 4.38 Leverage Index, Saunders got David DeJesus to groundout to third.

The remaining two half-innings went by quickly, with each pitcher retiring the three batters they faced. Four of those struck out and Billy Butler flied out to center to end the game. Two complete games, nine total hits, one total walk, and nine strikeouts. Best duel of the season so far and last week’s top game.

I’ll be honest, folks, I haven’t been able to get enough of MLB TV. I love the instructional demonstrations the analysts provide, and when nothing but Rock of Love Bus or whatever barely heard of National Lampoon’s movie on Comedy Central is playing, nothing beats some good ‘ole fashioned baseball television. Unfortunately, something has bothered me quite a bit recently: the cast and crew seemingly have it in their heads that the Kansas City Royals are vastly improved and have a shot at competing for the division next season.

The analysts have been praising Dayton Moore’s offseason moves, stating that Mike Jacobs and his 32 HR, Kyle Farnsworth and his blazing fastball, and Coco Crisp will all help turn the team around. Jacobs was replacement level last season after steadily declining in value since 2005. Farnsworth is not a bullpen savior and no explanation on my part should be needed to back that up. And Crisp, while he may be a nice player, is not going to turn any team around. This is before even discussing the additions of Horacio Ramirez and Willie Bloomquist.

The show ‘Hot Stove’ even had a discussion last night pertaining to whether or not the 2009 Royals can be the 2008 Rays. Seriously? Their reasoning dealt with both being small market teams with plenty of young talent. I can unequivocally say that the 2009 Royals will not be the 2008 Rays. The 2008 Rays were a well-oiled machine with incredible defense, great starting pitching, and a solid, interchangeable bullpen. The 2009 Royals have little in their bullpen outside of Joakim Soria, are going to be dependent on another solid season from Gil Meche and a breakout campaign from Zack Greinke to make even their 1-2 pitchers effective, and despite a solid defensive output last season, are well behind the Rays in that category.

The interviewer talking to Dayton Moore and Trey Hillman asked both if they watched the Rays, another small market team, and thought, “why not us?” Both said yes, but the major difference is that the Rays farm system was constructed in much better fashion. And, their GM, in a short amount of time, has shown a knack for acquiring the right veterans and role players. Dayton Moore has not.

Royals fans, I am not writing this to bash your team or drown your hopes. It just really bugs me when analysts who get paid a heck of a lot more than I do, who simultaneously receive a ton of national recognition, mistake acquiring new players with acquiring good players. Dayton Moore has been very active this offseason but he realistically has not done anything to seriously improve his team.

Colleague Matthew Carruth said it best: The 2009 Royals may actually be the Rays… the 1998-2007 Rays.

Following the 2006 season, Gil Meche inked a 5-yr/55 million dollar contract with the Kansas City Royals. The deal underwent immediate scrutiny due to Meche’s below average performance throughout the previous few seasons. His ERA ranged from 4.48 to 5.09, with an FIP entrenched in the 4.60-4.70 area. Simply put, an average annual value of 11 million dollars did not seem appropriate for someone with his credentials. Perhaps Dayton Moore, who apparently goes by the nickname DMGM, knew what he was doing, because Meche has established himself as a solid and consistent pitcher over the past two seasons.

2007: 34 GS, 216.0 IP, 6.50 K/9, 2.58 BB/9, 2.52 K/BB, 4.02 FIP
2008: 34 GS, 210.1 IP, 7.83 K/9, 3.12 BB/9, 2.51 K/BB, 3.61 FIP

His walk rate rose a bit this past season, but his WHIP remained in the same general vicinity as 2007, and his FIP improved by almost a half-run, all the while repeating his durability. So, the 55-million dollar question then becomes is he worth the 11 mil per season? As in, if Meche were a free agent right now, what would an appropriate contract look like? To figure out the answer, we turn to the ever familiar dollar valuation formula that Dave and I have used here recently.

For starters, we need to see what Meche is projected to do in 2009. Bill James and Marcel disagree, both in innings logged and FIP, with James calling for more innings and Marcel projecting a lower FIP. Averaging the projections, Meche in 2009 would pitch 199 innings with a 4.18 FIP. His value would be how this compares to a replacement level pitcher. For a starting pitcher, replacement level FIP is set at 5.50. Unfortunately, a replacement level starter would not be left out there for 200 innings. Instead, he would amass somewhere around 150 innings. The remaining 49 innings would be logged by a reliever. For bullpen hurlers, replacement FIP is 4.50.

Replacement SP:    150 IP  5.50 FIP  92 runs
Replacement RP:     49 IP  4.50 FIP  25 runs
Replacement Total: 199 IP            117 runs

Meche, with a 4.18 FIP in 199 innings, would be responsible for 92 runs. Conveniently enough, this cancels out with the 92 runs surrendered by the replacement starter, meaning Meche’s value above replacement level is +25 runs. Converted to wins, Meche would be worth 2.5 wins. Then, factor in that Meche is taking innings away from the bullpen, and I’m comfortable adding another quarter-win, bringing the total to 2.75 wins.

Last year, the average dollar figure per win was around 4.5-4.75 million dollars. With inflation, I’ll call this year’s amount a firm 5 million per win. 2.75 wins multiplied by 5 million dollars per win amounts to 13.8 million dollars. That is, if Meche were a free agent right now and signed a 1-yr deal, 13.8 million dollars would be an appropriate fee. For multi-year deals, we usually factor in a 10% discount rate, since players tend to sacrifice a bit of their monetary value for some security. With that in mind, a 3-yr deal for Meche would come out to 37.3 million dollars. A 5-yr deal would be valued at 62.1 million dollars.

Meche may not have seemed worth the money back in 2006, but as of right now, his average annual value would be somewhere around 12.4 million dollars, above the 11 mil in his actual contract.